



**TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies
2023-2025
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**Longitudinal cross-country database on voter turnout
in European countries (1990-2023)**

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Purpose and scope of the deliverable:

The objective of D2.1 Longitudinal cross-country database on voter turnout in European countries (1990-2023) is to provide an aggregate level dataset on voter turnout. In the broader context of the Horizon TRUEDEM research project, this database on voter turnout, mainly developed by the UNISA-IT team, is part of a series of databases that our research network has committed to providing to the public. It is the first result of a comprehensive research effort aimed at analyzing patterns and trends of the electoral behavior in the European countries and their role in addressing new challenges for inclusiveness and representativity in democratic systems in Europe. It includes political, electoral, social, demographic and economic data from the 27 European Union member countries, plus data from other European states (Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom) and refers to country-level parliamentary elections (European Parliament and lower house of the national parliament, first round).

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Introduction

Project summary

TRUEDEM is a 3-year multinational research project funded by the Horizon program of the European Commission with several core objectives. TRUEDEM aims to design and implement a complex research effort to collect comprehensive evidence on the perceptions of trust and judgments of trustworthiness in a range of European states. The project will create a robust and comprehensive knowledge base on long-term dynamics and predictors of trust in political institutions of representative democracy (parties, executives, parliaments, judiciary etc.) in the EU. TRUEDEM will examine the role of new patterns of electoral behaviour, impact of socioeconomic transformations, the erosion of old and emergence of new political cleavages for the inclusiveness, representativity and legitimacy in European democracies, and political trust. TRUEDEM will identify strategies to address the demands and needs of citizens expressed via both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation as means to enhance active engagement and inclusion and thus booster inclusive and responsive decision-making and governance in Europe. TRUEDEM will distinguish clusters of values that can hinder or foster pro-democratic values and attitudes and thus contribute to the barriers and opportunities to re-invigorating and enhancing representative democratic systems. Finally, TRUEDEM will develop a comprehensive and transparent toolbox of policy interventions including recommendations, toolkits and methodologies for enhancing trust in political institutions, boosting transparency inclusiveness of representative systems. TRUEDEM is coordinated in Austria with partners in Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The three-year program runs from January 2023 to December 2025.

Annotation of the Deliverable (D2.1)

This document is a part of work package 2 Voting and electoral behaviour: new challenges for inclusiveness and representativity in democratic systems, led by UNISA-IT (WP Leader Domenico Maddaloni). The aim of this WP is to explore the significant changes in the electoral behaviour of citizens witnessed in the last decades, including the steadily declining turnout in most countries, the growing electoral volatility as shown by the European research and statistical data, an increase in radicalization of voter attitudes and greater polarization. More specifically, electoral results will be analysed with the aim of identifying patterns of electoral behaviour that imply the relationship with European institutions as such. Moreover, we will study the evolution of voting participation rates, with the aim to assess the reliability of the different turnout rates and to develop an index that can briefly describe the evolution of turnout. This WP will define a volatility index that could be less exposed to methodological risks and contextual dynamics.

Deliverable D2.1 aims to produce a longitudinal cross-country database on voter turnout in Europe which will be constantly updated through the project course.

1 Database on voter turnout

In the broader context of the TRUEDEM research project, this database on voter turnout, developed by the UNISA-IT team, is a part of a series of databases that our project has committed to provide to the public to be used by the communities of scholars and researchers, students, media, civil society and political organizations, citizens interested in scientific research on these issues among the other. More specifically, the database on voter turnout in Europe is the first result of a comprehensive research effort aimed at analysing patterns and trends of the electoral behaviour in the European countries and their role in addressing new challenges for inclusiveness and representativity in democratic systems in Europe. The database includes data from the 27 European Union member countries, in addition it also features data from non-EU member states: Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The database presents data at the country-level parliamentary elections (European Parliament and lower house of the National Parliament, first round). In addition to presenting data on electoral participation and vote distribution among political parties, the database includes a number of variables of great relevance to research on the relationship between voter turnout, political trust and democracy in Europe. At the next stages of the project, the database on voter turnout will be merged with the datasets on political trust, identities and polarization, and participation through social media, to be produced within TRUEDEM work packages, 1, 5, and 6.

