



**TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies
2023-2025
European Commission Grant No 101095237**

**Consolidated report on the implications of
socioeconomic transformations for democratic
attitudes, political participation, and trust**

Deliverable number:	D3.5
Due date:	31 March 2025
Submission date:	31 May 2025
Type:	REPORT
Dissemination Level:	PU (PUBLIC)
Work Package:	WP3. Role of socioeconomic transformations in reshaping European democracies
Lead Beneficiary:	UOP-GR
Contributing Beneficiaries:	All partners
Authors:	Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Aggeliki Yfanti, Nikos Klironomos, Sokratis Koniordos, Anastasia Kafe, and Kostas Kanellopoulos

Purpose and scope of the deliverable:

The objective of D3.5 is to analyze the impact of socioeconomic transformations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, immigration, and digitalization of work on democracy and political trust in European societies today.

Citation: Sotiropoulos, D.A., Yfanti, A., Klironomos, N., Koniordos, S., Kafe, A. Kanellopoulos, K. (2025). Consolidated report on the implications of socioeconomic transformations for democratic attitudes, political participation, and trust. Working Paper no.3.5. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project (www.truedem.eu).

Table of Contents

Project summary	4
Aims and goals for deliverable	4
Acknowledgements	4
Summary of the Deliverable 3.5	5
Introduction	6
1. Theoretical argumentation about the shift in the basic categories that are implicated in D3.5	6
2. Rationale and selection criteria of societies/countries to be explored statistically	7
3. Formulation of the “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT)	9
<i>The research question</i>	9
4. Brief literature review	10
<i>Brief literature review on the influence of immigration on political trust</i>	10
<i>Brief literature review on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on political trust</i>	13
5. Statistical exploration and analyses	16
Research questions.....	16
Method	17
Satisfaction with how the government and democracy work	21
Coronavirus cases and experiences	25
Satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution ...	27
The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to satisfaction with how the government and democracy work	29
<i>Satisfaction with the National Government and Political Trust (OIPT)</i>	29
Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works and Political Trust (OIPT)	30
<i>Cross-Country Comparisons</i>	30
The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to attitudes towards immigration	31
<i>Immigration and Political Trust</i>	31
<i>Cultural Perceptions of Immigration and Political Trust</i>	32
<i>Immigration and Perceptions of the Country’s Livability</i>	32
<i>Cross-Country Comparisons</i>	32
<i>Having Had COVID-19 and Political Trust</i>	34
<i>Long-Lasting Symptoms and Political Trust</i>	34
<i>Still Having Symptoms and Political Trust</i>	34



<i>Vaccination and Political Trust</i>	34
<i>Cross-Country Comparisons</i>	35
The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution	35
<i>Satisfaction with the Economy and Political Trust</i>	36
<i>Support for Income Redistribution and Political Trust</i>	36
<i>Cross-Country Comparisons</i>	36
Overall relation of the GINI coefficient to satisfaction with the present state of economy, support for income redistribution and satisfaction with how the government and democracy work	36
Relation of “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) to support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the present state of economy, satisfaction with how the government and democracy work and trust in national institutions (OIPT)	38
<i>Support for Income Redistribution and Immigration Attitudes</i>	40
<i>Satisfaction with the Economy and Immigration Attitudes</i>	40
<i>Satisfaction with the Government and Immigration Attitudes</i>	40
<i>Satisfaction with How Democracy Works and Immigration Attitudes</i>	40
<i>Trust in National Institutions and Immigration Attitudes</i>	40
<i>Cross-Country Comparisons</i>	41
DISCUSSION	41
Summary results of univariate analyses	41
Summary results of bivariate analyses	43
Overall discussion of cross-country analysis	44
Strengths and methodological limitations	50
Conclusions	51
References	54
Appendices	57
Appendix 1	57
Appendix 2	58
Appendix 3	59
Appendix 4	60

Project summary

TRUEDEM is a 3-year multinational research project funded by the Horizon program of the European Commission with several core objectives. TRUEDEM aims to design and implement a complex research effort to collect comprehensive evidence on the perceptions of trust and judgments of trustworthiness in a range of European states. The project will create a robust and comprehensive knowledge base on long-term dynamics and predictors of trust in political institutions of representative democracy (parties, executives, parliaments, judiciary etc.) in the EU. TRUEDEM will examine the role of new patterns of electoral behaviour, the impact of socioeconomic transformations, the erosion of old and emergence of new political cleavages for the inclusiveness, representativeness and legitimacy in European democracies, and political trust. TRUEDEM will identify strategies to address the demands and needs of citizens expressed via both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation as means to enhance active engagement and inclusion and thus boost inclusive and responsive decision-making and governance in Europe. TRUEDEM will distinguish clusters of values that can hinder or foster pro-democratic values and attitudes and thus contribute to the barriers and opportunities to re-invigorate and enhance representative democratic systems. Finally, TRUEDEM will develop a comprehensive and transparent toolbox of policy interventions including recommendations, toolkits, and methodologies for enhancing trust in political institutions, boosting transparency and inclusiveness of representative systems. TRUEDEM is coordinated in Austria with partners in Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The three-year program runs from January 2023 to December 2025.

Aims and goals for deliverable

This document is a part of work package 3 - Role of socioeconomic transformations in reshaping European democracies, led by the University of the Peloponnese (team leader: Prof. Sokratis Koniordos).

D3.5 report sets out to discuss the TRUEDEM proposal's plan to compare European countries regarding the impact of recent socioeconomic transformations on democracy and political trust. Based on the availability of data and feasibility of comparison, the deliverable lays out a specific, feasible way to study this impact through a cross-national analysis of 10 European democracies. Then, the rationale of comparison and selection criteria of countries that are included in the deliverable are analyzed. Afterwards, the deliverable introduces a new composite statistical index, the "Overall Index of Political Trust" (OIPT). This section is followed by a brief literature review on how the COVID-19 and immigration have impacted on political trust. A new composite index, the "Immigration Attitudes Index" (IAI), is used. The deliverable then proceeds with statistical explorations and analyses, using European Social Survey (ESS) data. Univariate and bivariate analyses are performed and presented. The purpose of this exercise is to explore the impact of the challenges of COVID-19 and immigration on political trust. Finally, a discussion of findings is presented and conclusions are drawn.

Acknowledgements

We are most thankful for the comments and suggestions provided by Domenico Fruncillo, Angela Delli Paoli, Domico Maddaloni, Pippa Norris, and Aneta Világi in an earlier draft of this paper. Of course they are not responsible for the final outcome.

Summary of the Deliverable 3.5

This deliverable compares European countries regarding the impact of recent socioeconomic transformations, such as growing immigration towards Europe and the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, on democracy and political trust. Based on data drawn on the rounds of European Social Survey for 2020 and 2022, the deliverable focuses on the extent to which perceptions of these socioeconomic transformations influence levels of political trust in 10 European countries. Systematic comparison shows that in all sampled countries, people who feel more positively about how their national government or democracy function are also more likely to trust national political institutions. People who view immigration favorably – whether in economic, cultural, or social terms – are more likely to have higher trust in national institutions. While having had COVID-19 and vaccination tend to be associated with lower trust in many countries, long-term symptoms show mixed effects. Long-term COVID-19 symptoms do not have a strong impact on political trust, while ongoing symptoms are positively correlated with trust in some countries, but not in others. Economic satisfaction is a key factor in political trust across all countries surveyed, while attitudes toward income redistribution have a much weaker influence. Across most countries, positive attitudes toward immigration are associated with greater satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy, as well as higher trust in national institutions. The effects of major socio-economic transformations/challenges, such as immigration and COVID-19, on political trust are variable across countries. As the cases of Poland and Germany show, such variations are the result of the political and economic circumstances of each country.

Introduction

Based on the TRUEDEM proposal, the purpose of D3.5 is to identify and reflect on the socioeconomic pathways to the shaping of democracy and influencing political trust. Specifically, the deliverable's aim is to explore the differential *impact* of the three social transformations, i.e. (a) the COVID-19 pandemic; (b) migration & refugee waves; (c) digitalization of work, on democracy and political trust.

In what follows, this aspect of the deliverable's initial description remains intact. However, there has been a significant shift in the substance of earlier TRUEDEM deliverables and in the availability of relevant data. Actually, due to the lack of pertinent data, it has not been possible to proceed with the examination of the impact of work digitalization on democracy and political trust and that aspect has to be dropped. Thus, in terms of design, the content of D3.5, has been directly affected. It has been reworked and revised and now includes the following six sections:

1. Theoretical argumentation about the shift in the basic categories that are implicated in D3.5.
2. Rationale and selection criteria of societies/countries to be explored statistically.
3. Formulation of the "Overall Index of Political Trust" (OIPT).
4. Brief literature review
5. Statistical exploration and analyses
6. Discussion and conclusions.

1. Theoretical argumentation about the shift in the basic categories that are implicated in D3.5

Regarding the societal types, i.e., broad historical categories of societies, to be utilized in D 3.5, these initially were designated as "traditional", "modern", or "postmodern" (Habermas & Ben-Habib 1981, Korab-Karpowicz 2019). Drawing on the relevant literature (Basáñez 2016), the three designations relied on criteria of preponderance in a society of the basic culture and value orientations of individuals, that correspondingly were seen to reflect honor (traditional society), achievement (modern society), and joy (postmodern society).

However, such aggregates of individual orientations are inherently limited, and in this deliverable the traditional, modern, or postmodern trichotomy has - for substantive purposes - to be dropped. For one thing, The set of orientations *cum* values in the Parsonsian pattern variables (Parsons 1953, 1960, 1985) that have been earmarked as traditional (namely diffuseness, affectivity, particularism, ascription, and collectivity-orientation), do not characterize in themselves any contemporary European social system/society. On the other hand, while the modern and materialist orientations are dominant in Europe today, value features/predispositions, that have been characterized as post-modern/post-materialist, have been on ascending (Inglehart 2000) over the last 50 or so years. So, one finds a mix of individual orientations in each European society to which a neat trichotomy cannot pay justice.

In fact, Ronald Inglehart (1997) has argued that a irreversible changes have occurred in the priorities of values in contemporary western type societies, which are often designated as post-industrial societies, notwithstanding counterarguments that modernity has not lapsed, as A. Giddens and others have pointed out (Giddens 1990, 1991). Irreversible changes relate to issues



of quality of life and expression/self-actualization, which do not negate the importance of the more tangible material dimensions of political and social life, but rather follow or evolve in parallel with material dimensions. Post-materialist issues have their own importance and significance, while being given a distinct and contemporary quality. Relevant issues include human rights, the environment, democracy, openness to choose, and what Anthony Giddens refers to as the present-day possibility, if not demand, for distinct individuals to write their own biography. In a sense, the above sketched post-materialist dimension of culture stands in contrast to issues related to the materialist dimension that focuses on issues such as security or economic development/growth.

Accordingly, we think that in this deliverable we should move away from the tripartite traditional-modern-postmodern distinction. It is a conceptual distinction that in itself is not as useful anymore as it may have been in the past. In addition, it is not supported by any large-scale social surveys from which we could have drawn relevant information.

In detail, based on older, structural functionalism approaches, selected South European and East European societies could have been considered “traditional”. It is exceedingly difficult to make such a case nowadays. These societies have undergone transitions from earlier established social practices (evolving, for example, around family and village life) and values (e.g., the importance of religion) to new forms of collaboration, integration, and governance (Katsikides and Koktsidis 2015). After all, despite differences among European societies, in the early 21st century such societies have converged a lot. In the words of Steffan Mau and Roland Verwiebe who have surveyed all, East and West European societies, in a comparative perspective: “European countries display manifold affinities, for example, in the areas of family structures, labour markets, state-market relations and values” (Mau and Verwiebe 2010: 351). We suggest that the countries studied in this deliverable from the standpoint of their reaction to contemporary, 21st century, challenges, share such affinities.

In the place of the above-mentioned trichotomic distinction, we propose to adopt an updated societal typology, one based on the “materialist” - “post-materialist” value orientations. We thus rely on a basic distinction which is meaningful in designating contemporary European societies. We shed any evolutionist bias that was ingrained in the previously mentioned trichotomy and we suggest a fourfold classification of European societies as “materialist”, “rather materialist”, “rather post-materialist”, “post-materialist”. Our fourfold typology is largely an updated version of the previous, by now outdated, threefold typology of societies noted above and is more sensitive to recent actual trends. It is also reflected in the new index of political trust, on which this report (D3.5) will rely upon and on which there is available data.

2. Rationale and selection criteria of societies/countries to be explored statistically

We have selected a sample of 12 European societies on which there is information as regards the “materialist” – “post-materialist” value orientations, based on European Values Surveys/World Value Surveys (EVS/WVS) and which vary along their income inequalities too (Table 1 below).

We do *not* hypothesize that the impact of socioeconomic transformations/challenges, such as COVID-19 and Immigration, on political trust is different by the type of society as there is no theoretical framework for it. We just use the “materialist”-“post-materialist” dimension as a basis to select a sample of European societies to compare, because, as suggested in the previous section of this deliverable, European societies share materialist and post-materialist dimensions. Yet, a

fourfold clarification of European societies is possible and we sketch it out here: “materialist”, “rather materialist”, “rather post-materialist”, and “post-materialist” societies. This typology is substantiated by considering a set of four questions that entail two materialist and two post-materialist statements - responses to the four questions that form the post-materialist index, which is available in the EVS-5/WVS-8 surveys (there is a lot of work on and information available by such surveys, see Haerpfer et al. 2022)

In some detail, if in a national case (e.g. a selected European society) respondents on the average mostly select postmaterialist elements as their first and second choices in the relevant WVS questions, then the designation ‘post-materialist’ is assigned to that case. If respondents give a post-materialist response as their first choice and a materialist as the second, then the national case is identified as ‘rather post-materialist’. If respondents preferably select a materialist option as their first choice and a post-materialist as their second, then the national case is identified as ‘rather materialist’. If, finally, respondents select materialist items for both their first and second choices, then the ‘materialist’ determination is assigned to the national case study. (The relevant outcomes appear in Appendix 4 of this deliverable).

It is possible then, based on responses to the World Values Survey (shown in Appendix 4) to group European countries in four categories as follows:

- Materialist societies: Portugal, Czechia, Romania.
- Rather materialist societies: Bulgaria, Poland, France.
- Rather post-materialist societies: Greece, the Netherlands, Denmark.
- Post-materialist societies: Germany, Slovenia, Croatia.

These 12 national cases also correspond to a variety of levels of income inequality, measured through the GINI coefficient. As is well known, the Gini index concerns the equalized disposable income in a national society and is available for each European country (see Appendix 1). For our sample of European countries, we have selected those countries that obtain the more extreme as well as intermediate values. We have selected European national cases in which the value of the GINI coefficient roughly ranges between 0.25 and 0.35 in the GINI scale 0.00-100.00. The GINI values for these countries are presented in Table 1 shown below.

