TRUEDEM
Trust in European Democracies

TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies
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INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EUROPE: DIMENSIONS, LEVELS AND DYNAMICS FROM A LATENT CLASS PERSPECTIVE

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Authors:	Lennart Brunkert, Bi Puranen, Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Christian Welzel

Purpose and scope of the deliverable:
The purpose of this deliverable is to analyse institutional trust across selected European countries, identifying trust patterns within different institutional domains through Latent Class Analysis. This report segments populations into distinct trust classes and explores the socio-economic, political, and cultural factors influencing these trust profiles. It aims to provide insights for policymakers and stakeholders to strengthen public confidence in institutions and support democratic stability across Europe.

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Introduction

Project summary

TRUEDEM is a 3-year multinational research project funded by the Horizon program of the European Commission with several core objectives. TRUEDEM aims to design and implement a complex research effort to collect comprehensive evidence on the perceptions of trust and judgments of trustworthiness in a range of European states. The project will create a robust and comprehensive knowledge base on long-term dynamics and predictors of trust in political institutions of representative democracy (parties, executives, parliaments, judiciary etc.) in the EU. TRUEDEM will examine the role of new patterns of electoral behaviour, impact of socioeconomic transformations, the erosion of old and emergence of new political cleavages for the inclusiveness, representativity and legitimacy in European democracies, and political trust. TRUEDEM will identify strategies to address the demands and needs of citizens expressed via both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation as means to enhance active engagement and inclusion and thus booster inclusive and responsive decision-making and governance in Europe. TRUEDEM will distinguish clusters of values that can hinder or foster pro-democratic values and attitudes and thus contribute to the barriers and opportunities to re-invigorating and enhancing representative democratic systems. Finally, TRUEDEM will develop a comprehensive and transparent toolbox of policy interventions including recommendations, toolkits and methodologies for enhancing trust in political institutions, boosting transparency inclusiveness of representative systems. TRUEDEM is coordinated in Austria with partners in Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The three-year program runs from January 2023 to December 2025.

Annotation of the Deliverable (D4.2)

This report investigates institutional trust among European citizens, utilizing a Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to reveal patterns of trust across eight European nations. Examining trust in various institutional domains—such as government, judiciary, and law enforcement—the study identifies four primary "trust classes": Low Trust, Political Trust, Law and Order Trust, and High Trust. Each class represents distinct trust profiles, shaped by socio-economic, political, and cultural factors. The findings highlight significant regional variations, with Scandinavian countries displaying the highest levels of institutional trust. In contrast, Southern and Eastern European nations reveal higher prevalence of Law and Order trust, often accompanied by skepticism toward electoral institutions. Through multilevel modelling, the report explores factors influencing trust class membership, including education, income, generalized trust, and political attitudes. The study emphasizes the nuanced relationship between institutional trust and democratic legitimacy, shedding light on trends that may influence populist voting behaviour and citizen engagement with democratic institutions. These insights offer implications for policy, suggesting that addressing socio-economic inequalities and fostering inclusive governance may bolster trust in political institutions across Europe.

Introduction

Since quite a while, scholars diagnose decreasing trust levels among European societies in both the social and institutional dimension of trust (Eurofound, 2022; Jansen, 2023; OECD, 2024). The latter is the focal point of this study. That is, the analysis of European citizens' trust patterns towards their respective national institutions. Different strands of research see a decline in institutional trust as a manifest threat to democracy, visible in the electoral rise of rightwing populism (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Fieschi & Heywood, 2004). A smaller revisionist school of analysts, by contrast, interprets lower levels and declines in institutional trust as the sign of a growing skepticism ("critical citizens") and as the indication of a generational "shift from 'allegiant' to 'assertive' citizens" whose longer exposure to education feeds an emancipatory spirit that turns people into a "elite-challenging" mode of thinking of a more and more educated populace (i.e. Dalton, 2005; Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Norris, 1999, 2011).

Against this backdrop, our study examines pairs of two countries from each of the EU's four geo-historic regions: the Western Core, the Mediterranean South, the Scandinavian North and the Post-communist East. We demonstrate (a) what different kinds of institutional trust (in terms of levels of institutional domains) exist in a Latent Class perspective, (b) which country-level and individual-level characteristics explain citizens' class membership and (c) how the size of these trust "classes" changed over time. Our analyses employ Latent Class Analysis based on the institutional confidence items of the World Value Survey and European Values Study (Haerpfer et al., 2021). To provide even more scientific value, we then apply multilevel modelling to the class probabilities and explain individuals' likelihood to be sorted in a specific class. This approach allows us to look at different types of "trusters", their socio-economic characteristics and their value profiles. It allows for an analysis of micro- and macro-level factors identified by cultural and institutionalist theories of trust that moves beyond the focus on country-mean values. Our aim is to double-check claims of decreasing trust in institutions and provide a more nuanced scientific analysis of trust classes among eight major European societies. In our models, we consider both – cultural (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam et al., 1994) and institutional theories of trust (Coleman, 1990; Dasgupta, 1988; Hetherington, 1998).

We proceed, first, by elaborating on the idea of institutional trust in theoretical terms. In the second step, we address the methodological challenges that inform our study design. Third, we present the results of our analysis, starting with a descriptive analysis of the different trust patterns, followed by inferential statistics that explain individuals' class-membership and the implications of these memberships in terms of political behaviour. In the final section we contextualize our findings within the debate about populist parties' attraction, rounded up by several suggestions for political intervention.

What do we know?

Scholars depict trust as the glue and lubricant of human societies and their systemic functioning, including effective governance (Bianco, 1994; Braithwaite & Levi, 1998; Gamson, 1968; Hetherington, 1998; Marien & Hooghe, 2011; Mishler & Rose, 2005). Scholars distinguish trust in the *horizontal* dimension (i.e., trust between people: in-group trust, out-group trust, generalized trust) and in the *vertical* dimension (i.e., trust in institutions, like government, parties, police, courts, church etc.) as the domain of trust that is supposedly most indicative of societies' systemic functioning. Indeed, without trust in its institutions a society lacks the loyalty and commitment among its citizens that the authorities need to rely on civic abidance to their rules, policies and