The reasons for this segment of our research effort are twofold. First, we intended to implement a secondary data review and data harmonization effort so as to improve data integrity and ensure efficiency in data management. We have worked with other research teams and followed the suggestions of our Principal Investigators so as to assure a high level of standardization and homogeneity of the election databases available. For each variable, we compared several data sources and chose what appeared to be the most reliable one in the judgment of our research team. This work, we believe, has resulted in a high-quality dataset which not only includes data from 1990 to the present, but will also be updated until the end of the project (December 2025). Second, we decided to create a database on voter turnout in order to organize information on this subject in a consistent manner, while also reducing possible data redundancy. This presupposed the preliminary definition of a theoretical model aimed at identifying the dimensions at play in aggregate-level sociological research on voter turnout (Geys, 2006; Smets, van Ham, 2013; Stockemer, 2017).

2 Voter turnout and heuristic model

In the literature, turnout is an indicator of electoral participation and is operationally defined in two ways: (1) as the percentage of registered voters; (2) the percentage of the voting age population. However, semantically these measures refer to different aspect of participation, depending on the individual choices and election regulation. Both may underestimate or overestimate electoral participation depending on contextual factors. The first one overestimates turnout by not including those who although being eligible to vote decide not to register. The second one may overestimate turnout in case of a high number of nationals living abroad. This is the reason why we decided to consider both in our database.

In this perspective, it is worth noting that the literature on voter turnout has associated voter behaviour with a wide range of factors and dimensions. A non-exhaustive list of possible determinants of voter turnout identified by the existing literature includes:

Institutional factors: institutional variables such as the legal characteristics of elections (compulsory voting in particular), and the type of electoral system have featured most strongly in turnout models (see for instance Norris, 2004; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Stockemer, 2017). Compulsory voting with sanctions shows an uncontroversial boosting effect on turnout (Stockemer, 2017) whereas the theoretical argument that PR should foster turnout is not always empirically supported (Collier and Vicente 2012; Stokes et al. 2013). Although important, other institutional factors such as the voting arrangements and requirements, the registration laws, the voting age, the concurrent elections occur in a minority of studies with mixed results. Some other studies introduce also corruption and trust in the turnout function (see for instance Kostadinova, 2009; Birch, 2010; Norris, 2017; Gutiérrez-Romero & LeBas, 2020; Stockemer et al 2013).

Political factors: variables pertaining to political competition such as the number of parties that win seats also features frequently in turnout models although with an unclear relationship (see for instance Huddy et al., 2018; Leininger & Meijers, 2020).

Socio-economic factors: following modernization theories (Inglehart, 1997), the existing literature suggests that economic development may have major effects on the political involvement of citizens although this influence on voter turnout appears to be moderate in previous studies (see for instance Norris, 2004; Susánszky et al., 2022; Steiner 2010; Diwar 2008; Indridason 2008).

Socio-demographic factors: voter turnout is supposed to be higher in relatively small political environments which make community relation closer and more direct and empirical research seems to confirm this stipulation (see for instance Tavits (2005); Elff, 2007; Bernauer & Bochsler, 2011; Koch et al., 2023; Kostandinova and Power 2007). Other socio-economic variables such as population density or urbanization do not show clear relationships.

Despite the increasing methodological sophistication of turnout studies, there is still no established core model of electoral turnout and as the meta-analysis of aggregate-level research demonstrate different factors have alternatively been considered predictors for macro-level turnout (Geys, 2006; Cancela, Geys 2016; Smets, van Ham, 2013; Stockemer, 2017). These factors have been rarely examined all together, but studies have alternatively tested the influence of just one or few factors.

Thus, we aim to provide a comprehensive model to assess turnout in Europe. This analysis prompted us to develop a heuristic model that seeks to systematically define the relationships between electoral turnout (dependent variable), on the one hand, and a complex set of dimensions among which different aspects of trust play an important role. We consider both explanatory factors find to be robust in the established literature and other potentially important factors which have attracted increasing attention in more recent works.

The heuristic model includes 10 dimensions (see Figure 1 below). Three of them can be located at a macro level since they refer to socio-economic factors:

- inequalities defined both in terms of income disparities and opportunity access;
- development defined both in terms of income, education and welfare;
- demography confined not only to the size of population but extended also to the presence of some groups such as the young, the elderly and the migrants.