Table 1 – County grid – extent of GINI-measured income inequality in selected materialist/post-materialist European societies

MATERIALIST	Portugal Gc: 0.35	Romania Gc: 0.34	Czechia Gc: 0.26
RATHER MATERIALIST	Bulgaria Gc: 0.39	France Gc: 0.32	Poland Gc: 0.28
RATHER POST-MATERIALIST	Greece Gc: 0.33	Croatia Gc: 0.29	Netherlands Gc: 0.26
POST-MATERIALIST	Germany Gc:0.32	Denmark Gc: 0.28	Slovenia Gc:0.24

Gc: Gini coefficient

In the statistical analysis that forms the main body of this deliverable we use ESS survey questions on support/rejection of income redistribution and on satisfaction with the state of the economy as a shorthand.¹

Data limitations

This deliverable does not offer a full analysis of all European societies along the dimensions of materialism/post-materialism and GINI-measured income inequality, as there is a lack of theory linking these two dimensions with the impact of socio-economic transformations (for instance, the challenges of COVID-19 and immigration to Europe) on political trust. The analysis that is presented in the deliverable is exploratory, a kind of a pilot study. It is of an inductive rather than deductive nature.

Moreover, while in this deliverable we started off to explore how the above 12 national cases of European societies perform in regard to democracy and levels of political trust, we have run into limitations of data. Briefly, it soon became apparent during our research that for two of these countries, i.e., for Denmark and Romania, there was missing data. The two countries were not included in the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2020 or 2022 (ESS 2020 or 2022). Nor were they included in other databases that could be integrated. Therefore, in the following analysis these two countries are not considered.

Also, one of the three socioeconomic transformations, namely the digitalization of work, cannot be explored statistically in this deliverable as neither the 2020 nor 2022 ESS dataset contains any relevant information. And no other database, containing reliable data on attitudes towards digitalization, has been identified.² Thus, the analysis of the impact of digitalization on democracy and political trust, based on subjective views recorded in surveys, has been dropped from this deliverable.

3. Formulation of the “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT).

The research question

Instead of using the many different items that measure political trust towards various political institutions, in this deliverable we have constructed a new composite index of political trust.

In detail, we use related data from the European Social Survey (round 11, conducted in 2022-2024) to construct an “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT) with reference to national institutions.³ The index is comprised of three political trust items, namely trust in country’s parliament, trust in political parties, and trust in politicians. The reliability of the new index will be assessed cross-nationally.

¹ As the World Bank has put it:

“The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.”
<https://databank.worldbank.org/metadataglossary/gender-statistics/series/SI.POV.GINI>

² It appears that information regarding attitudes towards digitisation is not gathered. Therefore, there is no pertinent information in even the more specialised databases on digitalisation, such as the well-known “Digital Economy and Society Index” (DESI) (see, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/interactive-publications/digitalization-2024>).

³ The ESS-11 data-set has been released and includes information for 24 European countries.

A descriptive analysis of the OIPT is performed, further down in this report, to investigate its value cross-nationally. Our analysis investigates the impact of the OIPT and how it varies across countries based on respondents' satisfaction with the national government question and the satisfaction with democracy variable.⁴

We will also use three ESS questions about how respondents evaluated the impact of immigrants on the economy of a country, how that country's cultural life has been undermined or enriched by immigrants, as well as how the immigrants are appraised by respondents in making a country a better or worse place to live. On the basis of the three questions, we will examine the impact of immigration on democracy and political trust in a cross-national manner.

Furthermore, there are four useful ESS questions about the experience with COVID-19. These are the following: if the respondents had coronavirus, if the respondents had symptoms lasting three months or longer, if the respondents still have symptoms (at the time of the survey), and finally if the respondents received at least one dose of a vaccine against coronavirus approved by the national regulatory authority of their country. In our research we will investigate responses to these four questions cross-nationally to explore how they vary across countries based on the OIPT.

4. Brief literature review

Brief literature review on the influence of immigration on political trust

This section draws from TRUEDEM deliverable 3.2. It provides a brief review of the impact of migration and refugees on political trust.⁵ In the relevant academic literature there are several perspectives on the matter. A first one puts immigration at the center stage of domestic politics of European democracies (Michael, 2021). It starts from the view that European governments deliberately utilize migration policy as a means of reinforcing state sovereignty at the price of democracy. Thus, they have closed their national borders to migrants and refugees in attempt to fortify national identity. However, the exclusion of migrants, and the violation of their rights, adversely impacts on civic trust and solidarity, which effectively damages the core principles of liberal democracy.

Another perspective perceives immigration as having a detrimental impact on political trust for the host societies. It sets out from a more comprehensive and global view. External challenges such as globalization and deindustrialization have triggered a rise in unemployment and economic crisis that have sparked political repercussions. Immigration is perceived to add fuel to the internal problems which are utilized by populist forces. Restricting immigration aims at countering the rise of such forces. But in doing so, the shift from an earlier humanitarian approach to migrants to policies restricting immigration negatively impact democratic norms (Campani, 2019). It also nurtures a shift of democracy to post-democracy to (Crouch, 2013), as democratic institutions are along the way rendered a pure formality.

A third perspective highlights the challenge irregular immigration poses for rule-based European democracies. In fact, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe have failed to address fundamental rights of migrants and refugees, as evidenced by numerous

⁴ Preliminary testing shows weak results for the latter variable, but as it is more inclusive it will be further explored.

⁵ For further elaboration, see Truedem deliverable D3.2 (Sotiropoulos, Kanellopoulos and Yfanti, 2023).

immigration-related cases (Kuźelewska et al., 2018), indicating that immigration presents European democracies with several moral and legal quandaries.

While empirical research shows that linkages between immigration and political trust exist, the direction of the causal relationship between these two variables remains unsettled. In the rest of this literature review, it emerges that the relationship between the two variables is mediated by various intervening variables. These include grievance mobilization by far-right parties, the content of government migration policy, and the role of the media.

Thus, McLaren (2012a) investigates the link between citizens' worries and misgivings about immigration and political trust in pre-Brexit Britain. For her, it is critical to distinguish between perceived and actual levels of immigration. The former affects political trust. The author describes the effect of immigration on political trust as a series of perceptions. When citizens regard immigration as a threat, they may have doubts about the institutions that govern society, and may mistrust institutions' ability to represent the national community. Furthermore, citizens may criticize elected politicians and the institutions that they run for failing to address the issue of immigration from the outset (McLaren, 2012a: 168). Citizens may consequently lose faith in political structures and authority.

McLaren's analysis on the case of Britain is based on national and international statistics, i.e. the British Election Study (BES) of 2001 and 2005, 2001 and 2005) and the European Social Survey (waves 2002-2003 and 2008-2009). She analyses a variety of political trust indicators to conclude that if citizens perceive the results of immigration negatively, there is a wider issue with the disintegration of political communities on which European democracies are built (McLaren, 2012:185).

In a study on the case of France, the authors wish to know how perceptions of immigrants affect their integration into French society (Danaj et al., 2018). Utilizing the European Social Survey (2014 wave, French component), the researchers look into the relationship between immigration and trust in the French parliament and judicial system/justice. They use odds ratios to determine how having high or low trust in the above two institutions affects attitudes towards immigration.

It turns out that in France individuals with low trust in parliament are more likely to have negative feelings towards immigrants than those with high trust, while those who have poor trust in the legal system are even more likely to have negative feelings towards immigrants than those who have high trust (Danaj et al., 2018: 235-236). The conclusion is that a lack of trust in the above-mentioned institutions defines negative attitudes towards immigration. Still, the data offered in Danaj et al. (2018) is limited (the findings of a single wave of ESS in one nation).

Among cross-national studies, McLaren's study (2012b) provides the clearest explanation of the claim that immigration has a detrimental impact on political trust. Drawing on European Social Survey data (ESS wave 2002-2009), which she models, McLaren investigates the effects of immigration on political trust in national government, parliament, and the legal system/justice, claiming that it is non-spurious. The statistical relationship holds even after controlling for many independent variables (McLaren, 2012b: 211). It is worth noting that the Far-Right's mobilization of citizens has no apparent effect on levels of political trust. The implication is that the starting point in explaining the negative impact of immigration on political trust is how citizens perceive immigration.

The study's conclusion emphasizes the importance of belonging to one's national community. Immigrants who hold diverse cultures (values and lifestyles) are viewed as threatening to the community. They are perceived as endangering national and social identity, which citizens believe national political institutions should protect. If institutions fail to accomplish this duty, citizens lose trust in them (McLaren, 2012b: 221 and 230). This implies that the degree to which citizens regard political institutions as trustworthy influences levels of political trust.

In yet another research, McLaren studies how inclusive and exclusive national identity constructions affect political trust in an age of migration (McLaren, 2017: 380). She analyses public trust in the national government, parliament, and the legal system, using data collected across the EU, which are drawn from Eurobarometer 71.3 (EB71.3), and from EU's Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, accessible at <https://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex>).

McLaren's key conclusion is that the relationship between immigration and political trust is determined by the sort/type of government immigration policy (as operationalized in her research using MIPEX). This finding is differentiated along four lines. Citizens have more trust in their country's political institutions when they subscribe to exclusionary ideas about other people, such as ascriptive characteristics (e.g., place of birth or parents' nationality), and when the government's immigration policy is also exclusionary. When citizens take an exclusive position towards immigration, yet their government's policy is more inclusive, political trust suffers. There are two intermediate places between these two extremes: Compared to the preceding example (low trust), trust is higher when migration policy is less inclusive but the individual emphasizes civic identity, and when migration policy is less inclusive and the individual emphasizes exclusive identity (McLaren, 2017: 392-393). Accordingly, the article's key contribution is its thesis that political trust is determined by the connection between a government's migration policy and citizens' attitudes towards immigration.

Among more recent cross-national studies linking immigration and political trust two stand out as more relevant for the purposes of this deliverable. The first one explores how anger, rather than fear, underlies voter support for Far-Right parties, negative attitudes towards immigrants, and low political trust (Cengiz & Vasilopoulou, 2022). The authors use online samples of the German and Dutch populations from PanelClix of 2015-2016; they also draw from a representative sample of the British population in 2019, by YouGov's U.K. Their study's main finding is that anti-immigrant sentiment is linked to Far-Right voting preferences. Yet, the association between anger and voting for the Far Right is moderated by levels of political trust. So, although anger increases the likelihood of voting for the Far-Right, people with higher levels of political trust are less likely to do so, and vice versa (Cengiz & Vasilopoulou, 2022: 642). However, as the attention of the authors is on an emotional response (anger contrasted to fear) with immigration and not on perceptions which is our area of focus, its relevance is of limited use.

The second study is more relevant. Its author (Wallace Goodman, 2021) addresses the question of whether citizens who regard immigration as a threat support liberal democratic values or favour other illiberal standards. Drawing on data from recent (2019) and comparable national surveys in the USA, UK, and Germany, the author finds that political polarization in the United Kingdom and Germany, is an important intervening element in the relationship between immigration and political trust (Wallace Goodman, 2021: 2054). Perception is all important here. Hence in the UK in which there is more acute polarization than in Germany, Labour Party voters adopt fewer liberal values when they perceive immigration in a negative light. In Germany, however, voters are not separated by party affiliation. Rather, irrespective of political affiliation, they portray immigration

negatively. Germans emphasize their devotion to their national community while decreasing their commitment to liberal values.

In other words, the perceived threat of immigration has a greater impact on left-wing voters than right-wing voters. In the author's own words, "citizens interpret norms of good citizenship in response to outgroup threats in line with partisanship" (Wallace Goodman, 2021: 2055). One possible explanation of the findings is that voters other than left-wingers were negatively predisposed to immigration before the scale of migrant inflow reached an unprecedented level.

Overall, in all three nations surveyed, there was a decline in support for liberalism and an increase in support for national identity, a tendency that was particularly evident among Left-wing voters. A key element to remember is that the portrayal of immigration is critical since it can lead to a decline in liberal democratic standards. At the same time, Wallace Goodman's research clearly emphasizes the role of mediating factors in the relationship between immigration and political trust.

Brief literature review on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on political trust.

The literature that touches on the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on political trust is extensive. A review of this literature has been attempted in a TRUEDEM project's deliverable (D3.1) on the basis of country-based briefs. Thirteen European countries have been surveyed, of which 11 are in the EU, forming a substantial cross section of the available literature in EU.⁶ This section of our deliverable draws from that source. What follows is a summary presentation of the common themes (thematic axes) identified in that literature, which shows what are the main lines of interests of European scholarship on the topic as a whole and provides the context for the unfolding or impeding of trustworthiness and trust.

The organizing principle for teasing out the thematic axes from the trust literature on COVID-19's impact on political trust is the identification of themes that are more prevalent than others, i.e., those to which multiple national literature works refer.

The pertinent thematic axes identified are five, the following:

1. Trust as driver of compliance to measures against the pandemic.
2. Vaccinations and protests during the pandemic crisis.
3. Political liberties and democracy.
4. Socio-demographic and affective drivers of vaccination refusal and hesitation.
5. The COVID-19 pandemic and other specific thematic areas.

⁶ The literature briefs refer to the following EU countries: Austria (AT), Czechia (CZ), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), and Sweden. The two non-EU European countries are: the Ukraine (UA) and Moldova (MD). For further elaboration, see Truedem deliverable D3.1 (Demertzis, Yfanti, and Koniordos, 2023).

1. Trust as driver of compliance to measures against the pandemic.⁷

Trust comes about as a major concern in all critical phases of the pandemic, as well as a key aspect in the success of the vaccine effort, specifically for Italy (IT), but also in other country review briefs.

Related trust studies were conducted and reported in numerous countries, including AT, CZ, DE, FR (on distrust and partisan prejudice), MD, and SK, where trust, its role, and importance were examined. Several national literature reports show the emergence of the "rallying around the flag" phenomena at the epidemic's outset, when the rapid spread of the disease caught everyone off guard. The state was viewed as the primary pillar of pandemic resistance at the time, but this trust was weakened or phased out in most cases after six months to a year (AT, DE, EL, FR, RO, SI, UA). The lack of trust has had an impact on compliance as well. The reasons behind this are complicated and contentious. Lockdown and vaccination, for example, have been viewed by some as a restriction in democratic rights (EL, PL).

This has resulted in a conversation about reviewing previous (past) experiences that applies to both the collective and individual levels. Thus, it became obvious that prior relative deprivation contributes to the decline of trust (AT, SK, UA). And there are levels of vulnerability that are worth noting: when the public across more vulnerable nations (e.g., RO, MD, UA), as well as within a country (AT), felt dissatisfied with the record of health care and social assistance they received, they lost faith in the process in the effectiveness of anti-COVID-19 efforts. Furthermore, previous systemic issues (UA) hampered help delivery, compounded by a prior loss of trust in authority. Thus, pre-existing patterns and conditions influence the severity, issues, and responses encountered during the pandemic (SK). Besides this, specific groups within a country, as in DE, that otherwise performed well in terms of compliance (and trustworthiness), were not supported as they should. There was then loss of trust, expressed in lesser degrees of compliance to government measures.

2. Vaccinations and protests during the pandemic crisis.

While the acute crisis caused by the global onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic and the extraordinary measures taken to combat it aided the "round the flag" rallying, the introduction of vaccines in early 2021, while improving the health situation, did not prove effective in eradicating the disease. This created a delivery gap. The scientific basis and practical efficacy of official *dictats* that claimed to protect citizens' lives were increasingly questioned, and government engagement in the fight against COVID-19 pandemic was generally viewed as a publicity gimmick. As worries and the hold of diverse particularistic ideas rose, the government's commandism was regarded as an additional unbearable weight, one that limited individual rights and liberties, while funneling vaccine reluctance and demonstrations against compulsory vaccination. As various country reports (IT, PO, SI, SK, UK) show, the political/ideological imperatives of oppositional political parties came to the forefront to bolster protests, which, while complex, did not reach particularly mass proportions and was rather nonviolent.

