



**TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies
2023-2025
European Commission Grant No 101095237**

**LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE IMPACT OF THE
MIGRATION AND REFUGEES' WAVES ON
DEMOCRATIC ATTITUDES AND TRUST**

Deliverable number:	D3.2
Due date:	31 December 2023
Type:	REPORT
Dissemination Level:	PU (PUBLIC)
Work Package:	WP3. Role of socioeconomic transformations in reshaping European democracies
Lead Beneficiary:	UOP-GR
Contributing Beneficiaries:	All partners
Authors:	Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos, Kostas Kanellopoulos and Aggeliki Yfanti

Purpose and scope of the deliverable:

The objective of D3.2 report is to provide a literature review on the impact of the migration and refugees' waves on democratic attitudes and trust. The report features a survey of the existing literature outlining main implications the economic migration and refugees movement have had on the pro-democratic attitudes and trust, including possible mediators of this influence.

Citation: Sotiropoulos, D. A., Kanellopoulos, K. & Yfanti, A. (2023). Literature review on the impact of the migration and refugees' waves on democratic attitudes and trust. *Working Paper no.3.2*. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project (www.TRUEDEM.eu).



Contents

Project summary	3
Aims and goals for deliverable (D3.2)	3
Introduction	4
The context of political trust in the early 21 st century in the EU: multiple crises	5
1 Literature review on migration and trust	6
1.1 Immigration and refugees in Europe: current situation	6
1.2 Theoretical Framework: How Immigration and Political Trust Are Connected	15
1.2.1 Diffuse and specific support to political institutions	15
1.2.2 The theoretical logic of the connection between immigration, political trust, and democracy	16
1.2.3 The theoretical argument and research hypotheses concerning immigration and political trust	18
1.3 Literature Review on the Influence of Immigration on Political Trust	22
1.3.1 Empirical research on immigration and political trust: cross-national studies and national case-studies	22
1.3.2 The mediating role of media and political parties	27
2. Immigration and Political Trust: Empirical Analysis.....	29
2.1. Method	29
2.1.1 The data	29
2.1.2 Measures.....	29
2.1.3 Statistical Analysis	30
2.2. Results	30
2.2.1 Univariate Analysis Results	30
2.2.2 Immigration and Political Trust: Cross-national results.....	34
2.3. Conclusions	39
4. Integration and Identification of Main Debates	40
4.1. EU’s policy interventions to manage migration and refugee waves	40
4.2. Democratic consultation on EU policy responses to immigration and refugee waves.....	41
4.3. The role of EU independent authorities.....	43
5. Conclusions and Hypotheses Building for the Future Research.....	43
References for part I	45
6. Immigration and Political Trust in Europe: National Case-Studies	49
6.1. Immigration, public perceptions, and political trust in Austria	49
6.2. Immigration perceptions and political trust in France.....	64
6.3. Public opinion and policy responses to immigration in Greece	69
6.4. Public perceptions and policy responses to immigration in Italy	74
6.5. Immigration to Poland: public perceptions and policy response.....	79
6.6. Ukrainian refugees in Poland: public perceptions and media reporting	84
6.7. Immigration to Slovakia: public perceptions and policy response.....	93
6.8. Immigration to Slovenia: public perceptions and policy response.....	99
6.9. Refugees from Ukraine: return home or successful adaptation in new places	101
APPENDICES	105
Appendix 1: Population and migration.....	105
Appendix 2: Countries of citizenship of the foreign/foreign born population - additional European countries	108
Appendix 3: Key framework programs and provisions at the EU level	110
Appendix 4: Immigration and Political Trust: Country Results	111

Project summary

TRUEDEM is a 3-year multinational research project funded by the Horizon program of the European Commission with several core objectives. TRUEDEM aims to design and implement a complex research effort to collect comprehensive evidence on the perceptions of trust and judgments of trustworthiness in a range of European states. The project will create a robust and comprehensive knowledge base on long-term dynamics and predictors of trust in political institutions of representative democracy (parties, executives, parliaments, judiciary etc.) in the EU. TRUEDEM will examine the role of new patterns of electoral behaviour, impact of socioeconomic transformations, the erosion of old and emergence of new political cleavages for the inclusiveness, representativity and legitimacy in European democracies, and political trust. TRUEDEM will identify strategies to address the demands and needs of citizens expressed via both electoral and non-electoral forms of political participation as means to enhance active engagement and inclusion and thus booster inclusive and responsive decision-making and governance in Europe. TRUEDEM will distinguish clusters of values that can hinder or foster pro-democratic values and attitudes and thus contribute to the barriers and opportunities to re-invigorating and enhancing representative democratic systems. Finally, TRUEDEM will develop a comprehensive and transparent toolbox of policy interventions including recommendations, toolkits, and methodologies for enhancing trust in political institutions, boosting transparency inclusiveness of representative systems. TRUEDEM is coordinated in Austria with partners in Czechia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and Ukraine. The three-year program runs from January 2023 to December 2025.

Aims and goals for deliverable (D3.2)

The aim of this report is to examine the past literature and public opinion research data addressing the causal relations between political trust on one hand and the phenomenon of immigration on the other. The report shall contribute to the TRUEDEM project's overall agenda on examining the trends, patterns and predictors of political trust in European democracies and shall inform the eventual policy recommendations on the relevant tools to mediate the potential negative implications of immigration for political trust and public support in Europe. The report is structured as follows. First, we describe firefly the recent immigration trends in European countries, including the number of migrants and the countries of the origin as well as the share of migrant population in every country. We then proceed to develop the theoretical framework of the study outlining the specific mechanisms through which the phenomenon immigration might affect political trust in the country. The then examine the available literature to document the state of the art of the studied issue. We turn to the findings of the latest ESS round on immigration and political trust to explore the correlations. Section four in the report discusses the EU policies aimed to tackle immigration. Finally, the last chapter of the report is dedicated to the national case-studied produced with the contribution of the TRUEDEM national teams. The overall goal of this report is to set up the theoretical and methodological framework for the consolidating reports in WP3 – D3.4. Democratic narrative around the socio-economic transformations and D3.5 Consolidated report on the implications of socioeconomic transformations for democratic attitudes, political participation and trust.

Introduction

In this report we present a literature review on the impact of the migration and refugees' waves on democratic attitudes and trust. We summarize and assess the main implications which the economic migration and refugees' movement have had on the pro-democratic attitudes and trust.

Writing on the challenges to European democracies at the end of the last decade, the sociologist Bryan S. Turner aptly summarized the daunting tasks of political and social research:

What is clear is that Europe faces an uncertain democratic future being confronted by Brexit, the Catalan movement for secession, political instability in Italy, the uncertain future of Merkel's coalition in Germany and the development of anti-immigrant policies in Hungary and Poland. One can either take the view of view that these are the normal trials and tribulations of democratic processes, or that the post-war democratic settlement is slowly unwinding. Either view is plausible (Turner, 2019: 7).

One may argue that both views are plausible at the same time. While the nationalist movement in Catalonia has abated, Brexit has been implemented, and the political party coalition led by Merkel in Germany has been replaced in power by another coalition, the other democratic challenges, noted by Turner, remain strong. While the Italian elections of September 2022 brought to power a stable coalition of Right and Far-Right parties under G. Meloni, Italy is repeatedly shaken by waves of migrants and refugees. And while the Polish elections of October 2023 spelled the electoral defeat of the anti-migrant, populist *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (CiS) (Law and Justice) party by the united opposition, the new Polish government, to be formed under Donald Tusk, will need time to ponder on policy reversals and to implement policy shifts. In brief, democratic processes allows for government turnover, but the challenges posed by immigration to European democracies endure.

This literature review focuses on the impact of immigration on the trust which European citizens grant to democratic institutions. Examples of such trust is confidence in the national government, political parties, the parliament, or the legal system as well as trust in the mass media, unions, and civic associations. Following the emphasis of the TRUEDEM project on political trust and trustworthiness of political leaders and institutions, this literature review does not discuss the impact of immigration on other orientations such as citizen's satisfaction with democracy and their support for democracy. The literature review also does not discuss the effects of immigration on the political trust of immigrants themselves, a topic on which there is a separate stream of research literature. This separate stream, not covered by the TRUEDEM research agenda, has to do with the political trust which incoming migrants show to political institutions of their home country, after they have resided for variable periods of time in the country of their destination (e.g., among many others, Careja & Emmenegger, 2012; Voicu & Tufiş, 2017; Dahlberg & Linden, 2018).

In what follows we first briefly sketch the international and domestic context in which immigration and political trust are interlinked. Then, we summarize the current situation in the EU regarding immigration, we discuss how immigration and political trust may be theoretically connected and look at what the available empirical evidence shows about such a connection. After that we present key findings of relevant cross-national surveys. In each research project which is discussed below, we highlight the main research question, the data set which has been used, the specific types of political trust which have been investigated as dependent variable, and the major findings and conclusions.

An excursus to findings of the latest ESS round on immigration and political trust is then examined sharing some cross-national results. It is followed by a presentation of the findings of national case

studies research on immigration and political trust and democracy in selected EU countries. At the end, we proceed with a discussion of the relevant debates and research hypotheses, before drawing our conclusions.

Our report outlines some key findings, which will be further discussed in the sections below. The main points are the following: Citizens may (or may not) perceive immigration as a threat and when doing so, they make rational judgements about how successful political institutions are in dealing with immigration. The perception of failure on the part of institutions and the elected officials to manage immigration negatively affects the trustworthiness of institutions and officials in the eyes of citizens. In turn, declining trustworthiness has a negative impact on the trust which citizens show to the institutions and officials. Eventually, the citizens' distrust towards the institutions and officials may become broader: they may come to distrust the democratically organized political community. The extent to which the dyadic relationship between trustworthiness and political trust plays out depends on the individual characteristics of citizens as well as on structural characteristics of the political, societal, cultural and information environment in which citizens find themselves.

The context of political trust in the early 21st century in the EU: multiple crises

Since 2000, European democracies have had to grapple with many crises, including the economic crisis, the rise of populism, Brexit and, of course, immigration. At the beginning of 2020s, European democracies face both external and internal challenges. Following the struggle to harmonize their policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, EU member-states are now occupied to take concerted actions regarding Russia's way in Ukraine (since February 2022) and the new war in the Middle East (since October 2023). Meanwhile, as it happened with other democracies, the European ones too have been ushered in a period of large-scale changes in their domestic public spheres, a period of "post-truth politics" (Conrad et al., 2023).

In relation specifically to the immigration crisis, this has to do with the dramatic increase in immigration flows to the EU member-states in two recent periods of time: that is in 2015 when approximately 1.2 million people mainly from Syria and other Middle Eastern countries immigrated or sought refuge in the EU, and that of 2022 when over 6 million citizens of Ukraine left their country due to Russia's military invasion. Population movements of such a scale and within such a short period of time can reasonably be considered as significant events able to affect the wider political, social, and economic environment of the receiving countries and, particularly, the level of public trust towards the key political institutions. The prevailing conclusion in the existing literature suggests that there was a decline of public trust in national governments and political leaders, growing dissatisfaction of how they deal with the immigration issues as well as increased support for anti-immigration political parties.

However, in order to explore the relationship between political trust and the recent immigration crises, it is important to better clarify the concept of crisis itself since there is no single and commonly accepted definition. If we draw on Colin Hay's reformulation of crisis as a "*moment of decisive intervention* and not merely a moment of fragmentation, dislocation or destruction" then we need "to give far greater emphasis to the essential *narrativity* of crisis, and the relationship between discourses of crisis and the contradictions that they narrate" (1999: 317). Geddes et al. (2020), when discussing migration and mobility in the EU, make a similar argument by stating that defining certain situation as a crisis is not a neutral action. They argue that

crises are political constructs that depend on certain interpretations of what is happening and, on the basis of these interpretations, subsequent decisions on courses of action. If the migration crisis is

seen as being driven by people smugglers exploiting the situation of helpless refugees, then a response could develop that targets the business model of these smugglers while also, as a side effect, tending to cast migrants as passive victims (2020: 3).

It is, however, outside the scope of this report to present a full and persuasive account of these competing narrations and the actual state interventions and transformations that have occurred around the immigration crisis (and other recent crises) at EU level and in each separate EU Member State.

1 Literature review on migration and trust

1.1 Immigration and refugees in Europe: current situation

Immigration is a major issue in Europe, and it is on the increase. The EU-27 countries are net recipients of significant migratory and refugee waves. Cross-border migration includes formal and informal economic migrants, migrants for family reasons and refugees. This occurs at a time when the natural population growth of the EU-27 is negative. Immigration *de facto* counterbalances this decline and allows for a slight increase of the overall EU-27 population. Specifically, the rate of natural population growth in the EU ebbed in the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1990s, the total number of deaths had been nearly equal to the total number of births, while since the mid-2010s deaths have begun to far exceed births. Therefore, until 2022 and since then the main reason that there is no rapid decline in the overall population in the EU is the inflow of immigrants. Since the beginning of the 1990s, migration flows have had a catalytic effect on the general index of population changes in the EU (see Figure 1.1).

According to the Eurostat calculations, the expectation for the European population (EU-27) is to remain almost stable until 2080 (510 million in 2016 and 518 million in 2080) (see Table 1.1). This would be so despite a projected continuing trend of negative natural increase (more deaths than live births) that would reach 65 million by the mark-year 2080. The anticipation is that the ensuing gap will be filled in by the continuing immigration into the EU-27, which shall add 65 million people by 2080. Of course, demographic calculations and projections are not hard and fast, and indeed may be offset by unforeseen or unanticipated factors. The figures cited, however, give credence to the perspective that, besides the bearing of natural population increase, future European population balance would significantly depend on the influx of migrants and refugees.


Table 1.1. Projections of population change in the EU 2016-2080 (millions)

Estimated population January 2016	510,279
Cumulative births	327,121
Cumulative deaths	383,991
Natural change	-56,870
Cumulative net migration	65,521
Total change	8,652
Projected population, 2080	518,798

Source: Geddes et al. (2020: 6).

Figure 1.1. Population changes in the EU, 1960-2022

Population change by component (annual crude rates), EU, 1960-2022
(per 1 000 persons)



Note: Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997. Breaks in series: 1991, 1998, 2000-01, 2008, 2010-12, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2022.

2022: Eurostat estimate

(*) 1960: not available.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

Source: Eurostat (2023d).

Of course, the demographic portrait of Europe (EU-27) is not uniform, but instead it is highly differentiated. According to the latest available data on the demographic balance in European countries (see Table 1.2 below), it emerges that the total European population decreased in only 6 out of 27 EU states in the last year (from 2022 to 2023). Greece is the only country with an outflow instead of an inflow of migrants and shows the largest population decrease in proportion to its population size. Relatively few immigrants enter Italy compared to other countries of similar population size, with the result that there is, too, a decrease in the country's total population. In Hungary, Croatia, Poland, and Slovakia, which are the other four EU countries showing a decrease in their total population, the inflow of migrants is minimal.

Other countries characterized by a substantial natural population decrease, among them Germany stands out, compensate their population reduction by the high numbers of immigrants they take in. This is the case in Spain, Portugal, Romania, and the Netherlands. And even when the influx of



immigrants does not suffice to counteract the natural population decrease, it tends to reduce the overall population decline, as in Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Finland, or Italy (see Table2).¹

Table 1.2. Demographic balance in Europe, 2022

Demographic balance, 2022
(thousands)

	Population, 1 January 2022	Live births	Deaths	Natural change (¹)	Net migration and statistical adjustment (²)	Total change between 1 January 2022 and 2023	Population, 1 January 2023
EU (³)	446,735.3	3,885.6	5,148.6	-1,263.0	4,054.7	2,791.7	448,387.9
Belgium (⁴)	11,617.6	114.1	116.4	-2.3	138.7	136.4	11,754.0
Bulgaria (⁴)	6,838.9	56.6	118.8	-62.2	27.4	-34.8	6,447.7
Czechia	10,516.7	101.3	120.2	-18.9	329.7	310.8	10,827.5
Denmark	5,873.4	58.4	59.4	-1.0	60.2	59.2	5,932.7
Germany	83,237.1	738.9	1,066.3	-327.5	1,449.2	1,121.7	84,358.8
Estonia	1,331.8	11.6	17.3	-5.7	39.8	34.1	1,365.9
Ireland	5,060.0	57.6	35.1	22.5	111.8	134.3	5,194.3
Greece (⁵)(⁶)	10,459.8	75.9	140.0	-64.1	-1.7	-65.7	10,394.1
Spain (⁵)(⁶)	47,432.9	329.9	462.7	-132.8	695.7	562.9	48,059.8
France (⁷)	67,871.9	723.6	667.2	56.4	142.4	198.8	68,070.7
Croatia	3,862.3	33.9	57.0	-23.1	11.7	-11.4	3,850.9
Italy (⁵)(⁶)	59,030.1	392.6	713.5	-320.9	141.5	-179.4	58,850.7
Cyprus (⁸)	904.7	10.2	7.3	2.9	13.1	16.0	920.7
Latvia	1,875.8	16.0	30.7	-14.8	22.0	7.3	1,883.0
Lithuania	2,806.0	22.1	42.9	-20.8	72.1	51.3	2,857.3
Luxembourg	645.4	6.5	4.4	2.0	13.4	15.4	660.8
Hungary (⁴)	9,689.0	89.7	136.8	-47.2	36.6	-10.5	9,597.1
Malta (⁴)	521.0	4.3	4.2	0.1	21.8	21.9	542.1
Netherlands	17,590.7	167.5	170.1	-2.6	223.2	220.6	17,811.3
Austria	8,978.9	82.6	93.3	-10.7	136.5	125.8	9,104.8
Poland (⁴)	37,654.2	305.1	448.4	-143.3	7.3	-136.0	36,753.7
Portugal	10,352.0	83.7	124.3	-40.6	156.0	115.3	10,467.4
Romania (⁸)	19,042.5	183.6	272.0	-88.4	97.5	9.1	19,051.6
Slovenia	2,107.2	17.6	22.5	-4.9	14.5	9.6	2,116.8
Slovakia	5,434.7	52.7	59.6	-6.9	1.0	-5.9	5,428.8
Finland	5,548.2	45.0	63.2	-18.3	34.0	15.7	5,564.0
Sweden (⁸)	10,452.3	104.7	94.7	10.0	59.2	69.2	10,521.6
Iceland	376.2	4.4	2.7	1.7	9.8	11.5	387.8
Liechtenstein	39.3	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.4	39.7
Norway	5,425.3	51.5	45.8	5.7	58.0	63.7	5,489.0
Switzerland	8,738.8	82.4	74.4	7.9	66.0	73.9	8,812.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Montenegro	617.7	7.0	7.1	0.0	-0.9	-1.0	616.7
North Macedonia (⁹)	1,837.1	18.1	22.5	-4.4	-2.8	-7.2	1,830.0
Albania	2,793.6	24.7	24.0	0.7	-32.5	-31.8	2,761.8
Serbia	6,797.1	62.7	109.2	-46.5	-86.2	-132.7	6,664.4
Turkey	84,680.3	1,035.8	504.8	531.0	68.3	599.3	85,279.6
Ukraine	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Georgia	:	:	:	:	:	:	3,736.4
Kosovo (¹)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Moldova	:	:	:	:	:	:	2,512.8

(-) not available

(¹) Live births minus deaths.

(²) Total change minus natural change.

(³) Provisional for 2023.

(⁴) Break in series in 2023. The components of the demographic balance are estimated by Eurostat using two consistent population figures.

(⁵) Estimate.

(⁶) Break in series in 2022.

(⁷) This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

Source: Eurostat (2023d).

¹ The figures cited for countries may vary due to the year of reporting. Usually, numbers given e.g., for year 2022, refer to the end of the previous year, i.e., 2021. However, this is not always the case as records for a particular year may be reported with more substantial time-gaps. This accounts for most of the variation observed, between this and subsequent tables. Also, there is no uniformity in the numbers of immigrants reported in official statistics as born in their country of origin and for those that are citizens of another country, have dual citizenship or settled status, which in turn leads to greater variation in reporting.



Another way to examine the specific weight of immigration in Europe is to look at it in terms of the percentage share of the third-country *nationals* among the population of specific countries (see Table 1.3 below). Among the EU countries, the highest share of third-country nationals in a country's total population (as of 01-01-2022) is in Estonia (13,6%), Latvia (12,5%), and Malta (12,0%). In absolute numbers, more populous EU countries, i.e., Germany, France Italy, and Spain, each host over three million immigrants (Germany – over 6,3 million). Yet, in smaller countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden, where immigrants exceed the half million mark (and Switzerland too among non-EU countries) the share of third-country nationals usually exceeds the 5% of a country's total population. It is evident therefore from the data on third-country nationals, that for most EU countries the immigrants constitute a substantial share of their population.

Table 1.3. Share of third-country nationals in the total population (EU and EFTA, 01-01-2022)

Country	Number of third-country nationals	Share in the total population %	Country	Number of third-country nationals	Share in the total population %
Austria	741.486	8,3	Spain	3.664.048	7,7
Belgium	530.091	4,6	Italy	3.640.764	6,2
Bulgaria	106.646	1,6	Latvia	238.253	12,7
Croatia	24.590	0,6	Lithuania	30.591	1,1
Cyprus	75.887	8,4	Luxembourg	57.916	9,0
Czechia	364.699	3,5	Malta	62.417	12,0
Denmark	317.962	5,4	Netherlands	574.038	3,3
France	3.828.711	5,6	Poland	419.024	1,1
Finland	190.431	3,4	Portugal	529.694	5,1
Estonia	181.106	13,6	Romania	28.001	0,1
Germany	6.358.798	7,6	Slovakia	22.217	0,4
Greece	632.657	6,0	Slovenia	151.250	7,2
Hungary	123.251	1,3	Sweden	556.363	5,3
Ireland	314.838	6,2	<i>Iceland</i>	<i>11.208</i>	<i>3,0</i>
Germany	6.358.798	7,6	<i>Liechtenstein</i>	<i>6.444</i>	<i>16,4</i>
Greece	632.657	6,0	<i>Norway</i>	<i>223.426</i>	<i>4,1</i>
Hungary	123.251	1,3	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>804.820</i>	<i>9,2</i>
Ireland	314.838	6,2			

Source: Eurostat (2023c: 8).

Probing into the evolution of immigration flows per year and per the European country for the entire period from 2010 to 2021, it appears that the peak years for migrant inflow in the EU-27 were 2019 (4.216.138 in total) followed by 2015 (4.055.071) (see Table 1.4). Overall, annual immigration into the EU during this period, taken as a whole, was in the range of 3 to 4 million per year, notwithstanding some fluctuation in the numbers of new migrants. In fact, every year the number of newly arrived immigrants is by any standard substantial, with a slight dip observed in 2020 associated to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Looking at individual countries' migrant influx, it emerges that for most of them it increased in the middle and later years of this period for Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Other EU countries however peaked in terms of their migrants' influx early in that period, as was the case of France, Italy, and Luxembourg. Still another set of countries showed a near uniformity in the influx of migrants over



the years, for instance, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania, and Slovakia.

Given that the migratory phenomenon is particularly complex and unpredictable, and tends to bypass categorizations, from the information presented up till now no specific patterning emerges as regards particular clusters of discreet EU countries, on the basis of dimensions or qualities other than their own size and that of the numbers of immigrants received, and geographic location.

Table 1.4. Annual Immigration to European countries, 2010-2021 [tps00176]

Data extracted on 20/11/2023 18:05:56 from [ESTAT]
Dataset: Immigration [tps00176]
Last updated: 03/10/2023 23:00

TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
EU-27 countries	:	:	:	2,890,780	3,155,818	4,055,071	3,693,495	3,751,814	3,942,303	4,216,138	3,268,760	3,744,277
Belgium	135,281	147,377	129,477	120,078	123,158	146,626	123,702	126,703	137,860	150,006	118,683	139,743
Bulgaria	:	:	14,103	18,570	26,615	25,223	21,241	25,597	29,559	37,929	37,364	39,461
Czechia	48,317	27,114	34,337	30,124	29,897	29,602	64,083	51,847	65,910	105,888	63,095	69,360
Denmark	52,236	52,833	54,409	60,312	68,388	78,492	74,383	68,579	64,669	61,384	57,230	63,489
Germany	404,055	489,422	592,175	692,713	884,893	1,571,047	1,029,852	917,109	893,886	886,341	728,606	874,367
Estonia	2,810	3,709	2,639	4,109	3,904	15,413	14,822	17,616	17,547	18,259	16,209	19,524
Ireland	52,339	57,292	61,324	65,539	73,519	80,792	85,185	78,499	97,712	85,630	74,211	80,732
Greece	60,462	60,089	58,200	57,946	59,013	64,446	116,867	112,247	119,489	129,459	84,221	57,120
Spain	360,705	371,331	304,053	280,772	305,454	342,114	414,746	532,132	643,684	750,480	467,918	528,856
France	307,111	319,816	327,431	338,752	340,383	364,221	377,709	369,621	387,158	385,591	283,237	336,398
Croatia	8,846	8,534	8,959	10,378	10,638	11,706	13,985	15,553	26,029	37,726	33,414	35,912
Italy	458,856	385,793	350,772	307,454	277,631	280,078	300,823	343,440	332,324	332,778	247,526	318,366
Cyprus	20,206	23,037	17,476	13,149	9,212	15,183	17,391	21,306	23,442	26,170	25,861	24,001
Latvia	4,011	10,234	13,303	8,299	10,365	9,479	8,345	9,916	10,909	11,223	8,840	12,689
Lithuania	5,213	15,685	19,843	22,011	24,294	22,130	20,162	20,368	28,914	40,067	43,096	44,858
Luxembourg	16,962	20,268	20,478	21,098	22,332	23,803	22,888	24,379	24,644	26,668	22,490	25,335
Hungary	25,519	28,018	33,702	38,968	54,581	58,344	53,618	68,070	82,937	88,581	75,470	80,471
Malta	4,275	5,465	8,256	10,897	14,454	16,936	17,051	21,676	26,444	28,341	13,885	18,148
Netherlands	126,776	130,118	124,566	129,428	145,323	166,872	189,232	189,646	194,306	215,756	182,244	214,105
Austria	70,978	82,230	91,557	101,866	116,262	166,323	129,509	111,801	105,633	109,167	103,565	118,511
Poland	155,131	157,059	217,546	220,311	222,275	218,147	208,302	209,353	214,083	226,649	210,615	241,116
Portugal	27,575	19,667	14,606	17,554	19,516	29,896	29,925	36,639	43,170	72,725	67,160	50,721
Romania	149,885	147,685	167,266	153,646	136,035	132,795	137,455	177,435	172,578	202,422	145,519	194,642
Slovenia	15,416	14,083	15,022	13,871	13,846	15,420	16,623	18,808	28,455	31,319	36,110	23,624
Slovakia	5,272	4,829	5,419	5,149	5,357	6,997	7,686	7,188	7,253	7,016	6,775	5,733
Finland	25,636	29,481	31,278	31,941	31,507	28,746	34,905	31,797	31,106	32,758	32,898	36,364
Sweden	98,801	96,467	103,059	115,845	126,966	134,240	163,005	144,489	132,602	115,805	82,518	90,631
Iceland	3,948	4,073	4,960	6,406	5,368	5,635	8,710	12,116	11,830	9,872	8,544	8,996
Liechtenstein	591	650	671	696	615	657	607	645	649	727	713	669
Norway	69,214	70,337	69,908	68,313	66,903	60,816	61,460	53,351	47,864	48,680	36,287	53,947
Switzerland	161,778	148,799	149,051	160,157	156,282	153,627	149,305	143,377	144,857	145,129	138,778	144,907
United Kingdom	590,950	566,044	498,040	526,046	631,991	631,452	588,993	644,209	603,953	680,906	:	:

Source: Eurostat (2023e).