Five of them can be located at a meso-level being related to political-institutional environment:

- electoral system: this includes legal aspects such as compulsory voting and type of electoral system but also voting arrangements, regulations and criteria for registration;

- electoral integrity: additional set of indicators characterizing electoral system as a whole in the opinion of experts included through selected indicators of electoral integrity perceptions.
- democratic profiles: in terms of respect of the liberal, electoral, participatory, egalitarian, and deliberative principles of democracy
- corruption: it refers to manipulations of election in terms of intimidation, vote-buying, violence and other irregularities;
- media pluralism: it refers to the media system, its capability of expressing different opinions, level of digitalization, and media censorship and bias;
- political fragmentation: it refers to the level of competition in terms of effective number of parties.

Two of them can be located at the micro level being related to civic engagement and including both trust and individual political culture. Indicators on political and institutional trust will be collected within work package 1 of TRUEDEM and merged with the present database.

The distinction between macro, meso- and micro-level factors is also linked to the data collection. Macro data preserve country as unit of analysis, meso- data are election-related information and micro data are individual survey-based data.

As for the relationship between voter turnout and trust, it has been investigated by a wide range of studies. To name only a few, Bjørnskov (2009) found a positive correlation between social trust and voter turnout. Trusting voters were more likely to hold politicians accountable through voting, indicating that trust can influence voter behaviour. Crepez et al (2016) found that electoral turnout was significantly and positively related to the level of trust in political institutions. This suggests that trust in political institutions can motivate individuals to participate in the electoral process. A worldwide comparative analysis developed by Norris (2022) shows that the popular belief in the steady decline of trust is not supported by empirical evidence. Trust trends are instead marked by their complexity and contextual nature, which makes it necessary to take multiple factors into account when evaluating trust levels across different societies and their relationship with democracy, political participation, and voter turnout.

In our model, trust is supposed to be an intermediary factor associated both with societal development and government performance. Although we are aware that interpersonal trust is not necessarily a direct antecedent of political trust since it can stimulate unconventional or non-institutionalized political participation and used against the state (Rose, Mishler, Haerpfer 1997; Kaase 1999; Cox 2003), we follow the Putnam argument which connects social trust to political trust (Putnam, 1993).

Therefore, the database allows to explore the **context-dependency of turnout**. Political and institutional determinants of turnout might be more complex than the institutional theory suggests so the dataset may allow to discover if institutions are still the most important predictors of turnout and under which socioeconomic contexts do institutional factors affect turnout.

Moreover, it allows to explore the **election-dependency of turnout**: turnout determinants may depend on the type of election. By including both national and EU elections, the database may allow to explore the variation in voter turnout and factors affecting it in national Parliament and European Parliament elections and to explain why some countries experience a greater difference in voting at the two levels than other countries.

Last but not least, this database may help to explore the **measurement-dependency of turnout**. Each dimension is operationally defined by a set of indicators including both variables found to be significant predictors of voter turnout (which appear to be indispensable in any analysis of turnout) and new variables we think can be predictors but have been rarely considered into previous studies or did not provide any clear relationship. This because also the measurements of concepts may matter. Just to make some examples, there is no consensus in the literature on how to operationalize development. GDP per capita is the most used indicator but we think that also education and literacy rate and the type of welfare have a role in the level of development of a country. A high per capita income does not necessarily imply higher educational levels, and this makes the relationships complex. The same for inequalities that is commonly measured with the Gini index but if we are interested in the connection between the distribution of income and the distribution of power maybe the poverty rate is a more appropriate measure to detect those who do not have the means to become politically engaged and so become disenfranchised. By looking at several operationalization of the same concept, the dataset may also help to discover the influence on turnout that might be dependent on the operationalization of some concepts.


As can be seen, the model includes different dimensions of civic engagement, including trust. It should also be noted that, at this stage of the research process, the relationships between these dimensions and their constituent variables cannot yet be corroborated by empirical research. For example, it is possible that institutional trust may not play a role as an intervening variable between dimensions such as corruption, electoral convenience or media pluralism, but can instead be regarded as a first-order causal variable (Putnam, 1993), with respect to which the dimensions mentioned above would play the role of second-order variables. On the other side, interpersonal trust may stimulate unconventional or non-institutionalized political participation and, in some context, may be negatively related to turnout. Specifically, interpersonal trust involvement in informal social networks and participation in nontraditional and unconventional activities could itself be an expression of interpersonal trust on the one hand and distrust of political institutions on the other (Kaase, 1999).

We selected the indicators to be included in the database according to the theoretical model presented above (figure 1). In the following pages we will present the database codebook, highlighting both the nature of the variables and the sources we have drawn on.