However, an oxymoron has emerged: the populations of European countries with the biggest number of anti-vax protests and previous vaccine hesitation have not avoided vaccines. In practice, open protest does not appear to result in fewer vaccinations. The reality of vaccinations appears to be unconnected to the well-known distinction between high-trust Northern European countries and

⁷ This part draws from D3.1, section IV.

low-trust Southern European countries. A possible explanation is that trust is not a major issue in this case. Instead, vaccination practice reveals an East European vs. West European divide, with the former being far less immunized than the latter. This may reflect an inherent divide between poor and rich countries, which may exhibit itself through popular attitudes and mindsets, as well as governmental policies or (in)ability.

3. Political liberties and democracy.

Democracy and political liberties are hotly debated issues. The restriction of liberties by governments has sparked debate, with some claiming that democratic rights have been eroded and that democratic regimes have slipped into technocratic rule, authoritarianism, or commandism (IT, EL, PL, UA). In fact, it has been stated that lockdowns and vaccinations, because they are mandatory, have contributed to the erosion of democratic rights (EL, PL). The issue therefore becomes one of safety against civil liberties and social trust (PL).

Governments were reported to be backsliding on democratic rights and democracy (EL, RO, IT). This likelihood has raised concerns about the necessity for political responses to the pandemic problem (IT, EL), which have also been mentioned in other country reviews, such as CZ and PL, and has prompted legal investigations into the relationship between democracy and a country's constitution (CZ, RO, SK).

Democratic elections held during pandemic lockdowns have elicited a variety of reactions, with some viewing them as a paradox that raises the question of democracy. Elections were held in Poland and Moldova during the initial phase of the pandemic, but these have been viewed with skepticism in the literature (MD, PL, RO). Furthermore, voting for specific parties can lead to partisan politics and party identification - I support my party whether (or not) it is in power, regardless of what it says. Moreover, a pattern has been established between coercive policies pursued by governments and consensual policies, which are determined by prior levels of trust in government, and particularly (for the latter) by imminent elections (FR, EL, PL, RO).

4. Socio-demographic and affective drivers of vaccination refusal and hesitation.

The literature review on pandemic and political trust has brought up the question of variation among individuals. The hypothesis is that there are strong correlations between certain psychological aspects of individuals and their positive attitudes towards immunization (SI). Individualization of the pandemic's impact based on one's own circumstances (IT, SI) is another aspect of the phenomenon to consider, as described in relevant publications that appeared in these countries.

In researching actual patterns of trust and the pandemic, factors influencing compliance with various measures (SK) were identified and analyzed for numerous countries (DE, FR, SI, and UA). Old age and poor socioeconomic status clearly have a role, due to increased health vulnerability, indicating a higher level of compliance with restriction measures (DE, SI, UA). Moreover, higher education levels are likewise associated with conformity, whereas lower education levels suggest a predisposition to accept lay, non-scientific ideas (CZ, DE, RO, SI).

Extensive economic support has been widely appreciated by the general public and fosters consensus (IT), but not always (AT). The converse situation, i.e., the perceived paucity of financial assistance measures, has discouraged people from giving their consent to government action, resulting in unfavorable appraisals and unhappiness with governments' performance in regard to the pandemic (UA, MD).



5. The COVID-19 pandemic and other specific thematic areas.

One subject area that has received some attention is the rise of *non-scientific* and *conspiratorial* notions (RO, SI, SK). Indeed, conspiracy theories have a significant grip on the population of various countries (EL, RO), as has a lack of trust in science.

Several briefings (CZ, UA, SK, EL) have examined the role of *media*, both official/state and private media, as well as communication concerns impacting their trustworthiness. It has been underlined that information sources on pandemic-related issues play a role in building trust with authorities and ensuring compliance (DE).

Some literature briefs (RO, EL, PO) have addressed the enhancement of *digitalization* of government services, education, and work, as well as related security risks. On the other hand, there have been assessments and critiques of what has been dubbed technocratic populism (CZ).

To sum up, the purpose of the exercise has been to establish the breadth of the impact of COVID-19 on the formulation and shaping of trust in government and political institutions. In most, but not in all, European countries during an initial period there was increased political trust due to the rally round the flag effect generated by the COVID-19 pandemic generated. Later on, however, there was a decline in trust in government as the lockdown persisted, vaccination programs were launched, and the economic repercussions of the pandemic affected large segments of the population.

5. Statistical exploration and analyses

In this section of the deliverable, we lay out our research question, method and available data sources. We then present results of descriptive statistics and then proceed with statistical analysis, showing the results of correlations between, on the one hand, independent variables related to the challenges of immigration and the COVID-19 pandemic, and, on the other hand, aspects of political trust.

Research questions

With the above theoretical and empirical insights in mind and using the European Social Survey (ESS) datasets in this report we comparatively explore the links between political trust with attitudes on immigration and experiences of coronavirus. Our analyses encompass two EU countries which participated only in the 10th Round of the ESS implemented during 18/09/2020 - 03/09/2022 and eight EU countries that participated in the 11th Round of the ESS implemented during 08/03/2023 - 29/06/2024.

To do so, we first create an “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT) with reference to national, political institutions assessing its reliability cross-nationally. Then, through descriptive statistics and correlation analysis we explore these links by addressing the following research questions:

- What is the relationship between the OIPT and satisfaction with the way the national government and the democracy work?
- What is the relationship between the OIPT and attitudes towards immigration?
- What is the relationship between the OIPT and experiences of the coronavirus?
- What is the relationship between the OIPT and satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution?

- What is the relationship between the GINI coefficient and satisfaction with the present state of economy, support for income redistribution and satisfaction with how the government and democracy work?
- What is the relationship between attitudes on immigration and support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the present state of economy, satisfaction with how the government and democracy work, and trust in national institutions (OIPT)?

Method

Procedure and Participants

The analysis was based on the 2020 ESS datasets for Bulgaria and Czechia (European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure, 2023) and the 2022 ESS datasets for Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia (European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure, 2024).

The ESS implements all the strict methodological prerequisites for overtime and cross-national comparability (Kish 1994; Carey 2000) by applying probability sampling, minimum effective achieved sample sizes in all participating countries, a maximum target non-response rate of 30% (The ESS Sampling Expert Panel 2016). Applying the same definition to all rounds, the ESS defines the survey population as all individuals aged 15+ residing within private households in each country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or language. The surveys of all rounds used exclusively face-to-face interviewing as the data collection method, but in the 2020 survey, due to the pandemic, national teams were allowed to implement self-completion methods for the first time (Hanson, 2021).

The ESS standardized questionnaire is designed centrally in British English including a core questionnaire that is repeated in all rounds of the survey and a rotating module employing rigorous translation strategies (Harkness et al. 2010). In the 2020 ESS survey, as in all previous surveys, face-to-face interviewing was used for data collection (European Social Survey, 2020a) and a shorter questionnaire for the surveys applying self-completion (European Social Survey, 2020b) methods. Therefore, the two ESS surveys are not strictly comparable.

In this respect, the 2020 ESS surveys of Bulgaria and Czechia used face-to-face interviewing and consequently their datasets are comparable. In the 2022 ESS survey, face-to-face interviewing was used for data collection for all participating countries (European Social Survey, 2022), except in the case of Czechia where a self-completion questionnaire was implemented rendering cross-national comparability impossible. Therefore, it was decided to use the 2020 ESS dataset for Czechia. In the analyses, the countries are presented using the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes followed by 20 or 22 to distinguish among the 2020 or 2022 ESS datasets, respectively.

In Table 2, a summary of the participants' demographic and social characteristics is presented. As shown, in the case of Bulgaria, gender was almost equally distributed, the mean age was 52, 43.3% were married, 64.8% had completed secondary education and half were in paid work. In the case of Czechia, the sample included more women than men, the mean age was 56, 35.8% were married, 61.4% had completed secondary education and 57.1% were in paid work. In 2022, in most countries gender was almost equally distributed, with the exception of Portugal and Greece - and to a lesser extent in Croatia - where the samples included more women than men. The mean age ranged from 49 (Poland) to 54 (Portugal). Married participants and those that had completed secondary education ranged from 43.8% (France) to 57.3% (Croatia) and 51.6% (Germany) to



77.7% (Croatia), respectively. Participants in paid work ranged from 45.5% (Croatia) to 63.5% (Netherlands).

Table 2. The demographic and social characteristics of participants: European Social Survey, 2020 and 2022

Country/year	N	Men	Women	Age	Married	Education *	In paid work**
		(%)	(%)	\bar{X} (SD)	(%)	(%)	(%)
ESS 2020							
Bulgaria	2,718	47.2	52.8	52.68 (18.256)	43.4	64.8	51.3
Czechia	2,476	43.6	56.4	48.30 (17.719)	35.8	61.3	57.1
ESS 2022							
Croatia	1,563	45.5	54.5	51.63 (19.717)	57.3	77.7	45.5
France	1,771	49.4	50.6	50.22 (19.222)	43.8	58.1	53.6
Germany	2,420	50.2	49.8	50.38 (18.997)	53.9	51.6	59.1
Greece	2,757	44.9	55.1	51.00 (17.357)	55.7	70.7	57.7
Netherlands	1,695	49.7	50.3	50.52 (18.827)	48.5	55.0	63.5
Poland	1,442	46.8	53.2	48.73 (18.466)	58.8	65.7	54.6
Portugal	1,373	42.1	57.9	54.30 (18.286)	48.3	74.5	53.5
Slovenia	1,248	48.7	51.3	49.76 (19.569)	48.5	68.2	53.6

* Secondary education or lower based on the European Social Survey version of ISCED (ES-ISCED values ES-ISCED I – ES-ISCED IIIa).

** The reference period for the respondent’s main activity was defined as during the last 7 days.

Measures

In Table 3, the 2020 and 2022 ESS measurements considered for the analyses are presented in the order they appear in the respective questionnaires. As shown, the three questions on political trust, the questions on the satisfaction with how the government and democracy work and the three questions measuring attitudes towards immigration are part of the core questionnaire and in the same order in both surveys. Questions on the coronavirus pandemic were first introduced in the 2020 ESS and therefore there is only one common question. The level of measurement of the variables assigned to a 0-10 scale is considered as interval. The level of measurement of the variables measured with three categories is ordinal. Variables measured with two values are dichotomies.

Table 3. The 2020 and 2022 European Social Survey (ESS) measurements used in the analyses

	ESS20 quest.	ESS22 quest.	Alig ned scale
How much do you trust the [country's] parliament: no trust at all (0)/complete trust (10)	B6	B6	0-10
How much do you trust the politicians: no trust at all (0)/complete trust (10)	B9	B9	0-10
How much do you trust the political parties: no trust at all (0)/complete trust (10)	B10	B10	0-10
On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]? extremely dissatisfied (0)/extremely satisfied (10)	B28	B28	0-10
Now thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? extremely dissatisfied (0)/extremely satisfied (10)	B29	B29	0-10
And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? extremely dissatisfied (0)/extremely satisfied (10)	B30	B30	0-10
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Agree strongly (0)/Disagree strongly (5)	B33	B33	1-5
Would you say it is generally bad (0) or good (10) for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries?	B43	B43	0-10
And would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined (0) or enriched (10) by people coming to live here from other countries?	B44	B44	0-10
Is [country] made a worse (0) or a better (10) place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?	B45	B45	0-10
Have you had coronavirus? Yes, I tested positive for coronavirus (1); Yes, I think I had coronavirus but was not tested/did not test positive (2); No, I have not had coronavirus (3). *	K17	K1	1-3
As a result of your coronavirus infection, did you have any of the symptoms on this card lasting 3 months or longer that you did not have prior to having coronavirus? Yes (1), No (2).		K2	1-2
(Filter question K2=1) Do you have any of these symptoms now? Yes (1), No (2).		K3	1-2
Have you received at least one dose of s vaccine against coronavirus? Yes (1), No (2).		K4	1-2

* In the 2022 ESS questionnaire this question was worded as “Have you had coronavirus at any time since the start of 2020?” using the same three values.

Statistical Analysis

First, an “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT) in national, political institutions was created by averaging the three items measuring political trust in the national government, the politicians and the political parties and its reliability was assessed cross-nationally. An index was considered reliable if Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were $\geq .70$ (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).

Univariate analyses were carried out for all measures cross-nationally. Bivariate correlation analyses were performed. Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlation coefficients were used for interval and categorical measures, respectively.

In carrying out statistical analyses, whether univariate, bivariate or multivariate, it was decided not to apply the analysis weight proposed by ESS (Kaminska, 2020) as in most cases the sample sizes of Bulgaria and Czechia of the ESS 2020 datasets and those of Croatia, Greece and Slovenia of the ESS 2022 datasets were so reduced as not to comply with the criterion of minimum effective sample sizes, a requirement met the achieved sample sizes. Furthermore, in the cases of France, Germany, and Poland of the ESS 2022 datasets the sample sizes were largely increased. In all cases, the resulting distribution and statistics of participants’ demographic characteristics were to a great extent distorted (see Appendix 1, Table A1).

Statistical analyses and path analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 27.

Results

The Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT): Reliability and descriptive

In Table 4, the OIPT reliabilities are presented for each country and survey. As shown, in all countries, the OIPT was reliable with Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients $\geq .70$. It ranged for 2020 and 2022 from .896 (Bulgaria), to .920 (Czechia), to .861 (France), and to .914 (Greece), respectively.


Table 4. “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT) reliability: European Social Survey (ESS) 2020 and 2022

Country/year	Cronbach’s alpha coefficient	Country/year	Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
ESS 2020			
Bulgaria	.896		
Czechia	.920		
ESS 2022		ESS 2022	
Croatia	.884	Netherlands	.907
France	.861	Poland	.882
Germany	.909	Portugal	.898
Greece	.914	Slovenia	.891



Figure 1 presents the mean OIPT values for each country and survey. In the 2020 ESS, Czechia had a higher mean score (4.13) than Bulgaria (2.19). In the 2022 ESS, the Netherlands recorded the highest mean score (5.11), while Croatia had the lowest (2.36).

Figure 1. Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT): Mean values



Satisfaction with how the government and democracy work

In Figures 2 and 3, the mean values of satisfaction with how the government and democracy work are presented, respectively.

As shown in Figure 2, the mean satisfaction scores with how the government works were higher in Czechia (4.67) than in Bulgaria (3.08) in the 2020 ESS. In the 2022 ESS, the Netherlands (4.58) and Poland (4.53) had the highest scores, while Croatia had the lowest (3.3).

Similarly, Figure 3 shows that in the 2020 ESS, Czechia (5.64) had a higher mean satisfaction score with how democracy works than Bulgaria (3.19). In the 2022 ESS, the highest scores were recorded in the Netherlands (5.97) and Germany (5.70), while Greece (4.17) and France (4.23) had the lowest.



Figure 2. Satisfaction with how the government works: Mean values





Figure 3. Satisfaction with how democracy works: Mean values



Attitudes towards immigration

In Figures 4, 5 and 6, mean values of the opinions on whether immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy, whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life and whether they make a country a worse or a better place to live are presented, respectively.