As regards, the *foreign-born* population per year and per the EU country for the period 2011-2022 (see Table 1.5). It emerges that for all ten countries that exceed the one million-mark of foreign-



born population, but for several other countries too, the general trend is that of a cumulative upward surge in numbers. This is much in line, with earlier indications of increases in immigrant flows.

Table 1.5. Foreign-born population in European countries per annum, 2011-2022 [tps00178]

Data extracted on 20/11/2023 18:43:28 from [ESTAT]
Dataset: Foreign-born population [tps00178]
Last updated: 05/10/2023 11:00

TIME	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
EU-27 countries	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	1,628,793	1,677,737	1,722,265	1,748,748	1,783,488	1,845,631	1,876,726	1,916,272	1,968,060	2,026,370	2,065,727	2,119,691
Bulgaria	78,621	85,076	96,113	109,239	123,803	136,421	145,390	156,505	171,993	188,729	201,940	220,843
Czechia	387,971	390,843	387,337	396,156	416,454	433,290	465,056	467,580	507,051	533,639	409,220	453,424
Denmark	517,230	531,540	548,411	569,596	595,876	636,666	668,090	690,549	707,880	715,936	721,135	745,851
Germany	8,935,603	9,117,874	9,456,225	9,807,877	10,220,418	10,908,255	12,105,436	13,745,843	14,879,635	15,040,708	15,162,728	15,287,650
Estonia	212,685	210,842	198,411	196,558	194,664	193,813	192,535	196,207	197,896	198,306	198,243	200,583
Ireland	737,219	772,826	760,960	754,664	759,256	773,649	796,410	811,245	844,412	875,559	883,319	904,801
Greece	1,325,255	1,312,519	1,279,516	1,265,165	1,242,924	1,220,395	1,250,863	1,277,861	1,307,471	1,348,174	1,361,720	1,198,086
Spain	6,282,205	6,294,954	6,174,740	5,958,308	5,891,208	5,918,341	6,024,698	6,198,833	6,538,961	6,996,825	7,214,878	7,365,311
France	7,335,966	7,463,157	7,543,950	7,746,520	7,915,838	8,028,227	8,098,872	8,199,663	8,428,660	8,521,829	8,670,939	8,651,109
Croatia	:	:	574,383	568,678	561,093	547,929	539,588	528,982	527,308	533,769	532,315	472,308
Italy	5,759,022	5,715,065	5,695,883	5,737,213	5,805,328	5,907,452	6,020,614	6,175,337	6,069,000	6,161,391	6,262,207	6,161,003
Cyprus	193,943	200,313	200,842	191,587	176,693	172,808	173,791	181,369	185,528	191,415	200,936	205,798
Latvia	302,849	289,018	279,227	271,126	265,418	258,889	251,465	246,040	241,754	236,953	230,095	223,631
Lithuania	149,544	143,675	140,221	137,417	136,021	129,706	127,351	130,975	138,171	152,578	165,164	168,787
Luxembourg	166,319	216,156	227,461	237,848	248,888	260,573	270,010	280,151	290,644	301,688	309,164	318,568
Hungary	443,295	401,769	423,317	447,029	475,508	503,787	513,649	536,182	564,761	593,937	597,440	612,618
Malta	33,591	35,121	38,815	44,149	52,642	61,632	69,576	83,396	99,555	118,927	119,550	122,930
Netherlands	1,868,655	1,906,295	1,927,728	1,953,436	1,996,318	2,056,520	2,137,234	2,215,849	2,298,705	2,399,804	2,451,157	2,550,837
Austria	1,294,224	1,322,656	1,364,003	1,414,215	1,483,123	1,588,209	1,649,008	1,690,619	1,722,833	1,760,595	1,792,053	1,834,342
Poland	637,408	630,478	625,363	620,308	611,855	626,396	651,845	695,850	760,849	849,320	901,790	951,051
Portugal	755,484	851,496	881,440	859,065	864,814	872,501	876,300	909,553	959,228	1,094,557	1,181,027	1,198,793
Romania	:	:	182,939	211,210	281,048	347,344	419,238	510,526	611,627	723,913	688,697	316,107
Slovenia	228,588	230,109	232,703	235,310	237,616	241,203	245,369	250,226	265,072	281,621	292,824	294,533
Slovakia	68,135	156,883	158,164	174,908	177,624	181,642	186,217	190,308	194,389	198,429	201,941	213,171
Finland	243,217	260,856	279,743	297,812	314,856	329,219	348,986	363,717	377,360	393,555	408,676	428,409
Sweden	1,384,111	1,426,402	1,472,353	1,532,563	1,602,522	1,675,116	1,783,179	1,875,637	1,954,065	2,018,191	2,045,234	2,089,008
Iceland	34,650	34,550	35,319	37,116	39,072	41,853	46,080	53,540	59,999	65,205	67,438	71,767
Liechtenstein	22,500	22,794	23,109	23,424	23,799	24,241	24,634	25,098	25,561	26,081	26,560	26,971
Norway	:	:	:	704,440	:	774,043	799,797	822,360	841,580	867,778	878,153	906,843
Switzerland	1,940,349	2,033,702	2,102,964	2,183,206	2,258,196	2,324,461	2,391,480	2,432,519	2,469,381	2,509,692	2,553,225	2,598,146
United Kingdom	7,342,547	7,762,334	7,923,428	8,039,324	8,406,996	8,696,511	9,298,018	9,512,464	9,469,015	:	:	:

Source: Eurostat (2023f).

The distribution of immigrant populations with a *settled* status (long-term residence permits) by the top 10 countries of origin in the EU countries by the end of 2022 is noteworthy (see Table 1.6). It indicates that certain ethnic groups are preponderant. In descending order, these are immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, China, and Algeria, followed by UK citizens and refugees from the Ukraine, with the latter being an adverse outcome of the ongoing war there. They are followed by citizens of Russia, Serbia, Albania, and Tunisia. Amongst them the multitudes of immigrants/refugees from the Middle East (Syria, Iraq), central Asia and from elsewhere, do not appear as often their status is largely unsettled.



Table 1.6. Immigrant populations with settled status in EU; top 10 countries of origin, 2022

Top 10 countries whose citizens have long-term residence in the EU and destination countries analysed by share of long-term residence permits in total valid residence permits, 2022

Citizens of:	Total number of long-term residents in the EU (number)	EU Member States: ranked by the share of long-term residents in the total number of residents with valid permits (%)		
		25 % to < 50 %	50 % to < 75	≥ 75 %
Morocco	1 549 566	Slovakia, Germany, Latvia, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, Finland and Luxembourg	France, Italy, Sweden, Slovenia, the Netherlands and Czechia	Spain and Belgium
Türkiye	1 484 173	Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Denmark and Lithuania	Belgium, Bulgaria, Austria and Spain	Germany and France
China including Hong Kong	630 543	Romania, Austria, Croatia, Portugal, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Latvia, Poland, Lithuania and the Netherlands	Slovenia, Malta, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Italy, Belgium, Czechia, Sweden and France	Cyprus and Spain
Algeria	621 288	Poland, Cyprus, Slovenia, Germany, Austria, Finland, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Hungary, Croatia and Malta	Czechia, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden and Bulgaria	Spain, France and Belgium
United Kingdom	615 418	Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Croatia	Slovakia and Austria	Spain, France, Malta, Sweden, Belgium and Hungary
Ukraine	576 798	Czechia, Sweden, France, Portugal, Austria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Cyprus and Finland	Bulgaria, Slovenia, Italy, Germany and Belgium	Spain
Russia	471 941	Sweden, Slovakia, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Italy, Finland and Cyprus	Spain, Lithuania, Germany, Belgium, Czechia, Slovenia, France and Bulgaria	Estonia and Latvia
Serbia	415 421	Slovenia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechia, Denmark, Finland	France, Italy, Austria, Sweden and Belgium	Germany, Spain and Bulgaria
Albania	345 443	Czechia, Slovenia, Austria and Finland	Bulgaria, Sweden, Belgium and Italy	Spain
Tunisia	291 952	Austria, Finland, Germany and Lithuania	France, Belgium, Czechia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Cyprus	Poland

Note: the information shown refers to the year-end situation (as of 31 December).
Total number including 2021 data for Denmark.
Shares for Denmark, 2021 data. Greece, Croatia and Lithuania, to calculate the shares the 2021 data on all non-EU citizens holding valid residence permits were used.
Ireland: low reliability. For more information please see the 'Data sources' section below.
France and Hungary: provisional.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_resvalid and migr_reslong)



Source: Eurostat (2023a).

A more detailed and versatile depiction of the distribution of immigrant populations by different ethnic group in the 20 EU and two other European countries, which provides information for a substantial cross-section of European countries, is available in Table 1.7 (see also related data in Appendix B). From this information it is possible to discern a set of patterns that relate to pull factors. These very broad patterns bring out the embeddedness of the migratory phenomenon in history, culture, geography, as well as opportunity.

The first one relates to historical ties: immigrants move to countries with which their country of origin (birth) was connected in the past. This relates to the colonial/imperial past of the European countries. It is asserted by the propensity of immigrants from such interlinked countries to speak the language of the ex-colonial power – now the host country – and by the cultural similarities and attraction it may exert. The remaining from the colonial past cultural ties facilitates the adaptation of migrants. Examples abound: Spain and migrants from Latin American countries ex-possession of Spain; Portugal and Brazil/Cape Verde; Italy and Romania/Albania; Austria and immigration from Germany and the Balkan countries; Netherlands and Surinam; Slovakia and migrants from Czechia; Romania from ethnically similar Moldova; Slovenia receiving migrants from countries with which it once constituted Yugoslavia; Finland attracts immigrants from linguistically similar Estonian and culturally interlinked Sweden; Latvia and Lithuania attracts migrants from areas of the former Soviet Union, into which it was a part; UK has a great numbers of migrants from its ex-colonies India and Pakistan; France from its own Maghreb ex-colonies and dependencies: Algeria and Morocco and Tunisia.



Table 1.7. Main countries of citizenship of the foreign/foreign born population, 1 Jan. 2022

Main countries of citizenship and birth of the foreign / foreign-born population, 1 January 2022
(in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total foreign/foreign-born population)

Belgium				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
France	175.6	11.8	Morocco	233.6 11.0
Netherlands	163.1	11.0	France	191.9 9.1
Italy	153.4	10.3	Netherlands	132.8 6.3
Romania	116.0	7.8	Italy	117.1 5.5
Morocco	81.7	5.5	Romania	108.0 5.1
Other	799.0	53.7	Other	1 336.2 63.0

Czechia				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Ukraine	171.0	31.8	Ukraine	154.2 34.0
Slovakia	101.0	18.8	Slovakia	86.0 19.0
Vietnam	55.0	10.2	Russia	34.4 7.6
Russia	37.2	6.9	Vietnam	32.5 7.2
Poland	14.9	2.8	Poland	13.2 2.9
Other	159.1	29.6	Other	133.2 29.4

Germany				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Türkiye	1 312.8	12.1		
Syria	834.9	7.7		
Romania	794.9	7.3		
Poland	773.4	7.1		
Italy	581.5	5.3		
Other	6 595.6	60.5		

Spain				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Morocco	775.2	14.3	Morocco	852.5 11.6
Romania	631.6	11.7	Colombia	564.9 7.7
United Kingdom	315.8	5.8	Romania	542.4 7.4
Colombia	315.4	5.8	Venezuela	438.6 6.0
Italy	298.2	5.5	Ecuador	423.2 5.7
Other	3 071.4	56.8	Other	4 543.7 61.7

Latvia				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Recognised non-citizen	182.4	74.4	Russia	104.8 46.9
Russia	39.2	16.0	Belarus	38.5 17.2
Ukraine	6.4	2.6	Ukraine	31.4 14.0
Lithuania	3.1	1.3	Lithuania	12.8 5.7
Belarus	2.6	1.1	Kazakhstan	5.4 2.4
Other	11.3	4.6	Other	30.8 13.8

Luxembourg				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Portugal	93.7	30.8	Portugal	72.9 22.9
France	49.2	16.2	France	44.8 14.1
Italy	24.1	7.9	Belgium	21.3 6.7
Belgium	19.4	6.4	Italy	19.8 6.2
Germany	12.8	4.2	Germany	16.8 5.3
Other	0.0	34.5	Other	142.9 44.9

Netherlands				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Poland	176.1	14.3	Türkiye	205.0 8.0
Germany	82.9	6.7	Suriname	177.9 7.0
Türkiye	80.2	6.5	Poland	173.5 6.8
Syria	57.0	4.6	Morocco	173.4 6.8
Italy	49.1	4.0	Germany	124.0 4.9
Other	784.6	63.8	Other	1 697.0 66.5

Portugal				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Brazil	204.7	29.3		
United Kingdom	41.9	6.0		
Cape Verde	34.1	4.9		
Italy	30.8	4.4		
India	30.3	4.3		
Other	357.1	51.1		

Slovenia				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	81.7	47.4	Bosnia and Herzegovina	133.8 45.4
Kosovo*	23.8	13.8	Croatia	42.0 14.3
Serbia	16.9	9.8	Serbia	29.7 10.1
North Macedonia	14.1	8.2	Kosovo*	24.9 8.5
Croatia	9.9	5.8	North Macedonia	19.9 6.7
Other	26.0	15.1	Other	44.3 15.0

Finland				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Estonia	51.8	17.6	Former Soviet Union	60.6 14.1
Russia	30.0	10.2	Estonia	46.9 11.0
Iraq	15.1	5.1	Sweden	33.7 7.9
China	11.4	3.9	Iraq	20.9 4.9
India	8.2	2.8	Russia	17.8 4.2
Other	178.1	60.4	Other	248.5 58.0

Liechtenstein				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Switzerland	3.8	28.0	Switzerland	15.2 56.3
Austria	2.3	17.0	Austria	4.0 14.7
Germany	1.8	13.1	Germany	1.9 7.2
Italy	1.2	8.9	Italy	0.8 3.1
Portugal	0.7	5.1	Türkiye	0.6 2.2
Other	3.8	27.9	Other	4.4 16.4

Bulgaria				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Russia	29.4	23.7	Russia	36.2 16.4
Türkiye	20.8	16.7	Türkiye	20.4 9.2
Syria	16.0	12.9	Germany	18.7 8.5
Ukraine	10.1	8.1	Syria	16.8 7.6
United Kingdom	3.6	2.9	Ukraine	15.0 6.8
Other	44.3	35.7	Other	113.8 51.5

Denmark				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Poland	43.6	7.8	Poland	44.5 6.0
Romania	38.3	6.8	Germany	39.2 5.2
Syria	35.8	6.4	Syria	35.1 4.7
Türkiye	28.5	5.1	Romania	34.1 4.6
Germany	28.2	5.0	Türkiye	33.4 4.5
Other	387.8	69.0	Other	559.6 75.0

Ireland				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Poland	135.9	20.2		
United Kingdom	118.1	17.6		
Lithuania	43.0	6.4		
Romania	26.6	4.0		
Latvia	22.5	3.3		
Other	325.3	48.5		

Italy				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Romania	1 083.8	21.5	Romania	901.0 14.6
Morocco	420.2	8.4	Albania	507.8 8.2
Albania	420.0	8.3	Morocco	456.0 7.4
China	300.2	6.0	Former Soviet Union	454.9 7.4
Ukraine	225.3	4.5	China	228.6 3.7
Other	2 581.3	51.3	Other	3 612.6 58.6

Lithuania				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Belarus	10.2	29.8	Russia	60.9 36.1
Russia	8.4	24.6	Belarus	41.5 24.6
Ukraine	7.1	20.7	Ukraine	17.9 10.6
Stateless	2.1	6.2	United Kingdom	11.2 6.7
Uzbekistan	0.4	1.2	Latvia	6.9 4.1
Other	6.0	17.5	Other	30.3 18.0

Hungary				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Ukraine	30.7	15.2	Romania	207.4 33.9
Germany	19.7	9.8	Ukraine	74.5 12.2
China	17.7	8.7	Germany	42.6 6.9
Romania	16.6	8.2	Serbia	41.5 6.8
Slovakia	16.0	7.9	Former Soviet Union	28.5 4.7
Other	101.5	50.2	Other	218.1 35.6

Austria				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Germany	216.7	13.8	Germany	251.6 13.7
Romania	138.4	8.8	Bosnia and Herzegovina	174.3 9.5
Serbia	121.6	7.7	Türkiye	159.1 8.7
Türkiye	117.6	7.5	Serbia	143.9 7.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	97.3	6.2	Romania	138.3 7.5
Other	880.6	56.0	Other	967.2 52.7

Romania				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Moldova	5.5	11.3	Italy	67.4 21.3
Hungary	5.2	10.8	Moldova	63.7 20.2
Italy	5.0	10.3	Spain	56.9 18.0
Germany	3.2	6.5	United Kingdom	18.1 5.7
Türkiye	2.7	5.6	Germany	13.7 4.3
Other	26.9	55.4	Other	96.3 30.5

Slovakia				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Czechia	10.3	17.2	Czechia	106.4 49.9
Hungary	6.8	11.4	United Kingdom	14.4 6.7
Ukraine	6.5	10.8	Ukraine	13.2 6.2
Poland	4.4	7.3	Hungary	13.1 6.1
Romania	4.4	7.3	Austria	5.9 2.8
Other	27.7	46.0	Other	60.2 28.2

Iceland				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Poland	21.2	38.5	Poland	20.9 29.2
Lithuania	4.8	8.7	Denmark	3.8 5.4
Romania	2.8	5.0	Lithuania	3.4 4.8
Latvia	2.4	4.3	United States	2.9 4.0
Germany	1.7	3.1	Romania	2.5 3.5
Other	22.2	40.4	Other	38.2 53.2

Norway				
Citizens of	(thousand)	(%)	Born in	(thousand) (%)
Poland	112.7	19.2	Poland	106.0 11.7
Lithuania	48.8	8.3	Sweden	48.8 5.4
Sweden	39.6	6.8	Lithuania	42.1 4.6
Syria	34.0	5.8	Syria	34.9 3.8
Germany	26.2	4.5	Germany	29.7 3.3
Other	324.6	55.4	Other	645.3 71.2

Note: The individual values do not add up to the total due to rounding.

Estonia, Greece, France, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland are not displayed because no detailed data by individual country are available.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: migr_pop1ctz and migr_pop3ctb)

Secondly, it is the (relative) geographical proximity of the sending and receiving countries: Greece and immigrants from Albania and Bulgaria; Spain and arrivals from Morocco; Czechia and immigrants from neighboring countries; Norway and Sweden/Lithuania; Hungary and neighboring Romania; Lichtenstein attracts people from Switzerland, Austria, Germany; the UK – from Ireland; Switzerland – from its surrounding countries; Sweden –from its neighboring Finland. Third, it is the prior migration history: Germany has second- and third-generation migrants from Turkey and Italy; Belgium has former immigrants from Morocco; Portuguese have a long presence in France, Switzerland and Luxembourg, as economic migrants and refugees. Four, the opportunity, which is linked with the generous subsidies available in specific countries particularly for refugees: for example, Syrian refugees in Germany, followed by Syrians, Iraqis and Iranians in Sweden.

The newest contingent of refugees in the EU-27 comes from Ukraine, after it has been invaded by Russia since February 2022. Such contingent of refugees, which has been granted temporary protection by the EU, forms a significant part of the new immigration. Whilst the EU as a whole hosts near to 4 million Ukrainians, these are unevenly distributed in the EU with some neighboring countries, such as Poland or Slovakia, or counties in the near vicinity of Ukraine, e.g., Czechia, Estonia, Germany or Lithuania, receiving relatively larger segments (see Table 1.8).

Table 1.8. Third-country nationals who fled Ukraine and were benefitting from temporary protection at the end of March 2023 in EU-27

Country	Number	Number per 1000 people		Country	Number	Number per 1000 people
Austria	71.515	8,0		Spain	172.660	3,6
Belgium	64.550	5,6		Italy	155.490	2,6
Bulgaria	153.545	22,5		Latvia	35.985	5,2
Croatia	19.915	5,2		Lithuania	67.775	24,2
Czechia	325.245	30,9		Luxemburg	4.065	6,3
Cyprus	15.275	16,9		Malta	1.665	3,2
Estonia	37.020	27,8		Netherlands	118.695	6,7
Finland	51.030	9,2		Poland	976.575	25,9
France	67.745	1,0		Portugal	57.895	5,6
Denmark	34.830	5,9		Romania	124.035	6,5
Germany	1.067.755	12,8		Slovakia	99.525	18,3
Greece	22.705	2,2		Slovenia	8.210	3,9
Hungary	30.585	3,2		Sweden	24.720	2,4
Ireland	79.335	15,7		EU	3.888.345	8,7

Source: Eurostat (2023c: 11).

The data appearing in the preceding tables show that immigrants and refugees form a constituent part of the population of most European countries. EU countries already have had a migration history in Europe, while more recent influxes have caught the public eye, as the circumstances of their movement are often interlinked to various catastrophes, foremostly war, as in Syria and in Ukraine. It logically follows that the presence of such sizeable and variable social groups in Europe, often culturally quite diverse, apparently irrespective of the integration policy the EU (see Appendix III) or each discreet country pursues, in large measure exert a variable influence the hosting societies and it is expected that it would impact the political trust of citizens towards the authorities too.

1.2 Theoretical Framework: How Immigration and Political Trust Are Connected

The project examines the trends and predictors of public trust in political leaders and institutions represented as a function of their perceived trustworthiness. TRUEDEM hypothesizes that the perceptions of trustworthiness of politicians and institutions, among other things, are affected by the specific policy decisions and overall performance of political actors. In line with this research agenda, in the current report we examine how success or failure of governing elites to manage the immigration crisis are associated with the erosion of citizens' support to specific democratic institutions and liberal democracy as a political regime. Research on the linkages between citizens' attitudes towards political institutions and threats to democracy focuses on the democratic norms that citizens espouse or abandon during times of political crisis, e.g., times when democracy is under threat (Wallace Goodman, 2022: 6, 11 and 14).

1.2.1 Diffuse and specific support to political institutions

The link between political trust and democracy has long been discussed in the literature. Trust towards the democratic regime itself, its institutions and elected authorities is not taken for granted and may fluctuate, but without such trust, in contrast to other political regimes, democracies cannot survive. The risk comes from a break in the link between citizens and political institutions. This link is political trust. Normative political theory has elaborated on this theme (Hardin, 2006; Warren, 2010). While theorists have conceptualized "political trust" in several ways, a succinct definition of the concept is the following: political trust is "*a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny*" (Miller & Listhaug, 1990: 358). However, further research has shown that it is important to distinguish between 'confidence' and 'trust', as well as between 'trust' and 'trustworthiness' (Norris, 2015: 19-20).

Confidence refers to the belief that an institution or a person(s) can efficiently carry out a task. Trust, on the other hand, refers to the "*benevolent motivation and performance capacity of another party*" (Norris, 2017: 19) and has a rational, an affective and an evaluative dimension. We can say that trust refers to the positive value which is accorded to an institution and/or person(s) managing the institution (e.g., the institution of parliament and/or the Members of Parliament serving during a specific term). Trustworthiness refers to whether a party deserves to be trusted, i.e. is worth trusting. For instance, the trustworthiness of a plainly and corrupt politician is, obviously, low. In this case, low trust is a healthy mistrust. As Norris suggests, we may understand the citizen as principal and the politician as his or her agent. The citizen's mistrust is healthy because he or she "correctly judges the performance record of the politician as dishonest, self-interested, without accountability, and thus untrustworthy" (Norris 2022: 7).

As Norris (2022: 4) has argued: "*Trustworthiness' is defined as an informal social contract where principals authorize agents to act on their behalf in the expectation that the agent will fulfil their responsibilities with competency, integrity, and impartiality despite conditions of risk and uncertainty.*" For Norris, this is a process that is expected to produce certain outcomes, whether for principals, "their family and local community, their government and society, or for the world. Decisions about trustworthiness may involve expectations about the behaviour of family, friends, and neighbours in the local community (in cases of social trust). Or they may concern the actions of expert elites, groups and organizations in civil society, the private sector, or the government (in cases of institutional trust)" (Norris 2022: 39).

Indeed, the above concepts, suggested by Norris, are very useful if applied to the analysis of the concept of political support developed by David Easton. Easton (1965) differentiated between specific and diffuse political support. Specific support refers to the popularity of elected and non-elected, incumbent office holders. It depends on numerous conjunctural factors, related to the time and place in which such individuals serve in office. Even if support towards them is low, we cannot infer that the institution in which they serve (e.g., parliament) has lost its legitimacy among the population. Diffuse (or generalized) support is long-term. It represents a more general positive attitude and affection towards an institution, regardless of the institution's incumbent managers. It is a more stable and long-lasting type of support than specific support. Empirical research has found it difficult to disentangle evidence for one or the other type of support particularly in fragile political regimes or states. Accurate measurement obviously also depends on the operationalization of the two concepts (Norris, 2017:22).