3 Structure of the database

The database comprises secondary data on elections, turnout and contextual indicators as described above. The database consists of several sections, including: (1) country information and codes (8 indicators); (2) democracy status (7 indicators); (3) electoral system (21 indicators); (4) corruption (7 indicators); (5) media pluralism (3 indicators); (6) country development (4 indicators); (7) inequalities (5 indicators); (8) demography (6 indicators); (9) political fragmentation (2 cross-country indicators and number of votes and seats per each party in every country in elections in 1990-2023, resulting in 7500 variables); (10) perceptions of electoral integrity (13 indicators); (11) voting turnout (10 indicators).

Figure 1. Heuristic model



Source: TRUEDEM elaboration

4 Codebook

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
1. COUNTRY INFORMATION				
ID	Election ID	Unique identifier of elections comprised from alpha-2 country code (XX), year of election (YYYY), election type (PAR/EUR), number of elections in case several per year (Z)	XXYYYYEUR XXYYYYPAR1	TRUEDEM
COUNTRY_ISO	Country ISO Numeric	Numeric country codes by ISO 3166-1	Numeric country codes	International Organization for Standardization: www.iso.org
COUNTRY_ISO_ALPHA2	Country ISO Alpha-2	Country codes by ISO 3166-1 alpha-2	Alpha-2 country codes	International Organization for Standardization: www.iso.org
COUNTRY_COW	Country COW numeric	Numeric country codes by the Correlates of War Project	Numeric country codes	Correlates of War Project: https://correlatesofwar.org/
COUNTRY_COW_ALPHA3	Country COW Alpha-3	Alpha country codes by the Correlates of War Project	Alpha-3 country codes	Correlates of War Project: https://correlatesofwar.org/
EUG	Accession group	Group by EU accession	0: Not an EU member 1: Founding members 2: Joined prior to 2000 3: Joined after 2000	European Union Portal https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/history-eu_en
REG	Region	Region of Europe	1: Northern Europe 2: Western Europe 3: Eastern Europe 4: Southern Europe	United National Geoscheme for Europe [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/]
V01_01	Accession Year	The year that the Member State acceded to the EU	Year (YYYY)	EUMS database https://www.eulaw.app/databases/eums
V01_02	Election type	The type of election, at the national level, for which the voter turnout and other relevant statistics are provided	1: Parliamentary (Lower chamber) 2: EU Parliament	National official statistics (National statistical agencies, Government); European Parliament; Varieties of