As shown in Figure 4, the 2020 ESS mean scores on whether immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy were higher in Bulgaria (4.94) than in Czechia (4.51). In the 2022 ESS, Portugal recorded the highest mean score (6.23), while Greece had the lowest (4.10).

Figure 5 illustrates that in the 2020 ESS, Bulgaria (4.95) had a higher mean score than Czechia (3.76) regarding whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country’s cultural life. In the 2022 ESS, the Netherlands had the highest mean score (6.28), whereas Greece had the lowest (4.02).

Similarly, Figure 6 shows that in the 2020 ESS, Bulgaria (4.77) had higher mean scores than Czechia (3.81) on whether immigrants make a country a worse or better place to live. In the 2022 ESS, the highest mean scores were recorded in the Netherlands (5.50) and Poland (5.49), while Greece had the lowest (4.19).

Figure 4. Whether immigration is bad or good for the country’s economy: Mean values






Figure 5. Whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants: Mean values






Figure 6. Whether immigrants make a country a worse or a better place to live: Mean values



Coronavirus cases and experiences

In Figure 7, the frequency distribution of the variable measuring whether respondents had coronavirus is presented. As shown, in the 2020 ESS 13.20% and 20.20% of the respondents declared they had coronavirus in Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, respondents declaring they had coronavirus ranged from 51.6% (Croatia) to 79.3% (Greece).

Figure 7. Whether respondents had coronavirus: Frequencies



In Figures 8 and 9, the frequency distributions of the variables measuring whether respondents had symptoms associated with coronavirus lasting three months or longer and they still have such symptoms, respectively. As shown (Figure 9), in the 2022 ESS respondents declaring they had symptoms lasting three months or longer ranged from 23.8% (Greece) to 50.1% (Poland). Of these respondents, those that declared still having symptoms (Figure 10) ranged from 16.2% (Greece) to 41.6% (Netherlands).



Figure 8. Whether respondents had symptoms lasting 3 months or longer: Frequencies






Figure 9. Whether respondents has still symptoms: Frequencies





In Figure 10, the frequency distribution of the variable measuring whether respondents had received at least one dose of vaccine is presented. As shown, respondents declaring that they did have received at least one dose of a vaccine ranged from 67.2% (Croatia) to 95.3% (Portugal).

Figure 10. Whether respondents received at least one dose of vaccine: Frequencies



Satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution

In Figures 11 and 12, the mean values of satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution. As shown in Figure 11, the mean satisfaction scores with the present state of economy were higher in Czechia (5.17) than in Bulgaria (2.94) in the 2020 ESS. In the 2022 ESS, the Netherlands (5.74) and Poland (5.26) had the highest scores, while Greece had the lowest (3.37).

Similarly, Figure 12 shows that in the 2020 ESS, Czechia (2.78) had a higher mean support for income redistribution than Bulgaria (1.65). In the 2022 ESS, the highest scores were recorded in Poland (2.54) and the Netherlands (2.36), while Portugal (1.74) and Greece (1.65) had the lowest.



Figure 11. Satisfaction with present state of economy: Mean values





Figure 12. Support for income redistribution: Mean values





The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to satisfaction with how the government and democracy work

Table 5 (below) shows the statistical relationship between respondents' satisfaction with how the government and democracy work and the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT).

Satisfaction with the National Government and Political Trust (OIPT)

In the 2020 European Social Survey (ESS), respondents' satisfaction with how the government works was positively correlated with political trust in national institutions. The correlation coefficients were .510 for Bulgaria and .517 for Czechia, indicating a moderate relationship between the two variables in these countries.

In the 2022 ESS, respondents' satisfaction with how the government works continued to show a significant positive correlation with political trust in national institutions in all surveyed countries. The strength of these correlations varied considerably across nations. The lowest correlation was found in Poland (.434), suggesting a weaker but still significant relationship between satisfaction with national government and trust in political institutions. Conversely, the strongest correlation was observed in Germany (.710). So, in Germany satisfaction with the government was much more strongly associated with trust in political institutions than in Poland. Other countries fell within this range (Germany-Poland), with Netherlands (.709) displaying a similarly strong relationship, while Portugal (.501), Greece (.560), and Slovenia (.589) exhibited moderate associations.

Similarly, in the 2020 ESS, respondents' satisfaction with how democracy works was positively correlated with political trust in national institutions in Bulgaria (.524) and Czechia (.504), suggesting that those who were more satisfied with democracy tended to have higher trust in political institutions.



Table 5. Satisfaction with the national government, satisfaction with the way democracy works in country and trust in national institutions: Pearson’s R correlation coefficients

Variable	Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) in national institutions				
	Bulgaria20	Czechia20	Croatia22	France22	Germany22
Satisfaction with the national government	.510	.517	.680	.594	.710
Satisfaction with the way democracy works	.524	.504	.534	.576	.685
Variable	Greece22	Netherlands22	Poland22	Portugal22	Slovenia22
Satisfaction with the national government	.560	.709	.434	.501	.589
Satisfaction with the way democracy works	.599	.649	.395	.531	.586

* All the results are significant at $p < .001$.

Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works and Political Trust (OIPT)

In the 2022 ESS, these relationships remained significant and positive across all countries. The weakest correlation was again found in Poland (.395), indicating that satisfaction with democracy had the least impact on political trust compared to other countries. Meanwhile, Germany (.685) showed the strongest correlation, suggesting that in Germany, citizens’ trust in national institutions was more closely linked to their satisfaction with democracy. The Netherlands (.649) also exhibited a strong association. Other countries, such as Greece (.599), Portugal (.531), and Slovenia (.586), fell between the values of Germany and Poland and had moderate relationships.

Cross-Country Comparisons

A key pattern across both indicators – satisfaction with the government and satisfaction with democracy – is that Germany and the Netherlands have the strongest positive correlations, meaning that in these countries, political trust is more strongly linked to government and democracy’s performance. In contrast, Poland consistently shows the weakest correlations,

indicating that trust in institutions is less dependent on how people perceive the government and democracy.

Moreover, Slovenia, Portugal, and Greece exhibit moderate relationships in both aspects, suggesting a balanced but not overwhelmingly strong connection between political satisfaction and trust in institutions. This indicates that while governance and democracy are relevant for political trust in these countries, other factors may also play a significant role, as discussed further below in this deliverable.

The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to attitudes towards immigration

In Table 6, the relationship between respondents' attitudes towards immigration and their trust in national political institutions is presented. The table shows positive correlations, meaning that more favorable views on immigration are associated with higher levels of political trust across all countries. The strength of these correlations varies, suggesting differences in how immigration attitudes shape political trust in different national contexts.

Table 6. Attitudes towards immigration and trust in national institutions: Pearson's R correlation coefficients

Variable	Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) in national institutions				
	Bulgaria20	Czechia20	Croatia22	France22	Germany22
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.229*	.324*	.156*	.268*	.449*
Country's cultural life undermined					
or enriched by immigrants	.210*	.266*	.120*	.244*	.444*
Immigrants make country worse					
or better place to live	.225*	.363*	.178*	.240*	.511*
Variable	Greece22	Netherlands22	Poland22	Portugal22	Slovenia22
Immigration bad or good for country's economy	.190*	.333*	.067**	.248*	.278*
Country's cultural life undermined					
or enriched by immigrants	.200*	.317*	.066**	.225*	.260*
Immigrants make country worse					
or better place to live	.164*	.355*	.120*	.271*	.302*

* $p < .001$. ** $p < .05$.

Immigration and Political Trust

Respondents' perceptions of whether immigration is good or bad for the country's economy were significantly correlated with political trust in national institutions in most countries. The highest correlation was found in Germany (.449), followed by Czechia (.324) and Netherlands (.333). This suggests that in these countries, individuals who believe that immigration benefits the economy

are more likely to trust national institutions. In other words, the stronger the belief that immigration is good for the national economy, the higher the trust in political institutions.

On the other hand, Poland had the weakest correlation (.067), and it was only significant at $p < .05$, indicating that economic perceptions of immigration have a very limited impact on political trust in Poland. Greece (.190), Portugal (.248), and Slovenia (.278) showed moderate correlations, implying that while immigration attitudes play a role in shaping trust, they are not the strongest predictor.

Cultural Perceptions of Immigration and Political Trust

The belief that immigration undermines or enriches a country's cultural life was also positively correlated with political trust. Again, Germany (.444) and Czechia (.266) showed relatively strong relationships, meaning that in these countries, people who view immigration as culturally enriching tend to have greater trust in institutions. Netherlands (.317) and France (.244) exhibited similar trends.

However, Poland (.066) again had the lowest correlation, suggesting that in Poland, cultural attitudes toward immigration have little to no effect on political trust. Other countries, such as Bulgaria (.210), Greece (.200), Portugal (.225), and Slovenia (.260), had moderate correlations, indicating that the impact of cultural perceptions on trust is present but not as strong as in Germany or the Netherlands.

Immigration and Perceptions of the Country's Livability

The strongest correlations in this table are found in the third variable: whether immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live. Germany (.511) had the highest correlation, followed by Czechia (.363) and Netherlands (.355). This suggests that in these countries, believing that immigration improves the country's livability is strongly associated with political trust. In other words, the stronger the belief that immigration makes a country a worthy place to live, the higher the trust in political institutions.

Bulgaria (.225), France (.240), Portugal (.271), Slovenia (.302), and Greece (.164) had moderate correlations, implying a consistent but weaker relationship. Once again, Poland (.120) had the weakest correlation, reinforcing the idea that in Poland, attitudes toward immigration have a relatively minor impact on political trust.

Cross-Country Comparisons

Germany has the strongest overall correlations, implying that public perceptions of immigration play a key role in political trust. Czechia and the Netherlands also show strong relationships, particularly in terms of immigration's perceived impact on the country's livability. France, Portugal, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Greece exhibit moderate correlations, suggesting immigration perceptions contribute to trust but are not the sole factor. Poland stands out with the weakest correlations, indicating that attitudes toward immigration have a limited influence on trust in institutions there.

The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to coronavirus cases and experiences

Table 7 presents the Spearman's correlation coefficients between respondents' experiences with COVID-19 (having had the virus, long-lasting symptoms, and vaccination) and their trust in national political institutions. Unlike the previous tables, some correlations here are negative, indicating an inverse relationship. This means that in some countries, having had COVID-19 or receiving a vaccine is associated with lower trust in institutions.

Table 7. Coronavirus cases, long lasting symptoms, vaccination and trust in national institutions: Spearman's correlation coefficients

Variable	Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) in national institutions				
	Bulgaria20	Czechia20	Croatia22	France22	Germany22
Respondent had coronavirus	-.017	-.058**	-.028	-.003	-.118*
Respondent had symptoms lasting 3 months or longer			-.014	.052	.130*
Respondent has still symptoms			-.050	.046	.136**
Respondent received at least one dose of vaccine			-.099*	-.123*	-.145*
Variable	Greece22	Netherlands22	Poland22	Portugal22	Slovenia22
Respondent had coronavirus	.098*	-.103*	-.002	-.091**	-.065**
Respondent had symptoms lasting 3 months or longer	-.061**	.089**	.000	.076**	.010
Respondent has still symptoms	-.064	.201*	.142**	.073	0.47
Respondent received at least one dose of vaccine	-.068*	-.187*	-.098*	-.025	-.080**

* $p < .001$. ** $p < .05$.

Having Had COVID-19 and Political Trust

The relationship between having contracted COVID-19 and political trust varies across countries. In Germany (-.118), Netherlands (-.103), Portugal (-.091), Slovenia (-.065), and Czechia (-.058), having had COVID-19 is negatively correlated with political trust. This suggests that people who had the virus tend to have slightly lower trust in national political institutions, with the strongest effect seen in Germany.

In contrast, in Greece (.098), having had COVID-19 is positively correlated with political trust, indicating that those who contracted the virus tend to trust institutions slightly more. This may be counterintuitive. It can be explained by considering that upon the emergence of the epidemic, the Greek government took measures very fast to manage the spread of the virus and later on put together a digitally-supported nationwide vaccination program that was efficiently implemented. For other countries such as Poland (-.002), Croatia (-.028), and France (-.003), the relationship is very weak or statistically insignificant.

Long-Lasting Symptoms and Political Trust

The correlation between experiencing symptoms lasting three months or longer and political trust is mostly weak and inconsistent across countries. Germany (.130) and Netherlands (.089) show a positive correlation, meaning that those with long COVID symptoms tend to have slightly more trust in institutions. However, Greece (-.061) shows a negative correlation, suggesting that in Greece, long-term symptoms are associated with lower trust in national institutions. This finding can be explained by the fact that the Greek health care system focused on preventing the spread of the disease rather than responding to needs of patients in the long run. In other countries (Czechia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Slovenia), the correlations are either very weak or statistically insignificant.

Still Having Symptoms and Political Trust

The relationship between currently experiencing symptoms and political trust is weak in most countries, but some notable differences emerge. In Germany (.136), Netherlands (.201), and Poland (.142), having ongoing symptoms is positively correlated with political trust. This suggests that in these countries, people still experiencing symptoms may have a greater reliance on institutions, possibly due to public health policies or government support. In contrast, Bulgaria (-.050), France (.046), Portugal (.073), and Slovenia (.047) show either weak or non-significant correlations, meaning that COVID-19 symptoms have little effect on political trust in these countries.

Vaccination and Political Trust

Receiving at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine is negatively correlated with political trust in most countries. The strongest negative correlations are found in Germany (-.145), Netherlands (-.187), Czechia (-.123), and Slovenia (-.080). This suggests that in these countries, vaccinated individuals tend to have slightly lower trust in national institutions.

This finding may seem counterintuitive but could be influenced by several factors, such as dissatisfaction with government handling of the pandemic, skepticism about institutional responses, or differing political views on vaccine policies.



Cross-Country Comparisons

Germany and the Netherlands show consistent negative correlations for vaccination and COVID-19 cases, but positive correlations for long-term symptoms, suggesting a complex relationship between health experiences and political trust. Czechia, Portugal, and Slovenia also exhibit mostly negative correlations, indicating lower trust among those who had COVID-19 or were vaccinated. Greece stands out as the only country where having had COVID-19 is linked to higher trust, while long-term symptoms correlate with lower trust. Poland and France show weak or inconsistent correlations, suggesting that COVID-19 experiences have little impact on trust in these countries.

The relation of the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) to satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution

Table 8 presents Pearson’s correlation coefficients between satisfaction with the present state of the economy, support for income redistribution, and trust in national institutions.

"Satisfaction with the state of the economy" is a positive variable, meaning that higher values correspond to greater satisfaction with the economy.

"Support for income redistribution" comes from a question where 0 = strong agreement that the government should reduce income differences, and 5 = strong disagreement. Therefore, higher values indicate weaker support for income redistribution (i.e., more opposition to government intervention).

In this instance, it is hypothesized that the higher the satisfaction with the present state of the national economy, the higher the support for income redistribution and trust in national political institutions.

Table 8. Satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution and trust in national institutions: Pearson’s R correlation coefficients

Variable	Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) in national institutions				
	Bulgaria20	Czechia20	Croatia22	France22	Germany22
Satisfaction with the state of economy	.472*	.473*	.559*	.534*	.562*
Support for income redistribution	.089*	.042**	.052**	.046	.052**
Variable	Greece22	Netherlands22	Poland22	Portugal22	Slovenia22
Satisfaction with the state of economy	.586*	.476*	.302*	.516*	.435*
Support for income redistribution	.135*	-.018	-.048	.099*	.065**

* p < .001. ** p < .05.