For Easton, support can be granted at three levels: the levels of nation-state, regime, and authorities. The first refers to the political community as a whole, the second to the main constitutional arrangements and institutions, and the third to the incumbent officeholders. This approach was further developed by Norris (2017:23) who developed two more levels. The system of political support therefore includes five-levels. The first is support of the state-wide political community, reflecting adherence to national identity. The second is approval of political regime principles and values. The third is evaluation of regime performance. The fourth is confidence in specific regime institutions. And the fifth is approval of incumbent officeholders.

Many empirical studies of political trust analyse the last two of the above-mentioned dimensions: confidence in regime institutions and performance capacity of officeholders. The TRUEDEM project and particularly WP3 focus on the challenges posed by immigration to these dimensions of political trust as well as the dimension of approval of political regime principles and values. The evaluation of institutions is important for gauging the effects of immigration on political trust. If institutions, the pillars of the political system, begin to crumble, after having lost the trust of the public, then there is "a cause for concern" (Norris, 2017: 28). Finally, while trust also has many social dimensions (social trust, trust to people, local communities, other citizens), as the TRUEDEM project examines primarily political trust, in this report, we focus on political trust and the implications the immigration has for the performance of the political systems and public trust changes (if any) in the EU.

1.2.2 The theoretical logic of the connection between immigration, political trust, and democracy

There are various perspectives on the connection between immigration, political trust, and democracy. They are briefly discussed here to have a comprehensive overview that includes approaches based on political theory (in the beginning of this section) and approaches relying on the theoretically grounded empirical research (in the second part of this section).

First, there is a theoretical argument that puts immigration at the centre of domestic politics of European democracies (Michael, 2021). It is an overly critical, if not radical, current of thought. It departs from the view that migration policy is a tool which European governments have used to re-affirm state sovereignty at the expense of democracy. Governments have made a return to national identity politics on purpose. To strengthen national identity, governments have turned against migrants and refugees and have closed the borders of Europe. In this process, West European democracies "have re-imagined themselves as cohesive societies" (Michael, 2021: 3).

In the same vein, the challenges which European democracies face cannot be understood out of the context of marginalization of migrants and refugees (Michael, 2021: 8). More concretely, the fear of, rather than the actual numbers, of incoming migrants and refugees sparks a series of reactions leading to a negative impact on democracy. Governments implement anti-immigration policies which violate the human rights of migrants and refugees encapsulated in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Moreover, governments opt for short-term securitization approaches to long-term approaches managing causes of immigration (Michael, 2012: 4-5).

In a nutshell, European governments have taken up the task to assert national sovereignty through the regulation of and restrictions on migration. By doing so, they particular want to exclude Muslim migrants and refugees. The result is on the one hand an “identarian closure” of European democracies and on the other hand, “corrosive effects on civic trust and solidarity but, more importantly, also the [undermining of] the foundations of liberal democracy” (Michael, 2021: 4 and 8).

There is a less polemical theoretical argument that links immigration with political trust, claiming that the former negatively impacts the latter. The argument departs from a wider, global, analytical view. In some detail, large-scale external and economic challenges to European democracies, such as globalization and de-industrialization, have brought a series of social and economic effects. The latter, in turn, have provoked political effects, including the rise of populism and the transition to “authoritarian democracy” which is reflected in restrictive migration policies (Campani, 2019: 35). The aforesaid external and economic developments have contributed to the decline of wellbeing of the lower-income groups, to rising unemployment, and to economic crisis in Europe. Populist parties give rise to the opportunity to attract voters who are the victims of the crisis. They embrace democracy, but not liberalism, as shown in the abrasive shifts of populist policies in reaction to the scale and timing of migration. The shifts negatively impact classical democratic norms such as human solidarity, openness, and diversity (Campani, 2019: 35).

However, not only populist, but also other European governments have tried to manage these developments by imposing economic policies of austerity and imposing restrictions on migration, as migration inflows were perceived to be a destructive aspect of globalization. For example, during and after the Eurozone crisis, Italian governments changed their migration policy. In 2013-2017 they had adopted a humanitarian approach to migrants and refugees under PMs E. Letta and M. Renzi. After 2017, however, they adopted a security-driven approach to immigration (Campani, 2019: 42-43). The combination of technocratic management of the economy (e.g., the Monti government in Italy) with the restrictive management of immigration contributes to a transition of democracy to post-democracy, in the sense Colin Crouch uses the term (Crouch, 2013). Democratic institutions are along the way rendered pure formality. Meanwhile, small circles of interconnected political and business elites put themselves in the driver’s seat of contemporary democracies.

Further on, legal theorists have also underlined how difficult it is for European democracies, which rely on the rule of law, to manage irregular migration (Kuźelewska, et al., 2018). Such migration poses multiple legal and ethical challenges to European democracies. Their failure to respond to these challenges is manifested in the numerous cases related to immigration which the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has considered and the Council of Europe’s actions to monitor the fundamental rights of migrants and refugees (Kuźelewska, et al., 2018: xxii).


1.2.3 The theoretical argument and research hypotheses concerning immigration and political trust

While the authors cited above develop a theoretical viewpoint, there is a body of empirical research on immigration and political trust consisting of national case studies and cross-national studies. This empirical research on the impact of immigration on political trust in specific European countries is theoretically grounded. The authors of such empirical studies adopt analytical explanations on why immigration influences political trust. Their arguments can be summarized as follows: political attitudes (including trust in political institutions) of citizens who, for various reasons, perceive immigration as a risk factor (or a threat) become subject to citizens' (dis)satisfaction with how successful the political institutions have been in dealing with immigration. If citizens perceive that the institutions and the elected officials who manage them fail in stemming the immigration, then the citizens' political trust decreases. Distrust towards institutions and elected officials may spill over to distrust towards the democratically organized political community.

This theoretical argument ties well with the conceptualization of political trust by Norris (2022) and with the theoretical framework of the TRUEDEM project. This conceptualization understands political trust as a function of the perception of trustworthiness of political institutions. While trust is a quality of the individual, trustworthiness as a feature of dyadic relationships (Norris 2022). The individual makes rational judgements not only on trust, but also on trustworthiness which is a useful way to understand the dyadic relationship between an individual and a political institution on which he or she passes a rational judgement. Thus, trustworthiness depends on how able the institutions are to construct a political environment providing citizens with guaranteed political rights, ensured economic prosperity, equality, and wellbeing and moreover an environment informed by ethical, just, fair, and transparent standards (Zmerli 2014; Mishler & Rose, 2005).

The concept of trustworthiness is particularly important for understanding how trust is built, and in the context of TRUEDEM research it is fundamental for conceptualizing the dynamic process through which political trust is built (or eroded). As explained in the conceptual framework of the TRUEDEM proposal ([see project website](#)), citizens recurrently evaluate new evidence (e.g. new policies, reforms, adoption of new legislation) based on good governance criteria. This repeated process is mediated by individual-level characteristics of the citizens (education, cognitive skills) and by factors of social, political, and cultural environment in which citizens are embedded. The following figure, drawn on Norris (2022: 42), is a model of how the individual, placed in a certain societal, cultural and information environment, uses their analytical, cognitive, and information-processing skills to rationally develop perceptions on the performance of institutions or agencies and to form sceptical judgements of the trustworthiness of institutions or agencies.

Figure 2.1. Theoretical framework on trust and trustworthiness



Source: Norris (2022: 42, Figure 2.1)


This theoretical framework can be applied to the case of immigration and political trust as follows (Figure 2.2). On the left, performance indicators are represented by immigration as an objective phenomenon (i.e. the actual number of foreign nationals arriving in the country) and the existing migration policies and regulations at the EU, countries and local (regional) levels that regulation the process of immigration, including practical aspects such as accommodation, financial support, healthcare, and integration of immigrants, including schooling, employment, language courses etc. The public perceptions of immigration are then formed under the influence of individual factors (education, access to information, choice of media sources, own social and economic status) and society-level factors, including information environment, media reporting and media pluralism. As outlined in the subsequent sections, perceptions of immigration are largely subject to one’s negative evaluation of newcomers in categories of “risk factor/ threat” – or rather positive evaluation as an addition to the local national community that would enrich and improve the life in the country. Negative vs positive perceptions of immigration would then comprise a cumulative assessment of the threat/ contribution along a number of dimensions including a) national identity; b) value system and culture; c) economy. Societies with the actively pronounced gender equality norms might be concerned about the immigrants from traditional, patriarchal societies. Societies where certain religion (e.g. Catholicism) became an integral part of the national identity might be concerns

about immigrants with different religious background (e.g. Muslims). Societies that go through economic hardships and have a high level of unemployment will likely be cautious about the immigrants perceiving them as a competition on the labour market. This link is also functional also at the level of individuals or social groups within the society.

The model suggests that after the citizens developed their perceptions on the extent to which political institutions and elected authorities rise up to the immigration challenge and deal with it, they use this information to judge on the trustworthiness of these institutions and authorities. Thus, the interaction of perceived threats with policy responses impact on how citizens consider the EU, national, and local governments, as well as other political institutions (the parliament, the public administration, political parties) as (un)trustworthy. The assessment of trustworthiness, in turn, influences the level of political trust of citizens towards the governing and other political institutions. Individual's civic knowledge, education level, cognitive skills and critical thinking as well as media reports on immigration and, foremost, the type of migration policy in the country serve as the key mediators between the immigrations and its implications for the political trust.

It should be noted that the process of assessment of immigration and decision about (un)trustworthiness of the political institutions is cyclic: as new immigrants arrive, as the migration policy change or if changes occur in one of the individual/ societal factors, public perceptions of immigration and public trust to the authorities might change. Finally, political trust (measured through public opinion surveys) can also be used to inform the authorities on the need to update their migration policies in response to the growing public (dis)satisfaction.

Figure 2.2. Theoretical framework on interplay of immigration and political trust



Source: TRUEDEM project team, original research.

Based on the above, several research hypothesis have been identified:

(H1) Political trust varies with levels of trustworthiness assessment that depends on the EU's and government migration policy responses which in turn are influenced by perception of immigration as a threat to national identity, culture, and economic sources and opportunities.

However, trustworthiness and political trust are not shaped in a socioeconomic vacuum. More specific research hypotheses can be formed regarding what determines the perception of immigrants as a threat. The individual characteristics of citizens matter as do structural and contextual factors. The individual characteristics are values as well as socioeconomic variables of the individual.

In detail, regarding individual characteristics:

(H2) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with sociopolitical values among which the most topical for this research project are ethnocentrism and xenophobia. The higher an individual scores on these values, the higher the perception of threat.

(H3) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with educational achievement. The higher the achievement, the lower the perception of threat.

(H4) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with economic security. The more precarious the job situation of a citizen, the higher the threat that he or she perceives.

(H5) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with voting preferences. Voters of Far-Right parties have a higher chance to perceive migrants as a threat than voters of the rest of political parties (Welzel 2023).

Moreover, there are associations among individual characteristics which are crucial for the heuristic model sketched above. For instance, economic insecurity is correlated with xenophobia and authoritarian populist attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2017, Inglehart 2018).

Regarding structural and contextual factors determining perceptions of immigrants as a threat, the following hypotheses are useful:

(H6) If the economy is on a downturn and jobs are in peril, then immigrants may be perceived as a threat.

(H7) If media disseminates misinformation and/or biased information regarding the scale of immigration and the behaviour of incoming migrants, immigrants may be perceived as a threat.

(H8) If national legislation is restrictive regarding immigration, immigrants may be perceived as a threat.

And (H9) If the rule of law in country X is deficient, then citizens may perceive citizens as a threat, for instance, a threat to personal safety and security.

1.3 Literature Review on the Influence of Immigration on Political Trust

The literature review is guided by the heuristic model that was presented in the previous section and that highlights the key mechanisms through which immigration can affect political trust. The model is a multi-faceted theoretical argument that serves as point of departure to assess the existing empirical research on immigration and political trust. While there is empirical research indicating linkages between immigration and political trust, the direction of the causal relationship between these two variables is debatable. In addition, previous research has revealed that the relationship between the two indicators is mediated by various intervening variables such as grievance mobilization by far-right parties, the content of government migration policy and the role of media.

1.3.1 Empirical research on immigration and political trust: cross-national studies and national case-studies

This report purports to explore whether (and how) immigration influences political trust. Such approach is justified by the project's overall aim to examine the long-term dynamics and predictors of political trust and to develop tools for its enhancement, thus treating political trust as a dependent variable in the equation. Before discussing in detail the past research on the key mechanism of the influence of immigration on political trust and the measured effects, we need to acknowledge existence of evidence that confirms the opposite direction of the causation. Studies that examine how the level of one's public confidence in the political system (and separate political institutions) influences their attitudes towards immigrants are built around the concept of "political alienation" (Uchitelle, 1994; Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Husfeldt 2004; Halapuu, V. et al. 2013). In a nutshell, alienation occurs when citizens distance themselves from the political sphere and tend to distrust various political institutions at the overall systemic level. This perception is more frequently inherent to the groups with low socio-economic status and those who tend to live in a condition of high social and economic insecurity, including job insecurity. Holding the politicians and the political system as a whole accountable for one's problems thus results not only in growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the work of political authorities, but also negative attitudes to migrants whose presence is perceived as an additional threat or a competition to the one's own social and economic wellbeing.

Halapuu V. et al. (2013) use the 2008 European Social Survey dataset to examine in the influence of political trust (measured as an aggregated index of trust in parliament, legal system, the police, politicians and political parties) on the attitudes towards immigrations. They split every country's sample into the "majority" and "minority" population and conclude that trust in institutions has a strong explanatory power when analysing the predictors of people's attitudes towards immigrants, especially among the majority population. The authors stress the policy relevance of this finding, as it "clearly emphasizes the importance of fair, selfless and transparent governance in order to create a tolerant environment that would help attracting global talent pool" (Halapuu V. et al. 2013:16).

In the similar vein, Danaj et al. (2018) explore how the perceptions towards immigrants affect their inclusion into French society. They investigate the relationship between immigration and levels of trust of the French people in the national parliament and the legal system/justice. The dataset they use is the French component of the European Social Survey (wave of 2014). They calculate odds ratios and focus on how the high or low trust in the above two institutions influences the type of sentiments towards immigrants. It turns out that among the French respondents those who have

low trust in parliament are 2,02 times more likely to have negative sentiments towards immigrants than those respondents who have high trust. And those who have low trust towards the legal system are 2,62 times more likely to have negative sentiments towards the immigrants than those who have high trust (Danaj, et al., 2018: 235-236).

These findings suggest certain cyclicity in the causal links between political trust and immigration perceptions. For one, political trust is a complex phenomenon that, as described in the previous section, often being a function of the institutions' performance, is formed under the influence of multiple individual-level (education level, cognitive skills, preferred sources of information) and society-level (values, media pluralism) factors. Thus, when a new wave of migrants arrives, the previously established level of political trust among the various social groups will, among the other factors, also regular their attitudes towards immigrants. On the other hand, substantial waves of immigration that since 2015 have been challenging the social, economic, and political organization of many European societies, create new conditions which affect the performance of the political institutions, and citizens' trust to the latter might, in turn, increase or decline.

Regardless of the direction of causality, the main mechanism that links changes in the political trust and attitudes to immigrants is associated with the reduction of the perceived threat and risk: citizens who have greater trust in their national political institutions tend to have greater confidence that – when immigrants arrive – the institutions will manage to deliver and implement the appropriate policy response. Citizens who have been sceptical about the performance of the national government and other political institutions in their country thus far (or countries where the political institutions are corruption, inefficient), in a situation of substantial immigration will likely feel less protected more frequently identifying the immigrants as the risk factor. Yet, the pre-existing level of institutional confidence provides only partial explanation of the positive or negative attitudes to immigrants. Immigrants, depending on the sending and receiving country, tend to be a very heterogenous group in terms of their ethnic, language, religious belonging, but also values and attitudes to the major domains of life such as family, work, leisure etc. New language and cultural elements, different value systems and lifestyles might work well or challenge those in the receiving country. In this situation, immigration regulation and immigrants' integration policies of the state become particularly important as a tool to mitigate the threat and risk perceptions, and thus tackle and reduce public's dissatisfaction and mistrust to the political system in a situation of extensive immigration. The aim of TRUEDEM in the context of this work package is to examine the interplay between the migration perceptions and political attitudes of European citizens and to develop recommendations for the eventual policy tools that could help further mitigate the negative implications of immigration perception for political trust and public support for the democracies in Europe.

The importance of immigration perceptions for the overall political position, party preference and political trust have been previously confirmed in the TRUEDEM report D4.1 that examined values and social inequalities, and their implications for political trust in Europe². Co-authored by several TRUEDEM project teams, the report investigates whether the national publics' middle-class spectrum experienced polarizing ideological shifts on four key value dimensions: right-vs left on economic issues, nativism-vs-cosmopolitanism on immigration issues, patriarchy-vs emancipation on sexuality issues, economy-vs-environment on the sustainability issue. The authors hypothesize that greater ideological drifts along these four dimensions contribute to the overall value

² https://www.jdsystems.es/truedem/D4.1_Cultural_background_of_European_democracies_-_values_and_social_inequalities.pdf

polarization in ways that erode institutional trust and diminish support for liberal democracy. The authors examine population survey data from the European Values Study and the World Values Survey (1995-2022) and find no evidence that that polarizing ideological shifts among European electorates' middle-class segments account for growing institutional distrust. Moreover, when examining the Right-Wing Populism (RWP) supporters' group, the authors confirm that their distinction from other political camps in the society is largely represented by the opposition against the non-RWP parties' liberal consent on immigration policy and the resulting institutional distrust for not having a credible voice among the parties of the pre-RWP era to share their immigration skepticism (Welzel et al. 2023).

A series of other studies have confirmed the positive correlation between the immigration perceptions and the decline in political trust. In particular, McLaren examines the case of Great Britain based on both national and international population survey datasets. These are the British Election Study (BES, conducted in 2001 and 2005) and the European Social Survey (waves of 2002-2003 and 2008-2009). The author examines the relationship between the concern of citizens about immigration and political trust in the pre-Brexit Britain (2012a). For her, it is crucial to distinguish between perceptions of immigration and actual levels of immigration. It is the former which impacts the political trust. The author interprets the impact of immigration on political trust as a consequence of such (positive or negative) perception. When citizens perceive immigration as a threat (to their social, economic wellbeing or their culture, identity etc.), they may doubt the institutions which govern the country. They may be doubtful that institutions are able to represent the interests of the national community. Additionally, citizens might blame the elected officials and the institutions which these officials manage for not tackling the question of immigration from the start (McLaren, 2012a: 168). They may thus decrease their trust in political institutions and authorities. The author examines multiple indicators of political trust to reach the conclusion that, if citizens perceive the consequences of immigration as negative, then there is a larger problem with the erosion of political communities upon which European democracies have been constructed (McLaren, 2012a: 185). The argument which McLaren (2012a) makes supports the hybrid model and the hypothesis H1 as presented in the previous section.

In another study, drawing on the cross-national data from the European Social Survey (wave of ESS 2002-2009), McLaren examines the impact of immigration on political trust in national government, parliament, and the legal system/justice in Europe in cross-country perspective. The author claims that the above relationship is non-spurious. It holds even after controlling for numerous independent variables: “general dissatisfaction and unhappiness in life; alienation and anomie; interpersonal trust and meeting with friends as indicators of social capital; perceptions of personal and national economic situations and actual economic performance of a country; perceptions of the performance of policy-making institutions and actual performance of institutions; being on the losing side of electoral competition, voting for a Far-Right party in recent elections, and self-placement on the left-right scale; and social welfare protection; and household income, age, education, and gender” (McLaren, 2012b: 211). It is noteworthy that the mobilization of citizens by the Far-Right does not seem to affect levels of political trust.

In other words, the starting point to explain the negative impact of immigration on political trust is citizens' perception of immigration. Citizens cannot easily reconcile the operation of the political institutions of their country with the inflow, let alone the integration, of immigrants. Citizens may perceive immigrants as very different in terms of their culture, language, values, and religious practices. This is a finding that corroborates with H2 above, linking the economic situation of individuals with perceptions of immigration as a threat. Moreover, citizens believe that immigrants

negatively impact the economic prospects of natives in the hosting country. This is a finding that corroborates with H4 above, linking the economic situation of individuals with perceptions of immigration as a threat.

The conclusion of this research is that belonging to their national community is important for nationals. It is the national community which is perceived as threatened by newcomers if they possess different cultures (values and lifestyles). They threaten national and social identity which citizens claim that national political institutions should preserve. If institutions are not successful in this task, citizens lose trust in them (McLaren, 2012b: 221 and 230). In other words, this finding ties well with the argument summarized in the heuristic model and H1 that the extent to which citizens recognize political institutions as trustworthy affects levels of political trust.

However, the author makes an interesting caveat. She distinguishes between European countries with limited immigration record (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland) from countries with a long history of immigration in the post-war period (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK). Compared to the former, the negative impact on political trust is higher in the latter countries (McLaren, 2021b: 200). It may be that the experience and memories of emigration from the former countries towards more advanced economies in the 20th century (the USA, Germany, etc.) plays a role here.

A new research hypothesis may be formed out of this finding:

H9: Compared to citizens of EU Member States which have a record of receiving immigrants in the post-World War II period, those who come from Member States having little experience with immigration in the post-World War II period, will more often tend to perceive immigration as a threat.

The closest research to the TRUEDEM's own agenda is another piece by McLaren (2017). She studies the "implications of inclusive and exclusive national identity constructions for political trust in the age of migration" (McLaren, 2017: 380). The author discusses political trust in the national government, parliament, and the legal system/justice. McLaren uses EU-wide data to investigate this question. They are data from Eurobarometer 71.3 (EB71.3), from June to July 2009 as well as data from EU's Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX, <https://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex>).

The major finding of McLaren is that the relationship between immigration and political trust depends on the type of government policy towards immigration (operationalized in her research through the MIPEX). This finding is differentiated along four lines. When citizens subscribe to exclusionary ideas about other people, for example, ascriptive characteristics (e.g., place of birth or parents' nationality), and when at the same time, the government policy on immigration is exclusionary, then citizens have a higher trust in their country's political institutions. By contrast, political trust is low when citizens adopt an exclusionary stance towards immigrants, but their government's policy is rather inclusionary. There are two middle points between these two extremes: compared to the aforementioned instance (low trust), "trust is somewhat higher where migrant policy is less inclusive towards migrants, but the individual emphasizes the relatively more inclusive civic identity and also where the where migrant policy is less inclusive towards migrants and the individual emphasizes exclusive identity" (McLaren, 2017: 392-393). So, the main contribution of this article is its claim that political trust depends on the interaction between the type of migration policy a government adopts, and the kind of stance citizens hold towards immigration.

This finding supports the idea of the heuristic model according to which government policy responses to immigration play a specific role in influencing the trustworthiness of political institutions. If citizens positively assess government policies on immigration, this positively affects trustworthiness which in turn increases political trust.

Finally, there are two more recent cross-national studies linking immigration and political trust. First, Cengiz and Vasilopoulou study how anger, rather than fear, underly support for Far-Right parties, negative attitudes towards immigrants, and low political trust (Cengiz & Vasilopoulou, 2022). The two authors use online samples of the German and Dutch populations, drawn from the panel of PanelClix. They recruited participants in their study from this panel in the winter of 2015-2016. The authors also used data from a representative sample of the British population in 2019. The sample was drawn on a study was conducted by YouGov in May 2019 as part of YouGov's U.K. The basic finding of their research is that anger about immigration is associated with vote preferences for the Far Right. However, the relationship between anger and voting for the Far Right is mediated by levels of trust: "While anger increases the chances of Far-Right party voting, individuals with greater political trust are less likely to vote for the Far-Right. In contrast, those with elevated levels of anger and little or no political trust are more likely to vote for the Far-Right" (Cengiz & Vasilopoulou, 2022: 642).

On the other hand, Wallace Goodman in a recent article poses the question whether citizens who perceive immigration as a threat espouse liberal democratic norms or – by contrast - intolerance and other illiberal norms (Wallace Goodman, 2021). The author relies on data which are more recent from those of Cengiz and Vasilopoulou and are obtained from comparable national surveys in the USA, UK, and Germany in 2019 (Wallace Goodman, 2021: 2054). Wallace Goodman finds that political polarization in two out of the three countries, i.e., in the UK and Germany is a crucial intervening variable in the relationship between immigration and political trust. In the UK there is much more acute polarization than in Germany. In the former country, voters of the Labour Party adopt fewer liberal values when they perceive immigration in a negative light. By contrast, in Germany, voters are not divided along party lines. Regardless of political persuasion, when they depict immigration in an unfavourable way. Germans underline their commitment to their national community and decrease their liberal value commitments. In other words, the perceived threat of immigration affects left-wing voters more than right-wing voters: "*citizens interpret norms of good citizenship in response to outgroup threat in line with partisanship*" (Wallace Goodman, 2021: 2055). A possible interpretation of the finding is that voters other than left-wing ones were negatively predisposed to immigration before the scale of migrant inflow became of an exceptionally large scale.

This finding of Wallace Goodman is a useful addition to research hypothesis H5 which, as stated above, links perception of immigration as threat with political party support. The finding can be tested as complementary hypothesis H5a:

H5a: Compared to less polarized political party systems, in acutely polarized political party systems, the perception of immigration as a threat is mediated by political party preferences (right-wing vs. left-wing voters).

Overall, in all three countries, there was decreasing support for liberalism and rising support for national identity, a pattern pronounced among voters of the Left. A major point to retain is that the depiction of immigration is crucial, as it can lead to depressing liberal democratic norms. Wallace Goodman's research clearly underlines the importance of mediators in the relationship between

immigration and political trust. Typical mediators are the mass media and political parties, briefly discussed below.

1.3.2 The mediating role of media and political parties

Mass media frames the debate on immigration, as they do on other policy issues. Media, such as newspapers, magazines, and TV programmes, affect the ways immigrants are perceived in hosting societies (Kind & Wood, 2001). The media plays a role regarding issue frames, partisan cues, and their interaction for opinion formation, albeit within some limits, when it comes to very salient, contested issues (Bechtel et al, 2015). While the media does not invent a difficult situation, namely the inflow of migrants and refugees, it plays a role in the way citizens understand and portray the phenomenon and its scale. In brief, mass media drastically shapes perceptions of immigration. However, there is also research indicating that regarding immigration, the provision of accurate information to citizens does not drastically change perceptions of the size of immigration (Hopkins et al, 2019).