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
				Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V01_03	Year and month	The year in which the election took place; month is indicated in case of multiple parliamentary election per year	YYYY.00 YYYY.05	National official statistics (National statistical agencies, Government); European Parliament; Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V01_01a	Year	Year of election	YYYY	National official statistics (National statistical agencies, Government); European Parliament; Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
2. DEMOCRACY STATUS				
V02_01	Liberal democracy index (v2x_libdem)	The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V02_02	Electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy)	The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy —liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V02_03	Participatory democracy index (v2x_partipdem)	The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations,	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.		
V02_04	Deliberative democracy index (v2x_delibdem)	The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V02_05	Egalitarian democracy index (v2x_egaldem)	The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; 3 groups and individuals enjoy equal access to power. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.		
V02_06	Political Rights Rating	Freedom House Political Rights Rating based on three political rights questions: (a1) Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? (a2) Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? (a3) Are the electoral laws and framework fair?	Scale from 1=free to 7=not free	Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org)
V02_07	Age of democracy	Consecutive years of democracy (citizens having the right to participate in free, fair, and multi-party elections)	Number of years	Our World in Data (https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/age-of-democracy-bmr) based on Boix et al. (2013)
3. ELECTORAL SYSTEM				
V03_01	Type of electoral system	Electoral system adopted in each election	1: Proportional System 2: List Proportional Representation 3: Two-Round System 4: First Past The Post 5: Mixed Member Proportional System 6: Parallel Systems	International IDEA electoral system design (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/electoral-system-design)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
			7: Mixed parallel 8: Block Vote 9: Party Block Vote 10: Alternative Vote 11: Single Transferable Vote 12: Single Non-Transferable Vote 13: Limited Vote 14: Borda Count	
V03_02	Family of electoral system	Type of election procedures	1: Majoritarian 2: Proportional 3: Mixed	International IDEA (https://www.idea.int/)
V03_03	Compulsory voting (v2elcomvot)	Compulsory nature of the electoral participation	0: No. 1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced. 2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter. 3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V03_04A	Special voting arrangements: In-country postal voting	Measures that allow voters to submit their ballot by physical post to the election administration.	0: Absence 1: Presence	International IDEA, 2022 (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/special-voting-arrangements)
V03_04B	Special voting arrangements: Early voting	In-person opportunities for submitting one's vote at a polling station before election day.	0: Absence 1: Presence	International IDEA, 2022 (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/special-voting-arrangements)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V03_04C	Special voting arrangements: Mobile ballot box	The case when members of the election administration visit a voter either at home or at an institution with a mobile ballot box to facilitate their vote away from their assigned polling station.	0: Absence 1: Presence	International IDEA, 2022 (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/special-voting-arrangements)
V03_04D	Special voting arrangements: Proxy voting	Cases in which an authorized individual casts or transmits a ballot on behalf of the voter.	0: Absence 1: Presence	International IDEA, 2022 (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/special-voting-arrangements)
V03_04E	Special voting arrangements: Electronic voting	Implementation of electronic solutions for voting.	0: Absence 1: Presence	International IDEA, 2022 (https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/icts-elections)
V03_04T	Special voting arrangements: Index	Aggregated index based on the presence or absence of each one of the voting arrangements.	Interval, from low to high (0-5)	TRUEDEM (2023-2025)
V03_05	Criteria of inclusion in the electoral lists	Procedures for registering voters on the electoral roll.	1: At the voter's request 2: Automatically 3: Both	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament
V03_06	Voting age	Age of eligibility to participate in elections.	Number of years	Country-specific sources
V03_07	Residents abroad: criteria of inclusion in the European elections electoral list	Procedures for registering voters on the electoral roll.	0: Non-EU election 1: At the voter's request 2: At the voter's request if resident at least 1 3: At the voter's request if resident at least 2 years 4: Automatically	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament
V03_08	Electoral constituencies	The number of electoral constituencies in the country.	Number	National Statistical Offices
V03_09	Seats	Total number of seats in the national parliament of the country.	Number	National Statistical Offices



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V03_10	Barrier threshold	Value of the threshold allowing the party to access the distribution of seats in the lower Parliament chamber.	0: No threshold 101: 16,66% first round, 1,8% second and third round 102: 5% political parties; 10% for list with two parties 103: 5%,7%,9%,11% 104: 5%,10%,15%,20% 105: 5%,8%,11% 106: 3% political parties; 10% coalition 107: 5% political parties; 7% coalition 108: 5% political parties; 8% coalition 109: 5% (in the case of coalition candidates, 5% was required for each political party of the coalition, e.g. for a coalition of three parties the threshold was 15%) 110: 5% (for a single party); 7% (for a coalition of two or three parties); 10% (for a coalition of four or more parties) 111: 3 seats 112: 50% plus one more vote	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; International IDEA; International Foundation for Electoral Systems: IFES
V03_11	Preference voting	Possibility of expressing a preference vote (if the electoral system is a proportional one).	0: Not detectable 1: Yes, just one 2: Yes, more than one 3: No	National official statistics European Parliament