measures[1] (Tyler, 1997, 2006). More specifically, a minimum degree of confidence that institutional "elites" act in citizens' best interest is essential for a well-functioning state to avoid mass-scale defection, subversion and open resistance. Without trust, many human interactions would follow a calculating game theory logic instead of some sense of moral obligation (Uslaner, 2002). This trust – in institutions, just as in individuals – can be learned and unlearned (Mishler & Rose, 2001). Institutional trust indicates regime legitimacy (for semantic distinctions see Gerschewski, 2018) and relates to Easton's distinction between *specific* and *diffuse* system support (Easton, 1965; Hetherington, 1998; Mishler & Rose, 2005). Concretely, the trust expressed in each *single* institution reflects *specific* systemic support, while the *overall* trust in the *sum* of a society's institutions measures *diffuse* (i.e., generalized) systemic support (Przeworski, 2023). This may also imply that short-term gains and losses of trust in institutions are possible and endogenous to the political system. In contrast to more responsive *specific* versions of trust, cultural theories of trust posit that there are culturally defined cross-national differences in nations' baseline-levels to trust one another (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam et al., 1994). This literature is closely related to debates on social capital, value-change and individualism-collectivism with societal tightness-vs-looseness (i.e. Gelfand et al., 2008) and family extension as central concepts. For example: so called amoral familism (Banfield, 1958) limits the circle of trust (Fukuyama, 1995) to only the closest blood relatives, while individualistic societies extend their out-group trust to many more individuals within the same cultural sphere (on the trust-radius in individualist-vs-collectivist cultures see van Hoorn, 2015). Even within a confined regional space – such as the European Union – we can see the different cultural influences at work. Some of this inner-European variation in out-group trust can be explained by historically present (mostly 19th century) cross-generational co-habitation and inner-familial power-imbalances which translated over to the state-society relationship (Kravtsova et al., 2024). Besides inter-individual trust, the interrelation between trust in peers and fellow citizens and trust in institutions is an ongoing subject of debate with conflicting scientific evidence. Some authors see interpersonal trust as (a) closely related to trust in institutions (Angino et al., 2022; Schiffman et al., 2010), (b) as weakly (to negligibly) related to trust institutions (Kaase, 1999) or (c) as being enhanced by trust in institutions via feelings of security (Nannestad et al., 2014; Spadaro et al., 2020). Bridging this divide, Dinesen (2013) finds that both – culture of origin and recipient countries' institutional performance – influence immigrants' systemic trust in institutions. This finding lends credibility to both culturalist and institutionalist approaches. Herein, culturalists generally see systemic trust as culturally embedded and, thus, exogenous to political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 2001). However, assuming complete exogeneity of cultural influences on generalized and institutional trust seems implausible, as institutions have recursive effects on political culture and proving exogeneity would require solving a chicken and egg problem. Culture and institutions co-evolve and share common origins in geo-climatic conditions, external threats and religious doctrines (Schulz et al., 2019; Welzel et al., 2021).

While some analyses suggest that democracy creates a culture of (civic and systemic) trust (Sztompka, 1998), others see high trust levels in autocracies as a counterfactual, showing that also autocrats can *command* systemic trust (Jiang & Zhang, 2021; Przeworski, 2023). In both scenarios, unexplainably high trust in institutions may turn into blind followership which has no democratic benefit (Welzel, 2007). Indeed, benefit-delivering autocracies may be highly trusted by their population if trust in institutions is a calculated evaluation of *specific* output performance

[1] (on the radius of trust see e.g. Delhey et al., 2011; Fukuyama, 1995; Reeskens, 2013; van Hoorn, 2015).

(Przeworski, 2023). Depending on the criteria that individuals use to assess autocratic regimes' performance, certain autocratic claims may fall on fertile ground (similar to the mechanism identified in Brunkert, 2022). Accordingly, we would expect "critical" and "assertive" citizens (Dalton & Welzel, 2014; Dawson & Krakoff, 2024; Norris, 1999) to maintain a certain level of skepticism towards their national institutions' performance, reflecting more demanding evaluation standards fed by education and emancipative values.

Perspectives on the EU

Since this report focuses on an EU sample, the perspective of authoritarian trust is negligible here. Instead, we focus on trust in institutions in democratic settings. One of the presumed main drivers of the widely suggested decline in European citizens' institutional trust is the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Unemployment and economic downturn following this crisis supposedly decreased levels of institutional trust throughout Europe (Foster & Frieden, 2017; Jansen, 2023), though it is difficult to identify whether the actual weakening of economic performance indicators or the main actors' handling of the crisis drives the changing trust levels. Indeed, populations suffering from harsher consequences of the financial crisis show the most marked decrease of trust in institutions (Kroknes et al., 2015). Logically, this decline in systemic trust is more pronounced in the economically weaker segments of each society (Van Erkel & Van Der Meer, 2016). Quite naturally, the lower-class trust decline is most pronounced in Southern Europe's debtor countries with soaring youth unemployment (Foster & Frieden, 2017)[2]. Higher levels of economic inequality result in lower levels of trust in institutions following the financial crisis. However, having higher before-crisis (individual) levels of trust benefit a faster recuperation post-crisis. This leads to a growing gap between more well-off individuals who quickly recovered their pre-crisis trust levels and those at the lower tiers of society who were harshly punished by the fiscal crisis and who remain much more cautious.

Several case studies confirm the performance-confidence link. In the early 2000s, political instability and decreasing economic performance led to a short decrease of systemic trust in the Netherlands (Bovens & Wille, 2008). In Finland, perceptions of political and economic performance are the main explanatory factors of systemic trust (Kestilä-Kekkonen & Söderlund, 2016). In Spain (Torcal & Christmann, 2021) and Spain and Portugal (Torcal, 2014) the lack of responsiveness and the perception of political corruption decreases Iberians' systemic trust. More generally, systemic trust is positively associated with individuals' subjective well-being, social capital, democratic attitudes, political interest and external efficacy (Catterberg, 2006). At the same time, systemic trust is negatively associated with individuals' perception of corruption, formal education and socioeconomic status (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Freitag & Bühlmann, 2009).

These results suggest that there is a *within*-country and a *between*-country dimension of systemic trust, which can roughly be equated with *institutional* explanations (within-country dimension) and *cultural* (between-country) explanations of systemic trust. Before turning to testable hypotheses, we provide a descriptive image of patterns of trust. This exploratory analysis then informs further explanatory steps.

[2] The opposite holds true for those living in creditor countries and especially those with higher education and more financial security.

Study Design

Our examination addresses the EU's four geo-historic regions: the Western Core, Scandinavian North, the Mediterranean South and the Post-communist East, reflecting the fact that countries in these four geo-historic regions share distinct inner-societal cleavage structures, on the basis of which different reactions to the European financial and refugee crises followed (Ferrín & Kriesi, 2016). For convenience reasons, in each of the four geo-historic regions we focus on the two countries with the largest populations: Germany and France for the Western Core, Denmark and Sweden for the Scandinavian North, Italy and Spain for the Mediterranean South, Poland and Czechia for the Post-communist East.

In terms of data, we rely on the WVS/EVS because we are interested in changes in systemic trust over larger stretches of time and because these data offer the widest temporal coverage. In comparison, the European Social Survey offers a considerably shorter time coverage, while the Eurobarometer Surveys include few explanatory variables of main theoretical interest.