This research ties well with the hypothesis H7 (stated above) which says that misinformation and/or biased information, which is diffused by the media, should be factored in and be treated as one of the contextual and structural items of the heuristic model.

Political parties also play a role. It would be useful to check, through research conducted in the context of TRUEDEM, if and how two different patterns, first, low political trust and negative perceptions towards immigrants, and second, low political trust and electoral support towards Far-Right parties in European democracies, are associated.

There is, after all, substantive research that links the propensity to vote for Far-Right parties with low trust in political institutions (Hooghe, et al. 2011; Zhirkov, 2014). For instance, Zhirkov (2014) uses cumulative data of the European Social Survey spanning five waves (ESS, 2002–2010), including respondents for all countries which were Member States of the European Union before the 2004 enlargement. He finds that those who do not trust the parliament, the legal system, and the politicians are more likely to vote for Far-Right parties (Zhirkov, 2014: 291). An interpretation of this finding is that voters of the Far Right “are extremely sceptical of the political elites which are perceived to push West European societies towards globalization and multiculturalism” (Zhirkov, 2014: 294).

The conclusions of Allen (2017), who compared data on political attitudes and political trust in Western and Eastern Europe, point to the same direction. He used data from the second, third, and fourth waves of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2001-2008). He found that “anti-immigrant attitudes, dissatisfaction with democracy, lack of trust in parties and politicians, as well as negative attitudes toward European integration are significant predictors of Far-Right party support irrespective of region” (Allen, 2017: 280).

All the above substantiates the existence of a link between distrust in politicians and voting for Far-Right parties in Western Europe. Arguably, in the 2010s and particularly in 2015-2016, when migration inflows into Europe peaked, right-wing populist parties seized the opportunity to use major themes of their political programmes and attract voters. A common theme of programmes of right-wing populist parties is the selection and targeting of an enemy who is portrayed as a risk to traditional values of the national community. Such an enemy is usually external to the community, for instance, an ethnic minority or a migrant group.

In Western Europe, as it is well known, typical examples of such parties, among many others, are the Lega Nord in Italy (Fiore & Ialongo, 2018), the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany (Decker, 2016) and the UK Independence Party (Sutcliffe, 2012). Populist parties cast doubt on the trust which citizens have in political institutions in preserving the national community (Kriesi, 2020; Attina, 2018). To the extent that populist themes become popular, immigration, couched as a national threat by populist parties, indirectly affects political trust towards democracy and its institutions.

Populists diffuse enmity towards selected minorities or groups. Thus, undermining major value bases of political culture of contemporary democracies, e.g., tolerance and diversity. If right-wing populists ascend to government, alone or in coalition, the potential of diffusing such anti-democratic values is high. Even if populists do not rise to power, they may influence the political agenda to the extent that mainstream parties react to populist ones, by meeting them halfway or wholeheartedly adopting policy measures that reflect intolerance and suppression of diversity. In other words, another way through which immigration indirectly affects democracy is by affecting political party competition and the political agenda. Depending on party strategies, immigration may provoke a diffusion of anti-democratic values not only among supporters of populist parties, but more generally in the electorate.

Another indirect effect has to do with the political opportunity that opens up for populist and/or authoritarian elites to compete in elections and ascend to government when citizens partially, if not wholly, withdraw their support for liberal democracy. There is research which, albeit in a debatable fashion, points to signs of weaker commitment of the younger generations of citizens and more specifically the so-called millennials to liberal democracy, compared to the middle- and old-age citizens (Mounk, 2018). Millennials may withdraw their support if incumbent liberal elites mismanage political and administrative institutions. Mismanagement may occur, for instance, through the toleration of corruption, or in circumstances of a major public policy failure on elites' incapacity to manage an economic or other crisis. such as uncontrollable immigration.

Finally, in research carried out for the TRUEDEM project, Brunkert et al. (2023) argue that immigration impacts on political trust and on voting for Far-Right parties. They use data the European Values Study/World Values Survey (EVS/WVS) covering an exceedingly long time, from the mid- to late-1990s to the early 2020s. Their findings refer to linkages between non-representation, institutional trust, and support of Far-Right parties. The authors argue that citizens who are sceptical about or are opposed to immigration perceive that mainstream parties do not represent them. These citizens become frustrated that they are not being heard. Consequently, their trust towards political institutions, including towards mainstream parties, declines (Brunkert et al. 2023: 34) and thus they turn to Far-Right parties which fill this representation gap by voicing concerns over immigration. The level of institutional trust is not the same across Europe. Compared to the Nordic and the West European regions, trust towards political institutions has fallen and is lower in Southern Europe and the Post-communist Eastern Europe (Brunkert et al. 2023: 33).

The above summarized large body of research linking support for Far-Right Parties with low political trust is echoed in the research hypothesis H5 and the complementary hypothesis H5a noted above. To test whether there is regional variation among regions of Europe with regard to partisanship and political trust, a complementary hypothesis (H5b) could be constructed as follows:

H5b: Compared to voters of Far-Right parties in the Scandinavian countries and West European countries, voters of such parties in East and South European countries tend more to perceive migrants as a threat.

2. Immigration and Political Trust: Empirical Analysis

In this section the aim is to investigate the correlations of political trust in the country's parliament and opinions towards immigration based on the 2020 European Social Survey (ESS) comprising data for 25 EU member countries. We analyze three variables assessing (1) the impact of immigration on the economy, (2) the country's cultural life and (3) life in general in relation to the measure of trust in – one of the most basic political institutions in modern democratic regimes – the national parliament. The selection of the question on the national parliament as indicative of the political trust was made for the reason that this particular variable was the most appropriate, when compared with the other available variables measuring political trust, namely trust in the government, trust in politicians and trust in political parties. The latter may be affected by contextual factors such as the low quality of the available political staff, the frustration of the usually high expectations cultivated by political parties, or the oppositional mood towards the ruling party. On this part, trust towards the national parliament is less volatile due to such contextual factors and shaped by more stable views of the system of political representation and the modern democratic constitution. It is in this sense that we consider it to be the most valid indicator of political confidence in the political system. Besides, this measure has also been used previously in thematically related research (McLaren, 2012b; Danaj, et al., 2018).

2.1. Method

2.1.1 The data

The analysis is based on the 2020 ESS dataset for the following 25 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The surveys previously used exclusively face-to-face interviewing as the data collection method, but in the 2020 survey, due to the pandemic, national teams could have employed self-administered data collection mode for the first time. Consequently, two different datasets were provided for the countries implementing face-to-face interviewing (European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC), 2023a) and self-completion method (European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC), 2023b). Therefore, the two ESS surveys are not comparable. In this respect, the surveys from Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia Switzerland, and the UK used face-to-face interviewing and the surveys in Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Latvia, Poland, Spain and Sweden used self-administered questionnaires. In the analyses, the countries are presented using the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes.

2.1.2 Measures

The questions used in the analyses were all included in the ESS core questionnaire (European Social Survey, 2020). The question on political trust in country's parliament was worded as follows: *“Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly [country's] parliament”*.

Three questions measuring opinions towards immigration were worded as follows:

- *“Would you say it is generally bad (0) or good (10) for [country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?”*;

- “[...] would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined (0) or enriched (10) by people coming to live here from other countries?”;
- “Is [country] made a worse (0) or a better (10) place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”.

As all the before mentioned four variables were assigned a 0-10 scale, their level of measurement was considered as interval.

2.1.3 Statistical Analysis


Initially, univariate analyses were carried out. Crosstabulations were performed and only results statistically significant at $p < .001$ were presented. Bivariate correlation analyses were performed using Pearson’s correlation coefficients. Correlations were considered significant at $p < .05$. Scatterplots were carried out based on the variables’ mean scores to provide an indication for cross-national comparisons. In all models, political trust in country’s parliament was identified as the independent variable (IV) and each of the three opinions towards immigration constituted the dependent variable (DV). Certainly, the 25 cases (countries) included in the analyses do not allow for a proper presentation of the simple regression analysis results as large samples are required to perform such analyses. Statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 29.

2.2. Results

2.2.1 Univariate Analysis Results

In Figure 2.1, the mean values of political trust in the country’s parliament are presented for all countries. As shown, political trust ranged from 2.27 (Bulgaria) to 6.61 (Switzerland). The majority of countries, their mean values lie between 4.0-5.0, which is the middle of the scale, values below 5.0 shall correspond to (some or substantial) mistrust towards the parliament. Societies with the mean values over 5.0 can be identified as predominantly trusting their parliaments, while societies with the mean value below 4.0 can be identified as predominantly mistrusting their parliaments.


Figure 2.1. Mean values of trust in country’s parliament [0-10 scale]



Data source: European Social Survey, 2020

In Figure 2.2, the mean values of whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live are presented for all countries. As shown, opinions considering that immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live ranged from 3.79 (Czechia) to 6.87 (Ireland). Overall, immigrants are perceived as making the country a worse place to live in Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, and Greece; and as making the country a better place to live – in Ireland, the UK, Poland, and Spain.


Figure 2.3. Mean value: immigrants make the country a worse [0] or better [10] place to live



Data source: *European Social Survey, 2020*

As discussed in the previous section, immigrants might pose a challenge to the host society primarily in economic (jobs, unemployment, economy development) or cultural (values, traditions) dimensions. Data from the ESS-2020 survey provides an overview of public perceptions along these two dimensions (figure 2.3). Countries where the majority tends to evaluate the impact of immigrants on country’s economic as predominantly negative (5.0 on a 10.0 scale and below) include: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia. Countries where the majority tends to evaluate the impact of immigrants on country’s cultural life as negative (5.0 on a 10.0 scale and below) include: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Hungary, North Macedonia, and Slovakia. As already evidence from the overlapping country names, the correlation between these two dimensions is very high (Pearson’s $R\ 0.710^{***}$) suggesting that immigration is often evaluated as a complex phenomenon that in the mid of citizens cannot be fully disentangled into separate components by the sphere of society’s life. In line with this, both dimensions in the evaluation of immigration perceptions have the highest scores in Iceland, Ireland, Spain, Finland, the UK. While the scores are very close, overall, the cultural aspect of immigration tends to be evaluated more positively as correlation between this indicator and the overall assessment of the impact of immigration (“immigrants make the country a better place to live”) is higher (Pearson’s $R\ 0.746^{***}$ vs 0.690^{***} for the economic dimension).


Figure 2.3. Perceptions of economic vs cultural dimension of immigration (mean values on a 0-10 scale)



Data source: European Social Survey, 2020



Figure 2.4. Perceptions of economic vs cultural dimension of immigration (mean values on a 0-10 scale)



Data source: European Social Survey, 2020

2.2.2 Immigration and Political Trust: Cross-national results

In Table 2.1, negative (0) and somewhat negative (5) opinions towards immigration and no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament are presented. As shown, respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy in Sweden, Czechia, Slovakia, Greece, Germany, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Finland whereas Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland are more tolerant; respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants in Czechia, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, Sweden, Germany, Austria, and France and Italy whereas they are more tolerant in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Sweden; respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live in Czechia, Sweden, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Finland whereas they are more tolerant in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the UK.

Table 2.1 No trust at all in country's parliament and negative opinions towards immigration

Country	No trust at all (0) in country's parliament					
	Immigration bad (0) or somewhat bad (5) for country's economy (5)		Country's cultural life undermined (0) or somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants		Immigrants make country worse (0) or somewhat worse (5) place to live	
	(0) %	(5) %	(0) %	(5) %	(0) %	(5) %
Austria		20.3	30.3		35.8	
Belgium		24.7		22.4		21.3
Bulgaria		19.8		24.1		29.7
Croatia		23.9		23.0		30.0
Cyprus	23.3		32.5		32.2	
Czechia	46.0		49.8		49.5	
Estonia		26.9		24.3		27.2
Finland	18.8				23.5	
France		28.5	22.2			39.0
Germany	25.0		32.2		38.2	
Greece	34.5		36.1		29.1	
Hungary		28.7		29.0		37.1
Ireland		22.8		22.1		18.1
Italy		23.3	19.8			27.5
Latvia		26.2		25.4		30.9
Lithuania	24.7			27.5		27.9
Netherlands		37.1		25.7		22.9
Poland		21.9		22.6		33.5
Portugal		26.8		35.0		33.3
Slovakia	43.3		41.0		39.2	
Slovenia		24.8		27.4		34.6
Spain		29.4		23.5		33.0
Sweden	61.9		32.5		45.8	
Switzerland		36.4				27.3
UK		23.7		16.8		18.2

Data source: European Social Survey, 2020

In Table 2.2, the correlation coefficients of the three opinions towards immigration and political trust are presented. As shown, in all cases, correlation coefficients were significant, except in Poland where only the correlation coefficient of whether immigration is bad or good for country's economy and political trust was significant. Correlation coefficients of whether immigration is bad or good, the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live and political trust in country's parliament ranged from -.050 (Poland) to .401 (Sweden), .050 (Hungary) to .377 (Germany) and .077 (Croatia) to .398 (Sweden), respectively. All correlation coefficients were positive, except in Poland (-) where in the opinion of the impact of immigration on the country's economy the reverse was true.

Table 2.2 Pearson's correlation coefficients of opinion towards immigration and trust in country's parliament

Country	Trust in country's parliament		
	Immigration bad or good for country's economy	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live
Austria	.324	.297	.334
Belgium	.340	.288	.309
Bulgaria	.216	.203	.210
Croatia	.076	.065*	.077
Cyprus	.071*	.072*	.168
Czechia	.249	.184	.265
Estonia	.258	.253	.273
Finland	.370	.329	.342
France	.313	.292	.262
Germany	.387	.377	.392
Greece	.240	.250	.209
Hungary	.093	.050*	.115
Ireland	.287	.232	.253
Italy	.291	.258	.283
Latvia	.235	.164	.163
Lithuania	.305	.314	.301
Netherlands	.298	.287	.241
Poland	-.050*	-.029**	.027**
Portugal	.239	.231	.272
Slovakia	.359	.337	.376
Slovenia	.214	.119	.157
Spain	.232	.208	.262
Sweden	.401	.359	.398
Switzerland	.209	.207	.208
UK	.117	.124	.088

All correlations are significant at $p < .01$ (2-tailed).


* Correlation is significant at $p < .05$ (2-tailed).

** Correlation is not significant.

Data source: *European Social Survey, 2020*

In Figure 2.5, the scatterplot of the mean scores on political trust in country’s parliament and whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live is presented. As shown, an “uphill” pattern is detected indicating a positive relationship between the two variables. Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Greece, and Cyprus “cluster” closer and around the “line” and its left end of lower value points; Italy, France, Belgium and Portugal at the middle; and Ireland, the UK and Spain at the right end of higher value points.

Figure 2.5. Scatterplot of the mean scores of political trust in country’s parliament and whether immigration is bad or good for country’s economy



Data source: *European Social Survey, 2020*

In Figure 2.6, the scatterplot of the mean scores on political trust in country’s parliament and whether the country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigration is presented. As shown, an “uphill” pattern is detected indicating a positive correlation between the two variables. Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Greece, and Cyprus “cluster” closer at the “line” and its left end of lower value points; Italy, France, and Slovenia at the middle; and Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, the UK and Spain at the right end of higher value points. Outliers include Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia, Spain, and Latvia, where trust in the parliament remains relatively low, while immigrants are perceived quite positively.

In Figure 2.7, the scatterplot of the mean values of the political trust in country’s parliament and whether immigration is bad or good for country’s economy is presented. As shown, an “uphill” pattern is detected indicating a positive relationship between the two variables. Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, Czechia and Cyprus “cluster” closer at the “line” and its left end of lower value points; Austria, Belgium, France and Italy in the middle; and Ireland, the UK and Spain at the right end of higher value points.



Figure 2.6. Scatterplot of the mean scores on political trust in country's parliament and whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigration






Figure 2.7. Scatterplot of the mean scores on political trust in country's parliament and whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live



Data source: European Social Survey, 2020

Finally, we turn to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX)³ to test the correlations between the index and the political trust measured through the trust in the national parliament indicator. MIPEX measures the policy environment for the integration of immigrants in key 8 areas. In this way, MIPEX represents an index of institutional performance with respect to the integration of immigrants: more successful integration of immigrants enhances their contribution to the economy and other spheres of public life, thus reducing the negative implications for the population of the host country. In this way, countries with the higher value of MIPEX are expected to experience greater political trust of their public. As figure 2.7 illustrates, there is indeed such a positive correlation. Countries with high/ medium political trust, but low MIPEX include Switzerland, partly the Netherlands, Estonia, and Austria. Countries with low political trust, but high MIPEX Portugal.

Figure 2.7. Scatterplot of the mean scores on political trust in country’s parliament and the migration integration policy index



Data source: European Social Survey, 2020 and MIPEX 2020

³ MIPEX score (<https://www.mipex.eu/methodology>) is based on a set of indicators covering eight policy areas that has been designed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards through consultations with top scholars and institutions using and conducting comparative research in their area of expertise. The policy areas of integration covered by the MIPEX are the following: Labour market mobility; Family reunification; Education; Political participation; Permanent residence; Access to nationality; Anti-discrimination; and Health. For each answer, there are a set of options with associated values (from 0 to 100, e.g., 0-50-100). The maximum of 100 is awarded when policies meet the highest standards for equal treatment.

2.3. Conclusions

In this section, the correlation between the political trust in country's parliament and the attitudes towards immigration was investigated for 25 EU member countries participating in the 2020 ESS. The findings showed that the mean values of political trust in the country's parliament were lower (<3.4) in Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia, Latvia and Slovakia and higher (5.75>) in Switzerland, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden.

The mean values of attitudes whether immigration is bad [0] or good [10] for country's economy were lower (<4.51) in Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, and Czechia and higher (6.08>) in Ireland, the UK, Spain, Switzerland, Portugal, Finland, Germany and Poland. The mean values of attitudes whether the country's cultural life is undermined [0] or enriched [10] by immigration were lower (<4.43) in Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, and Cyprus and higher (6.18>) in Finland, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland, the UK, Belgium, Poland, Sweden and Portugal. The mean values of attitudes whether immigrants make the country a worse [0] or better [10] place to live were lower (<4.35) in Slovakia, Czechia, Hungary, Greece and Cyprus and higher (6.13>) in Ireland, the UK, Poland and Spain. As shown, in all three opinions towards immigration, Slovakia, Hungary, Greece and Czechia scored consistently lower whereas Ireland, the UK, Spain and Poland higher. In all countries, lower and higher levels of political trust in the country's parliament resulted in less and more favorable opinions towards immigration, respectively.

As shown, respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy in Sweden, Czechia, Slovakia, Greece, Germany, Lithuania, Cyprus, and Finland whereas they are more tolerant in all other countries; respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants in Czechia, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, Sweden, Germany, Austria, and France and Italy whereas they are more tolerant in all other countries; respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live in Czechia, Sweden, Slovakia, Germany, Austria, Cyprus, Greece and Finland whereas they are more tolerant in all other countries.

In all countries, attitudes towards immigration on all three indicators, i.e., whether immigration is bad or good for country's economy, the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live, were significantly related to political trust in country's parliament, except for Poland where only the first opinion was significantly related to political trust. In all countries, correlation coefficients were positive, except for Poland (-) where in the opinion of the impact of immigration on the country's economy the reverse was true. Overall, the positive correlations ranged from .050 (Hungary) to .401 (Sweden). These findings point out that, in all countries but Poland, as the levels of political trust in the country's parliament increase, the more favorable the opinions towards immigration are becoming.

In all scatterplots, an "uphill" pattern was detected indicating a positive relationship between the mean values on political trust in country's parliament and the opinions towards immigration. In all cases, Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, Czechia, and Cyprus "clustered" closer at the "line" and its left end of lower value points; France and Italy at the middle; and Ireland, the UK and Spain at the right end of higher value points.

4. Integration and Identification of Main Debates

The debates on what is political trust and what are its determinants have become topical with the challenge of immigration which EU member states face. At the level of decision-making of the EU there have been many developments regarding policies on immigration and asylum seeking. In this section we proceed to a brief identification and integration of the main issues which are relevant to a) EU policy interventions and their shifts and turns, b) democratic consultation on policy responses, and c) the role of independent authorities.

4.1. EU's policy interventions to manage migration and refugee waves

Although there were earlier policy measures to tackle immigration, the major milestones, which are briefly outlined below, were implemented between 2005-2022. Within the European Commission, the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs is responsible for the European migration policies. In 2005, the European Commission relaunched the debate on the need for a common set of rules for the admission of economic migrants with a “Green Paper” on an EU approach to managing economic migration (COM (2004) 811 final) which led to the adoption of a policy plan on legal migration (COM (2005)669 final) at the end of 2005.

In July 2006, the European Commission adopted a Communication on policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals (COM (2006) 402 final), which aims to strike a balance between security and an individual's basic rights during all stages of the illegal immigration process. In September 2007, the European Commission presented its third annual report on migration and integration (COM (2007) 512 final). A European Commission Communication adopted in October 2008 emphasized the importance of strengthening the global approach to migration: increasing coordination, coherence, and synergies (COM (2008) 611 final) as an aspect of external and development policy.

The Stockholm Programme, adopted by EU heads of state and government in December 2009, set a framework and a series of principles for the ongoing development of European policies on justice and home affairs for the period 2010 to 2014; migration-related issues were a central part of this program. To bring about the changes agreed upon, the European Commission enacted an action plan implementing the Stockholm Programme – delivering an area of freedom, security, and justice for Europe's citizens (COM (2010) 171 final) in 2010.

In May 2013, the European Commission published the “EU Citizenship Report 2013” (COM (2013) 269 final). The report noted that EU citizenship brings new rights and opportunities. Moving and living freely within the EU is the right most closely associated with the EU citizenship. Given modern technology and the fact that it is now easier to travel, the freedom of movement allows Europeans to expand their horizons beyond national borders, to leave their country for shorter or longer periods, to come and go between EU countries to work, study and receive training, to travel for business or for leisure, or to shop across borders. Free movement potentially increases social and cultural interactions within the EU and closer bonds between the EU citizens. In addition, it may generate mutual economic benefits for businesses and consumers, including those who remain at home, as internal obstacles are steadily removed.

In 2015 the European Commission presented a European Agenda on Migration (COM(2015) 240 final) outlining immediate measures to be taken in order to respond to the crisis situation in the Mediterranean as well as steps to be taken in later years to better manage migration in all its aspects

(13 May 2015). In 2016 the European migration network started publishing annual reports on migration. They provide an overview of the main legal and policy developments taking place across the EU as a whole and within participating countries. They are comprehensive documents and cover all aspects of migration and asylum policy by the European Commission's Migration and Home Affairs and EU agencies.

On 15 November 2017, the updated European Agenda on Migration focused on the refugee crisis, a common visa policy and Schengen. The relevant matters included resettlements and relocations, financial support to Greece and Italy, and facilities for refugees. Objectives included enabling refugees to reach Europe through legal and safe pathways, ensuring that relocation responsibility is shared fairly between Member States, integrating migrants at local and regional levels.

On 4 December 2018, the Commission published a progress report on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, examining progress made and shortcomings in the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration. Focusing on how climate change, demography and economic factors create new reasons pushing people to move, it confirmed that the drivers behind migratory pressure on Europe were structural, thus making it all the more essential to deal with the matter efficiently and uniformly. On 16 October 2019, the Commission published a progress report on the implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, focusing on key steps required on the Mediterranean routes in particular, as well as actions to consolidate the EU's toolbox on migration, borders and asylum.

On 23 September 2020, the Commission presented a New Pact on Migration and Asylum, setting out a fairer, more European approach to managing migration and asylum. This is a major policy shift. It aims to put in place a comprehensive and sustainable policy, providing a humane and effective long-term response to the current challenges of irregular migration, developing legal migration pathways, better integrating refugees and other newcomers, and deepening migration partnerships with countries of origin and transit for mutual benefit.

On 2 March 2022, the Commission activated the Temporary Protection Directive to offer quick and effective assistance to people fleeing the war in Ukraine. Under this proposal, those fleeing the war will be granted temporary protection in the EU, meaning that they will be given a residence permit, and they will have access to education and to the labour market. The Commission created a solidarity platform to coordinate the reception of displaced people in the Member States. The EU Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Mechanism Network, which gathers and disseminates information on the latest developments, strengthened the EU's collective response.

4.2. Democratic consultation on EU policy responses to immigration and refugee waves

European Union institutions have long established processes of consultation (Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. et al., 2022). There are different channels of consultation at the European Commission, the European Parliament and other fora and they have included migration and asylum issues. The European Commission follows a process of public consultation as well as targeted consultations with selected groups on various issues, including on immigration. For instance, on 21 July-22 October 2020 the European Commission held a public consultation on actions promoting the integration and social inclusion of migrants. Its purpose was “to feed into the development of the EU Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion” (European Commission 2020a).

A total of 864 responses were received: 63% of responses came from citizens and the rest from organizations, primarily NGOs (European Commission 2020b).

Further on, in September – December 2020 a public consultation took place on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. The purpose of the consultation was to improve on EU's legislation on legal migration and to collect new ideas to make the EU more attractive for immigrants whose skills could be matched with labour market demand and to make the EU a safer place for labour migrants in risk of exploitation (European Commission 2020c). Participation in the consultation was small. A total of 228 responses were received: 47% of responses came from citizens and the rest from organizations, primarily NGOs (European Commission 2021).

There is an obvious need to increase the channels of participation in consultations and the volume and range of contributions of stakeholders.

The European Parliament (EP) regularly holds public hearings on many issues, including migration policy. Hearings are organized by the parliament's committees, sometimes jointly by two or more committees. The purpose of hearings is to allow Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to consult experts and discuss key issues. An example is the public hearing on legal migration that took place on 22 May 2023 (European Parliament 2023).

However, there is research showing that, despite disagreements among MEPs, debates during sessions of the European Parliament (EP) resemble a secluded world. The EP has been characterized as a parliament without a public (Lord 2018). It is a parliament in which the elected representatives of the nation-states which constitute the EU address their speeches to an audience of EU officials rather than to national audiences (Krotky 2023). Thus, MEPs and EU officials speak to each other. The MEPs participate in and feed into intra-institutional conflict, rather than conflict over programmes and policy choices. In this way, MEPs contribute to the communication gap separating EU institutions from citizens of EU Member States, opening further opportunities for the rise of Euroscepticism.