Satisfaction with the Economy and Political Trust

In all countries, satisfaction with the economy is positively correlated with political trust, meaning that people who perceive the economy more favorably tend to have greater trust in national institutions. The strongest correlations are found in Greece (.586), Croatia (.559), and Germany (.562), indicating that in these countries, economic satisfaction is highly linked to political trust. France (.534), Portugal (.516), and Slovenia (.435) also exhibit strong relationships. While Czechia (.473), Netherlands (.476), and Bulgaria (.472) show slightly lower, but still strong, correlations. And finally, Poland (.302) has the weakest correlation among all countries, suggesting that while economic satisfaction still influences trust, other factors may play a more dominant role in shaping institutional trust there.

These findings indicate that economic perceptions are a key factor in political trust across all surveyed countries, with stronger effects in Greece, Germany, and Croatia compared to Poland.

Support for Income Redistribution and Political Trust

The relationship between support for income redistribution and political trust is generally weak and varies across countries. Since higher values indicate less support for redistribution, a positive correlation means that those who oppose redistribution tend to trust institutions more, while a negative correlation would mean that those who support redistribution have more trust.

Bulgaria (.089), Germany (.052), Croatia (.052), Portugal (.099), and Slovenia (.065) show small but positive correlations, suggesting that in these countries, people who oppose income redistribution tend to trust political institutions slightly more, while Czechia (.042) and Greece (.135) also show weak positive correlations. And finally, Netherlands (-.018), Poland (-.048), and France (.046) have correlations close to zero, suggesting no meaningful relationship between redistribution preferences and trust.

Cross-Country Comparisons

Greece, Germany, and Croatia show the strongest links between economic satisfaction and trust, meaning that in these countries, trust in institutions is highly dependent on economic perceptions. Poland has the weakest relationship between economic satisfaction and trust, suggesting that economic perceptions are less influential in shaping political trust there.

Opposition to income redistribution is only weakly associated with trust across all countries, with no strong patterns emerging. Bulgaria, Portugal, and Slovenia show moderate but positive correlations for both variables, indicating a consistent (though weaker) pattern of economic and political trust relationships.

Overall relation of the GINI coefficient to satisfaction with the present state of economy, support for income redistribution and satisfaction with how the government and democracy work

Table 9 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between the GINI coefficient and four subjective variables: “support for income redistribution”, “satisfaction with the present state of the economy”, “satisfaction with how the government works”, and “satisfaction with how democracy works”. The data is based on the mean scores from ten countries.



Table 9. Support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the state of economy, satisfaction with the national government, satisfaction with the way democracy works in country and GINI coefficient: Pearson's R correlation coefficients

Variable	GINI coefficient	Support for income redistribution	Satisfaction with the state of economy	Satisfaction with how the government works	Satisfaction with the way democracy works
GINI coefficient	1	-.667*	-.847**	-.825**	-.719*
Support for income redistribution	-.667*	1	.816**	.844**	.769**
Satisfaction with the state of economy	-.847**	.816**	1	.939**	.897**
Satisfaction with how the government works	-.825**	.844**	.939**	1	.809**
Satisfaction with how democracy works	-.719*	.769**	.897**	.809**	1

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.

The table shows a significant negative correlation between the GINI coefficient and support for income redistribution (-0.667 , $p = 0.035$), meaning that in countries with higher income inequality, there is stronger agreement that the government should reduce income differences. Similarly, the correlation between the GINI coefficient and satisfaction with the state of the economy is strongly negative (-0.847 , $p = 0.002$), indicating that higher levels of inequality are associated with lower satisfaction with economic conditions. A comparable pattern is observed in the relationship between income inequality and satisfaction with government performance, with a correlation of -0.825 ($p = 0.003$), suggesting that people in countries with greater inequality tend to be less satisfied with how their government functions. Additionally, the correlation between the GINI coefficient and satisfaction with democracy is also negative and significant (-0.719 , $p = 0.019$), implying that higher inequality is linked to lower confidence in how democracy works.

Beyond the direct relationship with the GINI coefficient, the table also highlights strong positive correlations between support for income redistribution and the three satisfaction variables, ranging from 0.769 to 0.844 . This suggests that individuals who are more satisfied with the economy, government, and democracy are also less likely to strongly support government intervention to reduce income inequality. Furthermore, satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy are highly correlated with one another, with particularly strong associations between economic satisfaction and satisfaction with government performance (0.939 , $p < 0.001$), as well as

between economic satisfaction and satisfaction with democracy (.897, $p = 0.002$). These results suggest that people's overall perceptions of their economic conditions play a crucial role in shaping their views of both governmental and democratic institutions.

The correlations in Table 9 reveal a consistent pattern linking inequality, satisfaction with governance and the economy, and support for income redistribution. Higher levels of income inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, are associated with lower satisfaction with the state of the economy, the way the government works, and how democracy functions. At the same time, greater inequality corresponds to stronger public support for income redistribution.

This indicates that in more unequal societies, people tend to be less satisfied with political and economic conditions and are more likely to support government intervention to reduce income differences. Conversely, individuals who report higher satisfaction with the economy, the government, and democracy tend to show weaker support for income redistribution—likely reflecting a sense of contentment with the status quo and less perceived need for redistributive policies. The very strong positive correlations among the three satisfaction variables also suggest that political and economic trust are deeply intertwined. Overall, the results imply that reducing inequality may not only address demands for fairness but could also play a role in improving public trust in democratic institutions and satisfaction with governance.

Relation of “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) to support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the present state of economy, satisfaction with how the government and democracy work and trust in national institutions (OIPT)

In Table 10, the “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) reliabilities are presented for each country and survey. As shown, in all countries, the IAI was reliable with Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients $\geq .70$. It ranged for 2020 and 2022 from .900 (Bulgaria), to .867 (Czechia), to .861 (France), and to .766 (Netherlands), respectively.

Table 10. “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) reliability: European Social Survey (ESS) 2020 and 2022

Country/year	Cronbach’s alpha coefficient	Country/year	Cronbach’s alpha coefficient
ESS 2020			
Bulgaria	.900		
Czechia	.867		
ESS 2022		ESS 2022	
Croatia	.854	Netherlands	.766
France	.861	Poland	.804
Germany	.852	Portugal	.819
Greece	.854	Slovenia	.856

Table 11 presents Pearson correlation coefficients between the “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) coefficient the “Overall Index of Political Trust” (OIPT) and four subjective variables: “support for income redistribution”, “satisfaction with the present state of the economy”, “satisfaction with how the government works” and “satisfaction with how democracy works”. The IAI reflects respondents' attitudes toward immigration—higher values on the index indicate more positive attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, positive correlations mean that as satisfaction or



support increases, immigration attitudes become more positive as well, while negative correlations suggest that greater satisfaction or support is associated with more negative immigration views.

Table 11. Support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the present state of economy, satisfaction with how the government and democracy work, trust in national institutions and attitudes over immigration: Pearson correlation coefficients

Variable	Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI)				
	Bulgaria20	Czechia20	Croatia22	France22	Germany22
Support for income redistribution	.043**	.147*	.075**	-.089*	-.048**
Satisfaction with present state of economy	.303*	.241*	.188*	.278*	.442*
Satisfaction with the national government	.193*	.130*	.132*	.218*	.485*
Satisfaction with the way democracy works	.254*	.30*	.127*	.272*	.538*
Trust in national institutions (OIPT)	.244*	.357*	.169*	.284*	.532*
Variable	Greece22	Netherlands22	Poland22	Portugal22	Slovenia22
Support for income redistribution	.035	-.144*	.099*	.036	.118*
Satisfaction with present state of economy	.225*	.322*	-.001	.310*	.356*
Satisfaction with the national government	.192*	.325*	.006	.299*	.393*
Satisfaction with the way democracy works	.168*	.396*	.041	.313*	.387*
Trust in national institutions (OIPT)	.217*	.405*	.097*	.283*	.324*

* $p < .001$. ** $p < .05$.

Support for Income Redistribution and Immigration Attitudes

The relationship between support for income redistribution and attitudes toward immigration is generally weak and inconsistent across countries. Positive correlations are found in Czechia (.147), Croatia (.075), Poland (.099), and Slovenia (.118), suggesting that in these countries, those less opposed to redistribution (i.e., who score lower on the scale) tend to have more positive immigration attitudes. In contrast, Germany (-.048) and France (-.089) show small negative correlations, indicating that those who support redistribution slightly tend to hold more negative attitudes toward immigration. In other countries (e.g., Greece (.035), Portugal (.036)), the correlations are weak and not significant, and Netherlands (-.144) stands out with a significant negative correlation, suggesting a stronger inverse relationship. Overall, support for income redistribution shows no clear or consistent pattern in relation to immigration attitudes across countries.

Satisfaction with the Economy and Immigration Attitudes

A clearer pattern emerges between economic satisfaction and immigration attitudes. In most countries, satisfaction with the economy is positively correlated with more favorable immigration views. The strongest correlations are in Germany (.442), Slovenia (.356), Netherlands (.322), and Portugal (.310). This suggests that in these countries, people who are more satisfied with the state of the economy tend to view immigration more positively. France (.278), Bulgaria (.303), Czechia (.241), and Greece (.225) also show moderate positive correlations. The only exception is Poland (-.001), where there is essentially no relationship. These findings indicate that, generally, those who perceive the economy as doing well are more likely to hold favorable views toward immigration.

Satisfaction with the Government and Immigration Attitudes

Similarly, satisfaction with how the national government works is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes in almost all countries. The strongest effects are found in Germany (.485), Slovenia (.393), Netherlands (.325), and Portugal (.299). France (.218), Greece (.192), Czechia (.130), Croatia (.132), and Bulgaria (.193) show smaller but significant positive correlations. Once again, Poland (.006) stands out with a negligible relationship. This suggests that in most countries, people who trust and support their governments are more open to immigration.

Satisfaction with How Democracy Works and Immigration Attitudes

The relationship between satisfaction with democracy and immigration attitudes follows a similar trend. The strongest correlations are observed in Germany (.538), Netherlands (.396), Slovenia (.387), and Portugal (.313). Moderate positive correlations also appear in France (.272), Czechia (.300), Bulgaria (.254), and Greece (.168). On the other hand, Poland (.041) and Croatia (.127) again show weaker or minimal relationships. In general, people who feel that democracy is functioning well are more likely to support immigration.

Trust in National Institutions and Immigration Attitudes

Trust in national institutions (measured via the Overall Index of Political Trust, OIPT) is also positively correlated with immigration attitudes in nearly all countries. Germany (.532), Netherlands (.405), Czechia (.357), and Slovenia (.324) have the strongest positive relationships, meaning higher institutional trust is associated with more favorable views of immigration. Moderate correlations are seen in France (.284), Portugal (.283), Bulgaria (.244), and Greece

(.217). Again Poland (.097) and Croatia (.169) show relatively weak correlations. This indicates that in most countries, higher political trust aligns with more open immigration attitudes.

Cross-Country Comparisons

Germany consistently shows the strongest positive correlations across nearly all variables, particularly regarding satisfaction with the government, economy, democracy, and political trust—highlighting a context where institutional trust and system satisfaction align with openness to immigration. The Netherlands and Slovenia also demonstrate strong, consistent positive associations, especially regarding satisfaction with democratic institutions and government. Portugal, France, Czechia, and Bulgaria show moderate and consistent patterns of positive correlations, suggesting a steady link between satisfaction/trust and positive immigration views. Greece and Croatia display weaker correlations across most variables, though still generally positive. Poland stands out with the weakest and often non-significant correlations in all dimensions, suggesting that attitudes toward immigration are largely disconnected from trust and satisfaction with political and economic systems in the Polish context.

DISCUSSION

In this deliverable, we comparatively explored our newly constructed index OIPT based on the results of descriptive analyses of the proposed index. OIPT was produced to investigate its value cross-nationally. The impact on the OIPT and how its values varied across countries, based on the satisfaction with the national government question, was the main focus of our research.

We analyzed responses to questions on how respondents assessed the impact of immigrants on the economy of their country, how a country's cultural life has been undermined or enriched by immigrants and how the immigrants make a country a worse or better place to live. In brief, we analyzed the impact of immigration on political trust cross-nationally and how the impact varied across countries, using our OIPT index.

Furthermore, we analyzed responses to four questions about the experience from COVID-19, whether the respondents had coronavirus, had symptoms lasting 3 months or longer, still had symptoms and whether they received at least one dose of a vaccine against coronavirus approved by the national regulatory authority in their country. As in the instance of the challenge noted above (immigration), we analyzed the impact of this challenge (the COVID-19 pandemic) on political trust. Using our index OIPT, we investigated this impact cross-nationally as well as how it varied by country. Our analyses were based on the 2020 ESS dataset for two countries (Bulgaria and Czechia) and the 2022 ESS dataset for eight countries (Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia).

In the following section, we present summary results of our analysis and a separate analysis for two cases, namely, first, Poland, that stands out as an outlier of cross-national trends that we have unearthed, and, second, Germany, that presents a typical, “standard”, case of our sample.

Summary results of univariate analyses

Summary results the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT)

In all countries and surveys, the OIPT was reliable with Cronbach's alpha coefficients $\geq .861$ and consequently, it can be used in further analyses.



In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on the OIPT were 2.19 and 4.13 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on the OIPT ranged from 2.36 (Croatia) to 5.11 (Netherlands). Therefore, overall, in all countries and surveys, low levels of political trust in national, political institutions were exhibited.

Summary results of satisfaction of how the government and democracy work

In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on satisfaction with how the national government works were 3.08 and 4.67 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on satisfaction with how the national government works ranged from 3.3 (Croatia) to 4.58 (Netherlands).

In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on satisfaction with how democracy works were 3.19 and 5.64 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on satisfaction with how democracy works ranged from 4.17 (Greece) to 5.97 (Netherlands).

Therefore, overall, in all countries and surveys, lower levels of satisfaction with how the national government and democracy work were detected although the latter were higher than the former.

Summary results of attitudes towards immigration

In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy were 4.51 and 4.94 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy ranged from 4.10 (Greece) to 6.23 (Portugal).

In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life were 3.76 and 4.95 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigrants undermine or enrich the country's cultural life ranged from 4.02 (Greece) to 6.28 (Netherlands).

In the 2020 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigrants make a country a worse or a better place to live were 3.81 and 4.77 for Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, the mean scores on whether immigrants make a country a worse or a better place to live ranged from 4.19 (Greece) to 5.50 (Netherlands).

Therefore, overall, in all countries and surveys, lower levels of tolerance towards immigrants were observed.

Summary results of coronavirus cases and experiences

In the 2020 ESS, 13.20% and 20.20% of the respondents declared they had coronavirus in Bulgaria and Czechia, respectively. In the 2022 ESS, in all countries, over 51.6% of the respondents declared having coronavirus.

In the 2022 ESS, respondents declaring they had symptoms associated with coronavirus lasting three months or longer ranged from 23.8% (Greece) to 50.1% (Poland). Of these respondents, those that declared still having symptoms ranged from 16.2% (Greece) to 41.6% (Netherlands).

In the 2022 ESS, in all countries, over 67.2% declared that they did have received at least one dose of a vaccine.