As our main descriptive tool, we rely on Latent Class Analysis because this analytical technique allows the categorization of broader patterns in citizens' systemic trust that are not directly observed. In the inferential part of the examination, we employ Multi-Level Analysis to simultaneously assess macro-level and micro-level influences on individuals' membership in their respective "class" of systemic trust.

We focus on nine variables capturing trust in institutions, each of which is measured on a four-point ordinal scale reaching from *none at all* and *not very much* to *quite a lot* and *a great deal* of confidence. The nine institutions selected include: government, the parliament, political parties, the press, the justice system, the police, the armed forces, churches and the EU itself. The criterion to select exactly these institutions is their temporal coverage (i.e., only with these institutions we can trace change over time). We dichotomize the two positive and negative trust answers into a dummy variable indicating trust in the respective institution ("quite a lot of confidence," "a great deal of confidence") or no trust in the institution ("not very much confidence," "no confidence at all"). Obviously, the variables capture the whole spectrum of systemic institutions in European societies.

Descriptive Results

For trust in government (Figure 1), we see confirmed what the literature already reports (for a great summary see Jansen, 2023). Above all the Scandinavian North, followed by the Western Core, shows substantially higher levels of trust than the Mediterranean South and the Post-communist East. Interestingly, due to the pre-vs-post crisis treatment, trust in government actually increased in net-giving countries (e.g., Sweden and Germany), whereas it decreased in debtor countries (e.g., Spain and Poland). For six out of our eight exemplary countries the trend is negative.

Looking at the legislative (Figure 2), we see that the WVS' measure of trust in national parliaments fluctuates around the 2008 economic crises without extreme changes, except for Poland and Denmark. We find the lowest levels of trust in the legislative in Czechia and in Poland, where only around 20% of the population trust their national parliament.

Surprisingly, on the EU-level the picture looks more positive (see Appendix Figure S1). Sweden, Germany and Denmark experienced increasing levels of trust in the EU. We see a negative trend in the Czechia and in Italy, albeit on a very high baseline level in the latter case. In France and Spain around 50% of the population trusts the EU and levels seem rather stable.

Figure 1: Trust in the Government



Figure 2: Trust in the Parliament



Looking at the judicial branch and law and order institutions, Czechia, Sweden, Germany and France show increasing levels of trust, ranging between 60-80% in the Scandinavian North and the Western Core. In Poland trust in the judiciary declined by around 20 percentage points during the PiS government. Spain remains at around 50% trust across all WVS waves and Denmark comes first with constant trust levels at around 80%. For the police (Appendix Figure S2), trust lies above 60% in all cases except for Czechia and Poland. Trust in the military slightly increased in most cases, ranging from between 40% and 60% (Czechia, Spain, Sweden, Germany) to above 60% (Denmark, France, Italy, Poland). For the future, it will be interesting to see whether the heated-up geopolitical confrontation with Russia and its military invasion into Ukraine generated a lasting

"rally around the flag" effect by which civic trust in the military (and maybe other systemic institutions) further increased.

Figure 3: Trust in the Justice System



Last, the bottom line of trust is reserved for the political parties. Here, rarely more than 20% trust their political parties in general. This may of course be due to partisanship and general mistrust for most parties except the one a person feels close to. Nevertheless, the values indicate that for most individuals most parties are no electoral option. Exceptions to this picture are Sweden, Denmark and Spain in the early 2000s.

Figure 4: Trust in Political Parties



The descriptive results paint a relatively uniform picture. The populations of the Scandinavian North and the Western Core show the highest average levels of trust in executive, legislative and

judicative institutions, with France ranging at the lower end of these regions' spectrum. Speaking of a general trust crisis seems implausible from this aggregated perspective, though some results give reason for concern. As already pointed out, most nuance is lost in this high level of aggregation and within country-variation is important for our understanding of potential polarization and populist vote choice.

Hence, we rely on the full available information for more detailed clustering of the survey participants in the following section. Our aim is to answer whether there is a hidden heterogeneity in patterns of trust in institutions – that is, can we find certain groups of individuals who share trust or lack trust for a given set of institutions and which institutions commonly go together in individuals' trust evaluations?

Latent Classes

We employ Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to identify unobserved subgroups within a population based on individuals' responses to a set of observed categorical variables. LCA is a model-based clustering technique that assumes the existence of distinct, mutually exclusive latent classes that explain the patterns of association among observed variables. Similar to the analyses of different types of democrats (Davis et al., 2021), attitudinal patterns (Lewis & de-Wit, 2019) or citizen participation (Oser, 2017), Latent Class Analysis allows us to identify patterns in the data without making too many assumptions beforehand. For this data-driven approach, we dichotomize nine trust (confidence) items contained in the World Values Survey. This allows us to observe frequent commonalities among European voters on a cross-national basis and simultaneously analyse shifts within these societies. That is, we ask which *patterns* of trust in a set of institutions are there and which factors explain membership in statistically defined latent classes of trust in institutions? By analysing the potentially unobserved underlying patterns of trust, we provide further nuance to the analysis of trust in institutions, which has hitherto relied on aggregate indices or singular variables.

This method is particularly valuable in social science research for identifying hidden heterogeneity within populations and understanding complex phenomena where traditional approaches might fall short. Complex phenomena such as social behaviours, attitudes, and psychological profiles are often multifaceted and not directly observable. LCA provides a powerful means of uncovering these hidden patterns by grouping individuals into distinct latent classes based on their responses to categorical indicators. By doing so, LCA enables us to explore complex relationships and typologies that may not be evident through traditional, observed-variable approaches. We see its strengths in its ability to handle categorical data and to provide a probabilistic framework that offers a more nuanced understanding of subpopulations compared to simple clustering methods or factor analysis. In this case, we assume that there are different types of *trusters*, which cannot be grouped by simply observing their mean values on the full set of '*confidence in ...'* variables. For descriptive purposes and for reasons of parsimony we use the class-membership predictions to assign each individual one specific class. We are well aware that this is a design decision which drops the more precise class probabilities and hence, we only use it to emphasize the overall results. Our main models use the class probabilities as dependent variables and take all information into account.

Figure 5: AIC and BIC of LCA-solutions



The use of LCA requires the analyst to make important decisions. The most impactful being the number of classes to retain. This is mostly done by comparing the relative fit of the class solutions in the form of their Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) and/or Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In our case, we expect an absolute minimum of three classes – high-trusters, low-trusters and intermediates. Figure 5 compares the AIC and BIC of solutions with up to eleven classes. The first point where the marginal improvement for each additional class drops sharply is at four (three) classes and thereafter at six classes. There does not seem to be any major improvement for seven or more classes. We chose to work with the four-class solution and occasionally compare their results to the six-class solution throughout the analysis (See Appendix Figure S3).