The aforementioned channels of consultation are top-down. They are initiated by EU organs. There is another consultation channel which is provided by the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and is bottom-up. This is the European Citizens Initiative (ECI) that allows individuals who are citizens of EU Member States to call the European Commission to task, without however having the capacity to enforce a decision of the Commission. More concretely, the requirement for a Citizens Initiative is that one million citizens from a quarter of EU Member States ask the Commission to submit a legislative proposal in an area of its competence (<https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/en>). After the Initiative is tabled, the Commission may or may not propose a new law. In 2011 and 2019 Regulations on ECI were adopted by the EU (Regulations (EU) No 211/2011 and 2019/788). At the time of writing this Deliverable (December 2023) ten ECIs were ongoing. Among those ten ECI's two concerned the reception of immigrants and their treatment at the borders of EU Member States (collecting signatures, https://citizens-initiative.europa.eu/find-initiative_en?CATEGORY%5B0%5D=any&STATUS%5B0%5D=ONGOING&SECTION=ALL).

There is a larger issue with consultations in the EU that goes beyond the lack of adequate consultation on migration and asylum policies. This is the fact that participation promises in EU policy making have not been redeemed. Citizens and associations should have contributed to the input legitimacy of democracy at the EU level, but rarely has such participation materialized. Past

research has called participation processes in the EU “Potemkin Villages”, a façade with no real content (Labitzke, 2012).

4.3. The role of EU independent authorities

Except for the turns and shifts of EU migration policy and the relevant democratic consultation, the EU has dedicated mechanisms which have been active regarding the challenges of immigration. Two such mechanisms are independent authorities, the European Ombudsman and the Fundamental Rights Agency.

In EU Member States, as well as at the EU level, independent authorities are assigned the role to hold government and public administration accountable. In particular, the ombudspersons of various states under different titles (e.g., Ombudsman in the Scandinavian countries, “Médiateur de la République” in France, “Defensor del Pueblo” in Spain, etc.) and the European Ombudsman seek to account for the impact which policy decisions on immigration have on incoming migrants and refugees and to uphold EU’s fundamental values. The European Ombudsman has outlined a series of policy recommendations concerning the voluntary or forced return of irregular third-country migrants (rejected asylum seekers and persons without a valid residence permit) to their countries of origin. Such operations may violate fundamental human rights (European Ombudsman, 2015).

Another relevant EU agency is the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), which also covers issues of human rights and - among others - the rights of immigrants. For instance, recently the FRA produced a report on the rights of immigrants and asylum-seekers who are already long-term residents of EU Member States. It is a report on their integration and social inclusion (FRA 2013). Moreover, in November 2023 the responses of the Ombudspersons and the European Ombudsman and the positions of the FRA were discussed in a dedicated public conference in Brussels (European Ombudsman, 2023).

To summarise, over the last two decades, the EU has intervened to meet the challenges of immigration at various time points. There have been many shifts and turns of EU policies on immigration and asylum seeking. Democratic consultations have taken place but only far and in between. As for the mobilization of independent authorities, it has borne mixed results. It has contributed to the rise of the awareness regarding immigration and asylum seeking, but the full potential of independent authorities is still to be developed.

5. Conclusions and Hypotheses Building for the Future Research

To conclude, it is possible to list the research hypotheses which have been extracted from the theoretical discussion and literature review presented above. The research hypotheses are as follows:

(H1): Political trust varies with levels of trustworthiness that depend on EU and government migration policy responses which in turn are influenced by perception of immigration as a threat to national identity, culture, and economic sources and opportunities.

(H2) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with sociopolitical values among which the most topical for this research project are ethnocentrism and xenophobia. The higher an individual scores on these values, the higher the perception of threat.

(H3) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with educational achievement. The higher the achievement, the lower the perception of threat.

(H4) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with economic security. The more precarious the job situation of a citizen, the higher the threat that he or she perceives.

(H5) Perceptions of immigrants as a threat vary with voting preferences. Voters of Far-Right parties have a higher chance to perceive migrants as a threat than voters of the rest of political parties.

H5a: Compared to less polarized political party systems, in acutely polarized political party systems, the perception of immigration as a threat is mediated by political party preferences (right-wing vs. left-wing voters).

(H5b) Compared to voters of Far-Right parties in the Scandinavian countries and West European countries, voters of such parties in East and South European countries tend more to perceive migrants as a threat.

If the above research hypotheses are confirmed by empirical research to be carried out by TRUEDEM researchers, various policy implications may arise.

Briefly, there will be a need to recalibrate EU and national institutions assigned to manage immigration and asylum seeking so that they win the trustworthiness of citizens. Democratic consultation with citizens will need to be enhanced. Questions regarding the stability of policy choices, guiding institutions, will be pertinent. The administrative capacity of institutions dealing with immigration and asylum seeking will be a major area of reform. The agents of political socialization of citizens (schools, media, civic associations etc) will be called upon to examine the type of political values which they diffuse.

Wider structural issues will also be at stake. Three such issues stand out: how to tackle the economic insecurity of citizens perceiving immigrants as a threat; how to upgrade the education of citizens and fight the misinformation to which they are exposed regarding immigration; and how to manage political party polarization and more specifically so the polarization strategies of Far-Right parties.

References for part I

- Allen, T. J. (2017). All in the Party Family? Comparing Far-Right Voters in the Western and Post-Communist Europe, *Party Politics*, 23(3), 274-285.
- Attina, F. (2018). Tackling the Migrant Wave: EU as a Source and Manager of Crisis. *Revista Espanola de Derecho Internacional*, 70(2), 49-70. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17103/redi.70.2.2018.1.02>
- Bechtel, M. M., Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D. & Helbling, M. (2015). Reality Bites: The Limits of Framing Effects for Salient and Contested Policy Issues. *Political Science Research and Methods*, 3(3), 683-695. <https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2014.39>. http://mbechtel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/bechteletal_reality.pdf
- Brunkert, L., Puranen, B., Turska-Kawa, A. & Welzel, C. (2023). Cultural Background of European Democracies. Examining the Role of Values and Social Inequalities. 30 October 2023, TRUEDEM Deliverable 4.1, available at https://www.jdsystems.es/TRUEDEM/D4.1_Cultural_background_of_European_democracies_-_values_and_social_inequalities.pdf
- Campani, G. (2019). The Migration Crisis between Populism and Post-Democracy. In G. Fitz, J. Mackert and B. S. Turner (Eds.), *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy, Volume 3: Migration, Gender and Religion* (29-47), Routledge.
- Careja, R. & Emmenegger, P. (2012). Making Democratic Citizens: The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(7), 875-890. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140114285>
- Cengiz, E. & Vasilopoulou, S. (2022). The Affective Model of Far-Right Vote in Europe: Anger, Political Trust, and Immigration. *Social Science Quarterly*, 103(3), 635-648, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.13153>
- Conrad, G., Hålfdanarson, G., Galpin, C., Michailidou, A. & Pyrhönen, N. (Eds.) (2023). *Europe in the Age of Post-Truth Politics: Populism, disinformation and the public sphere*. Palgrave Macmillan. [10.1007/978-3-031-13694-8](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13694-8)
- Dahlberg, S. & Linde, J. (2018). Socialization or Experience? Institutional Trust and Satisfaction with Democracy among Emigrants in Different Institutional Settings. *The Journal of Politics*, 80(4), 1389-1393. <https://doi.org/10.1086/698661>
- Danaj, A., Lazányi, K. & Bilan, Y. (2018). Perceptions and Implications of Immigration in France – Economic, Social, Political and Cultural Perspectives. *Economics and Sociology*, 11(3), 226-247. https://www.economics-sociology.eu/files/14_507_Danaj%20et%20al.pdf
- Decker, F. (2016). The “Alternative for Germany”: Factors Behind Its Emergence and Profile of a New Right-wing Populist Party. *German Politics & Society*, 34(2), 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.3167/gps.2016.340201>
- Espenshade, T. J., Hempstead, K. (1996). Contemporary American Attitudes Towards U.S. Immigration. *International Migration Review*, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 535-570.
- European Commission (2020). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027. COM(2020) 758 final, 24.11.2020. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/en?file=2020-11/action_plan_on_integration_and_inclusion_2021-2027.pdf
- European Commission (2020a). Integration of Migrants: Commission Launches a Public Consultation and Call for an Expert Group on the Views of Migrants. 22 July 2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_1364, retrieved on 12 December 2023.
- European Commission (2020b). Analysis of the Responses to the Public Consultation on the Integration and Inclusion of Migrants and People with a Migrant Background Synthesis Report. 2020, available at https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/en?file=2020-11/synthesis_analysis_responses_public_consultation_integration_inclusion_2020.pdf, retrieved on 12 December 2023.

- European Commission (2020c). Legal Migration-Public Consultation, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12594-Public-consultation-on-legal-migration/public-consultation_en, retrieved on 12 December 2023.
- European Commission (2021). Analysis of the Responses to the Public Consultation on the Future of Legal Migration. Synthesis Report. January 2021, available at , retrieved on 12 December 2023.
- European Migration Network (2023). *Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2022*. EMN Report, July. <https://emn.ie/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/ARM2022.pdf>
- European Ombudsman (2015). Decision of the European Ombudsman closing her own-initiative inquiry OI/9/2014/MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex). 4 May 2015, available at <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/59740>
- European Ombudsman (2023). Protecting human rights: approaches to migration and artificial intelligence - ENO Conference 2023. 9 November 2023, available at <https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/event/en/1536>
- European Parliament (2023). Public Hearing on “Legal Migration: The Skills and Talent Package. 22 May 2023. Available at <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/public-hearing-on-legal-migration-the-sk/product-details/20230511CHE11702>, retrieved on 12 December 2023.
- European Social Survey (2020). ESS Round 10 Source Questionnaire. London: ESS ERIC Headquarters c/o City, University of London.
- European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC). (2023a). ESS10 integrated file, edition 3.2 [Data set]. Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. https://doi.org/10.21338/ess10e03_2
- European Social Survey European Research Infrastructure (ESS ERIC). (2023b). ESS10 Self-completion - integrated file, edition 3.1 [Data set]. Sikt - Norwegian Agency for Shared Services in Education and Research. https://doi.org/10.21338/ess10sce03_1
- Eurostat (2023a). Migrant integration statistics - active citizenship. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics_-_active_citizenship
- Eurostat (2023b). Migration and migrant population statistics. [Migration and migrant population statistics - Statistics Explained \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics_-_Statistics_Explained_(europa.eu))
- Eurostat (2023c). Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2022. Statistical Annex. Co-produced by Eurostat and the European Migration Network, 2023 edition, Publications Office of the European Union, June. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-statistical-reports/w/ks-09-23-223>
- Eurostat (2023d). Population and population change statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Population_and_population_change_statistics
- Eurostat (2023e). Migration and Asylum Database. Eurostat Data Browser. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00176/default/table?lang=en>
- Eurostat (2023f). Migration and Asylum Database. Eurostat Data Browser. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tps00178/default/table?lang=en>
- Fiore, T. & Ialongo, E. (2018). Introduction: Italy and the Euro–Mediterranean “Migrant Crisis”: National Reception. Lived Experiences. E.U. Pressures. *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 23(4), 481-489. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1354571X.2018.1500787>
- FRA-Fundamental Rights Agency (2023). Promoting Migrant Integration-Strengthening EU Law on Long-Term Residence. 6 September 2023, available at <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2023/long-term-residents>
- Geddes, A., Hadj-Abdou, L. & Brumat. L. (2020). *Migration and Mobility in the European Union*. 2nd edition, Red Globe Press.
- Halapuu, V. *et al* (2013) ‘Is institutional trust related to pro-immigrant attitudes? A pan-European evidence’, *Eurasian geography and economics*, 54(5-6), pp. 572–593. doi:10.1080/15387216.2014.908313.
- Hardin, R. (2006). *Trust*. Polity Press.

- Hay, C. (1999). Crisis and the Structural Transformation of the State: Interrogating the process of change. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 1(3), 317–344. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-856X.00018?casa_token=-sxjZx36V5gAAAAA:0uZG56cBJTz9V8voTAH7ENOOEWObEAAAtNVUYAPBGnfioVLaGatuC4sHAr7DYwiT74nsIaKI4ngbBAhJn
- Hooghe, M., Marien, S. & Pauwels, T. (2011). Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There is No Viable Exit or Voice Option? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in the Belgian Regional Elections of June 2009. *Government and Opposition*, 46(2), 245–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01338.x>
- Hopkins, D.J., Sides, J. & Citrin, J. (2019). The Muted Consequences of Correct Information about Immigration. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1), 315–312. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798622
- Husfeldt, V. (2004). Negative attitudes towards Immigrants: Explaining factors in Germany, Switzerland, England, and Denmark. In C. Papanastasiou (Ed.). Conference Proceedings of the 1st IEA International Research Conference, pp. 57–68. Nikosia: IEA.
- Brunkert L. J., Puranen B., Turska-Kawa A., Welzel C. (2023). Cultural Background of European Democracies: Examining The Distribution Of Values And Norms. Working paper no.4.1. TRUEDEM: Trust in European Democracies Project (www.truedem.eu).
- Inglehart, R. & P. Norris (2017). Trump and the Xenophobic Populist Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse. *Perspectives on Politics* 15 (2), 443-454, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592717000111>
- Inglehart, R. (2018). The Age of Insecurity: Can Democracy Save Itself? *Foreign Affairs* 97(3), 20-28, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44822141>
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2023). *World Migration Report 2022*. IOM-UN Migration. <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022>
- King, R. & Wood, N. (Eds.) (2001). *Media and Migration*. Routledge.
- Kriesi, H-P. (2020). Backlash Politics against European Integration. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 22(4), 692-701. <https://DOI:10.1177/1369148120947356>
- Krotky, J. (2022). Debating Irregular Migration in the European Parliament: A ‘Parliament Without a Public’ or the Voice of the People? *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 31(3), 874-888. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.20861082>
- Kuźelewska, E., Weatherburn, A. & Kloza, D. (2018). Introduction. Asking Big Questions: Migrants Ante Portas and What to Do with Them?. In E. Kuźelewska, A. Weatherburn & D. Kloza (Eds.), *Irregular Migration as a Challenge to Democracy*. (European Integration and Democracy Series, vol. 5) (pp. xiii-xlvii), Intersentia. <http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-8738558>
- Labitzke, J. (2012). Consultation Processes as a Practice of Legitimacy in the EU Legislative Process. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 20 (3), 323-336. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2012.711157>
- Lord, C. (2018). “The European Parliament: A Working Parliament without A Public?” *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 24 (1): 34–50. doi:10.1080/13572334.2018.1444624.
- McAuliffe, M. & Triandafyllidou A. (Eds.) (2021). *World Migration Report 2022*. International Organization for Migration (IOM), /UN MigrationUN/IOM. *World Migration Report (2022)*. <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022>
- McLaren, L. M. (2012b). The Cultural Divide in Europe: Migration, Multiculturalism, Political Trust”. *World Politics*, 64(2), 199-241. doi: [10.1017/S0043887112000032](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887112000032)
- McLaren, L. M. (2017). Immigration, National Identity and Political Trust in European Democracies, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 43(3), 379-399. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2016.1197772
- McLaren, L.M. (2012a). Immigration and Trust in Politics in Britain. *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(1), 163-185. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123411000251>
- Michael, C.P. (2021). *Migration and the Crisis of Democracy in Contemporary Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-64069-9#aboutBook#aboutBook>

- Miller, A. H. & Listhaug, O. (1990). Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States. *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 357-386. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123400005883>
- Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (2005). What are the political consequences of trust? A test of cultural and institutional theories in Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 38, 1050–1078 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414005278419>
- Mounk, Y. (2018). *The People Vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and How to Save It*. Harvard University Press.
- Norris, P. (2017). The Conceptual Framework of Political Support. In S. Zmerli & T.W.G. van der Meer (Eds.). *Handbook on Political Trust* (pp. 19-32). Edward Elgar.
- Norris, P. (2022). *In Praise of Scepticism: Trust but Verify*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. et al. (2022). Stakeholder Consultations in the EU Commission: Instruments of Involvement or Legitimacy? *Journal of European Public Policy*. 30(6), 1142-1162. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2022.2058066>
- Sutcliffe, J.B. (2012). The Roots and Consequences of Euroscepticism: An Evaluation of the United Kingdom Independence Party. *Geopolitics, History and International Relations*, 4(1), 107-127. <https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=poliscipub>
- Turner, B. S. (2019). Introduction: Demography, Democracy, and Right-wing Populism. In G. Fitzi, J. Mackert & B. S. Turner (Eds.). *Populism and the Crisis of Democracy: Migration, Gender and Religion* (pp. 1-9). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315108056>
- Uchitelle, L. (1994). The Rise of the Losing Class. *The New York Times*, November 20, Section 4, p.1.
- Voicu, B. and Tufiş, C.D. (2017). “Migrating Trust: Contextual Determinants of International Migrants’ Confidence in Political Institutions”. *European Political Science Review*, 9(3), 351-373. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773915000417>
- Wallace Goodman, S. (2021). Immigration Threat, Partisanship, and Democratic Citizenship: Evidence from the US, UK, and Germany. *Comparative Political Studies*, 54(1), 2052-2083. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414021997165>
- Wallace Goodman, S. (2022). *Citizenship in Hard Times: How Ordinary People Respond to Democratic Threat*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009058292>
- Warren, M. E. (Ed.) (2010). *Democracy and Trust*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511659959>
- Zhirkov, K. (2014). Nativist but Not Alienated: A Comparative Perspective on the Radical Right Vote in Western Europe. *Party Politics*, 20(2), 286–296. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813511379>
- Zmerli S. (2014). Political Trust. In: Michalos A.C. (Ed) *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and WellBeing Research*. Springer, Dordrecht.

6. Immigration and Political Trust in Europe: National Case-Studies

6.1. Immigration, public perceptions, and political trust in Austria⁴

This country report provides an overview of the immigration situation in Austria and its implications for the public’s political trust in 2015-2022. This country report presents factual data on migration (immigration, integration) in Austria and summarizes the key research outputs, while also giving an overview of the public debate, including issues such as xenophobia, integration policies, migration policies and public trust regarding migration and immigration issues.

Population: migration and immigration

Austria has been a country of immigration for four decades now: the migration balance has been positive every year since 1983. In 2015, around 1,813 million people with a migrant background lived in Austria, an increase of 98,300 since 2014. Based on the total population in private households, this corresponded to a share of 21%. Around 1,334 million people belong to the so-called “first generation” migrants: they were born abroad and moved to Austria. The remaining approximately 478,700 people are descendants born in Austria of parents with a foreign place of birth (“second generation”). Germans continue to be by far the largest group of foreign nationals in Austria (Migration and Integration, 2016).

Austria’s population is growing solely through immigration; without it, the population would fall back to the level of the 1950s in the long term, according to the population forecast. Since 2015, the share of the population with a migration background has risen continuously from 21,4% to 25,4 %. (Statistical Yearbook Migration and Integration, 2022). In 2021, according to Statistics Austria, around 2,24 million people (25,4 % of the total population) with a migration background lived in Austria, that is around 430,000 or 24% more than in 2015 (1.81 million). In 2022, 26,4% of Austria's residents had a migration background (both parents were born abroad.) In Vienna the proportion is almost twice as high (Statistics Austria, 2023).

Table 6.1.1. Size of the Austrian Population 2015 and 2022 by citizenship

		01.01.2015	01.01.2022
	Total	8.584,926	8.978,929
Citizenship	Austrian	7.438,848	7.392,220
Citizenship	non-Austrian	1.146,078	1.586,709

Source / data taken from: Statistics Austria, Statistik des Bevölkerungsstandes, Demographisches Jahrbuch der Statistics Austria 2022. Population statistics, Demographic Yearbook of Statistics Austria. Online available at: https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Demographisches-JB-2022_Web_barrierefrei.pdf

In 2022, Austria recorded the largest population growth since the start of the First World War. Austria grew faster in 2022 than in previous years. After the population had already exceeded the nine million mark in the first quarter of 2022 due to refugee migration from Ukraine, it was over than 9.1 million at the beginning of 2023 (Demographic Yearbook, 2023). With 67,400 people, Ukrainian citizens made up almost half of the new immigrants balance in 2022 (Migration and Integration 2023). As of 2022, Germans and Romanians are the largest groups of foreigners in Austria: 217,000 and 138,000 respectively. They are followed by 122,000 Serbian citizens and

⁴ This country report was produced by Claudia Palt and Christian Haerperfer, Institute for Comparative Survey Research, Austria.

118,000 Turkish citizens. In fifth place were the 97,000 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, just ahead of the 95,000 Croatian and 94,000 Hungarian nationals. They were followed at some distance by 68,000 Syrians and 66,000 Polish nationals. While at the beginning of the year 2022 there were about 13,000 Ukrainians living in Austria, on 1 April 2022 there were already almost 53,000, which then increased to 78,400 by the end of the year.

Table 6.1.2. Immigration from abroad: 2019-2022 (by nationality and sex)

IMMIGRATION FROM ABROAD

2019 – 2022 by nationality and sex




Fig. 1; Source: Statistics Austria (2023), Migration statistics; own presentation

Source: Expert Council for Integration. Integration Report 2023. (Report in English.) Available at: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/service/publikationen-aus-dem-bundeskanzleramt/publikationen-zu-integration/integrationsberichte.html>

Of all 261,937 new immigrants in 2022, 15,700 were returning Austrian citizens and a further 100,700 were citizens of EU or EFTA states or the United Kingdom (GB). Of these, German and Romanian nationals (around 21,700 each) formed the largest groups, followed by people with Hungarian nationality (12,500). Immigration from third countries (145,600), which also includes 78,400 Ukrainians (29,9% of all immigration), accounted for a total of 56% of all immigration. They also included 15,100 Syrians, 12,800 people from countries of the former Yugoslavia (outside the EU), 3,300 Afghans and 2,000 Iranians. (Migration and Integration, 2023).

Table 6.1.3. External Population Migration: 2015 and 2022

Year	Influx from abroad	Exodus abroad / foreign country	Net migration with foreign countries / migration balance
2012	140,358	96,561	43,797
2013	151,280	96,552	54,728
2014	170,115	97,791	72,324
2015	214,410	101,343	113,067
2016	174,310	109,634	64,676
2017	154,749	110,119	44,630
2018	146,856	111,555	35,301
2019	150,419	109,806	40,613
2020	136,343	96,279	40,064
2021	154,202	101,714	52,488
2022	261,937	124,958	136,979

Data taken from: Statistics Austria. Wanderungsstatistik, 2023. Available at: <https://www.statistik.at/statistiken/bevoelkerung-und-soziales/bevoelkerung/migration-und-einbuengerung/wanderungen-mit-dem-ausland>

In the years before 2022, it was consistently the case that more male than female immigrants came to Austria. By contrast, there was hardly any difference between the genders in 2022 (131,618 men; 130,319 women; 1,299 more men than women). There were more men than women in 2022 among immigrants from other EU/EU/EFTA states (55,470 men; 45,222 women; 10,248 more men than women), among asylum seekers and subsequently immigrating persons from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria (14,293 men; 4,684 women; 9,609 more men than women), and among nationals of other third countries (excluding Ukraine; 26,835 men; 21,322 women; 5,513 more men than women). Similarly, there were more men than women among Austrian citizens who moved or returned to the country in 2022. By contrast, women were clearly in the majority among the Ukrainian citizens who came to Austria for the first time in 2022 (25,905 men; 52,534 women; 26,629 more women than men).

The refugee immigration and the social inclusion of the refugees were dominant themes of the migration and integration policy in the past years, especially since 2015. Seldom have so many refugees come to Austria from other regions, which can be neither geographically nor historically designated as neighboring regions. And in contrast to the historical “waves of refugees”, this time it was not just a quick stop before moving on, but rather a permanent immigration. Previously a transit country of Austria, has now become a permanent host for persons granted asylum. Austria and the EU were not prepared for this influx, and the European asylum system was overridden by

the actions of individual countries and by decisions of European institutions – from the European Court of Justice to NGOs – but without having previously developed an organizational and political alternative. The now slowly returning onset of the common European asylum system due to the closure of the Balkan Route and the growing intra-European pressures are also the first steps to addressing the situation.

With around 112,300 cases, significantly more asylum applications were filed in Austria in 2022 than in 2021 (39,900) and in previous years. The number of asylum applications was also higher than in the high-migration year 2015 (88,300 asylum applications). The significant increase in asylum applications is primarily due to applications from Indians (2022: 20,000; 2021: 900) and Tunisians (2022: 13,100; 2021: 500). But those of people from Afghanistan (2022: 25,000; 2021: 8,700) also tripled in 2022 nearly. Around 13,800 people were granted asylum in Austria in 2022, which was slightly more than 2021 (12,000). This was offset by around 31,100 negative asylum decisions, 128% more than in 2021 (13,600).

Education

According to PISA 2015 (<https://www.iqs.gv.at/pisa-2015>), students with an immigrant background made up 20,3% of the total student population in Austria, a percentage significantly higher than the OECD average of 12,5%. Education outcomes for students with an immigrant background remained significantly below those of other students. Additionally, grade repetition was higher amongst immigrant students, with 26,5% of immigrant students reporting having repeated a grade, compared to 12,1% of non-immigrant students (above the OECD average of 19,9% and 10,9%, respectively). According to Eurostat data, foreign-born students also have almost three times the early school leaving rates of native-born students. (Bejenari A., 2023)

It was stated in the Integration Reports (2015, 2016) that the education system remains the largest integration policy site. The failures in recent years have become more obvious due to the additional refugee children to be integrated – and this despite the great efforts of many teachers. In the 2021/22 school year, the proportion of students without Austrian citizenship among all students hardly changed compared to 2020/2021. The proportion of students with a first language other than German fell slightly from 27,2% to 26,8%. In the 2021/22 school year, the highest proportion of non-Austrian citizens or students with a first language other than German were in special schools (43%) and polytechnic schools (37%), the lowest were in schools leading to the Matura – “AHS Oberstufe” (high school) (20%), “BHS” (vocational high school) (22%) and vocational schools (14%). About 68% of Turkish young people in the 10th grade attended schools that do not lead to the Matura. This proportion was slightly higher for young people from Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq (74%). In 2021, a significantly lower proportion of students born abroad attended secondary school after compulsory school (15 to 19 year old) (65%) than young people born in Austria (81%). Ten years earlier (2011) it was 56% and 76% respectively. Early school leaving is more common among young people with a first language other than German (10%) than among German-speaking young people (3%).