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V03_12	Lower chamber election cumulative (v2ellocumul)	How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections including the current election have been held since 1900? This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.	Number	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V03_13	Election free and fair (v2elfrfair)	Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? Responses: 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to	Converted interval scale	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Scale: Ordinal, converted by V-Dem to interval by the measurement model.		
V03_14	Clean elections index (v2xel_frfair)	To what extent are elections free and fair? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), non-state electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair).	Interval, from low to high (0-1)	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V03_15	EMB autonomy (v2elembaut)	Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? Responses: 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body. 1:	Converted interval scale	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		<p>Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body. 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election. 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules. Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.</p>		
V03_16	EMB capacity (v2elemcap)	<p>Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? Responses: 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory. 1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country. 2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of</p>	Converted interval scale	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB. 3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread. 4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election. Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.		
4. CORRUPTION				
V04_01	Election vote buying (v2elvotbuy)	In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies.	0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates. 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties. 2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded. 3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
			<p>personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.</p> <p>4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.</p>	
V04_02	Election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg)	In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes. This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).	<p>1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.</p> <p>2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavoured particular groups.</p> <p>3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavour particular groups' access to participation.</p> <p>4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.</p>	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V04_03	Election government	In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation,	0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
	intimidation (v2elintim)	violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).	<p>or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.</p> <p>1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.</p> <p>2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated — harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.</p> <p>3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.</p> <p>4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.</p>	
V04_04	Election other electoral violence (v2elpeace)	In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct	0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?	<p>swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.</p> <p>1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.</p> <p>2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.</p> <p>3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.</p> <p>4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.</p>	
V04_05	Political corruption index (v2x_corr)	How pervasive is political corruption? The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. The measures tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both ‘petty’ and ‘grand’; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation.		
V04_06	Executive corruption index (v2x_execorr)	How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V04_07	Public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr)	To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
4. MEDIA PLURALISM				
V05_01	Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information Index (v2x_freexp_altinf)	To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V05_02	Government censorship effort – Media (v2mecenefm)	Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? Responses: 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine. 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine. 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues. 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues. 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished. Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.	Converted interval scale	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)
V05_03	Media bias (v2mebias)	Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? Responses: 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover. 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage. 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate. 3: The print and broadcast	Converted interval scale	Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem 2022; www.v-dem.net)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates. 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness. Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.		
6. DEVELOPMENT				
V06_01	GDP	Main GDP aggregates per capita: Gross domestic product at market prices	Current prices, EUR per capita	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/NAMA_10_PC/default/table?lang=en)
V06_02	Education	Share of the population (25-64 years) with the upper secondary, post-secondary non-tertiary and tertiary (ISCED 3-8) educational attainment	%	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/EDAT_LFSE_03_custom_7447008/default/table?lang=en)
V06_03	Public social spending	Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. Benefits may be targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons. To be considered "social", programmes have to involve either redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation. Social benefits are classified as public when general	Total expenditure, Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Annual	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/SPR_EXP_SUM_custom_7449345/default/table?lang=en)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		government (that is central, state, and local governments, including social security funds) controls the relevant financial flows. All social benefits not provided by general government are considered private. Private transfers between households are not considered as "social" and not included here. Net total social expenditure includes both public and private expenditure. It also accounts for the effect of the tax system by direct and indirect taxation and by tax breaks for social purposes. This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP or USD per capita.		
V06_03_1	Expenditure in Social Protection	Sickness / health care, disability, old age, survivors, family / children, unemployment, housing, and social exclusion expenditure	Percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), Annual, Total expenditure	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/SPR_EXP_SUM_custom_7449589/default/table)
7. INEQUALITIES				
V07_01	Gini coefficient	The Gini coefficient is based on the comparison of cumulative proportions of the population against cumulative proportions of income they receive, and it ranges between 0 in the case of perfect equality and 1 in the case of perfect inequality	Interval, from 0 = complete equality to 1 = complete inequality	OECD (https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm#indicator-chart)
V07_01_1	Gini Coefficient (WID/ WB)	Gini coefficient as calculated by the World Inequality Database	Interval, from 0 = complete equality to 1 = complete inequality	World Inequality Database (https://wid.world/data/) World Bank (https://databank.worldbank.org/s)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
				ource/gender-statistics/Series/SI.POV.GINI#)
V07_02	Unemployment	Unemployment rate	Percentage of labour force	OECD (https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm)
V07_03	Poverty	Proportion of population living below national poverty line	%	World Bank – Global Poverty Working Group for SDGs (https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal/database)
V07_04	Poverty rate	The poverty rate is the ratio of the number of people (in a given age group) whose income falls below the poverty line; taken as half the median household income of the total population.	Ratio	OECD (https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm#indicator-chart)
8. DEMOGRAPHY				
V08_01	Population size	The number of people living in a given country in the year in which the election took place.	Number of people	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/TPS00001/default/table?lang=en)
V08_02	Population concentration	Population density (number of persons per square kilometre in the country)	Number of people	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/product/view/DEMO_R_D3DENS)
V08_03	Youthful population	Share of young people (age 15-29) in the total population	%	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/YTH_DEMO_020_custom_7281795/default/table)
V08_04	Elderly population	Share of old people (age 65 and over) in the total population	%	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data-browser/view/DEMO_PJANIND_