Aggregated Class Setup and Descriptives

We run both four- and six-class solutions in Stata's Structural Equation Model (SEM) suite and in MPLUS. The results are identical, and the best solution can be replicated using different random starts and starting values. The interpretation of these models now follows a probabilistic logic. Each individual receives a likelihood to be in each of the classes, which allows us to identify most likely class-membership and turn the abstract probabilities into quantifiable estimates of total numbers of individuals in each class (Table 1). Each class then receives a set of answer-probabilities for each of the nine trust items (Figure 6). In our example this means that we have different classes of individuals that have different probabilities to trust certain institutions more than others. Hence, we get an overview of the underlying patterns in the data. Our preferred four-class solution results in the following class setup. Table 1 summarizes the estimated class counts and proportions for the latent classes. Class three is the most prevalent class across all WVS waves with close to 40% of all individuals having the highest probability to be in this class. Class two is the smallest group and contains ~10% of the observations, class four encompasses 22% and class one 28%. Comparing these results to the six-class solution (see Appendix Table S2), we find general agreement with the four classes, with class two and three each being split into two probability setups that look very similar. While the six-class model may provide some additional nuance, the entropy value for the four-class solution suggests that this model results in a better separation of the estimated classes.

Table 1: Final class counts and proportions for the latent classes based on predicted class membership.

Latent Classes	Class Counts	Proportions for the latent classes
1	17,502	27.86%
2	5,885	9.37%
3	25,243	40.18%
4	14,198	22.60%

The four panels of Figure 6 describe the setup of our identified LCA solution. As a simplifying heuristic, the four groups could be described as "Low Trust", "Political Trust", "Law and Order Trust" and "High Trust". This means that we have two extreme groups at opposite ends: low-vs-high trust in all institutions (Class 1: low; Class 4: high), mediated by two groups in between with trust in only one of two types of institutions: political institutions (Class 2) and law & order institutions (Class 3).

Figure 6



We apply this labelling by identifying those institutions that have the highest probability to be trusted within each class – with a minimum probability of 0.5 to trust given institutions. Those individuals in the "Low Trust" class have a very low probability to trust any of the institutions with only close to 25% chance to trust the police and everything else below this value. The "Political Trust" class is an intermediate category with mixed probabilities. However, we can clearly see that the probability to trust the Government, the national Parliament, the Justice System, the Police and the EU is above the threshold value of 0.5. The individuals in this class, thus, seem to generally trust the political system and its main components, consisting of executive, legislative and judicative, as well as their supranational equivalent. At the same time, they do not trust more partisan institutions like the press and the political parties as well as rather authoritarian/hierarchical institutions such as the military and the churches. A more conservative picture emerges when we look at the third class, titled "Law and Order Trust". Here we see the highest likelihood of trusting the police, followed by the military, the judiciary and churches. This pattern reveals a group of individuals who appreciate the safety of their country but do not trust the electoral institutions – which clearly deserves further attention. Last, we see a class, which has a high probability of trusting each of the included institutions with the lowest, but still above 50%, values for the press and the political parties. Looking back at Table 1, we see that close to 70% of the surveyed individuals fall into a category which has no trust in democracies' electoral institutions

(class one and three). Depending on whether these judgements of the citizens represent their evaluation of the electoral institutions' *current performance* or an evaluation of these institutions' *existential legitimacy*, the findings are more or less worrisome for countries that count as liberal, consolidated democracies.

This highly aggregated picture does not yet allow any explanation of the class setup. For a more nuanced picture, we split the estimated class membership first by survey-wave (Figure 7) to create an EU-wide image and then look at country-by-country results.

Figure 7: % of class membership across all countries by WVS-waves



The results across all eight countries show a general trend towards more trust in law-and-order institutions. Surprisingly, this happens in exchange for a *decreasing* (!) share of people with very *low* trust and an *increasing* (!) share with high trust, which *grew* to match around a quarter of the surveyed populations. The already small group of people with an aptitude to trust electoral institutions shrank in the latest wave of the WVS to less than 10%.

Adding more nuance, Figure 8 summarizes the average sizes of the identified classes separated by country and across waves. We find some regional separation. Sweden is the only country where high-trust individuals are the majority. In its neighbour Denmark, this group switched places with those that only express trust in Law-and-Order. These two Nordic countries also have the lowest share of individuals within the low trust class. Confirming the main observation of Figure 7, we find an increasing share of individuals in the class favouring "Law and Order" institutions, with the highest share in Poland, Spain, France and Italy (all Catholic in historic imprint), where Italy and France show the steepest increase. In Denmark and Spain their share fluctuates, and Sweden is the only country where it decreases.

The group being more skeptical but generally trustful of the electoral institutions is on a very low level in most countries. Sweden and Spain are the countries that push up the average of this on the aggregate level. However, in Spain we see a continuous decrease of this Political Trust class.

Again, how worrisome the low and generally declining trust level in democracies' electoral institutions actually is, depends on—still—untestable assumptions. It depends on whether we interpret the figures as citizens' evaluation of the *performance* of the electoral institutions (i.e., a specific support view) or as citizens' evaluation of these institutions' very *justification* to exist (i.e., a diffuse support view). It goes without saying that the latter interpretation would hint to much deeper legitimacy problems than the former.

Since each individual can be assigned a most likely class-membership, Table 2 and Table 3 present some additional descriptives for each of our four classes. More precisely, we aim to identify if there is an identifiable socio-economic background for each of the four classes. If the findings of the presented literature apply to our sample, we should see that economically disadvantaged individuals are more likely to inhabit the low-trust group. Non-voters and right-wing-populist party voters should also be characterized by a lack of trust in political institutions. Culturally, we expect individuals who trust their fellow citizens to also exhibit more trust in institutions.

Figure 8: Share of Class-Membership by Country and WVS-Wave



This first section of cross-tabulations (Table 2) summarizes the frequencies of the four identified classes in three additional categories. Those that express general mistrust towards their fellow citizens are the dominant individuals in the Low Trust (41.9%) and in the Law and Order Trust (32.8%) classes. By contrast, of those individuals that fall into the High Trust class 52% say that most people can be trusted and in the Political Trust class 50%, respectively.

Table 2: Descriptives for political and Cultural Attitudes.