Nevertheless, the level of education of the population with a migrant background has improved significantly in a long-term comparison. In 2022, less than a quarter (24%) of those 25-64 years old had compulsory school as their highest level of education, but 51% had an intermediate or higher level of education and 25% had a university degree. In the first generation of immigrants, the proportion of people with compulsory schooling as the highest education level was 24%, while in the second generation it was only 19%. On the other hand, the proportion of medium qualifications (apprenticeship, BMS) in the second generation increased to 47%, compared to 30%

for the first generation. First-generation immigrants are more likely to have an academic education than the second generation (27% versus 17%) (Statistical Yearbook, 2023 and Asylkoordination Österreich, 2023).

Employment and Unemployment

The unemployment rate in Austria in 2015 was 5,7% overall (+0.1 percentage points compared to the previous year), including 4,8% for residents and 11,4% for foreigners (8,4% for EU citizens and 15,3% for non-EU nationals). The unemployment rate for foreigners in Austria was well below the EU average of 15,1% (Migration & Integration, 2016). People with a migrant background were less likely to be in employment in 2015.

The employment rate of those 15-64 years old with a migrant background was 63% in 2015, while that of people of the same age without a migrant background was 74%. This difference is largely due to the lower labor force participation of migrant women (57% compared to 70% for women without a migrant background). The employment participation of people from the EU accession states from 2004 onwards (69%) and the former Yugoslavia (64%) differs. An increase in the immigrant employment rate to match the employment rate of the local population would in Austria result in an increase in GDP of almost 0,4% per year, assuming that all those ready to work also in fact found a job (OECD Migration Outlook, 2013).

Table 6.1.4. Unemployment rate 2015 by nationality and education

Nationality	Total	Mandatory School	Apprenticeship, vocational school	Secondary school, high school, university
Total	9,10%	29,00%	7,00%	4,60%
Austrian	8,10%	25,50%	7,00%	4,40%
non-Austrian	13,50%	35,90%	6,60%	5,00%
EU before 2004 / EWR / Switzerland	8,10%	22,80%	9,60%	5,00%
EU candidate countries since 2004	10,80%	31,20%	6,20%	4,00%
former Yugoslavia (non-EU)	14,50%	33,80%	5,90%	3,50%
Turkey	19,80%	41,20%	5,40%	5,00%
other States	25,80%	50,30%	5,30%	11,70%

Source: Labor market service Austria 2015, own graphics

Turkish nationals from the 2015 and 2016 immigration cohorts recorded employment rates of 52,8% and 53,9% after just one and two years, respectively. The rate rose further to 62,5% and 63,3% after five and six years of residence, respectively. The cohort that immigrated in 2019 was faster to find gainful employment. Already after the first year of residence, the rate was 59,6% and rose to 64,0% after the second year, a value higher than that achieved by the 2015 and 2016 immigrant cohorts after five and six years, respectively. This suggests that recent Turkish immigration either had higher skill levels than previous cohorts, which would increase their job opportunities, and/or labor market conditions were more favorable, or the propensity to work was higher, especially among women. Given the skills shortages already evident in 2019, the combination of better qualifications and high demand is likely to have boosted the levels of gainful employment. The chances of integration are also better among nationals from the former Yugoslavia outside the EU than among refugees. They achieved an employment rate of 77.0% after

five and six years in Austria, respectively (2000: 81,2%; 2015: 77,2%; 2016: 77%). Persons from the 2019 immigration year already achieved an activity rate of 76% after two years of residence.

In 2015 the unemployment rate of working age non-Austrian citizens is considerably higher than that of Austrian citizens. On one hand, this is related to the sectors in which non-Austrian workers are frequently employed, since these sectors are characterized by a high risk of unemployment (construction, tourism). On the other hand, the persisting lower level of education among descendants of former migrant workers also still plays a role. Compared to the overall population, approximately twice as many non-Austrian citizens hold a compulsory education school leaving certificate as their maximum qualification. It is, however, exactly this population group which most affected by unemployment (BMASK The Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2015)

In 2015 the economic sectors in which most of the working migrants and refugees worked were: business services, such as building cleaning, temporary employment, or vehicle rental. In 2015, these were among the sectors with the highest proportion of employees with a migrant background (43% of those employed in this sector), with the proportion of women (46%) being significantly higher than that of men (39%). The proportion of migrants was also high in tourism (39%); here it was higher among men (40%) than among women (38%). Men with a migrant background were also found more often than average in the arts and entertainment industry (30%), in transport and construction (27% each), while women were found as household staff (51%), in real estate and housing as well as in the arts and crafts Entertainment industry (25% each). Sectors with a very low proportion of foreign employees were finance and insurance (13%), public administration and defense (6%) and agriculture and forestry (4%). (Migration & Integration 2016)

In 2021 the employment rate of people with a migrant background was 66%, 8 percentage points lower than that of the working-age population without a migrant background. The rate is particularly low among third-country nationals, and somewhat weaker among people from EU countries from 2004 onwards. Women from third countries have a significantly lower level of employment compared to the overall female average of 68%. This was particularly low for women from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, followed by Turkish women at. The employment rate of women without a migrant background is higher than that of migrant women until their mid-50s. Only at the age of 55 to 64 did women from other EU countries (59%) have a higher labor force participation rate than women without a migrant background (Statistical Yearbook. Migration and Integration, 2023).

In 2022 the overall unemployment rate in Austria was 6,3%, 1,7 percentage points lower than in the previous year. It was lower among Austrians (5,4%) than among foreigners (9,1%). People from Syria had the highest unemployment rates (35,2%), followed by people from Afghanistan (20,6%). For these two groups of origin, the difference by gender is particularly pronounced: women from Syria had the highest rates with 47,5%, followed by women from Afghanistan with 39,6%. As already mentioned, Syrian women registered as job seekers with the Public Employment Service (AMS) much earlier and in greater numbers. However, figures from the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) showed that the later immigration of Syrian refugees also has a low level of education. This group of people often comes from refugee camps where there was limited or no access to education or work. As a result, a high proportion of young men and women from Syria now have alphabetization needs, both in the Latin script and in their language of origin.

In 2022 the industry-specific pattern of employment differs between people with and without a migration background. People with a migrant background are more likely to work in the catering

and accommodation sectors (10,1% compared to 4,0% in the population without a migrant background), in the construction industry (9,4% compared to 7,8%) and in the transport sector (5,9% compared to 4,2%) employed. People with a migrant background are also more likely to work in retail (14,6% compared to 13,2%), especially the second generation (18,9% compared to 13,8% of the first generation). In return, employees without a migrant background are more common in health and social services (11,6% compared to 10,0%), in public administration and national defense (8,3% compared to 2,3%) and in education and teaching (7,1% compared to 5,4%). The proportion of foreign employees varies greatly by industry. In 2021, their share was highest in “accommodation and catering” and “agriculture and forestry” at over 50% each, and lowest in “public administration, defense and social security” at 6%. On average across all sectors the proportion of foreign workers was 23%.

In all categories, with the exception of persons from EU states before 2004/EFTA/ GB, persons with a compulsory school leaving certification at most made up the largest group of unemployed jobseekers or jobseekers in training. The highest share of jobseekers with no more than compulsory schooling was recorded by persons entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection (72%); among the total of third-country nationals the share was 70%. This refers to 57,000 job-seeking third-country nationals, including 25,100 persons entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection. Among the EU27 nationals looking for work – 45,300 people in total – around half had at most a compulsory school leaving certification. The share of jobseekers with a compulsory school leaving certification at most among Austrians was significantly lower (38%). On the other hand, the share of persons with intermediate education (apprenticeship and intermediate technical college) was significantly higher with a total of 42%; also, among jobseekers from the EU27, the share of intermediate qualification was comparatively high with 24%, and lowest among third-country nationals (10%). Academics had the lowest share (7–8%) of jobseekers among all groups of origin, except among jobseekers from EU states before 2004 EU/EFTA/GB, of whom 22% (2,417 persons) had a university education (Migration and Integration, 2023).

Table 6.1.5. Unemployment rates 2022 by sex and nationality

Nationality	Men	Women
Syria	31.9%	47.5%
Russian Federation	22.7%	17.8%
Serbia	21.7%	20.1%
Iraq	19.3%	35.5%
Afghanistan	15.7%	39.6%
Türkiye	12.2%	17.4%
Bulgaria	11.9%	13.8%
Romania	8.6%	10.6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8.4%	8.0%
Croatia	8.4%	8.1%
Poland	6.3%	8.5%
Austria	5.8%	4.9%
Germany	4.5%	4.5%

Source: BMAW - Federal Ministry Republic of Austria Labor and Economy (2023). Online Labor Market Information system AMIS. Online database - Labor market information https://www.dnet.at/amis/Datenbank/DB_IndexEN.aspx. <https://www.bmaw.gv.at/en.html>

Crime

The year 2015 was marked by global migration and was often accompanied by fears of rising crime. An analysis of the suspects shows the following picture: In 2015, a total of 517,870 cases were reported in Austria. Of these reports, a total of 227,855 cases were resolved by the police and 250,618 suspects were identified. Divided into the suspects' countries of origin, 37 percent are foreign suspects and 63 percent are domestic suspects.

In 2015 the proportion of foreign nationals living in Austria among the suspects identified by the police was 30% - not adjusted for age structure - and was therefore significantly higher than the foreign population proportion, which was 13,8% on average for the year. A further 7,0% of the suspects were in Austria as tourists or illegally, so that the proportion of foreigners among the suspects was 37,0% overall. Of the 32,118 final convictions handed down by Austria's courts in 2015, 40,0% involved foreigners; of the 29,511 people convicted, 40,4% did not have Austrian citizenship (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik. Statistik Austria, 2015).

With the absolute number of 92,804 foreign suspects identified, 2015 was the year with highest number in the last ten years. The number of domestic suspects was 157,777 in 2015 and fell by 5,1 percent compared to 2014. In 2015, the total of 92,804 foreign suspects had the following nations of origin in absolute numbers:

Table 6.1.6. Suspects in Austria 2015 by Nationality

Country	2015
Romania	9624
Germany	9161
Serbia	8568
Turkey	6398
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5232
Hungary	4348
Slovakia	3573
Afghanistan	3269
Poland	3171
Russian Federation	3008

Source: Security Austria 2015, Federal Criminal Police Office: Available at: <https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/>, own graphics.

Overall, in 2015, foreign suspects primarily violated against other people's assets (42,010 foreign suspects), followed by criminal acts against life and limb (23,951 foreign suspects). In 2015 948 foreign suspects were charged with criminal acts against sexual integrity and self-determination. Smuggling crime rose sharply in 2015: a total of 9,569 reports of smuggling (§ 114 of the Austrian Foreign Nationals Police Act, Fremdenpolizeigesetz FPG), which means an increase of 84,9 percent compared to 2014 (5,176 reports). (Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2015)

In 2022, 488,949 reports were filed across Austria, which corresponds to an increase of 19 percent compared to 2021 (2021: 410,957). Looking at the long-term comparison, the level before the Covid-19 pandemic was reached. There was a total of 488,912 reported offenses in 2019.

A total of 302,530 suspects were identified 2022, which corresponds to an increase of 13,3 percent compared to the 266,979 identified in 2021. Looking at the number of foreign suspects over the last ten years, the picture shows an increase from 85,376 (year 2013) to 128,594 people (year 2022), which represents an increase of 39 percent in relation to the total number of suspects from 2021 to 2022 42,5 percent means.

From the 302,500 recorded suspects in 2022 the proportion of foreign nationals was 42,5%, with 27,7% also residing in Austria. Compared to the proportion of the foreign population (18,4% on average for 2022), the proportion of foreign suspects living in Austria was significantly higher. People living abroad or not legally in Austria accounted for 14,8%. For comparison, in 2018 the proportion of foreigners among the suspects was 40,0%. For people living in Austria, it was 26,4% (with a foreigner share of 16,0%), while suspects living abroad or not legally in Austria made up 13,5%).

When dividing the foreign suspects according to their countries of origin the picture shows for 2022 that 14,468 suspects come from Romania, 12,919 suspects from Germany, 9,965 suspects from Serbia, 7,236 suspects from Turkey and 7,159 suspects from Hungary were identified. (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, 2022)

Policy Responses

The fight against xenophobia and racism is also an important task in Austria, for which measures are taken at various levels, including to promote equal treatment, the reduction of prejudices and integration. For example, in recent years criminal law protection against discrimination and hate speech has been strengthened. The principle of equal treatment is anchored in the Federal Constitution. Building on this, comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation was passed and is continually being developed further. In the administrative and civil law areas, the implementation of the relevant EU directives has contributed to strengthening anti-discrimination legislation in Austria.

In 2010, the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs (Federal Ministry for Internal Affairs, Bundesministerium für Inneres, BMI, <https://www.bmi.gv.at>) established an Expert Council on Integration for the purpose of the implementation of the set of measures which were defined in the National Action Plan Integration (Nationaler Aktionsplan Integration (NAP.I.) The National Action Plan for Integration (NAP.I) was intended to structure the Austria-wide cooperation of all those responsible for successful integration measures and to optimize their implementation. In addition to general integration policy guidelines, NAP.I deals in more detail with challenges, principles and goals in the following fields of action: language and education, work and career, rule of law and values, health and social affairs, intercultural dialogue, sport and leisure as well as housing and the regional dimension of integration. The task of the Expert Council was to bring the over 60 measures into a more compact format. One central result was a 20-point program which highlighted essential integration policy measures and provided hints for their operational implementation.

Austria responded to the refugee immigration with an integration policy and did so much more swiftly than other countries or the European Union. Members of the Expert Council, together with the BMEIA developed 50 Action Points for the integration of persons entitled to asylum or subsidiary protection as early as November 2015, which were later also acknowledged and approved by the Council of Ministers and have since been applied as a guiding principle for a common integration policy. The 50 Action Points offer a variety of measures along the established

areas of activity of the National Action Plan for Integration. The Expert Council suggests these measures, encourages them, but cannot take responsibility for their implementation due to the current distribution of powers. This would require the interplay of many participants at the federal, state, and municipality level as well as the social partners and many civil society institutions.

Over the period under study the Austrian support and integration measures were continuously adapted and expanded according to need in cooperation with the Austrian Integration Fund, a fund of the Republic of Austria and the federal government's partner in promoting integration (Austrian Integration Fund, ÖIF). As a result, the Austrian Integration Fund has been offering a wealth of advice and information services for displaced persons from Ukraine since March 2022. (Austrian Integration Fund, 2022).

Since 2021, there has been cooperation between several European states in the area of extremism prevention in the context of integration. Thematically, the cooperation focuses on different forms of extremism, on extremist ideologies, networks and actors that divide societies and undermine social cohesion, right up to the implementation of extremist goals with violence. In the context of integration, political Islam and Islamism represent a particular challenge. Since Islamist networks do not stop at national borders, international cooperation is crucial. (Vienna Forum on Countering Segregation and Extremism in the Context of Integration)

The Austrian federal government has set up a migration platform entitled "Living and Working in Austria" (<https://www.migration.gv.at/en/living-and-working-in-austria/>). With the Red-White-Red Card, Austria has a flexible immigration system that enables qualified skilled workers from third countries and their family members to permanently immigrate to Austria. All information about the red-white-red card, the other working and settlement requirements, as well as a comprehensive description of living and working conditions in Austria can be found on this platform.

Due to the war in Ukraine and the resulting large number of displaced persons, Austria took extensive measures to support these persons. In order to adapt the framework conditions of the Red-White-Red Card to a modern labor market, to simplify the access of qualified workers to the labor market, to make the application process more efficient and thus to contribute to alleviating the shortage of skilled workers, the Red-White-Red Card was reformed and associated financial alleviations, simplification of procedures and changes to the allocation of points were implemented. Austria intensified its focus on migration from India. Accordingly, there was a special campaign to support voluntary return to India.

The Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) is a fund of the Republic of Austria and a partner of numerous organizations and responsible parties in the area of integration and migration in Austria (<https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/impressum-copyright.html>). In its integration centers in all state capitals, the ÖIF offers integration measures for those entitled to asylum and subsidiary protection, as well as for immigrants, and provides information about current developments in the area of integration and migration. The target groups of the ÖIF are: those entitled to asylum, those entitled to subsidiary protection, displaced persons and third-country nationals, people with a migration background, institutions, organizations and multipliers in the areas of integration, social and education. For this purpose, 9 integration centers and mobile advice centers were set up. They are located in Vienna, Upper Austria, Tyrol, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Lower Austria, Vorarlberg and Burgenland and thus cover the whole of Austria with their services. In addition, ÖIF employees also offer integration advice for refugees and immigrants outside of metropolitan areas in the form of mobile advice services.

In 2015 in terms of the integration of displaced Ukrainians, the Federal Minister for Women, Family, Integration and Media (from March 2014 to June 2016 the Directorate General for Women belonged to the Federal Ministry of Education and Women's Affairs. From 1 July 2016 to 7 January 2018 the Directorate General was integrated into the Federal Ministry for Health and Women's Affairs. See: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/en/agenda/women-and-equality/about-division-for-women-and-equality.html>.

It was stated that neighborhood help was to take place on three levels – specifically, it would cover local help, full solidarity with Ukraine and support for displaced persons in Austria. Existing proven integration structures adapted to the new target group and expanded accordingly were used in integration work for displaced persons from Ukraine. Special attention was paid to the fact that the majority of those seeking protection are women with children (Expert Council for Integration, 2022). In addition, the expectation that these displaced persons would have a higher-than-average educational attainment level was taken into account (Expert Council for Integration, 2022b). Relevant numbers and developments were continuously monitored in order to be able to take any necessary measures as and when required (Federal Chancellery, 2022, Sicher. Österreich. Strategie 2025, Vision 2030, 2021)

An expert council for integration has been set up. An independent expert council for integration in the integration department was set up as a competence center and central driver of the integration process. Experienced and recognized personalities from public life ensure a high level of expertise.

The National Action Plan for Integration (NAP.I) is intended to structure the Austria-wide cooperation of all those responsible for successful integration measures and to optimize their implementation. In addition to general integration policy guidelines, NAP.I deals in more detail with challenges, principles and goals in the following fields of action: language and education, work and career, rule of law and values, health and social affairs, intercultural dialogue, sport and leisure as well as housing and the regional dimension of integration. National Action Plan for Integration. Available at: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/integration/nationaler-aktionsplan.html>.

In parallel to the Expert Council for Integration, an Integration Advisory Board was set up in October 2010, which is essentially modeled on the NAP.I steering group. It includes representatives from the federal, state and social partners as well as the association of municipalities and cities, the industrial association and NGOs. In particular, the integration advisory board should include cross-competency networking, coordination and coordination as well as a knowledge transfer of all actors involved with regard to NAP.I implementation and enable advice on the findings of the expert council⁵.

⁵ Source: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/en/agenda/integration/advisory-committee-on-integration.html>. The following institutions are represented on the Integration Advisory Board: Federal Chancellery, Federal Ministry of Labor and Economic Affairs, Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Federal Ministry of Justice, Federal Ministry of Art, Culture and Civil Service and Sport, Federal Ministry for Climate Protection, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology, Federal Ministry of Defense, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Regions and Water Management, Federal Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, Office of the State Government of Burgenland, Office of the State Government of Carinthia, Office the State Government of Lower Austria, Office of the State Government of Upper Austria, Office of the State Government of Salzburg, Office of the State Government of Styria, Office of the State Government of Tyrol, Office of the State Government of Vorarlberg, City of Vienna, Austrian Association of Municipalities, Austrian Association of Cities, Federal Chamber of Labor, Association of Industrialists, Austrian Chamber of Agriculture, Austrian Trade Union Confederation, Austrian

Public opinion on immigration in Austria

Since 2010, the GfK Austria market research institute, on behalf of Statistics Austria and in cooperation with the “Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung of the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften” (Austrian Academy of Sciences), surveys the integration climate based on selected questions. In 2012 and 2015, further questions on the understanding of integration, on responsibility for integration, on integration measures and on trust between people were added to the survey. This additional survey was financed in 2012 by a German foundation and in 2015 using the funds made available for integration monitoring. It seems that these findings can be generalized: The integration climate, which had improved over the years before, experienced a setback in 2015 (Migration und Integration, 2015).

The daily television and print media reports on the so-called “Islamic State” and that group’s criminal actions as well as the murders in the editorial office of Charlie Hebdo two months before the survey doubtlessly influenced people’s opinions. An alleged failure of integration was superficially cited via these media as a reason and partly accepted as a reason by the respondents. People who hear every day that the “Islamic State” is recruiting dissatisfied and socially marginalized first or second-generation migrants, who then, directly or indirectly, take part in the atrocities reported in the media can easily be tempted to generalize and believe that something has not gone well with integration.

As mentioned above, the spectrum of opinions in 2015 fell back to the level of 2012, at least partly due to this generalization of individual cases to the whole. Integration policy has lost ground and trust with the majority population and had to regain. The following point, however, offers some small “consolation”: Despite the setback, the integration climate has improved significantly from a long-term comparative perspective. During the first year of integration monitoring, the assessment of the majority population was markedly more pessimistic than in 2015. In 2010, only 31% believed integration was working “very well” or “rather well,” while in 2015 almost 41% chose these answers. And in 2010 only 12% felt that co-existence was improving, compared to 18% in 2015.

One section of this survey relates to trust within the society. Trust can be regarded as a key factor of successful integration. If there is trust between members of the population with and without a migrant background, it becomes much more difficult to speak of a parallel society or of failed integration. The empirical results prove – and this is pleasing – that this basic trust does exist – in contrast to the widespread idea of collective and mutual mistrust between people with and without a migrant background. Out of the immigrants who took part in this survey, 86% “absolutely” or “somewhat” trust the population without a migrant background. They trust the majority population more in fact than their own group of origin. Trust towards population groups of other background origins is largely similar as far as both members of the population with and without a migrant background are concerned. Members of the population without a migrant background trust Eastern Europeans, Turks and Africans the least and each other and Western Europeans the most. Respondents with a migrant background (originally from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey) are more skeptical concerning all other population groups than the “local population.”

A population survey in Austria as a part of the Migration and Integration 2016 Report (Migration and Integration, 2016) showed a significant connection between xenophobic attitudes and age, education, and social positioning. Anyone who belongs to the age group of 60 and over, earns little, has little schooling, is unemployed, is a housewife or a pensioner and is in real or perceived danger of having to give up social status to the immigrant population, is more susceptible to xenophobia and corresponding enemy images. Young respondents with high qualifications who live in federal states with a long history of migration (particularly Vienna), where living together with immigrant population groups is normal, are less skeptical of foreigners.

In September 2020, 1,000 people aged 16 and over, representative of Austrian society, were asked about the topics of cohesion and social division as part of a survey (ÖIF, 2021). The factors of cohesion subjectively perceived by the population in Austria are diverse; they describe in different ways an ideal state that results from cultural and social similarities. Especially in times of crisis, the concept of “standing together” is of particular importance and is particularly emphasized as a joint “effort” that needs to be overcome. In addition to connecting elements, changes in cohesion, in the development of society and in perception from the perspective of the population are subject to constant change. Controversial topics, on the other hand, lead to the formation of camps and controversies in public discourse: A number of topic areas arose both socially and in the political context that did not generate broad consensus, for example the question of immigration, questions about discrimination against certain population groups or even trust in politics and parties to solve the problems at hand. A key point highlights the subjectively perceived disadvantage of those surveyed: As in other surveys people with a higher education (degree from a university or technical college) or those of advanced age (60 years and over) and those with higher incomes are the least likely to see themselves as disadvantaged. Those who see themselves as disadvantaged trust the state structures and processes to a much lesser extent and also see less reason to enter into a political participation process. Among other things, this also creates the potential for (violent) protest, which one in ten respondents may see as justified.

In April 2023 a report with the title: “Social cohesion and segregation - an inventory of integration and disintegration in Austria” was unveiled (Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt und Segregation – Eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Integration und Desintegration in Österreich” (<https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/service/publikationen-aus-dem-bundeskanzleramt/publikationen-zu-integration/segregationsberichte.html>). The report " offers an inventory and scientific basis for recording disintegration/integration tendencies and segregated milieus in Austria. The publication marks both the implementation of a key step in the government’s program and the start of a process for combating the growth of parallel societies in Austria. It provides a comprehensive academic basis for tackling this highly pertinent issue over the long term. One of the first measures taken was to set preventing extremism and segregation as a new funding priority for integration support. Local authorities and the federal government must work together here.

The Vienna-based Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work (ZARA) released 2022 a report on racism. (Kiyagan A., 2023). At least 1,479 racist incidents were reported across Austria. More than half of racist incidents, 68%, took place on online forums, social media, and video platforms, according to the annual report by the Vienna-based rights group Civil Courage and Anti-Racism Work. A total of 167 racist incidents took place in public, on streets, in traffic areas, or in parks. Muslim families and Black people were among those who faced racist discrimination, insults, or violence. At least 134 people were subject to racist treatment in the service and entertainment sectors, according to the report. ZARA also documented 85 racist incidents in public institutions, as well as 59 cases of

racist violence by the police. The report was based on interviews by victims of racist violence, those who filed complaints, and witnesses of racist incidents.