Summary results of bivariate analyses

Summary results of the relation of the OIPT to satisfaction with how the government and democracy work

Satisfaction with how the government and democracy work was significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions in all countries and surveys. In the 2020 ESS, overall correlations ranged from .499 (Czechia) to .517 (Bulgaria). In the 2022 ESS, overall correlations ranged from .394 (Poland) to .699 (Netherlands). All correlations were positive.

Summary results of the relation of the OIPT to attitudes towards immigration

Attitudes towards immigration were significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions in all countries and surveys. In the 2020 ESS, overall correlations ranged from .205 (Bulgaria) to .360 (Czechia). In the 2022 ESS, overall correlations ranged from .056 (Poland) to .509 (Germany). All correlations were positive.

Summary results of the relation of the OIPT to coronavirus cases and experiences

Respondents' having had coronavirus was significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions only in the case of Czechia for the 2020 ESS with a negative correlation coefficient (-.052) and in the cases of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovenia of the 2022 ESS, the respective correlations ranging from -.114 (Germany) to .095 (Greece). All these correlation coefficients were negative except in the case of Greece.

In the 2022 ESS, respondents' having had symptoms lasting 3 months or longer was significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions in the cases of Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Portugal – the respective correlations ranging from -.062 (Greece) to .130 (Germany). All these correlation coefficients were positive except in the case of Greece.

In the 2022 ESS, respondents' still symptoms were significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions in the cases of Germany, the Netherlands and Poland – the respective correlations ranging from .132 (Germany) to .188 (Netherlands). All these correlation coefficients were positive.

In the 2022 ESS, respondents' having received at least one dose of vaccine was significantly related to political trust in national, political institutions in all countries except Portugal – the respective correlations ranging from -.183 (Netherlands) to -.064 (Greece). All these correlation coefficients were negative.

Summary results of the relation of the OIPT to satisfaction with the present state of economy and support for income redistribution

The relationship between economic satisfaction, support for income redistribution, and political trust (OIPT) is examined. In the 2020 ESS, economic satisfaction correlated significantly with political trust in Bulgaria (.472) and Czechia (.473). In 2022, this remained significant across countries, ranging from .302 (Poland) to .586 (Greece). Support for income redistribution showed weaker but still significant correlations with political trust: in 2020, Bulgaria (.089) and Czechia (.042) in 2022, ranging from .052 (Croatia, Germany) to .135 (Greece).



Summary results of overall relation of the GINI coefficient to satisfaction with the present state of economy, support for income redistribution and satisfaction with how the government and democracy work

The analysis reveals a significant negative correlation between the GINI coefficient and support for income redistribution (-.667), indicating that higher income inequality leads to stronger public support for reducing income differences. Similarly, income inequality correlates negatively with satisfaction with the economy (-.847), government performance (-.825), and democracy (-.719), suggesting that greater inequality reduces confidence in these institutions. Additionally, strong positive correlations (.769 to .844) exist between support for income redistribution and satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy, implying that those more satisfied with these aspects are less likely to support redistribution. Economic satisfaction strongly correlates with satisfaction with government (.939) and democracy (.897), emphasizing that across all 10 countries, economic perceptions play a crucial role in shaping political trust and institutional confidence.

Summary results of “Immigration Attitudes Index” (IAI) to support for income redistribution, satisfaction with the present state of economy, satisfaction with how the government and democracy work and trust in national institutions (OIPT).

In the 2020 ESS, support for income redistribution was significantly related to immigration attitudes in Czechia and Croatia. In the 2022 ESS, this relationship was observed in Poland, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Satisfaction with the economy, national government, and democracy showed significant correlations with immigration attitudes in both years, with the strongest associations in Germany. Trust in national institutions was positively linked to immigration attitudes in all surveyed countries, with the highest correlation in Germany (.532) in 2022. Overall, the findings indicate that public trust and satisfaction with economic and political conditions influence immigration attitudes across different European countries, with variations between survey years and national contexts.

Overall discussion of cross-country analysis

An overall discussion of differences among countries is possible by looking more closely at the Table 5, 6 and 7 presented above.

Table 5 examines the correlation between respondents’ satisfaction with government and democracy and their trust in national political institutions. In the 2022 European Social Survey (ESS), a strong positive correlation is observed in most countries, with Germany (0.706 for government satisfaction, 0.677 for democracy satisfaction) and the Netherlands (0.699 and 0.638, respectively) exhibiting high values. This suggests that higher satisfaction with governance and democracy is strongly associated with greater political trust in these nations. Poland presents the lowest correlation (0.431 for government satisfaction, 0.394 for democracy satisfaction), indicating a weaker relationship between political trust and institutional performance.

Table 6 explores how attitudes toward immigration correlate with political trust. Among all countries, Germany exhibits the strongest correlation between political trust and positive attitudes toward immigration (.443 for economic impact, .443 for cultural impact, .509 for general livability). The Netherlands also shows strong correlations (.334, .315, and .353, respectively). By contrast, Poland displays the weakest correlations (.058, .056, and .100).



Table 7 investigates the relationship between the COVID-19 experiences and political trust. Notably, Germany exhibits a negative correlation between having developed COVID-19 and political trust (-.114), implying that those who contracted the virus trust institutions less. However, having long-term symptoms is positively correlated with political trust (.130), possibly indicating confidence in state healthcare responses. In the Netherlands, similar trends appear. Thus, a negative correlation for vaccination (-.183) and positive for long-term symptoms (.188) is observed. These results cannot be interpreted.

The strong positive correlation between political trust and favorable attitudes toward immigration in Germany and the Netherlands aligns with broader theoretical and empirical research on the subject.

Germany's relatively high correlation values suggest that individuals who view immigration positively also exhibit high political trust. This can be contextualized within Germany's broader political and social landscape. Germany has actively pursued integration policies since the 2015 refugee crisis, with efforts to assimilate migrants into the labor market and society (Michael, 2021). Policies such as work permits and language courses may have fostered a perception that immigration contributes positively to the economy and culture. Additionally, Germany's institutions have consistently promoted democratic values and social cohesion, which enhances political trust among pro-immigration demographics (McLaren, 2012a; 2012b). Finally, Germany's strong economy, at least at the point in time when the ESS survey was conducted, supports immigrant employment, reinforcing the belief that migration benefits the country (Wallace Goodman, 2021).

The Netherlands exhibits similar trends, reinforcing the link between political trust and pro-immigration attitudes. The country's liberal cultural framework of tolerance and multicultural policies has cultivated a positive view of immigration (McLaren, 2012a; 2012b). Dutch institutions rank highly in transparency and responsiveness, which may lead citizens with positive immigration attitudes to also exhibit high political trust (Mau & Verwiebe, 2010). Finally, the Netherlands' relatively small but diverse population allows for controlled immigration policies that are widely accepted by the public.

Germany's correlations are stronger than those in the Netherlands, potentially due to its more direct engagement with large-scale immigration post-2015. The Netherlands, while open to immigration, maintains stricter policies regarding cultural integration and social benefits, which may slightly temper the relationship between immigration attitudes and trust.

The comparative analysis of Tables 5, 6, and 7 reveals key patterns in the relationship between political trust, governance satisfaction, immigration attitudes, and pandemic experiences. Germany and the Netherlands exhibit stronger correlations between pro-immigration views and political trust, supported by robust institutions and well-integrated immigration policies. This finding aligns with broader research on the stabilizing effects of inclusive policies on political trust, reinforcing the notion that positive perceptions of immigration contribute to stronger institutional confidence in democratic states. Poland, on the other hand, showed weak or negligible correlations across all three tables, suggesting that other factors may drive political trust in this context, such as economic stability or political polarization. The impact of socioeconomic structures is evident, as nations with strong welfare systems and economic resilience, such as Germany and the Netherlands, tend to maintain higher levels of political trust. In contrast, countries experiencing political instability or economic downturns, such as Poland or Greece,

exhibit weaker correlations, indicating that political trust may be more susceptible to external pressures in these contexts (Macdonald & Cornacchione, 2023)

Discussion: The exception of Poland

In most of the tables presented above, Poland consistently stands out as an exception. There is little trust in Polish political institutions, and the statistical relationships between the Overall Index of Political Trust (OIPT) and most independent variables—such as satisfaction with the national government, satisfaction with democracy, and satisfaction with the state of the economy—are weak, marginal, or even non-existent. The same holds for the Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI), the values of which in the case of Poland are not meaningfully associated with levels of political trust or satisfaction with institutional performance. Nor are immigration attitudes correlated with respondents' views on the economy, cultural life, or livability in Poland.

This pattern is consistent across all thematic domains explored in the ESS data from 2020 and 2022. In Table 5, for instance, Poland shows the lowest correlations between political trust and both satisfaction with the government (.434) and democracy (.395), compared to consistently stronger relationships in countries like Germany (.710 and .685) or the Netherlands (.709 and .649). In Table 6, Poland again shows the weakest correlations across all immigration-related trust variables (.067, .066, and .120), where most other countries show much stronger associations (e.g., Germany: .449, .444, and .511). Table 7, focused on COVID-19 experiences, further underscores Poland's divergence, as nearly all correlations with political trust are weak and statistically insignificant—whether for having contracted the virus, long COVID symptoms, or vaccination. Even in Table 8, which links satisfaction with the economy and support for income redistribution to political trust, Poland once again records the lowest correlation (.302) and a non-significant, negative association with redistribution (−.048). Lastly, in Table 11, which examines how trust and satisfaction relate to immigration attitudes, Poland stands out once more, as nearly all correlations are either statistically insignificant or close to zero—far below those observed in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, or Slovenia.

This persistent statistical disconnection between trust in institutions and broader attitudes or perceptions sets Poland apart from the other nine countries in the sample, where these relationships are typically moderate to strong and positive. The data suggest that, in Poland, political trust and satisfaction with democratic or economic institutions are less tightly interwoven with other attitudinal dimensions, such as immigration or redistribution. While in most European countries political trust appears to reflect a broader evaluative outlook that incorporates satisfaction with the economy, governance, and societal values, Poland presents a more fragmented picture, where these dimensions are decoupled.

This finding is consistent with conclusions drawn in the EnTrust project's integrated report, which highlights Poland (alongside Serbia) as one of the only countries where trust in national and European institutions does not move together. In most other countries studied, institutional trust tends to follow a shared trajectory across levels of governance, but in Poland, this alignment breaks down—likely due to the partisan landscape and the presence of Eurosceptic forces in government. The report further notes that, while institutional trust generally correlates with political efficacy, attitudes toward the establishment, and satisfaction with the economy, such patterns are less coherent in Poland. Moreover, survey data show that trust is reinforced by positive interactions with public administration and welfare institutions, as well as by feeling respected by

bureaucrats—mechanisms that may be comparatively weaker or more uneven in the Polish case (Tsatsanis, Georgiadou, Klironomos, & Mavropoulou, 2022).

The pattern revealed in the ESS data for 2020 and 2022, however, does not hold across time. Past research on Poland has shown that the state of economy and democracy had an effect on trust in political institutions. In detail, in the mid-1990s, studies based on the New Democracies Barometer for 1993 and 1998, showed that in Poland there was a positive association between economic performance and confidence in political institutions (Johnson 2005). However, those times were different. The period of the mid-1990s was a period in which Poland was a young democracy, aspiring to become a EU Member-State, an aim it achieved with the East European Enlargement of the EU in 2004.

The Polish economy was one of the very few European economies that was not subjected to the economic crisis of 2008–2009. Thus, in contrast to other European countries, in Poland trust in the national government was not affected by the state of the economy. Evidence based on the European Social Survey data for the period after the economic crisis, namely in 2012–2016, suggests that Poles had high political trust in national government (Lenik 2023). However, the majority of the Polish electorate repudiated policy failures of the Civic Platform government in 2011–2015 and brought the right-wing populist party PiS to power in 2015. The PiS was returned to government again in 2019, but eventually lost the elections of 2023.

After winning the elections of 2015 the PiS went on to capture significant Polish institutions, such as the Constitutional Tribunal and the National Council of the Judiciary. The government restricted civil liberties of women and LGBTQ people and harassed civil society associations that opposed the PiS (Ekiert 2017; Czaky 2024).

As a result, trust in national government that stood at 50% in 2017 (two years into the first PiS government) declined two years into the first term. It dropped sharply in 2020 after the PiS government mismanaged the COVID-19 campaign, while large scale protests erupted in Polish cities. Compared to high trust in national government in 2017, only 30% of Poles trusted their national government in 2020 (Wilczek 2021). Later on, the encroachment of the PiS government on political institutions and civil liberties further depressed political trust and political participation too.

However, such political changes did not affect (until the start of the war in Ukraine) two stable patterns on which Poland differed from most other European societies. First, in the 2010s, in contrast to other crisis-ridden EU countries, Poland experienced economic growth. In fact, in 2024 Poland's GDP was more than double its size in 2004, the year the country joined the EU (Kosc 2025). Even though in 2020 (the first year of COVID-19) the Polish economy, as all other European economies, experienced negative growth, it soon returned to positive growth: in 2021 it grew by 6.9% (EU average: 6.3%) and in 2022 it grew by 5.3% (EU average: 3.5%. See Eurostat 2023). And second, between 1989 when it made its transition to democracy and 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine provoking a wave of refugees who abandoned Ukraine, Poland was a ethnically homogenous nation-state (pop. 37 million).

Thus, the challenges that other EU Member States faced, i.e., economic hardship and immigration inflows, did not appear in the case of Poland. In that respect, these two variables did not fluctuate and could not be statistically associated with levels of political trust, as this deliverable claims.



The weak correlations between political trust and key variables in Poland are therefore not necessarily due to public indifference or randomness, but may instead reflect a different political rationale, where trust is no longer grounded in evaluations of democratic or economic performance, but is instead shaped by partisan allegiance, national identity, or cultural anxieties. This aligns with recent scholarship on democratic backsliding and populist governance, which shows that in polarized environments, institutional trust may persist or erode independently of actual performance (Mishler & Rose 2001; Markowski 2019; Norris 2011). Poland thus becomes a critical case for comparative analysis, where trust in political institutions appears increasingly decoupled from the democratic legitimacy norms that still operate in most other European democracies.

The main point that needs further systematic research is of course to look for other determinants of political trust in the case of Poland.

This suggests that future research on political trust in Poland should look beyond traditional performance-based explanations and examine alternative determinants, such as affective polarization, partisan identity, and symbolic narratives of national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity.

Discussion: the typical case (the “standard”) of Germany

Among the countries studied in this deliverable, Germany stands out because it shows the strongest correlations between our independent variables and levels of political trust as well as attitudes towards immigration. This consistency across all tables (Tables 5,6,7,8 and 11) suggests that Germany represents not just a high-trust country, but one in which institutional trust is closely and systematically linked to public satisfaction with democratic performance, economic conditions, and inclusive social attitudes. This aligns with existing research which shows that in democratically stable and institutionally effective systems like Germany, political trust tends to follow a rational, performance-based logic (Zmerli & Newton, 2008).

In detail, among German respondents to the ESS survey, the higher the satisfaction with the national government and the satisfaction with democracy, the higher the trust towards political institutions.