	Low Trust	Political Trust	Law and Order Trust	High Trust	Total
Generalized trust					
Can't be too careful	15,574	2,826	12,188	6,585	37,173
Row %	41.9	7.6	32.79	17.71	100
Column %	63.72	49.7	72.48	47.94	61.26
Most people can be trusted	8,866	2,860	4,628	7,150	23,504
Row %	37.72	12.17	19.69	30.42	100
Column %	36.28	50.3	27.52	52.06	38.74
Voted for Populist Party					
no	23,878	5,757	16,876	13,726	60,237
Row %	39.64	9.56	28.02	22.79	100
Column %	94.59	97.82	96.42	96.68	95.88
yes	1,365	128	626	472	2,591
Row %	52.68	4.94	24.16	18.22	100
Column %	5.41	2.18	3.58	3.32	4.12
Immigrants should have the same right to a job					
no	13,876	2,308	10,498	6,269	32,951
Row %	42.11	7	31.86	19.03	100
Column %	54.97	39.22	59.98	44.15	52.45
yes	11,367	3,577	7,004	7,929	29,877
Row %	38.05	11.97	23.44	26.54	100
Column %	45.03	60.78	40.02	55.85	47.55

Regarding populist vote choice, the small number of absolute votes for populists in the sample makes the distinction less clear-cut. However, what stands out is that 5% of the Low Trust class express support for Right-Wing Populist parties (column percentages) but at the same time this class makes up more than half of those that voted for an RWP-Party overall – meaning that 50% of the RWP-voters fall into the Low Trust class (row percentages). One quarter of the populist voters belong to the Law-and-Order class. A very similar picture emerges when we look at attitudes towards immigrants' entitlements to a job. High Trust and Political Trust individuals are more supportive of integrative measures, while a majority of the Low Trust and Law and Order Trust class do not support equal (job-market) rights for immigrants.

Turning to the more general socio-demographics (Table 3), the unemployed are more frequently found in the Low Trust (37.8%) and Law and Order Trust classes (38.9%; row percentages). The highest employment level (self-employed, part-time or full-time) can be found in the Political Trust class. The 'other' category of the employment trichotomy contains those that are students, pensioners and housewives. Here the Law-and-Order Trust class has the highest frequency (41.2%). Regarding income and education, we find a complementary picture. High education and high income are more frequent among the High Trust and Political Trust classes and vice versa. However, the picture becomes more diffuse and inseparable in the middle income and education categories.

Table 3: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the 4 Classes.

	Low Trust	Political Trust	Law and Order Trust	High Trust	Total
Employment					
employed	9,217	3,353	12,794	7,092	32,456
Row %	28.4	10.33	39.42	21.85	100
Column %	54.06	58.15	52.23	51.46	53.12
unemployed	1,492	338	1,534	583	3,947
Row %	37.8	8.56	38.86	14.77	100
Column %	8.75	5.86	6.26	4.23	6.46
other	6,342	2,075	10,169	6,107	24,693
Row %	25.68	8.4	41.18	24.73	100
Column %	37.19	35.99	41.51	44.31	40.42
Education					
Low	5,899	1,513	8,935	4,673	21,020
Row %	28.06	7.2	42.51	22.23	100
Column %	34.05	26.02	35.79	33.36	33.85
Mid	9,307	3,221	13,112	7,151	32,791
Row %	28.38	9.82	39.99	21.81	100
Column %	53.73	55.4	52.53	51.06	52.8
High	2,117	1,080	2,916	2,182	8,295
Row %	25.52	13.02	35.15	26.31	100
Column %	12.22	18.58	11.68	15.58	13.36
Income					
Low	2,709	604	3,390	1,673	8,376
Row %	32.34	7.21	40.47	19.97	100
Column %	22.84	14.7	19.25	16.96	19.28
Mid	7,767	2,687	11,374	6,225	28,053
Row %	27.69	9.58	40.54	22.19	100
Column %	65.47	65.38	64.57	63.11	64.56
High	1,387	819	2,850	1,965	7,021
Row %	19.76	11.67	40.59	27.99	100
Column %	11.69	19.93	16.18	19.92	16.16

To sum up and provide some heuristics, we can support the previous findings and find that those individuals of the Political Trust class are most frequently found in high income, high education and high generalized trust categories. Also, the High Trust class shares these features. We find the least educated and less wealthy individuals in the Low Trust class, who also have the highest support for Right-Wing Populist parties. However, most interesting – as also noted before – are those individuals who fall into the Law-and-Order Trust class. The previous figures show that this class is growing in most surveyed countries and is overall the largest class in size. This class is also the most heterogeneous in attitudes and socio-demographic characteristics. Only a small fraction of it falls into the unemployed category and mostly into the *other* category (suggesting a large fraction of pensioners and housewives). The majority of this class has a mid-level income and education, close to three quarters do not generally trust other individuals and close to two-thirds

are skeptical of immigrants. They seem to be skeptical in both cultural and political dimensions. Explaining the growth of this class and its separation from other classes is thus of major interest. As with the electoral institutions, however, a major ambiguity in interpretation applies: Does the expressed high trust in Law & Order institutions of this class express a positive evaluation of the law institutions' current performance or a desire for greater authority of the law institutions relative to the electoral ones?

Zooming out again, we see the biggest cleavage in trust-patterns when comparing the Scandinavian North with the Post-communist East and between high-low education and employment levels. The Scandinavian North shows the largest share of High Trust individuals, while the Post-communist East shows the highest combined share of Low Trust and Law and Order Trust. However, we find a general European trend towards more individuals who trust Law and Order Institutions at the cost of Electoral Institutions. Depending on the ambiguities of interpretation outlined above, it is without doubt that this development needs to be closely monitored. However, it is not exactly clear how worrisome this trend actually is.

To shed further light on these developments, we aim to explain class-membership based on conceptual variables identified in cultural and institutionalist theories and those that follow from our observations.

Inferential Results

Informed by recent debates about the cultural deconsolidation of democracies and their theoretical inspiration, we expect that two of our four classes are problematic for democracies' long-term legitimacy: the Low Trust class and the class expressing Law Trust but low or little Electoral Trust. Given that the drop in discriminatory power in Figure 5 is deepest when moving from two to more classes, we suspect that the data embody a basic dichotomy between generic Low Trusters (with the occasional exception of Law Trust), on one hand, and generic High Trusters (including Electoral Trusters), on the other. We also expect that both class pairings have similar micro-level and macro-level predictors *within* the pairing but opposite ones *between* the two pairings. Specifically, we hypothesize that healthy conditions at the macro-level (e.g., economic prosperity, impartial governance, electoral integrity) and at the micro-level (higher income, more education, interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, emancipative values) predict a higher likelihood of membership in the Hight Trust/Electoral Trust class pairing. Vice versa, the exact opposite macro-level and micro-level characteristics predict a higher likelihood of membership in the Low Trust/Law Trust class pairing. Finally, we expect that this predictive contrast is more strongly pronounced for the Low-vs-High Trust opposition (which is an opposition in levels) than for the Law-vs-Electoral Trust opposition (which is an opposition in kind).