Literature

- Access to Education. Austria. Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles. May 5, 2023. <https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/austria/reception-conditions/employment-and-education/access-education/>
- Bejenari A. 2023. Educational Challenges in Austria. Bejenari, Available at: <https://brokenchalk.org/educational-challenges-in-austria/>
- BMASK The Austrian Ministry of Social Affairs, Health, Care and Consumer Protection, 2015. Available at: <https://www.sozialministerium.at/en/Ministry/Organisation.html>
- BMAW - Federal Ministry Republic of Austria Labor and Economy (2023). Online Labor Market Information system AMIS. Online database - Labor market information https://www.dnet.at/amis/Datenbank/DB_IndexEN.aspx. <https://www.bmaw.gv.at/en.html>
- Bundesministerium für Inneres, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Available at: https://www.bmi.gv.at/312_EN/60/start.aspx
- BMI, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik; STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Gerichtliche Kriminalstatistik; BMJ, Strafvollzugsstatistik. <https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/files/BroschuereSicherheit2015.pdf>
- BMI, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik; STATISTIK AUSTRIA, Gerichtliche Kriminalstatistik; BMI, Strafvollzugsstatistik. <https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/files/BroschuereSicherheit2015.pdf>
- Boelhouwer J. Kraaykamp G., Stoop I.: (Ed.), 2016. Trust, life satisfaction and opinions on immigration in 15 European countries. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | scp, The Hague.
- Demographisches Jahrbuch 2022, Statistik Austria. (Demographic Yearbook, Statistic Austria) Available at: https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Demographisches-JB-2022_Web_barrierefrei.pdf
- EMN Annual report on migration and asylum in AT 2022 Part 2. Available at: <https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-08/EMN%20Annual%20report%20on%20migration%20and%20asylum%20in%20AT%202022%20Part%202.pdf>
- European Commission. n.d. "Education and Training Monitor 2021. Austria." Op.europa.eu. Accessed September 6, 2023.
- European Migration Network. EMN Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum 2015. A Synthesis of Annual Policy Reports 2015 submitted by EU Member States and Norway Synthesis Report: June 2016.
- Expert Council for Integration. Integration Report 2023. (Report in English.) Available at: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/service/publikationen-aus-dem-bundeskanzleramt/publikationen-zu-integration/integrationsberichte.html>
- Fact Sheet 19. Aktuelles zu Migration und Integration. Österreichischer Integrationsfonds 2015.
- Fact Sheet 33. 2020. Fünf Jahre Flüchtlingskrise. Österreichischer Integrationsfonds. 2020.
- Federal Chancellery, 2022. Sicher. Österreich. Strategie 2025 | Vision 2030. Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abteilung I/5 (Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), 2021. Available at: https://www.bmi.gv.at/107/files/BMI_Ressortstrategie_RZ_WEB_kleiner_V20211221.pdf
- Federal Chancellery, 2022, Sicher. Österreich. Strategie 2025 | Vision 2030. Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abteilung I/5 (Öffentlichkeitsarbeit), 2021. Available at: https://www.bmi.gv.at/107/files/BMI_Ressortstrategie_RZ_WEB_kleiner_V20211221.pdf
- Federal Constitutional Act, Article 14 (5a). Available (also in English) at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/ErV/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.html
- Federal Constitutional Act, Article 14 (5a). Available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/ErV/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.html
- Foreign Nationals Police Act, Fremdenpolizeigesetz FPG, 2014. Available at: <https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/NormDokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20004241&Artikel=&Paragraf=114&Anlage=&Uebergangsrecht=>
- Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt und Segregation. Eine Bestandsaufnahme zu Integration und Desintegration in Österreich. Available at: <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/service/publikationen-aus-dem-bundeskanzleramt/publikationen-zu-integration/segregationsberichte.htm>
- Integration Report 2022. Expertenrat für Integration, 2022.
- Kiyagan A., 2023. Available at: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/more-than-1-400-racist-incidents-reported-in-austria-last-year/2852092>
- Koppenberg S., 2015. Austria – Annual Policy Report 2015.
- Meuleman, Roza & Lubbers, Marcel & Kraaykamp, Gerbert. (2020). Opinions on migration in a European perspective. Trends and differences. 10.4324/9781003077558-3
- Migration & Integration. Zahlen, Daten, Indikatoren. 2015. Erstellt von STATISTIK AUSTRIA und der Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2015.
- Migration & Integration. Zahlen. Daten. Indikatoren. 2021. Statistical Yearbook 2021.



Migration & Integration. Numbers. Data. Indicators 2022. Statistical Yearbook., 2022. Created by Statistics Austria, Vienna 2022.

Migration und Integration Zahlen. Daten. Indikatoren. 2015. Erstellt von Statistik, Kommission für Migrations- und Integrationsforschung der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, GfK Wien, 2015

Migration & Integration 2016. Numbers. Data. Indicators. Statistics Austria and Commission for Migration and Integration Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna 2016.

Nationaler Aktionsplan für Integration. Available at:

file:///C:/Users/claud/Downloads/bericht_zum_nationalen_aktionsplan.pdf

Newsletter October 2023, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Country Office Austria.

OECD Migration Outlook 2013. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2013_migr_outlook-2013-en, <https://doi.org/10.1787/1999124x>.

ÖIF-Forschungsbericht. Zusammenhalt und Spaltung. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Umfrage zum gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt und Spaltungphänomenen in Österreich. Available at:

https://www.integrationsfonds.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschungsbericht_Zusammenhalt_Spaltung_Ansicht.pdf

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik; Statistik Austria, 2015.

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2022. Die Entwicklung der Kriminalität in Österreich, Bundesministerium für Inneres. Bundeskriminalamt, Wien, 2023. Available at:

https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/files/2023/PKS_Broschuere_2022.pdf

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik; Statistik Austria, Gerichtliche Kriminalstatistik; BMJ, Strafvollzugsstatistik. Federal Ministry of Justice, Available at: <https://www.bmj.gv.at/public.html>

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik; Statistik Austria, Gerichtliche Kriminalstatistik; BMJ, Strafvollzugsstatistik. Federal Ministry of Justice, Available at: <https://www.bmj.gv.at/public.html>

Security Austria 2015, Federal Criminal Police Office: Available at: <https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/>

Sicher. Österreich. Strategie 2025, Vision 2030. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2021. Available at:

https://www.bmi.gv.at/107/files/BMI_Ressortstrategie_RZ_WEB_kleiner_V20211221.pdf

Sicherheit Österreich, 2015. Bundeskriminalamt, 2015. Available at:

<https://bundeskriminalamt.at/501/files/BroschuereSicherheit2015.pdf>

Statistik Austria, Volkszählungen (censuses) 1869 to 2001, register counting (Registerzählung) 2011 and 2021.

Statistik Austria, Statistik des Bevölkerungsstandes, Demographisches Jahrbuch der Statistik Austria 2022. Population statistics, Demographic Yearbook of Statistics Austria. Online available at:

https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Demographisches-JB-2022_Web_barrierefrei.pdf

Statistik Austria. Wanderungsstatistik, 2023. Available at:

<https://www.statistik.at/statistiken/bevoelkerung-und-soziales/bevoelkerung/migration-und-einbuengerung/wanderungen-mit-dem-ausland>.

Statistik Austria, Statistik des Bevölkerungsstandes, Demographisches Jahrbuch der Statistik Austria 2022. Population statistics, Demographic Yearbook of Statistics Austria. Online available at:

https://www.statistik.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Demographisches-JB-2022_Web_barrierefrei.pdf

Statistik des Bevölkerungsstandes, Demographisches Jahrbuch der Statistik Austria 2022. Population statistics, Demographic Yearbook of Statistics Austria, 2023.

Statistik Austria, Volkszählungen (censuses) 1869 to 2001, register counting (Registerzählung) 2011 and 2021.

Statistical Yearbook. Numbers. Data. Indicators, 2022.

Stiller, M., 2023. Austria – Annual Report on Migration and Asylum 2022. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Vienna. Available at:

<https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-08/EMN%20Annual%20report%20on%20migration%20and%20asylum%20in%20AT%202022%20Part%202.pdf>

Trust, Life Satisfaction and Opinions on Immigration in 15 European Countries. Imprint Netherlands Institute for Social Research, DOI:10.4324/9781003077558-3, Available at:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/344088478_Opinions_on_migration_in_a_European_perspective_Trends_and_differences

Vienna Forum on Countering Segregation and Extremism in the Context of Integration.

<https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/integration/vienna-forum-on-countering-segregation-and-extremism-in-the-context-of-integration.html>

Yearbook. Numbers. Data. Indicators. Migration and Integration. 2023) Asylkoordination Österreich. 2023. “Access to Education. Austria.” Asylum Information Database | European Council on Refugees and Exiles. May 5, 2023.

<https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/austria/reception-conditions/employment-and-education/access-education/>

6.2. Immigration perceptions and political trust in France⁶

This country report provides a concise overview of the topics of trust and migration in France. It presents factual data on immigration in the country and summarizes the key research outputs, while also highlighting the pivotal axes of the public debate, namely integration policies, xenophobia, and public trust regarding the immigration issue.

Factual data on immigration in France

France has a long history of immigration, attracting individuals from various parts of the world.

Demographic composition

In 2022, according to data from the national census (INSEE, 2023a), France has 7 million people born abroad and living on the national territory (10.3% of the national population). Among them, 1.7 million are French citizens born abroad, and 2.5 million are immigrants who have acquired French citizenship. Put differently, France is home to 4.5 million foreign nationals, and overall, there are 5.3 million foreigners, including those born in France with foreign nationality. The number of foreigners in the population is significantly higher than in 1999 (5.5%), but only slightly higher than in 1982 (6.8%). What is more, it remains modest when compared to other EU countries. With 7.7% of foreigners, France ranks 17th in the EU, far behind Austria (17.1%), Estonia (15.1%), Latvia (13.3%), Ireland (13%), Belgium (12.8%), Germany (12.7%), Spain (11.3%), Denmark (9.2%), or Italy (8.7%) (Pech, 2023). The immigrant population in France is a very diverse mix of nationalities, cultures, and religions. The country has a substantial number of second-generation immigrants, born to foreign-born parents. They often face unique challenges related to identity, integration, and social cohesion.

Inflows and outflows

Admittedly, these figures are likely to conceal recent massive inflows. As it turns out, entries into the territory in recent years have reached significantly higher volumes than what was observed in the late 2000s (INSEE, 2023b). Yet, they do not result from a greater openness of national borders. Even though national regulations comply with international conventions that organize a right-based immigration (family reunification, asylum rights...), France has restricted its reception conditions over the past decade and considerably complicated the pathways for regular access to its territory, like most EU member states (Pech, 2023). The largest share of immigrants originates from Africa, particularly from countries such as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. France also receives a significant number of asylum seekers and refugees. In 2022, the country recorded over 131,000 asylum applications, which places France among the top 3 European countries in terms of asylum requests (OFPRA, 2023).

Inflows and outflows in a comparative perspective

The increasing flows observed over the past decade are primarily linked to exogenous shocks resulting from several recent geopolitical crises (such as the wars in Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Ukraine, etc.). France has 4,176 kilometers of land borders with 11 neighbor countries, hence a large geographical exposure. However, when compared to its European neighbors, recent immigration figures in France appear consistently lower than those of the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Italy. This suggests that France has played a smaller role in the large

⁶ This country report was produced by Frédéric Gonthier, Maël Mesplou and Prunelle Aymé, Sciences Po Grenoble, University of Grenoble Alpes, Pacte-CNRS, France.

migratory movements sparked by various recent geopolitical crises and may well have lost its relative attractiveness in terms of migration.

Public debate in France

Research in France has extensively examined various aspects of immigration, thus shedding light on several central axes of the public debate. The following areas have garnered significant attention.

Integration policies

Integration policies and practices have been a focal point of research and public discourse in France. Scholars have analyzed the effectiveness of integration measures and their impact on immigrants' social, economic, and cultural integration. The debates often revolve around issues such as education issues and language acquisition (Bechichi et al., 2016), diversity in unions (Lê et al., 2022), unequal employment opportunities and access to social services (Lê and Okba, 2018). All in all, national statistics indicate that the majority of immigrant populations integrate into French society in the long run, even though they may occasionally still display significant differences from 'native' French individuals, primarily because of the discrimination they face (Héran, 2017).

It is worth noting that the issue of whether foreign immigrants contribute to the national economy or represent a burden for the welfare state ignited controversy during the last presidential campaign when Eric Zemmour, one of the candidates from the populist radical right, proposed abolishing social benefits for non-European foreigners (for an overview, see Geisser, 2022). He was planning on an annual savings of €20 billion (0.6% of GDP). This estimate was challenged by a liberal (i.e., close to business circles) think tank, the Montaigne Institute, which assessed the savings in public expenditure at €6.7 billion (0.2% of GDP) (Pech, 2023). By contrast, according to the OECD (2021), immigration would rather generate a surplus equating 1.02% of GDP in France, which is approximately €30 billion, the same as in most OECD countries.

The management of refugees and asylum seekers has also been a prominent topic, with scholars investigating legal frameworks, reception conditions, and integration prospects for refugees, and pundits rather addressing the balance between humanitarian obligations, national security concerns, and the social and economic impact of refugee flows. External shocks are known to fuel a climate of fear and suspicion, leading to decreased trust in political authorities' ability to address security concerns effectively. Some studies provide evidence of the impact of terrorist attacks on the rise of xenophobic sentiments in public opinion. Ferrin et al. (2020) demonstrate, in particular, that the Paris attacks had a significant and negative effect on attitudes towards immigrants in the 28 EU member states (see, also, Geisser, 2020; Vasilopoulos, Marcus, and Foucault 2018).

Xenophobia and discrimination

Xenophobia, discrimination, and social exclusion have been persistent concerns in France. Scholars examine the underlying factors contributing to these issues. National official statistics extensively document the influence of origins on living conditions and social trajectories, in combination with other sociodemographic characteristics, thus also addressing discriminatory practices in housing, employment, public services etc. (see, among many, Brinbaum et al., 2015; Beauchemin et al., 2022; Lê et al., 2022; Safi, 2006).

The relationship between xenophobia and discrimination on the one hand, and political trust on the other hand, has been less systematically investigated. Still, based on the 13th wave of the Barometer of Political Trust, there is a significant hardening of positions on immigration and Islam. Two-

thirds of the French claim that there are too many immigrants in France –14-point increase from the late 2000s. At the same time, 61% believe that Islam poses a threat to the Republic, and only one in two French citizens thinks that immigration is a source of cultural enrichment. These attitudes are part of a broader ‘cultural backlash’ (Ivaldi, 2022): Three-quarters of the French believe that ‘France has lost its moral compass’, while 68% argue that France needs a ‘strong dose of order and authority’ and 39% think that it would be better to have a strong leader governing the country without having to be concerned about parliament or voters. These figures suggest that xenophobia fuels political discontent and support for authoritarian alternatives. They should not, however, be exaggerated as other surveys point to the steady increase in moral tolerance and to a stable support for democratic values in France (CNCDH, 2023), especially among the younger generations (Tiberj, 2017).

Trust and attitudes towards migrants

In France as in many other European countries, scholars have set out to make sense of the factors influencing trust perceptions and their impact on immigration, including media representation and political discourse. The way mainstream media and political parties frame immigration plays a significant role in public trust in institutions (Joannon et al., 2022). Research indicates that negative representations of immigrants or biased reporting can contribute to the erosion of trust in both political and social institutions. Typically, the French think that Muslims represent one third of the population, whereas they are currently around one tenth (Ipsos, 2016). Another interesting mismatch is the one between perceptions of social norms and attitudes toward multiculturalism: while the French are rather supportive of multiculturalism when asked individually, they believe that the mass public are opposed to it (Guimond et al, 2015).

Such discrepancies are key since objective indicators usually have little explanatory power compared to perceptions of immigrant inflows. Fetzer (2000) argues that individual economic indicators do not predict immigration attitudes in France. By contrast, opposition to immigration usually rises with their misperceptions about the number of immigrants in a country. This distorted view mirrors the negative framing of the Muslim population. Populist radical right’ rhetoric and media narratives that emphasize negative aspects of immigration foster skepticism and reduce trust in political authorities (Ivaldi, 2021; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2020).

In turn, political trust shapes attitudes towards immigrants in such a way that those with lower levels of trust in national institutions are more concerned with the immigrants and of the threats they might pose (Danaj et al, 2018). Research also suggests that social trust declines in communities experiencing higher levels of ethnic diversity, particularly when there is a perceived lack of shared values or social cohesion. At the macrolevel, ethnic diversity has, indeed, been found to reduce political trust in France (Koopmans and Schaeffer 2016). However, other studies indicate that diversity can result in more positive intergroup interactions and increase social trust in certain contexts. Diversity itself is not a determining factor; instead, factors such as socioeconomic disparities and integration policies play a more significant role in shaping social trust. Forsé and Parodi (2020) show that interpersonal trust increases along with social protection: High social protection comes with higher interpersonal trust as people are more welcoming and less likely to suspect the immigrants to be ‘welfare magnets’.

From the other side of the equation, the French with an immigrant background do not substantially differ from their ‘native’ counterparts when it comes to social and political attitudes (Tiberj, 2019; Tiberj and Simon, 2012). In particular, for those French originating from Africa and Turkey, ethnicity does not have a significant impact on political attitudes. Religiosity does not influence

their attitudes towards secularism. And belonging to the lowest socio-economic subgroups has a minor effect on political behaviors among French people of African and Turkish immigrant backgrounds than in the rest of the French population (Brouard and Tiberj, 2005). Similarly, trust in the courts, in the social security system, in the educational system and in public service at large is no lower among the descendants of immigrants than in the majority population, thus contrasting with the notion that children of African, Maghrebi, and Turkish immigrants would develop a significant distrust in political institutions (Geisser, 2010). The assumption of a lower political engagement among descendants of migrants has also been challenged. For some, neither religion nor ethnicity significantly influence turnout or voter registration. Still, religion and ethnicity bear shape political ideology, with young descendants of migrants exhibiting a strong preference for (radical) left parties (Jardin, 2013). For others, French citizens of Maghrebi immigrant background living in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to vote frequently than those residing in middle-class neighborhoods. Thus, the influence of ethnicity on turnout is strongly mediated by social status, as well as social context and media environment specific to certain elections (Audemard and Gouard, 2015).

In sum, France's immigration landscape is complex and multi-faceted. The country receives significant inflows of immigrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, and faces challenges related to integration policies, xenophobia, and public trust. Research has contributed valuable insights into these topics, emphasizing the importance of effective integration measures, combating discrimination, and fostering social cohesion. By understanding the central axes of the debate, policymakers can work towards informed decision-making and fostering a more inclusive society that respects and embraces diversity. In particular, research findings highlight the complex and nuanced relationship between immigration and political trust or social trust in France, as factors such as political discourse, media representation and intergroup dynamics, play a crucial role in shaping trust levels. Understanding these dynamics can guide policymakers in developing evidence-based strategies to promote trust, social cohesion, and inclusive integration policies.

References

- Audemard, J., et D. Gouard (2015), « La participation électorale au prisme de la variable ethnique. Premiers résultats et perspectives de recherche », *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, 22, 1, pp. 83-114. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ripc.221.0083>
- Beauchemin, C., Ichou, M., Simon, P. et al. (2022), [Familles immigrées : le niveau d'éducation progresse sur trois générations mais les inégalités sociales persistent](#), *Population et Sociétés*, n°602.
- Brinbaum Y., Meurs D., Primon J.-L., (2015), « Situation sur le marché du travail : statuts d'activité, accès à l'emploi et discrimination », in Beauchemin C., Hamel C., Simon P. (eds), *Trajectoires et Origines – Enquête sur la diversité des populations*, Ined. <https://books.openedition.org/ined/856?lang=fr>
- Bechichi N., Bouvier G., Brinbaum Y., Lê J., « Maîtrise de la langue et emploi des immigrés : quels liens ? », in Insee Références, *Emploi, chômage, revenus du travail*, 2016. <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2122739?sommaire=2122750>
- Brouard, S., Tiberj, V. (2005), *Français comme les autres ? Enquête sur les citoyens d'origine maghrébine, africaine et turque*, Paris, Presses de Sciences po. <http://www.pressesdesciencespo.fr/fr/book/?GCOI=27246100034710>
- Commission National Consultative des Droits de l'Homme (2022) *Rapport 2022 Sur La Lutte Contre Le Racisme, l'antisémitisme et La Xénophobie*. Paris: CNCDH. <https://www.cncdh.fr/publications/rapport-2022-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-lantisemitisme-et-la-xenophobie>
- Danaj, A., Kornélia Lazányi, K., Yuriy Bilan, Y. (2018). Perceptions and Implications of Immigration in France – Economic, Social, Political and Cultural Perspectives. *Economics and Sociology*, 11(3), 226-247. https://www.economics-sociology.eu/?609_en_perceptions-and-implications-of-immigration-in-france-%E2%80%93-economic-social-political-and-cultural-perspectives
- Ferrin, Mónica, Moreno Mancosu, and Teresa M. Cappiali. 2020. "Terrorist Attacks and Europeans' Attitudes towards Immigrants: An Experimental Approach." *European Journal of Political Research* 59 (3): 491–516. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12362>
- Fetzer, Joel S. 2000. *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany*. Cambridge University Press. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/public-attitudes-toward-immigration-in-the-united-states-france-and-germany-by-joel-s-fetzer-cambridge-cambridge-university-press-2000-272p-5495-cloth-1995-paper/28E2C8563646331D2629908DF3E9D9C5>



- Forsé, M., & Parodi, M. (2020). Redistribution et immigration en Europe. Y a-t-il un dilemme ? *Revue de l'OFCE*, 169(5), 133-160. <https://doi.org/10.3917/reof.169.0133>
- Geisser V. (2010), « Les descendants d'immigrés : des « citoyens anormalement normaux », *Migrations Société*, 6-132, 3-12 <https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.132.0003>
- Geisser, V., (2020), « Immigration et terrorisme : « corrélation magique » et instrumentalisation politique », *Migrations Société*, 182, 4, pp. 3-13. <https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.182.0003>
- Geisser V. (2022), Le « quadriptyque » électoral de la peur : immigration, islam, insécurité et identité nationale au programme de l'élection présidentielle, *Migrations Société*, 1-187, 3-18, <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.471.0003>
- Gorodzeisky, Anastasia, and Moshe Semyonov. 2020. "Perceptions and Misperceptions: Actual Size, Perceived Size and Opposition to Immigration in European Societies." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (3): 612–30. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1550158>.
- Guimond, S., Streith, M., & Roebroek, E. (2015). "Les représentations du multiculturalisme en France : Décalage singulier entre l'individuel et le collectif". *Social Science Information*, 54, 1, pp. 52–77. DOI: [10.1177/0539018414554826](https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018414554826)
- Héran, F. (2017), *Avec l'immigration. Mesure, débattre, agir*, Paris, La Découverte, ISBN : 9782707190246. <https://www.editions-ladecouverte.fr/avec-l-immigration-9782707190246>
- INSEE (2023a), L'essentiel sur... les immigrés et les étrangers, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3633212>
- INSEE (2023b), Flux migratoires : un nombre d'entrées en France encore en retrait en 2021 par rapport à 2019, Insee Première, 1945, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/7454727>
- Ipsos (2016), Perils of Perception, <https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/perceptions-are-not-reality-what-world-gets-wrong>
- Ivaldi, G. (2021). Que reste-t-il de la « crise migratoire » de 2015 ? Attitudes à l'égard de l'immigration et confiance dans l'union européenne dans les enquêtes European Values Studies. *Revue européenne des sciences sociales*, 59-2(2), 141-173. <https://doi.org/10.4000/ress.7848>
- Ivaldi, G. (2022), French-style cultural backlash? The far right and cultural backlash in the 2022 presidential election, *Revue française de science politique* 72,4.
- Jardin, A. (2013), « Les jeunes français issus de l'immigration sont-ils dépolitisés ? », *Migrations Société*, 147-148, 3-4, pp. 175-188. <https://doi.org/10.3917/migra.147.0175>
- Joannon B., A. Lenoël, H. Thiollet, P. Emel Yavuz (2022), "Les migrations dans l'œil des médias : infox, influence et opinion ». Institut Convergences Migrations. De Facto, 30, 46 p. <https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03556931>
- Koopmans, Ruud, and Merlin Schaeffer. 2016. "Statistical and Perceived Diversity and Their Impacts on Neighborhood Social Cohesion in Germany, France and the Netherlands." *Social Indicators Research* 125 (3): 853–83. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-015-0863-3>
- Lê, J., Okba, M. (2018), L'insertion des immigrés, de l'arrivée en France au premier emploi, Insee Première 1717, <https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/3640742>
- Lê, J., Simon P. and Coulmont, B. (2022), [La diversité des origines et la mixité des unions progressent au fil des générations](#), *Insee Première*, n°1910.
- Lê, J., Rouhban, O., Tanneau, P., Beauchemin, C., Ichou, M. and Simon P. (2022), [En dix ans, le sentiment de discrimination augmente, porté par les femmes et le motif sexiste](#), *Insee Première*, n°1911.
- OCDE (2021), *Perspectives des migrations internationales 2021*, Éditions OCDE, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/da2bbd99-fr>.
- OFPPA (2023), Premières données de l'asile 2022, <https://www.ofppa.gouv.fr/actualites/les-premieres-donnees-de-lasile-2022-a-lofpra-sont-disponibles-chiffres-provisoires>
- Pech T., « L'immigration menace-t-elle l'Etat providence ? », *La Grande Conversation*, Août 2023, <https://www.lagrandeconversation.com/politique/limmigration-menace-t-elle-letat-providence/>
- Safi M. (2006), « Le processus d'intégration des immigrés en France : inégalités et segmentation », *Revue française de sociologie*, 47 (1), <https://doi.org/10.3917/rfs.471.0003>
- Tiberj V (2017) *Les citoyens qui viennent*. Paris: PUF. https://www.puf.com/content/Les_citoyens_qui_viennent
- Tiberj, V., (2019) « Diversité des origines, diversité des valeurs ». In P. Bréchon, F. Gonthier, S. Astor (dir.). *La France des valeurs : quarante ans d'évolutions*, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, pp.48-53. <https://www.pug.fr/produit/1663/9782706142659/la-france-des-valeurs>
- Tiberj, V., P. Simon, (2012), *La fabrique du citoyen. Origines et rapport au politique en France*, Paris : INED. <https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/editions/document-travail/fabrique-citoyen-origines-rapport-politique-france/>
- Vasilopoulos, Pavlos, George E. Marcus, and Martial Foucault. 2018. "Emotional Responses to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks: Addressing the Authoritarianism Puzzle." *Political Psychology* 39 (3): 557–75. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12439>.

6.3. Public opinion and policy responses to immigration in Greece⁷

Policy response to immigration

Greece since the end of the 19th century and until the 1970s could be characterized as a country of emigration. It was the end of the Cold War in 1989/1990 that triggered the mass entry of immigrants, initially from the Balkans (and particularly from Albania), Central and East Europe. In the 2000s, immigrants also originated from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, while during the 2015–2016 period approximately 1.2 million individuals transited through the country towards other European countries. Greek state's initial policy responses towards immigration were retarded and short-sighted since the migration phenomenon had been regarded as temporary and rather unfortunate (Cavounidis, 2002). It almost took a decade for the Greek state to commence drafting and implementing a coherent immigration policy. Even the notion of immigrant integration made its appearance as a concept and a goal in the relevant legislation and proposed Action Plans in the early 2000s (Tramountanis, 2022).