In Table 5, Germany displays the highest correlation coefficients between political trust and satisfaction with government (.710) and democracy (.685), highlighting a particularly strong alignment between institutional performance and trust. However, this finding refers to the most general, abstract level. It does not consider shifts of trust owing to unexpected circumstances. A circumstance affecting this finding was that Germany, as other countries, was struck in 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic. There was a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, meaning that in times of crisis incumbent office holders receive political support from all sides. However, this effect diminishes with the passage of time as shown by research on Germany (Gluckroft 2023, Schulz 2024).

As in other countries, political trust in Germany is obviously not immune to challenges. Such a challenge, that may have been formidable even for a usually well-oiled institutional apparatus as the German one, was the COVID-19 pandemic. Our analysis of the ESS survey shows that the higher the incidence of having contracted the COVID-19 virus, the lower the trust towards political institutions. The same holds for receiving at least one dose of vaccination against the virus. This

too is negatively correlated with trust in political institutions. This pattern is confirmed in Table 7, where Germany exhibits a negative correlation between trust and having had COVID-19 (-.118), as well as with vaccination (-.145), suggesting that public reactions to pandemic management may have temporarily strained institutional trust.

The reasons behind this statistical relationship are difficult to trace. They may be associated with popular discontent owed to the inefficiency of states, including the German one, to manage the relevant risks. The German state, as most other states, failed to erect barriers to the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first place, such as, for instance, to prevent the spread of the disease that was “imported” from abroad into Germany or to stop the further spread of the disease with a timely and effective restriction of movement of inhabitants.

This finding of our study is corroborated by other research on the impact of COVID-19 on political trust in Germany. Data drawn on surveys of German respondents between autumn 2020 and May 2021, i.e. within the first year of the pandemic, indicate a decline in political trust (Schulz 2024: 16). The decline may be attributed to worries about possible negative economic effects provoked by the pandemic and perceived threats to fundamental rights (Schulz 2024: 18).

However, in Germany, having long-lasting symptoms of the disease is positively correlated with trust in political institutions. A similar positive correlation holds for respondents who still had symptoms related to the disease at the time the ESS survey was conducted (in 2022). Here, the implication is that there is confidence in the efficiency of the German state (the public health care and social assistance mechanisms) to take care of COVID-19 patients in the long run. This interpretation is supported by the data in Table 7, where trust correlates positively with having long-term symptoms (.130) and still having symptoms at the time of the survey (.136), suggesting a perception of institutional support and state capacity to care for citizens over time.

Naturally, the interpretation of survey results on political trust are affected by the political conjuncture. Thus, in the case of Germany, in the winter of 2021 there was a government transition period. After the federal elections of September 2021, that were inconclusive, a long negotiation among parties started to form a coalition government. Eventually a coalition was formed by three parties, the so-called traffic light coalition reflecting the colors (red, orange, green) adopted by the parties (SPD, FDP, Greens). The SPD leader Scholz was approved as Chancellor by the Bundestag in December 2021.

Political trust was measured in that period in Germany. Thus, in January 2022 51% of respondents trusted the national (federal) government, while in November 2021 47% had done so. There was a small increase, as respondents took “a small leap of faith in the new government and other institutions” (Edelman Trust Barometer 2022).

Moreover, Germany is one of the countries in our sample in which levels of political trust are influenced by economic perceptions too. In Germany there is a comparatively very strong correlation between positive assessment of national economic performance and political trust. In other words, Germans who perceive that the national economy of their country performs well, tend to have higher levels of political trust. This is reflected in Table 8, where satisfaction with the state of the economy is strongly correlated with trust in Germany (.562), one of the highest values in the sample. Armingeon and Guthmann (2013) have shown that in Germany, economic evaluations remained closely tied to political trust even during broader European crises. By contrast, in Germany views on economic redistribution are very weakly correlated with levels of political trust and the same holds for such views when they are correlated with views on immigrants. Other

factors are associated with views on immigration. Indeed, Germany shows only a weak correlation between support for income redistribution and political trust (.052), in line with broader patterns across countries where redistribution is a weak predictor of institutional trust.

Further on, among the ESS survey respondents, in Germany the stronger the view that immigration is beneficial for the national economy and the stronger the view that immigration enriches national culture, the higher the trust towards political institutions. This is particularly visible in Table 6, where political trust is strongly correlated with positive views on immigration's economic contribution (.449), cultural enrichment (.444), and general immigration attitudes (.511)—among the strongest relationships in the dataset.

Finally, in Germany favorable views towards immigrants are strongly correlated with higher satisfaction with the way the national economy works. Such favorable views are also associated with high appraisal of the way democracy works. The case of Germany presents a standard: favorable views towards immigrants are strongly correlated with higher levels of the OIPT index. In Table 11, Germany again ranks first or among the top countries in every correlation between immigration attitudes and satisfaction with economy (.442), government (.485), democracy (.538), and political trust (.532), further confirming Germany as a positively exceptional case.

To sum up, political trust in Germany is a good example of standard, rather than outlier, trends in political trust. Besides research presented in this deliverable, this claim is supported by other similar research. For instance, cross-national research conducted by the OECD on “Drivers of Trust in Political Institutions” for 2023 shows that high or moderately high trust in national government, national parliament, and political parties stands in Germany at the level of OECD average. In Germany the level of trust towards these three institutions stood in 2023 at 36% for the national government, 35% for the federal parliament and 26% for political parties, i.e., exactly at or very close to the OECD average (OECD 2024). Germany, therefore, may not be an outlier in absolute levels of trust compared to OECD norms, but it is exceptional in how coherent and predictable the structure of trust appears across domains. Trust in Germany remains tightly aligned with institutional performance, democratic satisfaction, and inclusive values—setting it apart from the more fragmented or disjointed patterns observed elsewhere in the sample.

Strengths and methodological limitations

This empirical study has certainly both strengths and limitations. Among its strengths was the creation of an overall index of political trust (OIPT) that was proven to be reliable in all countries and surveys. Despite its strengths, the following methodological limitations should be considered in drawing conclusions from this study. First, as two different datasets were used, the findings are comparable cross-nationally for Bulgaria and Czechia for the 2020 ESS datasets and Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia for the 2022 ESS datasets. Second, many analytical decisions were restricted by the software used. Though SPSS is the most widely used software, it does not provide the sophisticated D'Agostino-Pearson normality test (D'Agostino, Belanger & D'Agostino, 1990) and consequently, normality was decided on the skewness and kurtosis values. Third, although Cronbach's alpha is widely used, it is considered as mis-estimator of scale reliability (Brown 2015). However, the index OIPT was constructed by three items only. Confirmatory factor analysis could not be performed (Brown 2015).



Conclusions

Our conclusions focus on the most interesting findings of this deliverable, the variation of observed trends across countries.

Our analysis shown a strong statistical relationship between on the one hand satisfaction with the national government and political trust. All correlations are positive, meaning that as satisfaction with the government and democracy increases, political trust in national institutions also tends to increase. This suggests that in all these countries, people who feel more positively about how their national government or democracy function are also more likely to trust national political institutions. In contrast, lower satisfaction with government or democracy is associated with lower trust in institutions.

However, the strength of these correlations varies. Countries like Germany and the Netherlands show particularly strong relationships, meaning that in these nations, political trust is highly sensitive to how people perceive government and democracy. In contrast, Poland consistently shows the weakest correlations, implying that trust in institutions in Poland is less influenced by satisfaction with government and democracy, possibly due to other political or historical factors.

Overall, these findings highlight important cross-country differences in how political trust is formed. While in some countries, like Germany and the Netherlands, trust in institutions is closely tied to government and democracy satisfaction, in others, like Poland, this link is weaker, indicating the presence of other contributing factors. This suggests that historical, cultural, and institutional contexts may shape how political trust develops in different nations.

We have also established a strong statistical relationship between views on immigration and political trust. All correlations are positive and they indicate that people who view immigration favorably—whether in economic, cultural, or social terms—are more likely to have higher trust in national institutions. Conversely, those with more negative views on immigration tend to have lower political trust.

However, the strength of these relationships varies across countries:

1. Germany, Czechia, and the Netherlands consistently show the highest correlations, meaning that in these countries, attitudes toward immigration are closely linked to trust in political institutions.
2. Poland shows the weakest correlations across all variables, indicating that immigration-related attitudes do not play a major role in shaping political trust there.
3. Countries like Portugal, Slovenia, Greece, and Bulgaria exhibit moderate correlations, suggesting that while immigration attitudes matter, other factors also influence trust in institutions.

The findings suggest that in most countries, more positive views on immigration are associated with higher political trust, particularly in Germany, Czechia, and the Netherlands. However, Poland consistently shows the weakest relationship, suggesting that other social or political factors play a more significant role in shaping political trust in Poland. These results highlight how attitudes toward immigration can contribute to institutional trust, though the strength of this connection varies across national contexts.

We have found that, unlike the abovementioned variables of satisfaction with democracy, satisfaction with the national government, and views on immigration, the statistical relationship between perceptions of and experiences with COVID-19 and political trust, are mixed. Our analysis showed a mix of negative and weak relationships between COVID-19 experiences and political trust. Some key takeaways:

1. Having had COVID-19 is associated with lower trust in institutions in Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Czechia, and Slovenia, but slightly higher trust in Greece.
2. Long-term symptoms do not have a strong impact on political trust, except for Germany and the Netherlands, where they show a small positive correlation.
3. Ongoing symptoms are positively correlated with trust in some countries (Germany, Netherlands, Poland), but not in others.
4. Receiving a vaccine is linked to lower political trust in most countries, especially in Germany, Netherlands, and Czechia.

There is a variety of experiences related to political trust in different ways across countries. While having had COVID-19 and vaccination tend to be associated with lower trust in many countries, long-term symptoms show mixed effects. These findings suggest that government responses, public health policies, and pandemic experiences may have shaped public trust in different ways across Europe.

Moving to the impact of perceptions on the economy on political trust, we have found that satisfaction with the economy is one of the strongest predictors of political trust. In all countries, those who feel positive about the economy tend to trust institutions more. This effect is strongest in Greece, Germany, and Croatia, and weakest in Poland. Support for income redistribution is only weakly related to political trust. In most countries, people who oppose income redistribution tend to trust institutions slightly more, but the relationship is weak. Poland stands out as an outlier because both correlations are weaker compared to other countries, suggesting that in Poland, political trust is shaped by other factors beyond economic satisfaction and redistribution preferences. Countries like Germany, Croatia, and Greece show the strongest relationships between economic satisfaction and political trust, indicating that economic performance is a key driver of institutional trust in these contexts.

The results highlight that economic satisfaction is a key factor in political trust across all countries surveyed, while attitudes toward income redistribution have a much weaker influence. The strongest relationships between economic satisfaction and trust appear in Greece, Germany, and Croatia, while Poland stands out as an exception with notably weaker correlations.

Across most countries, positive attitudes toward immigration are associated with greater satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy, as well as higher trust in national institutions. This suggests that people who view their country's systems as functioning well are also more likely to be open toward immigrants. While support for income redistribution shows a mixed and weaker pattern, satisfaction-related indicators—particularly in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and Slovenia—demonstrate strong alignment with pro-immigration attitudes. Poland remains an outlier, with immigration attitudes appearing relatively unaffected by economic and political satisfaction or trust.



Our analysis of the case of Poland has shown that, compared to the rest of European countries in our sample, perceptions of Polish respondents of the economy and immigration were not associated with political trust. Poland avoided the economic crisis of 2008-2009 and its economy grew steadily for the last twenty year. Immigration in Poland was not really an issue until after the start of the war in Ukraine. In Poland country political trust was also influenced by the rise to power and government performance of the right-wing populist party PiS.

As for Germany, in contrast to Poland, it presented in our analysis a standard case of strong statistical relationships of political trust with most of the variables that our hypotheses considered as influential, namely perceptions of the performance of the political and economic system, the COVID-19 pandemic, and immigration. However, the short- and longer-term effects of the German government's management of the pandemic as well as developments in the political conjuncture of domestic German politics in 2020-2022 also played a role in determining levels of political trust among German respondents.

To conclude, our cross-national research on determinants of political trust has shown the variable across countries, rather than uniform, effects of major socio-economic transformations/challenges, such as immigration and COVID-19, on political trust. Our research converges with the strands of the relevant academic literature that argue that perceptions of such challenges vary depending on the national circumstances and provoke shifts in confidence in political institutions.



References

- Armingeon, K., & Guthmann, K. (2013). Democracy in crisis? The declining support for national democracy in European countries, 2007–2011. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(3), 423–442. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12046>
- Basáñez, M. E. (2016). *A World of Three Cultures: Honor, achievement and joy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Brown. T. A. (2015). *Confirmatory factor analysis for applied research* (2nd edition). New York: The Guilford Press.
- Campani, G. (2019). The Migration Crisis between Populism and Post-Democracy. In G. Fitzzi, J. Mackert and B. S. Turner (Eds.), *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy*, Volume 3: Migration, Gender and Religion (29-47), Routledge.
- Carey, S. (Ed.). (2000). *Measuring Adult Literacy: The international adult literacy survey (IALS) in the European context*. Office for National Statistics.
- Cengiz, E. & Vasilopoulou, S. (2022). The Affective Model of Far-Right Vote in Europe: Anger, Political Trust, and Immigration. *Social Science Quarterly*, 103(3), 635-648, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13153>
- Crouch, C. (2013). *Post-Democracy*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- D’Agostino, R.B., Belanger, A. & D’Agostino, R. B. Jr. (1990). A suggestion for using powerful and informative tests of normality. *The American Statistician*, 44(4), 316-321.
- Danaj, A., Lazányi, K. & Bilan, Y. (2018). Perceptions and Implications of Immigration in France – Economic. Social. Political and Cultural Perspectives. *Economics and Sociology*, 11(3), 226-247. https://www.economics-sociology.eu/files/14_507_Danaj%20et%20al.pdf
- Demertzis, N., Yfanti, A., Koniordos, S. (2023). Literature Review on the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Democratic Attitudes and Trust. Working paper, No 3.1. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project (www.TRUEDEM.eu).
- Edelman Trust Barometer (2022). Trust in decline: German institutions caught in a downward spiral of distrust and inaction, https://www.edelman.de/sites/g/files/aatuss401/files/2022-02/Press%20Release_Edelman%20Trust%20Barometer%202022_German%20data_k_0.pdf
- European Social Survey (2020a). ESS Round 10 Source Questionnaire. London: ESS ERIC Headquarters c/o City, University of London.
- European Social Survey (2020b). ESS Round 10 source questionnaire (Self completion, Paper). London: ESS ERIC Headquarters c/o City, University of London.
- European Social Survey (2022). ESS Round 11 Source Questionnaire. London: ESS ERIC Headquarters c/o City, University of London.
- European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) (2023). ESS10 integrated file, edition 3.2 [Data set]. Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. https://doi.org/10.21338/ess10e03_2
- European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) (2024). ESS11 - integrated file, edition 2.0 [Data set]. Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. https://doi.org/10.21338/ess11e02_0.
- European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC) (2024). ESS11 - integrated file, edition 2.0 [Data set]. Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. https://doi.org/10.21338/ess11e02_0.
- Eurostat (2024). Real GDP Growth Rate - Volume, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00115/default/table?lang=en>
- Giddens, A. ([1996] 2006). *The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge, Polity Press.