A multilevel approach takes into consideration the multi-wave/multi-country setup of our analysis and allows intercepts to vary across waves and countries. We report the full model here (Table 5) and discuss the more complex models in the Appendix Table S4. In the Appendix, for each class-membership probability, we provide three models, which contrast cultural and attitudinal with socio-economic and macro-level performance indicators. The presented model for each class membership combines all explanatory variables to identify if cultural or institutional theories perform better. For easier interpretation panels A-D of Figure 9 show the results as coefficient plots.

The variables we aim to test can broadly be grouped into cultural and political values and attitudes, socioeconomic characteristics and macro-level performance. The first of these three categories comprises individuals' emancipative values and their generalized trust as cultural markers and their

self-positioning on a left-right spectrum as well as their position towards immigrants as political markers. Socioeconomic indicators include age, age², income, education and employment status. Lastly, we include country-level unemployment rates, inflation rates, GDP growth and migrant stock as macro-level factors.[3]

This variable selection builds on the presented literature. However, we deliberately refrain from (re-)formulating hypotheses here, since these would need to be formulated for each class individually leading to X_i *times the four classes* as the number of hypotheses. This is neither helpful nor comprehensible. Instead, we follow the previous exploratory approach, while keeping in mind that:

- Institutional theories of trust posit its endogeneity and short-term responsiveness to political events as central explanatory factors for changing patterns of trust.
- Cultural theories describe trust as a deeply cultural phenomenon which is exogenous to the observed contemporary institutions and whose baseline levels should follow cultural tendencies to *generally* trust one another.

We focus on the most interesting class's interpretation first – that is the growing Law-and-Order class (model 4). We find three main explanatory factors that are linked to a higher likelihood of being placed in the Law Trust class: a lower level of generalized trust, the rejection of equal job rights for migrants and lower levels of education. A more *right* self-placement on the left-right scale is also related to a higher likelihood for this class, though it just about fails the test for significance at the 95% level. This class's antagonist seems to be the smallest of the four groups – the Electoral Trust Class. Here we find that generalized trust, a favourable attitude towards immigrants and more education lead to an increased probability to be a member of this class. Additionally, scoring higher on the Emancipative Values Index (EVI) (Welzel, 2013) and a more leftist positioning on the left-right scale increase the probability.

Here, we also see several macro-level factors as influential. However, we need to take these indications with a pinch of salt because the number of level-2 instances (country-waves) only amounts to 28. These level-2 factors suggest that a higher share of immigrants in the country, a higher inflation rate and more GDP growth increase the probability of individual membership in the Electoral Trust class. Interesting is also what we do not find. There is no significant difference in the likelihood for either of the above class-probabilities between the employed (the baseline category) and unemployed and the employed and pensioners, students or housewives.

A similar set of antagonistic results can be found when comparing the Low Trust and High Trust classes. Specifically, we find that generalized trust is related to a higher probability of being in the High Trust class and a lower probability of being in the Low Trust class. Being in favor of immigrant rights relates positively only to the High Trust class. Placing oneself further to the political right decreases the probability for the Low Trust class and vice versa for the High Trust class. The opposite holds true for emancipative values. In fact, holding more liberal values in regard to gender equality and sexual self-determination increases the likelihood for the Low Trust class and decreases it for the High Trust class – opposing our expectations. Hence, more emancipated (culturally progressive) and leftist individuals seem to more frequently get sorted into the Low Trust class and less progressive and more right-leaning individuals are more likely to fall into the High Trust class. Additionally, the employment status shows that – in reference to being employed

[3] A full list of the descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix Table S6.

– unemployment increases the likelihood to being classified in the Low Trust class and decreases the likelihood to belong to the High Trust class (keeping everything else at mean-level). The latter receives a higher probability for pensioners, students and housewives (the *other employment* category).

The coefficients for age do not reveal much here. However, cross-tabulations (Appendix table S5) reveal that the share of individuals in the Low Trust class drops in the age groups 60 and above, while the opposite holds true for the High Trust class. These older, oftentimes more conservative, individuals may fall into what Dalton and Welzel (2014) call the *allegiant* citizen category. They are generally positive about society and (naively) trust all institutions.

Figure 9: Coefficient Plots for Model 1-4 of Table 5



These analyses reveal some ideotypes.

- Law and Order Trust is associated with being more right-wing and less educated, as well as with having less trust in fellow citizens and less support for inclusion of foreigners.
- Electoral Trust is associated with better socioeconomic standing in terms of education and income, more positive images of fellow citizens, a desire for inclusion and generally more emancipative values.

- Low Trust shows a mixed picture, where more leftist self-positioning meets less likely employment, lower income, lower generalized trust, but an emancipative outlook – potentially driven by lower average age in this class.

High Trust shows features of the allegiant citizen, which will mostly be found in older cohorts. There seems to be a high level of trust in other citizens and some support for inclusion of foreigners, but lower levels of support for gender equality and sexual emancipation. Being pensioner or housewife increases this class's likelihood. As does having a higher income.

Table 4: Explaining Class-Probabilities

	(1) Low Trust Prob.	(2) High Trust Prob.	(3) Political Trust Prob.	(4) L&O Trust Prob.
Most people can be trusted	-0.089***	0.097***	0.023***	-0.031***
(Ref. no trust)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Pro Migrant Job Rights	-0.012	0.024**	0.019***	-0.031***
(Ref. prefer natives)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.008)
Income	-0.010***	0.007**	0.002***	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Education	0.003	0.020	0.035***	-0.058**
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.019)
Unemployed	0.017*	-0.019***	0.006	0.000
(Ref. employed)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(.)
Other Employment	-0.026***	0.021**	0.003	0.005
(Ref. employed)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Left-Right Positioning	-0.014***	0.014***	-0.006**	0.006
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Emancipative Values	0.128***	-0.128***	0.031*	-0.031
	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.022)
Migrant stock, % pop.	-0.013*	0.012**	0.006***	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Inflation, annual %	-0.011***	0.007**	0.007***	-0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Unemployment, total %	0.007	-0.004**	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
GDP growth (annual %)	0.032***	-0.028*	0.007***	-0.009
	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.008)
1999-2004	-0.078	0.105***	0.028	-0.054**
	(0.057)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)
2005-2009	-0.069	0.062**	-0.017	0.024
	(0.046)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.031)
2010-2014	0.031	0.001	-0.012	-0.017
	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.017)	(0.042)
2017-2022	-0.038	0.034	-0.047	0.053
	(0.070)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	0.335***	0.114	0.052	0.474***
	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.051)	(0.079)
AIC	24747	23727	-9625	27082
BIC	24806	23787	-9566	27141
Intraclass Correlation	0.068	0.046	0.030	0.033
Observations	35594	35594	35594	35594

Cluster-robust Standard errors in parentheses $^{*}\,p<0.05$, $^{**}\,p<0.01$, $^{***}\,p<0.001$. Model also controls for age and age².