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
				_custom_7277346/default/table?lang=en)
V08_05	Foreign population	Number of non-nationals residing in the country	Number	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/browser/product/page/TPS00178)
V08_05_1	Foreign population share	Share of non-nationals in the resident population [Eurostat]	%	Eurostat (https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/browser/product/page/TPS00178)
V08_05_2	Foreign population share	Share of non-nationals in the resident population [OECD]	%	OECD International Migration Database (https://data.oecd.org/migration/foreign-population.htm)
9. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION				
V09_01	Electoral fragmentation index	Effective number of electoral parties (Laakso, Taagepera 1979). Electoral fragmentation index: 1 divided the Sum of the squared percentage of votes of all parties in an election: $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{n=1}^i p_i^2}$ where pi is the fractional share of votes of the i-th party.	Number	TRUEDEM
V09_02	Parliamentary fragmentation	Effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso, Taagepera 1979) Parliamentary fragmentation index: 1 divided the Sum of the squared	Number	TRUEDEM



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		<p>percentage of seats obtained by all parties in an election</p> $N = \frac{1}{\sum_{n=1}^i s_i^2}$ <p>where s_i is the fractional share of seats of the i-th party.</p>		
V09_03_AT_001 - V09_03_AT_044	AUSTRIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_BE_001 – V09_03_BE_229	BELGIUM. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_BG_001 - V09_03_BG_299	BULGARIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_CY_001 - V09_03_CY_061	CYPRUS. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_CZ_001 - V09_03_CZ_133	CZECHIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_CH_001 - V09_03_CH_024	SWITZERLAN D. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_DE_001 - V09_03_DE_106	GERMANY. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_DK_001 - V09_03_DK_019	DENMARK. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_EE_001 - V09_03_EE_084	ESTONIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_EL_001 - V09_03_EL_101	GREECE. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_ES_001 - V09_03_ES_511	SPAIN. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_FI_001 - V09_03_FI_054	FINLAND. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_FR_001 - V09_03_FR_143	FRANCE. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_HR_001 - V09_03_HR_260	CROATIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_HU_001 - V09_03_HU_131	HUNGARY. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_IE_001 - V09_03_IE_039	IRELAND. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_IT_001 - V09_03_IT_261	ITALY. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_LT_001 - V09_03_LT_070	LITHUANIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_LU_001 - V09_03_LU_020	LUXEMBOUR G. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_LV_001 - V09_03_LV_119	LATVIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_MT_001 - V09_03_MT_017	MALTA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_NL_001 - V09_03_NL_110	NETHERLAN DS. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_NO_001 - V09_03_NO_071	NORWAY. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_PL_001 - V09_03_PL_144	POLAND. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_PT_001 - V09_03_PT_052	PORTUGAL. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_RO_001 - V09_03_RO_374	ROMANIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_SE_001 - V09_03_SE_172	SWEDEN. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_03_SI_001 - V09_03_SI_118	SLOVENIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_SK_001 - V09_03_SK_120	SLOVAKIA. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_UA_001 - V09_03_UA_152	UKRAINE. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_03_UK_001 - V09_03_UK_005	UNITED KINGDOM. Votes: XXX	Number of votes received by each political party in the country in the election	Number of votes	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_AT_001 - V09_04_AT_044	AUSTRIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_BE_001 - V09_04_BE_239	BELGIUM. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_BG_001 - V09_04_BG_299	BULGARIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_CY_001 - V09_04_CY_059	CYPRUS. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_CZ_001 - V09_04_CZ_132	CZECHIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_CH_001 - V09_04_CH_024	SWITZERLAN D. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_DE_001 - V09_04_DE_110	GERMANY. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_DK_001 - V09_04_DK_019	DENMARK. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_EE_001 - V09_04_EE_085	ESTONIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_EL_001 - V09_04_EL_098	GREECE. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_ES_001 - V09_04_ES_438	SPAIN. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_FI_001 - V09_04_FI_054	FINLAND. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_FR_001 - V09_04_FR_048	FRANCE. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_HR_001 - V09_04_HR_242	CROATIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_HU_001 - V09_04_HU_128	HUNGARY. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_IE_001 - V09_04_IE_038	IRELAND. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_IT_001 - V09_04_IT_272	ITALY. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_LT_001 - V09_04_LT_080	LITHUANIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_LU_001 - V09_04_LU_017	LUXEMBOUR G. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_LV_001 - V09_04_LV_121	LATVIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_MT_001 - V09_04_MT_017	MALTA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_NL_001 - V09_04_NL_111	NETHERLANDS. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_NO_001 - V09_04_NO_071	NORWAY. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_PL_001 - V09_04_PL_148	POLAND. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_PT_001 - V09_04_PT_052	PORTUGAL. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_RO_001 - V09_04_RO_366	ROMANIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_SE_001 - V09_04_SE_164	SWEDEN. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_SI_001 - V09_04_SI_140	SLOVENIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V09_04_SK_001 - V09_04_SK_120	SLOVAKIA. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_UA_001 - V09_04_UA_153	UKRAINE. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
V09_04_UK_001 - V09_04_UK_005	UNITED KINGDOM. Seats: XXX	The number of seats obtained by each political party in the country in the election	Number of seats	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; Parties and Elections in Europe Database (http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/); European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)
10. PERCEPTIONS OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY				
V10_01	Electoral authorities index imputed (EMBSi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the four previous variables (impartial, info, scrutiny, performance), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V10_02	Results index, imputed (resultsi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the four previous variables (challenged2, protestpeace2, protestviolent2, disputes), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_03	Vote count index, imputed (counti)	This is an additive scale created by summing the five previous variables (secure, delay, faircount, intlmonitors2, domesticmonitors2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_04	Voting process index, imputed (votingi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the eight previous variables (violence2, fraudulent2, easy, choice, postal, disabled, expats, internet) , with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_05	Campaign finance index, imputed (financei)	This is an additive scale created by summing the five previous variables (subsidies, donations, accounts, rich2, resources2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)



Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
V10_06	Media coverage index, imputed (mediai)	This is an additive scale created by summing the five previous variables (newspapers, tv2, fairaccess, faircoverage, socialmedia) , with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_07	Party and candidate registration index, imputed (partyregi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the five previous variables (opprevent2, womenopp, minorityopp, leadersselect2, rallies2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_08	Voter registration index, imputed (voteregi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the three previous variables (reglisted2, reginaccurate2, ineligible2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_09	Voting district boundaries index, imputed (boundariesi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the three previous variables (bdiscrim2, bfavored2, bimpartial), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_10	Electoral procedures index,	This is an additive scale created by summing the four previous variables	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0)

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
	imputed (proceduresi)	(managed, votinginfo, fairofficials, legalelections), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.		(https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_11	Electoral laws index, imputed (lawsi)	This is an additive scale created by summing the three previous variables (lawsunfair2, favoredincumbent2, citizens2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0–100-point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_12	Descriptive type of electoral integrity (PEItype)	Descriptive type of electoral integrity (Very Low to Very High). Classification of the PEI Index in five categories.	1. Very Low (less than 40) 2. Low (40-49) 3. Moderate (50-59) 4. High (60-69) 5. Very High (70 or more)	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
V10_13	Electoral authorities index, imputed (PEIIndexi)	The PEI index is designed to provide an overall summary evaluation of expert perceptions that an election meets international standards and global norms. It is generated at the individual level. Unlike the individual index (PEIIndex), PEIIndexi is imputed and thus fully observed for all experts and states.	Standardized scale 0-100	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, (PEI-9.0) (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/2MFQ9K)
11. TURNOUT				
V11_01	Voting age population	The total number of potential voters of voting age in each country.	Number	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament
V11_02	Enrolled voters	The number of people who were registered to vote in an election as	Number	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament

Code	Variable name	Description	Values	Source
		reported by the national Electoral Management Body.		
V11_03	Total voters	The actual number of people who voted in an election as reported by the national Electoral Management Body, including invalid and blank votes.	Number	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament
V11_04	Invalid votes	The number of invalid votes (including blank votes).	Number	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; International IDEA; International Foundation for Electoral Systems: IFES
V11_05	Valid votes	The sum of the votes attributed to parties or candidates in the electoral competition.	Number	National Statistical Offices; European Parliament; International IDEA; International Foundation for Electoral Systems: IFES
V11_06	Voter Turnout	The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the number of people registered	%	TRUEDEM
V11_07	VAP turnout	The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the voting age population (VAP)	%	TRUEDEM
V11_08	Abstention rate total	The total number of votes not cast (non-participants and invalid votes) out of the total number of registered voters.	%	TRUEDEM
V11_09	Abstention rate VAP	The total number of votes not cast (non-participants and invalid votes) out of the voting age population.	%	TRUEDEM
V11_10	Seats per capita	Number of seats per 1 million inhabitants in each country.	Number	TRUEDEM

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