- Gluckroft, W. N. (2023). Germans' trust in state institutions hits new low', Deutsche Welle, 18 August 2023, <https://www.dw.com/en/germans-trust-in-state-institutions-hits-new-low/a-665706603>
- Habermas, J. and Ben-Habib, S. (1981). "Modernity versus Postmodernity", *New German Critique*, No. 22, Special Issue on Modernism (Winter): 3-14.
- Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano J., M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen (eds.) (2022). World Values Survey: Round Seven - Country-Pooled Datafile Version 5.0. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WWSA Secretariat. [doi:10.14281/18241.24](https://doi.org/10.14281/18241.24)
- Hanson, T. (2021). Developing self-completion instruments for the European Social Survey. Paper presented at the GenPopWeb2 workshop *Designing and delivering online surveys – Transitioning long questionnaires to online*, University of Southampton. https://www.ncrm.ac.uk/documents/Developing_self-completion_instruments_for_ESS.pdf
- Harkness, J. A., Villar, A., & Edwards, B. (2010). Translation, adaptation and design. In J. A. Harkness, M. Braun, B. Edwards, T. P. Johnson, L. Lyberg, P. P. Mohler, B. E. Pennell and T. W. Smith (Eds), *Survey Methods in Multinational, Multiregional, and Multicultural Contexts* (pp. 117–140). Wiley.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Inglehart, R. (2000). "Globalization and Postmodern Values", *The Washington Quarterly*, 23 (1): 215-28. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/36510>
- Kaminska, O. (2020). Guide to using weights and sample design indicators with ESS data. European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/ESS_weighting_data_1_1.pdf
- Katsikides, S. and Koktsidis, P. (eds.) (2015). *Societies in Transition: Economic, Political and Security Transformations in Contemporary Europe*, London: Springer International.
- Kish, L. (1994). Multi-population survey designs: five types with seven shared aspects. *International Statistical Review*, 62(2), 167-186.
- Korab-Karpowicz, J. W. (2019). "The Clash of Epochs: Traditional, Modern, Postmodern, and Evolutionary", *Perspectives on Political Science*, 48(3): 170-182. DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2019.1576435.
- Kosc, W. (2025). Poland's changing population mix turns political. *Politico*, 6 January 2025. <https://www.politico.eu/article/poland-changing-population-political-immigration-border-donald-tusk-election-pis/>
- Kuźelewska, E., Weatherburn, A. & Kloza, D. (2018). Introduction. Asking Big Questions: Migrants Ante Portas and What to Do with Them?. In E. Kuźelewska, A. Weatherburn & D. Kloza (Eds.), *Irregular Migration as a Challenge to Democracy. (European Integration and Democracy Series, vol. 5)* (pp. xiii-xlvii), Intersentia. <http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8738558>
- Macdonald, D. and Cornacchione, T. (2023). Political Trust and Support for Immigration in the European Mass Public. *Political Behavior*, 45: 491–510. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09714-w>
- Markowski, R. (2019). Creating Authoritarian Clientelism: Poland After 2015. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 11(1), 111–132. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-018-0082-5>
- Mau, S. and Verwiebe, R. (2010). *European Societies: Mapping Structure and Change*, Bristol: Policy Press.
- McLaren, L. M. (2012a). Immigration and Trust in Politics in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(1), 163-185. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000251>
- McLaren, L. M. (2012b). The Cultural Divide in Europe: Migration. Multiculturalism. Political Trust". *World Politics*, 64(2): 199-241. doi: 10.1017/S0043887112000032
- Michael, C.P. (2021). *Migration and the Crisis of Democracy in Contemporary Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-64069-9#aboutBook#aboutBook>



- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What Are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-communist Societies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 34(1), 30-62. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414001034001002> (Original work published 2001).
- Norris, P. (2011). *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511973383>
- Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). *Psychometric Theory*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- OECD (2024). OECD Survey on drivers of trust in public institutions – 2024 Results, OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/06/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results-country-notes_33192204/germany_1b23ffcd.html
- Parsons, T. (1985). *Talcott Parsons on Institutions and Social Evolution: Selected Writings*, edited and with an Introduction by Leon H. Mayhew, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Parsons, T. (1953). “Some Comments on the State of the General Theory of Action”, *American Sociological Review*, 18 (6): 618-631. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2088115>
- Parsons, Talcott (1960), “Pattern Variables Revisited: A Response to Robert Dubin”, *American Sociological Review*, 25 (4): 467-83. Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2092932>
- Sotiropoulos, D. A., Kanellopoulos, K. & Yfanti, A. (2023). Literature review on the impact of the migration and refugees’ waves on democratic attitudes and trust. Working Paper no.3.2. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project (www.TRUEDEM.eu).
- The ESS Sampling Expert Panel. (2016). *Sampling Guidelines: Principles and implementation for the European Social Survey*. ESS ERIC Headquarters. <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/> .
- Tsatsanis, M., Georgiadou, V., Klironomos, N., & Mavropoulou, T. (2022). A comparative analysis of political trust and distrust in Denmark, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Serbia (Part A). In EnTrust Consortium (Ed.), *Integrated Report on Appraising Citizens’ Trust and Distrust in Governance: Forms, Determinants, Effects and Remedies (Deliverable 6.2, Horizon 2020 Research Project No. 870572)*. European Commission. https://entrust-project.eu/files/2024/06/EnTrust_D6.2_Integrated-Report.pdf
- Wallace Goodman, S. (2021). Immigration Threat, Partisanship, and Democratic Citizenship: Evidence from the US, UK, and Germany. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(1), 2052-2083. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997165>
- Zmerli, S., & Newton, K. (2008). Social trust and attitudes toward democracy. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72(4), 706–724. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfn054>



Appendices

Appendix 1

Table A1. The demographic characteristics of participants: European Social Survey, 2020 and 2022

Country/year	Sample achieved				Sample by applying the analysis weight			
	<i>N</i>	Men (%)	Women (%)	Age \bar{X} (SD)	<i>N</i>	Men (%)	Women (%)	Age \bar{X} (SD)
ESS 2020								
Bulgaria	2,718	47.2	52.8	52.68 (18.256)	592	47.9	52.1	49.45 (19.112)
Czechia	2,476	43.6	56.4	48.30 (17.719)	898	48.9	51.1	47.77 (17.703)
ESS 2022								
Croatia	1,563	45.5	54.5	51.63 (19.717)	330	48.4	51.6	52.77 (19.828)
France	1,771	49.4	50.6	50.22 (19.222)	5,640	48.0	52.0	48.25 (19.974)
Germany	2,420	50.2	49.8	50.38 (18.997)	7,243	49.1	50.9	48.98 (19.730)
Greece	2,757	44.9	55.1	51.00 (17.357)	902	48.3	51.7	49.56 (18.229)
Netherlands	1,695	49.7	50.3	50.52 (18.827)	1,508	49.6	50.4	47.91 (19.547)
Poland	1,442	46.8	53.2	48.73 (18.466)	3,109	48.2	51.8	51.29 (18.518)
Portugal	1,373	42.1	57.9	54.30 (18.286)	912	46.7	53.3	50.42 (18.697)
Slovenia	1,248	48.7	51.3	49.76 (19.569)	180	50.4	49.6	49.68 (19.028)

Appendix 2

Gini coefficient for European countries for 2021 (primarily), or for 2020; it refers to equivalized disposable income

- | | |
|--------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Austria – 0.31 | 17. Lithuania – 0.37 |
| 2. Belgium – 0.27 | 18. Luxembourg – 0.33 |
| 3. Bulgaria – 0.39 | 19. Malta – 0.31 |
| 4. Croatia – 0.29 | 20. Netherlands – 0.26 |
| 5. Cyprus – 0.31 | 21. Poland – 0.28 |
| 6. Czechia – 0.26 | 22. Portugal – 0.35 |
| 7. Denmark – 0.28 | 23. Romania – 0.34 |
| 8. Estonia – 0.32 | 24. Slovakia – 0.24 |
| 9. Finland – 0.28 | 25. Slovenia – 0.24 |
| 10. France – 0.32 | 26. Spain – 0.34 |
| 11. Germany – 0.32 | 27. Sweden – 0.30 |
| 12. Greece – 0.33 | |
| 13. Hungary – 0.29 | ----- |
| 14. Ireland – 0.30 | a. Norway – 0.28 |
| 15. Italy – 0.35 | b. Switzerland – 0.34 |
| 16. Latvia – 0.34 | c. Ukraine – 0.26 |
| | d. UK – 0.32 |

Source: <https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/gini-coefficient-of-equivalised-disposable-income-eurostat-data.html> ; also <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/gender-statistics/Series/SI.POV.GINI#>

Appendix 3

Appendix 3 – EU Country Designations (plus four other European countries) – assigned. Materialist - Rather Materialist - Rather Postmaterialist – Postmaterialist (based on the Appendix 4 tables):

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Austria – rather materialist | 17. Lithuania – rather materialist |
| 2. Belgium – 0.27 | 18. Luxembourg – 0.33 |
| 3. Bulgaria – rather materialist | 19. Malta – 0.31 |
| 4. Croatia – rather postmaterialist | 20. Netherlands – rather postmaterialist |
| 5. Cyprus – materialist | 21. Poland – postmaterialist |
| 6. Czechia – materialist | 22. Portugal – materialist |
| 7. Denmark – rather materialist | 23. Romania – materialist |
| 8. Estonia – postmaterialist | 24. Slovakia – materialist |
| 9. Finland – rather materialist | 25. Slovenia – postmaterialist |
| 10. France – rather materialist | 26. Spain – postmaterialist |
| 11. Germany – postmaterialist | 27. Sweden – rather materialist |
| 12. Greece – materialist | 28. Norway – rather materialist |
| 13. Hungary – materialist | 29.. Switzerland – postmaterialist |
| 14. Ireland – 0.30 | 30. Ukraine – materialist |
| 15. Italy – rather materialist | 31. UK – postmaterialist |
| 16. Latvia – 0.34 | |



Appendix 4

Country (CoW Numeric code) * Aims of respondent: first choice Crosstabulation (WVS-7/EVS-5 data)

	M Maintaining order in the nation		PM <i>Give people more say</i>		M Fighting prices rising		PM <i>Protecting freedom of speech</i>		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Austria</i>	490	30.0	361	22.1	340	20.8	437	26.8	1628	100
<i>Bulgaria</i>	859	55.8	197	12.8	449	29.2	32	2.0	1537	100
<i>Cyprus</i>	312	31.5	287	28.9	256	28.5	135	13.6	990	100
<i>Croatia</i>	470	32.2	548	37.1	270	18.5	169	11.5	1457	100
<i>Czechia</i>	725	42.2	379	22.0	352	20.5	259	15.1	1715	100
<i>Denmark</i>	1738	55.4	381	12.1	96	3.6	920	29.3	3135	100
<i>Estonia</i>	369	28.8	499	38.9	282	22.0	131	10.2	1281	100
<i>Finland</i>	441	37.5	313	26.6	88	7.4	333	28.3	1175	100
<i>France</i>	562	30.4	508	27.4	376	20.3	402	21.7	1848	100
<i>Germany</i>	921	26.1	1145	32.5	266	7.5	1188	33.7	3520	100
<i>Greece</i>	458	38.3	227	19.0	407	34.1	101	8.4	1193	100
<i>Hungary</i>	630	42.3	430	28.9	238	16.0	189	12.7	1487	100
<i>Italy</i>	562	25.1	513	22.9	692	30.9	470	21.0	2237	100
<i>Lithuania</i>	204	14.3	283	19.8	834	58.5	103	7.2	1424	100
<i>Netherlands</i>	794	33.7	265	11.2	325	13.8	967	41.1	2351	100
<i>Poland</i>	351	26.9	507	38.9	232	17.8	213	16.3	1303	100
<i>Portugal</i>	452	39.5	235	20.5	315	27.5	140	12.2	1142	100
<i>Romania</i>	1029	36.6	570	20.2	861	30.6	349	12.4	2809	100
<i>Slovakia</i>	539	38.1	355	25.1	407	28.8	111	7.8	1412	100
<i>Slovenia</i>	324	31.3	465	44.7	107	10.2	143	13.7	1039	100
<i>Spain</i>	339	28.7	395	33.4	230	19.4	217	18.3	1181	100
<i>Sweden</i>	513	43.6	205	17.4	14	1.1	443	37.7	1175	100
<i>Norway</i>	548	49.0	168	15.0	24	2.1	377	33.7	1117	100
<i>Switzerland</i>	870	27.9	485	15.5	661	21.1	1102	35.3	3118	100
<i>Ukraine</i>	1307	46.2	593	20.9	818	28.9	106	3.7	2824	100
<i>UK</i>	476	26.9	563	31.8	242	13.6	488	27.5	1769	100

Source: Haerpfer et al. 2022.



Country (CoW Numeric code) * Aims of respondent: second choice Crosstabulation (WVS-7/EVS-5 data)

	M Maintaining order in the nation		PM Give people more say		M Fighting prices rising		PM Protecting freedom of speech		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Austria</i>	373	23.1	398	24.6	405	25.0	438	27.1	1614	100
<i>Bulgaria</i>	442	29.4	446	29.7	437	29.1	174	11.6	1499	100
<i>Croatia</i>	306	21.2	357	24.7	413	28.6	365	25.3	1441	100
<i>Cyprus</i>	248	25.6	194	20.0	320	33.1	204	21.1	966	100
<i>Czechia</i>	444	26.6	423	25.4	419	25.1	377	22.6	1663	100
<i>Denmark</i>	814	26.1	630	20.2	291	9.3	1374	44.1	3109	100
<i>Estonia</i>	322	25.4	369	29.1	348	27.4	227	21.8	1266	100
<i>Finland</i>	306	26.5	347	30.1	156	13.5	343	29.6	1152	100
<i>France</i>	341	18.6	401	21.9	446	24.4	636	34.8	1824	100
<i>Germany</i>	825	23.3	1061	30.0	510	14.4	1140	32.2	3536	100
<i>Greece</i>	307	26.0	256	21.6	403	34.1	214	18.1	1180	100
<i>Hungary</i>	317	21.5	378	25.7	416	28.3	357	24.3	1468	100
<i>Italy</i>	412	19.0	572	26.4	570	26.3	612	28.2	2166	100
<i>Lithuania</i>	382	27.4	479	34.4	354	25.4	177	12.7	1392	100
<i>Netherlands</i>	691	29.7	525	22.5	429	18.4	679	29.2	2324	100
<i>Poland</i>	266	20.8	332	26.0	297	23.2	380	29.8	1275	100
<i>Portugal</i>	295	26.3	209	18.6	370	33.0	247	22.0	1121	100
<i>Romania</i>	540	19.5	566	20.5	929	33.6	723	26.2	2758	100
<i>Slovakia</i>	330	23.5	290	20.6	495	35.2	288	20.5	1403	100
<i>Slovenia</i>	245	24.4	262	26.0	229	22.8	268	26.6	1004	100
<i>Spain</i>	230	19.7	265	22.7	291	25.0	378	32.4	1164	100
<i>Sweden</i>	337	28.8	379	32.3	54	4.6	400	34.1	1170	100
<i>Norway</i>	319	28.6	272	24.4	86	7.1	437	39.2	1114	100
<i>Switzerland</i>	726	23.8	793	26.0	728	23.8	800	26.2	3047	100
<i>Ukraine</i>	827	29.7	653	23.4	1006	36.1	294	10.5	2780	100
<i>UK</i>	376	21.4	508	29.0	332	18.9	534	30.5	1750	100

Source: Haerpfer et al. 2022.