From a model perspective, we find a very low intra-class correlation coefficient, indicating that, depending on the model, only 3-7% of the total variance is due to the country-wave level. Within country variance seems to be the main explanatory factor and thus European citizens' class membership probabilities are mostly driven by individual-level variables. This is an interesting finding as it suggests that our LCA seems to work across borders and that its results are best explained by individual-level factors, irrespective of the larger national setting – speaking in favour of a cross-national class-pattern.
This looks different, however, when we change perspective from individual class membership to the country-differences in proportional class size. Here, macro-level characteristics do matter. Specifically, membership in the High Trust and Electoral Trust class is substantially larger (and still growing) in countries in which institutional qualities—most notably electoral integrity and impartial governance—are better (e.g., Scandinavian North, Western Core) than where they are worse (e.g., Mediterranean South, Post-communist East). This distinction between the EU's geo-historical regions reflects ages-old differences in institutional quality and cultural history (catholic-vs.-protestant dominant regions).

Explaining non-voting and right-wing populist voting

Of course, investigating which effects individuals' class membership has on their political behaviour is just as interesting as the determinants of class membership itself. Hence, we present two logistic regression models to predict two dependent dummy variables: right-wing populist vote choice (yes: 1, no: 0) and non-voting (yes: 1, no: 0). We focus on these two variables because right-wing populism's electoral success is the wave of the day and because non-voting is in many cases the intermediate psychological stage in voters' transition from electing an established party towards casting a vote for anti-establishment populists. Against this backdrop, we expect that RWP-voting and non-voting exhibit a similar determinacy structure, albeit somewhat weaker in the case of non-voting.

We present the results in odds ratios, where a significant coefficient above 1 indicates that a one-unit change in X_i increases the odds of (1) populist vote choice or (2) non-voting. Values between 0-1 indicate a decrease of the odds of the event happening.

Table 5 reveals that generalized interpersonal trust is an important factor in lowering individuals' tendency to both RWP-voting and non-voting. As another common influence, individuals in the High Trust class are less likely RWP-voters and non-voters. However, voters in the Electoral Trust and in the Low Trust class do not differ from voters in the Law Trust class as concerns their RWP-voting tendency – which is somewhat surprising in light of the descriptive evidence presented above[4].

Expectedly, higher levels of education and stronger emancipative values decrease the odds of RWP-voting. Being in favor of immigrant integration more than halves the odds, as well. Unsurprisingly, self-identification as more politically right increases these odds.

In regard to non-voting, we find that only individuals in the Low Trust class have a higher aptitude to abstain than those in the Law Trust class. Vice versa, voters in the High Trust class are least likely to abstain from elections. Additionally, a higher income is related to lower odds of abstention.

[4] The lack of significance may be due to the relatively low total number of populist vote choice in the sample – especially in earlier waves of the WVS.

Table 5. Explaining non-voting and right-wing populist voting

	(1) Populist Vote		(2) Non-Voting	
Low Trust	1.075	(0.249)	1.524***	(0.132)
Political Trust	0.763	(0.127)	0.706***	(0.073)
High Trust	0.640*	(0.143)	0.476***	(0.031)
Most people can be trusted	0.600***	(0.086)	0.835***	(0.046)
Pro Migrant Job Rights	0.404***	(0.076)	1.025	(0.088)
Income	0.970	(0.023)	0.948***	(0.015)
Education	0.462*	(0.180)	0.709	(0.128)
Unemployed	0.919	(0.088)	1.118	(0.101)
Other Employment	1.009	(0.077)	0.921	(0.071)
Left-Right Positioning	1.393***	(0.084)	0.988	(0.012)
Emancipative Values	0.357*	(0.169)	0.991	(0.198)
Migrant stock, % pop.	0.823	(0.188)	1.069	(0.103)
Inflation, annual %	1.006	(0.055)	0.750*	(0.095)
Unemployment, total %	1.242	(0.138)	1.064	(0.069)
GDP growth, annual %)	0.941	(0.187)	0.931	(0.274)
AIC	9435		10680	
BIC	9484		10740	
Countries	7		8	
Observations	28051		35621	

Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses. Models include fixed effects for survey wave.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; Law and Order Trust is the reference category for the predicted classes. Spain excluded in model one due to the missing coding of the populist VOX party.

Discussion and Conclusion

Putting together the findings of the descriptive evidence and the two presented regression-based analyses, we identify several key takeaways.

There are cross-national, unobserved patterns of trust in institutions which can be expressed through various class setups. These class setups always contain a class with overall low and overall high trust, a class which distrusts the electoral institutions and focuses on law-and-order institutions and a class which trusts the electoral institutions but remains cautious of hierarchical institutions of law-and-order.

The class-membership-likelihood can be explained by cultural, institutional and socio-demographic variables, such that generalized trust, emancipative values, a leftist self-positioning and a welcoming attitude towards immigrants stand out as the strongest antidotes to RWP-voting (and somewhat weaker to non-voting). We see that RWP-voting is the least common among voters in the High Trust class and non-voting is the most common among voters in the Low Trust class. Trust-class membership seems to be one among several factors for populist voting choice. We also see that lower education, rightist political positions, low emancipative values and the lack of generalized trust are driving individuals towards RWP-voting– which speaks towards a potential mediation of these factors via trust in institutions.

Not surprisingly, RWP-voting is best explained by a generally low trust level combined with a trust profile that lends particularly low trust to electoral relative to L&O institutions. However, the size of this RWP-favouring (dis)trust constellation has not dramatically grown over time, at least not enough to explain the soaring electoral successes of RWP. Consequently, the electoral rise of RWP is not so much deriving from the growth of the population segment in the respective (dis)trust constellation but from the more successful mobilization of people who already belonged to this segment.

Follow-up analyses should inquire whether individuals remain settled in one trust class and if changes are following generational replacement or whether there are frequent shifts from one class to another. Given that relatively stable socio-economic indicators and long-standing cultural traits such as generalized trust explain class-membership well, the former theory seems plausible. By connecting this research with research on parties and voters, political science should further investigate how our identified class-membership overlaps with partisan alignment and vote-choice. Which trust class is the most volatile in their party loyalty and should be monitored more closely?

In light of the growing populist challenge that many European countries face, it is important to further disentangle the patterns of trust that we find. Distrust need not be destructive and anti-democratic as we know from Norris (1999, 2011) and Dalton and Welzel (2014). Hence, there may well be skeptical mistrust against political actors which serves as a healthy benchmark for democratic governance. The Political Trust class falls well into this category but is too small in most countries to function as democracy's guardians. Looking at the High Trust class, we find a mixed picture but may generally conclude that we can talk of democratic, but naïve trust in this class. This class's broadband trust follows the logic of Almond and Verba's allegiant citizen (1963), who accepts political hierarchy and is loyal to the given institutions. It is also not surprising that we find this group to be older, relatively well educated and financially secure – basically the embodiment of the traditional middle-class *baby-boomer* generation, which reaped the all the benefits of European democracies' stable post-war economic growth.

It remains to be seen if the Law-and-Order trust class will continue to grow, where this will be and what the major consequences will be. However, on a conceptual level, this class shows a pattern of trust, which may well be destructive in nature. Placing trust only in those institutions which are non-electoral, highly hierarchic and who wield power over people reveals a problematic, (potentially) authoritarian mindset. The individuals in this class may well be susceptible to populist narratives which aim to further undermine the existing system while stressing law and order narratives. However, if we follow institutionalist theories of trust, these individuals may also exhibit a temporary lack of trust following the restrictive decrees and policies during the Covid-19 pandemic with, again, hit the lower working class the hardest. This reduction in trust for electoral institutions – while maintaining traditionalized trust in law-and-order institutions – may well return to pre-crisis levels once they see more positive developments for their countries. Stressing the positive developments driven by good governance may well be the main countermeasure against pessimistic views on politics in times of multiple crises. Solving the actual problems of their citizens and not following populist narratives by inflating illusionary problems should be the main countermeasure to maintain a consistent level of trust in political institutions.

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Appendix

Figure S1: Confidence in the European Union



Figure S2: Confidence in the Police



Figure S3: Six-Class Solution Output



Table S4: Multilevel Models with stepwise inclusion of independent factors.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	Low-Trust				High Trust				Political Trust				Law & Order Trust			
Most people can be trusted	-0.093***				0.093***				0.031***				-0.030**			
	(0.013)				(0.014)				(0.004)				(0.010)			
EVI	0.176***				-0.177***				0.070***				-0.068*			
	(0.044)				(0.035)				(0.019)				(0.031)			
Left-Right Self-Positioning		-0.018***				0.018***				-0.005*				0.005		
		(0.002)				(0.003)				(0.002)				(0.003)		
Pro Immigrant Rights		-0.019				0.029*				0.030***				-0.040***		
		(0.013)				(0.013)				(0.004)				(0.008)		
Scale of incomes			-0.012***				0.008***				0.003***				0.001	
			(0.002)				(0.002)				(0.001)				(0.001)	
Education			0.013				0.013				0.054***				-0.080***	
			(0.029)				(0.032)				(0.009)				(0.017)	
Unemployed			0.036***				-0.030***				0.003				-0.009	
(Ref. Employed)			(0.008)				(0.005)				(0.006)				(0.009)	
Housewife, Pensioner, Student			-0.051***				0.048***				0.002				0.001	
(Ref. Employed)			(0.008)				(0.009)				(0.005)				(0.012)	
Migrant stock, % pop.				-0.013**				0.001				0.001				0.015
				(0.005)				(0.004)				(0.003)				(0.008)
Inflation, annual %				-0.016***				0.009***				0.003**				0.003
				(0.004)				(0.002)				(0.001)				(0.002)
Unemployment, total %				0.004				-0.003*				-0.003				0.002
				(0.006)				(0.001)				(0.002)				(0.005)
GDP growth, annual %				0.020***				-0.020**				-0.008				0.007
				(0.005)				(0.007)				(0.004)				(0.007)
Constant	0.216***	0.390***	0.374***	0.318***	0.270***	0.081	0.111*	0.260***	0.059*	0.131***	0.097***	0.158**	0.454***	0.398***	0.417***	0.236
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.092)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.064)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.031)	(0.144)
AIC	45551	40405	31715	48900	39090	36856	28037	41776	-18545	-13410	-12710	-19253	45531	41069	31579	47624
BIC	45614	40468	31775	48963	39153	36918	28098	41840	-18482	-13347	-12650	-19190	45594	41131	31640	47687
Country-Waves	34	34	28	34	34	34	28	34	34	34	28	34	34	34	28	34
Observations	59634	53847	41549	62591	59634	53847	41549	62591	59634	53847	41549	62591	59634	53847	41549	62591

Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table S5: Tabulation of Age-Groups and predicted Class-Membership

	Predicted Class				
Age-Group	Low Trust	Political Trust	Law and Order Trust	High Trust	Total
15-19	567	182	654	440	1843
	30.77	9.88	35.49	23.87	100.00
	3.25	3.10	2.59	3.10	2.94
20-39	6229	2103	7867	3994	20193
	30.85	10.41	38.96	19.78	100.00
	35.70	35.78	31.20	28.17	32.20
40-59	6246	2087	8725	4693	21751
	28.72	9.59	40.11	21.58	100.00
	35.80	35.51	34.60	33.11	34.68
60-79	4036	1360	7010	4312	16718
	24.14	8.13	41.93	25.79	100.00
	23.13	23.14	27.80	30.42	26.66
80+	368	145	960	737	2210
	16.65	6.56	43.44	33.35	100.00
	2.11	2.47	3.81	5.20	3.52
Total	17446	5877	25216	14176	62715
	27.82	9.37	40.21	22.60	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note: First row has *frequencies*; second row has *row percentages* and third row has *column percentages*

Table S6: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Emancipative Values Index	61787	0.620	0.220	0.000	1.000
Left-Right self-placement	53939	5.240	2.150	1.000	10.000
Age	62717	48.350	17.710	17.000	108.000
Income Decentiles	43450	4.860	2.460	1.000	10.000
Education	62106	0.490	0.290	0.000	1.000
Migrant stock, % pop.	62828	8.410	4.590	1.600	16.770
Inflation, annual %	62828	2.850	3.000	-0.490	15.100
Unemployment, total %	62828	8.730	4.300	2.370	22.680
GDP growth rate	62828	2.120	2.180	-5.280	6.450
Generalized Trust	60677	0.390	0.490	0.000	1.000
no trust (%)		37173		61.260	
most people can be trusted (%)		23504		38.740	
Immigrant job rights	62828	0.480	0.500	0.000	1.000
0 (%)		32951		52.450	
1 (%)		29877		47.550	
Employment Status	61096	0.870	0.960	0.000	2.000
Employed (full, part-time, self-employed) (%)		32456		53.120	
unemployed (%)		3947		6.460	
Other (pensioner, housewife, student (%)		24693		40.420	