Scholars who have studied the immigration phenomenon in Greece suggest a chronology that is divided into four distinct periods. The decade 1991–2000 that could be characterized as an 'early' phase for the development of the Greek immigration policy, during which strict control measures and a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon were adopted. During the following period (2001–2008) the first comprehensive laws attempting to regulate immigration in the country were presented while a more positive attitude towards the phenomenon was also recorded (Triantafyllidou, 2010). The period 2008–2015 was characterized by the economic crisis that severely affected the country. More importantly, this period was defined by the dis-integration of immigrants, as a direct consequence of the economic crisis. Finally, the present period which starts in mid-2016 is characterized by the primacy of the refugee issue (Mavrommatis, 2017; Tramountanis, 2022).

Greece was completely unprepared for the migration flows of the early 1990s. The relevant legal framework in place at the time dated back to the 1930s (Law 4310/1929 '*On the settlement and movement of foreigners in Greece, police control, passports, expulsions and displaced persons*'). The first law was presented in 1991 (Law 1975/1991 '*Entry, exit, stay, employment, expulsion of aliens, determination of refugee status and other provisions.*') and fully adopted a repressive approach towards the new phenomenon. The (then) Ministry of Public Order was designated as the competent Ministry, while the law primarily focused on deterring new immigrants from entering, and facilitating the deportation of those who were already in the country (Triantafyllidou, 2009). It is estimated that during the 1990s over 2 million immigrants (predominantly from Albania) were deported back to their country without any legal procedure (Baldwin-Edwards, 2004). During this first decade there were no provisions in place regarding the integration of immigrants in Greece. On the contrary, the emphasis on preventing the entry of undocumented immigrants and facilitating the deportation of those already present in the country, defined immigration in terms of illegality and created a vulnerable labor force to be exploited mainly in the "shadow" economy (Kapsalis, et al., 2020).

In the new century Law 2910/2001 ('*Entry and stay of aliens in Greek territory. Acquisition of Greek citizenship by naturalization and other provisions*') had two main aims. It provided a policy framework to manage immigration, by establishing avenues of legal entry for employment or

⁷ This country report was produced by Kostas Kanellopoulos, University of Peloponnese, Greece.

studies and defining naturalization conditions for immigrants already residing in the country. Additionally, a first Action Plan on the social integration of immigrants (2002–2005) was drafted, supported by EU funds. Measures were foreseen for the integration of immigrants in the labor market, access to healthcare, and initiatives to combat racism and xenophobia in the Greek society, even though most of these actions were not implemented (Triandafyllidou, 2005). In 2005 the Law 3386/2005 (*‘Entry, residence and social integration of third country nationals on Greek territory’*) mentions integration for the first time but in reality, few of its provisions were implemented (Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014).

The deep financial crisis that hit Greece in 2010 also had significant effects on the integration process of immigrant populations. While until 2009 the unemployment of immigrants was significantly lower than that of the domestic population, this relationship has completely reversed. Therefore, while in 2008 the Greeks’ unemployment rate was 7.9% and foreigners’ unemployment rate residing in the country was 6.8%, the corresponding percentages during the peak of crisis in 2013 were 26.5% and 38.2% (Eurostat, 2020). The impossibility of finding work in a population that had come to Greece precisely for this reason led to a mass exodus of immigrants from the country. An estimated 250,000 migrants left the country between 2010-2015 (Hellenic Statistical Authority, 2019). State policies for the integration of immigrants in the same period are characterized by great contradictions. In 2010 the Local Government Reform Act created Migrant Integration Councils and attached them to each municipality. In addition, Law 3838/2010 (Current provisions related to Greek nationality and the political participation of expatriates and legally residing immigrants) attempted to renegotiate issues related to the granting of Greek citizenship and the rights to vote and be elected to the immigrant population. However, its positive provisions specifically for the granting of political rights to the children of immigrants were canceled in 2013 by the Council of State that found them to be unconstitutional. Also in 2013, a new National Strategy for the Integration of Third Country Citizens was introduced which rejected multiculturalism as anachronistic and aimed at the assimilation of immigrants (Skamnakis & Polyzoidis, 2013; Anagnostou & Kandyla, 2014). Several scholars characterize the period 2008-2015 as a period of disintegration rather than integration of immigrants in Greece (Tramountanis, 2022).

The period from 2016 until today mainly revolves around the management of the refugee issue. In 2015-2016 approximately 1.2 million immigrants arrived in Greece mainly from the Middle East. The increasing complexity of managing the phenomenon led to the creation of an autonomous Ministry of Migration Policy that was established in November 2016 (Afouxenidis et al. 2017; Skleparis 2017). A new Strategy in January 2019 proposed a new model of integration, which among others ‘aims to create and sustain an open society that respects diversity’ and has as its ultimate goal the ‘conquest’ of interculturalism (Mantanika & Arapoglou, 2022). Accordingly, Law 4636/2019 (On International Protection and other provisions) provides that ‘beneficiaries of international protection are allowed to engage in employment or independent professional activity’ with the same conditions as the nationals, with only the prerequisite of having the relevant residence permits and also provided beneficiaries of international protection access to medical care on the same conditions that apply to Greek citizens (Dimitriadi, 2022). However, a new government was elected in 2019 that has a different political orientation. The then new government decided in July 2019 was to merge the Ministry of Migration Policy with the Ministry of Citizen Protection. Only 6 months since its abolition, it was decided to re-institute the Ministry of Migration Policy, and rename it ‘Ministry of Migration and Asylum’. The new policy was based on four pillars:

border controls, acceleration of asylum procedures, increased returns and closed pre-departure centers (Petsas, 2020) marking a policy reorientation prioritizing containment and deterrence.

The most recent policy response to immigration is Law 5038 (2023) (*‘Immigration Code’*) that was implemented in March of 2023 after a brief consultation period. The purpose of the new extensive law is primarily the reform of the current institutional framework for matters of entry and residence of citizens of third country nationals in Greece. The law incorporates Directive (EU) 2021/1883/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2021 regarding the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly skilled employment, and the repeal of Council Directive 2009/50/EC (L 382). However, as critics and stakeholders note the new Immigration Code pays little service to integration. Instead, it focuses almost exclusively in consolidating the model of temporary and seasonal work in several sectors of the economy. Also, this law concentrates in structuring foreign workers of limited duration. In terms of civic, social and work rights the new law includes relevant provisions, although those who are already in the country are ignored. The latter, thus continue to live and work in unsafe conditions, reside in inappropriate accommodation, while regulatory mechanisms are ineffective or inactive (Markou 2023).

Public perceptions and past research on immigrants

In line to the state policies of the first periods that considered the influx of immigrants to Greece as a transitory phenomenon, several surveys have shown that the public opinion also did not evaluate immigration as a matter of high priority. The proportion of the population considering immigration a top-two concern reached a peak of 20% only in 2015, but this was still much lower than peaks at that time of 39–76% in many other Southern, Western and Northern European countries. Salience did rise to an unprecedented 47% in 2019, well above other European countries at the time, following an escalation of tensions in Greek-Turkish relations and Turkish president’s threat to ‘open the gates’ for refugees to enter Europe. However soon afterwards salience dropped again and in the Eurobarometer survey of 2022 immigration ranked as the seventh most important issue, at 9%. As Baily & Lowe (2023: 12) note “the lack of salience of immigration over time does not, however, reflect high acceptance of immigrants among the Greek population. On the contrary, while Eurobarometer data from 1989 suggests that Greek attitudes towards foreigners were among the most tolerant in Europe in the late 1980s, attitudes became consistently and strikingly negative shortly afterwards as the number of immigrants increased” (see also Kiprianos, et al., 2003).

The negative opinions of the natives have to do, as in other EU countries, with the fear of increasing unemployment, law and order issues and the threat to cultural identity. European Social Survey has similarly shown that negative attitudes towards immigrants have continuously far exceeded positive attitudes – at much higher rates than many other countries in Europe. In 2015 with the refugee crisis there was a counter trend of solidarity towards refugees (Cinalli, et al., 2021; Paschou, et al., 2022; Tramontanas, et al., 2022) but the dominant trend remained negative (Galaxites, et al., 2018; Calogerakis, 2019; Triantafyllidou, 2020).

References

- Afouxenidis, A., Petrou, M., Kandyli, G., Tramountanis, A., & Giannaki, D. (2017). Dealing with a humanitarian crisis: Refugees on the eastern EU border of the island of Lesbos. *Journal of Applied Security Research*, 12(1), 7–39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19361610.2017.1228023>
- Anagnostou, D., & Kandyli, A. (2014). *Review of existing monitoring mechanisms for the integration of migrants in Greece* (ASSESS project on the integration of vulnerable migrants). ELIAMEP. https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/greece-review-existing-monitoring-mechanisms-integration-migrants_de
- Bailey-Morley, A. and Lowe, C. (2023) *Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: Greece country profile*. London: ODI (<https://odi.org/en/publications/public-narratives-and-attitudes-towards-refugees-and-other-migrants-greece-country-profile>).
- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2004). Albanian emigration and the Greek labour market: Economic symbiosis and social ambiguity. *Southeast Europe Review*, 7(1), 51–65. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43293028>
- Bosilkov, I., & Drakaki, D. (2018). ‘Victims or intruders? Framing the migrant crisis in Greece and Macedonia’ *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, 12(1), 26–169. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/329216190_Victims_or_Intruders_Framing_the_Migrant_Crisis_in_Greece_and_Macedonia
- Bousiou, A. (2020). From humanitarian crisis management to prison island: Implementing the European asylum regime at the border island of Lesbos 2015–2017. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 22(3), 431–447. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19448953.2020.1752560>
- Cavounidis, J. (2002). Migration in Southern Europe and the case of Greece. *International Migration*, 40(1), 45–70. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2435.00185>
- Cinalli, M., Trenz, H-J., Brändle, V., Eisele, O., & Lahusen, C. (2021) *Solidarity in the media and public contention over refugees in Europe*. London and New York: Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-monograph/10.4324/9780367817169/solidarity-media-public-contention-refugees-europe-manlio-cinalli-christian-lahusen-hans-j%C3%B6rg-trenz-olga-eisele-verena-br%C3%A4ndle?_gl=1*esh8q8*_ga*MjA0MTkzNzkwMy4xNjk4NjExMzk3*_ga_0HYE8YG0M6*MTY5OTY4NjU5OC4yLjEuMTY5OTY4ODU0NC4wLjAuMA
- Dimitriadi, A. (2022). Governing migrant (im)mobility in Greece after the EU-Turkey statement. In M. Kousis, A. Chatzidakis, & K. Kafetsios (Eds.), *Challenging mobilities in and to the EU during times of crises: The case of Greece* (221–239). IMISCOE Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5_11
- Dixon, T., Hawkins, S., Juan-Torres, M., & Kimaram, A. (2019). Attitudes towards national identity, immigration, and refugees in Greece. More in Common, May. https://www.moreincommon.com/media/ltinlnc/0535-more-in-common-greece-report_final-4_web_lr.pdf
- European Commission (2022a) Standard Eurobarometer 97 – Summer 2022. (<https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2693>).
- European Commission (2022b). ‘Special Eurobarometer: integration of immigrants in the European Union’. 20 June. (https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union_en).
- Eurostat. (2020). Unemployment rates [lfsa_urgan]. https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_urgan&lang=en
- Galarotis, I. Georgiadou, V., Kafe, A., & Lialiouti, Z. (2018). Xenophobic manifestations, otherness and violence in Greece 1996–2016: evidence from an event analysis of media collections. Working Paper, EUI MWP, 2017/08. https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/46565/MWP_2017_08.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
- Hellenic Statistical Authority (2019). Estimated population (1.1.2019) and migration flows (2018) [Press Release] <https://bit.ly/3foehmh>
- Kalogeraki, S. (2019). Opposition to Syrian refugees and immigrants during the refugee crisis in Greece. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 37(2), 361–395.
- Kapsalis, A., Floros, K., & Jørgensen, M. B. (2020). Migrants’ Entrapment in a ‘State of Expectancy’: Patterns of immobility for agricultural workers in Manolada, Greece. In *Coercive Geographies* (pp. 20–41). Brill. <https://brill.com/display/book/9789004443204/BP000002.xml>



- Kiprianos, P., Balias, S., & Passas, V. (2003). 'reek policy towards immigration and immigrants. *Social Policy and Administration*, 37(2), 148-164. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9515.00331>
- Law 5038 (2023). Immigration Code. *Government Gazette of the Greek Republic*, First Issue, No 81, 1st April, 4103-4218 (in Greek). <https://collab.lawspot.gr/sites/default/files/mashup/feka/2023/fek-81-2023.pdf>
- Mantanika, R., & Arapoglou, V. (2022). The making of reception as a system. The governance of migrant mobility and transformations of statecraft in Greece since the early 2000s. In M. Kousis, A. Chatzidaki, & K. Kafetsios (Eds.), *Challenging mobilities in and to the EU during times of crises: The case of Greece* (201–220). IMISCOE, Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5_10
- Markou, E. (2023). The new immigration code. SyntagmaWatch.gr, 28 March (in Greek). <https://www.syntagmawatch.gr/trending-issues/o-neos-kwdikas-metanasteysis/>
- Mavrommatis, G. (2017). The rise of a hesitant EU host? Examining the Greek migrant integration policy and its transformation during the crisis. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 17(1), 1–15. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309146600_The_rise_of_a_hesitant_EU_host_Examining_the_Greek_migrant_integration_policy_and_its_transformation_during_the_crisis
- Papageorgiou, I. (2013). The Europeanization of immigration and asylum in Greece (1990- 2012). *International Journal of Sociology*, 43(3): 72-90. <https://doi.org/10.2753/IJS0020-7659430304>
- Paschou, M., Loukakis, A., & Kousis, M. (2022). Political claims and the so called 'refugee crisis' in the Greek public sphere, 2015–16. In M. Kousis, A. Chatzidaki, and K. Kafetsios (Eds), *Challenging mobilities in and to the EU during times of crises: the case of Greece* (139–162). IMISCOE, Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5_7
- Petsas, S. (2020). Statement by the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Stelios Petsas on the establishment of Ministry of Migration and Asylum) January 15. (in Greek). <https://government.gov.gr/dilosi-ifipourgou-para-to-prothipourgo-ke-kivernitikou-ekprosopou-steliou-petsa/>
- Skamnakis, C., & Polyzoidis, P. (2013). Migrant integration councils: The incomplete functioning of an important institution for the local government. *Social Cohesion and Development*, 8(2), 165–176 (in Greek).
- Skleparis, D. (2017). *The Greek response to the migration challenge: 2015–2017*. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Greece, 0 5 • 1 6 / 0 3 / 2 0 1 7. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=9ca070c8-b546-01ac-e85a-df93ea2e5297&groupId=252038
- Tramountanis, A. (2022). Pathways to integration and dis-integration: an assessment of the Greek immigration policy for the inclusion of immigrants, applicants and beneficiaries of international protection. In M. Kousis, A. Chatzidaki and K. Kafetsios (Eds.), *Challenging mobilities in and to the EU during times of crises: the case of Greece* (263–282). IMISCOE, Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-11574-5_13
- Tramountanis, A., Linardis, A., Mouriki, A., Gerakopoulou, P., Kondyli, D., Papaliou, O., Varouxi, C., & Levine, S. (2022). *Humanitarian assistance and social protection responses to the forcibly displaced in Greece*. ODI, April. https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/Humanitarian_assistance_and_social_protection_in_Greece.pdf
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2009). Greek immigration policy at the turn of the 21st century. Lack of political will or purposeful mismanagement? *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 11(2), 159–177.
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2010). Twenty years of Greek immigration policy. In A. Triandafyllidou & T. Maroukis (Eds.), *Migration in 21st century Greece* (pp. 97–126). Kritiki Publications (in Greek).
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2014). Greek migration policy in the 2010s: Europeanization tensions at a time of crisis. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(4). 409-425, DOI: [10.1080/07036337.2013.848206](https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2013.848206)
- Triandafyllidou, A. (2020). Migration in Greece. In K. Featherstone & D. A. Sotiropoulos (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics* (pp. 550–566). Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198825104.013.35>

6.4. Public perceptions and policy responses to immigration in Italy⁸

Public perceptions and past research on immigration

Recent research has shown that there has been a growth in the levels of racism and xenophobia expressed by some segments of Italian society over the years. OSCAD data show that the number of hate crimes in Italy increased from 736 to 1445 from 2016 to 2021 (OSCAD 2022). Considering only crimes in the racial, ethnic or religious sphere, the number of crimes increased from 494 to 1160 during this period. A research report from Lunaria (2020) examines the issue of racism in Italy over a span of twelve years, highlighting the systemic nature of racism and its roots in institutionalized discrimination. A systemic connection is emerging between discriminatory rhetoric, distorted representations, online hate speech, and physical acts of racism.

A general interpretative framework of this systemic process is outlined by Castelli Gattinara (2017), who highlights how the crisis of legitimacy of contemporary European politics has prompted Italy to follow a logic of exceptionality, trying to put a halt to the inflow of migrants and asylum-seekers rather than pursuing the logic of normalcy that must apply to migration at a global level. Institutional and mainstream actors have mirrored public anxieties and security concerns, endorsing emergency narratives, aggressive policing and militarized border control. Unable to engage with citizens' concerns, they have helped to conflate migration with insecurity, creating a fertile breeding ground for xenophobic, populist reactions.

On this point, research on Italy has shown that the issue of migration declined in terms of emergency has become a social imaginary, that is a fundamental symbolic resource for the storytelling that fuels the political communication of Italian parties. This interpretation creates a primary cultural framework creating a climate of "moral panic" that, in turn, serves as a context for the normalization of migrant's exclusion (Nicolosi 2019). More specifically, migratory narration has been systematically organized on negative campaigning blaming political opponents on both "old" e "new" media (Lucchesi & Romania 2022). Moreover, a subalternity of center parties to right-wing parties emerges in the discourse on immigration, apparently intertwined with the large electoral success of these parties in recent national parliamentary elections (Dennison & Geddes 2022).

Regarding the distorted representation of immigration, a comparison between Italian and Spanish attitudes towards immigrants has shown that the Italian society is more prejudiced towards migrants than the Spanish one. Moreover, the findings show that, during the years of the socio-economic crisis, the figures of extremist individuals have increased in both countries (Bello 2015). Among the variables involved in immigrants' perception formation, there are: trust, solidarity, positioning on the left-right political orientation scale, age, personal happiness, education and time spent in front of the TV. On the latter point, it has to be said that Italian media system play a significant role in the polarization of public opinion on immigration issues (Villa 2018). Media outlets often present immigration-related news in a way that aligns with their political and ideological biases (Musarò & Parmiggiani 2022). Social media platforms have become breeding grounds for the spread of misinformation and the proliferation of extremist views. Moreover, the anonymity and lack of accountability on social media platforms can embolden individuals to express extreme and divisive opinions, leading to the spread of hate speech, xenophobia, and racism (Tagliamonte 2019).

⁸ This country report was produced by Domenico Maddaloni, University of Salerno, Italy.

This can contribute to an online environment that fuels hate speech towards immigrants (Lunaria 2020; Anselmi et. al. 2022; Colombo & Quassoli 2022). This wave of polarization and hostility continued to grow even during the period of the COVID-19 pandemic (Openpolis 2022). Hate speech often takes the form of ethnic replacement theory, recently defended even by a member of the current (2023) Italian government. These theories depict immigration as a mechanism, which accomplishes the replacement of Europeans by migrants mainly from Africa and Asia. For these theories migratory flows are portrayed as a useful tool for ruling elites because they would produce a more malleable and easily governed populace (Pellegrino 2021). According to some authors (Petrovich Njegosh 2023) these theories constitute a symbolic device that intertwines racism and sexism, naturalizes, and reproduces them, generating concrete consequences, including violent actions.

Policy response to immigration

Italy has implemented various government policies to integrate migrants and refugees. These policies have focused on areas such as immigration management and migrants' and refugees' integration.

Regarding immigration management, Italy has addressed issues related to illegal immigration, security, and crime problems, as well as the management of the refugee crisis (Nese 2022). The country's approach to integration has been classified as "Halfway favorable" based on the Migrant Integration Policy Indicators (MIPEX) (Nese 2022). However, the Italian reception system for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers often neglects the people it is supposed to host and ends up producing disoriented people (Avallone 2021) that may be end up caught in a legal and social limbo (Della Puppa & Sanò 2021). Palidda (2021) shows an increase in police checks on migrants and foreign nationals, which has resulted also in the opening of detention centers for illegal migrants (Campesi 2015, Esposito et al. 2019). Around 2020, Italy was recognizing about 350 asylum claims per million inhabitants annually compared to an EU average of about 900 (Ambrosini 2022). The same growth in the number of unaccompanied foreign minors is one of the consequences of the absence of legal channels for labor migration, asylum, child protection (Ambrosini & Pozzi 2017). Apparently, this attitude of Italian authorities responds to both a growing demand for personal safety of native Italian citizens and the anti-migrant rhetoric spread in the political arena (Quassoli, 2021).

Based on the available research, the overall levels of economic, social, and political integration of migrants in Italy today can be assessed as mixed (Istituto S. Pio V & IDOS 2020; ISMU 2022).

In terms of economic integration, the need for labor by Italian firms and households has prompted the current right-wing government to allow the entry of 452 thousand foreign workers in the three-year period 2023-2025. However, this does not automatically imply full economic integration of migrant workers. There are barriers to entry into the Italian labor market, especially as regards the access to non-manual jobs and the career development in a context of generalized precarity (Zanfrini 2021). Moreover, Italian strong regional imbalances often make labor market integration policies ineffective (La Bella 2020). Additionally, refugees and undocumented migrants in Italy face difficulties in finding legal employment, especially in the early years after their arrival (Ortensi & Ambrosetti 2021).

Regarding immigrants' and refugees' access to welfare services, a first point to note is the increasingly territorially diverse nature of these policies, that have been following different paths and are now highly differentiated, which ends up reproducing among foreign nationals the

inequalities in access to services found for Italian citizens (Ibba 2021). In addition to regional imbalances, discrimination against “poor” migrants and refugees (be it caused by prejudice, political calculations or simple bureaucratic rigidity) has a role in shaping the mixed fortunes of these people when approaching the Italian welfare system (ASGI & Centro studi Medi 2023). In this field, the role of civil society organizations is of particular importance in ensuring the access of migrants to public services (Storato et al. 2021), as well as the satisfaction of essential needs (Caritas Italiana & Fondazione Migrantes, 2022).

In terms of political integration, Italian legislation allows the enjoyment of political rights (albeit limited to local elections) only to citizens of European Union countries, thus recognizing the political participation rights only according to a merely formal dimension of citizenship (Lo Presti 2016). In this field, recent studies have shown that migrants in Italy are largely inactive political subjects compared to Italian natives (Ortensi & Riniolo 2020). Factors such as being a woman, having low education, and residing in the southern regions of Italy and the islands have been associated with political disengagement among migrants. The same impact of EU citizenship on enhancing political participation in Italy has been found to be negligible (Ortensi & Riniolo 2020). Migrant groups show low levels of public claims-makings, confirming their marginalization from the Italian public discourse (Pilati 2018). They also show a somewhat limited degree of participation in civil society organizations, and their engagement is very often limited to executive tasks (Moro 2013). However, some immigrant groups are found to be active in social movements, particularly those fighting discrimination and racism and for access to social rights (Lotto 2015; Zamponi 2017; Perrotta 2019; Caciagli 2021).

In conclusion, the Italian model of migrant and refugee integration can be described as a case of subaltern inclusion, relying on institutional marginalization within a framework of increasing job and life insecurity and the growing spread of hate speech and discriminatory practices.

References

- Ambrosini M. 2022. Rifugiati e richiedenti asilo. In Fondazione ISMU, *Ventisettesimo rapporto sull'immigrazione in Italia 2021*. Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 261-273.
- Ambrosini M., Pozzi S. (2018). *Italiani ma non troppo? Lo stato dell'arte della ricerca sui figli degli immigrati in Italia*. Genoa: Centro studi Medi. https://www.csmedi.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/italiani_pagina_singola_OK.pdf
- Anselmi G., Maneri M., Quassoli F. 2022. The Macerata shooting: digital movements of opinion in the hybrid media system. *Partecipazione e conflitto*, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 846-864 DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v15i3p846.
- Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull'Immigrazione, Centro studi Medi (2023). *Quando discriminano le istituzioni. Uguaglianza, diritti sociali, immigrazione: Rapporto finale del progetto L.A.W – Leverage the Access to Welfare*. Torino: Associazione per gli Studi Giuridici sull'Immigrazione. https://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Report_LAW.pdf.
- Avallone G. (2021). Italy's Reception System for Asylum Seekers and Refugee: A System with Many Shadows and Little Light. In Della Puppa F., Sanò G. (eds.), *Stuck and Exploited Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Italy Between Exclusion, Discrimination and Struggles*. Venezia: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, pp. 33-48.
- Bello V. 2015. La crisi dell'identità sociale tra pregiudizi, xenofobie e razzismi. L'inclusione dell'altro in tempo di crisi in Italia e Spagna. *Società Mutamento Politica*, vol. 6, no. 11, pp. 197-218. DOI: 10.13128/SMP-16406
- Caciagli C. 2021. Generating Solidarity in Diversity: The Case of Housing Struggles in Rome. *Critical Sociology* vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 249-263. DOI: 10.1177/0896920520943657

- Campesi G. 2015. Hindering the Deportation Machine: An Ethnography of Power and Resistance in Immigration Detention. *Punishment and Society* vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 427–453. DOI: 10.1177/1462474515603804.
- Caritas Italiana, Fondazione Migrantes 2022. *XXXI Rapporto immigrazione 2022. Costruire il futuro con i migranti*. Todi: Tau.
- Castelli Gattinara P. 2017. The ‘refugee crisis’ in Italy as a crisis of legitimacy. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, vol. 9 no. 3, pp. 318-331. DOI: 10.1080/23248823.2017.1388639
- Colombo M., Quassoli F. 2022. ‘Is this terrorism?’ The Italian media and the Macerata shooting. *Critical studies on terrorism*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 759-781. DOI: 10.1080/17539153.2022.2049946.
- Della Puppa F., Sanò G. 2021. Stuck and Exploited: Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Italy Between Exclusion, Discrimination and Struggles. In Della Puppa F., Sanò G. (eds.), *Stuck and Exploited Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Italy Between Exclusion, Discrimination and Struggles*. Venezia: Edizioni Ca’ Foscari, pp. 11-32.
- Dennison J., Geddes A. 2022. The centre no longer holds: the Lega, Matteo Salvini and the remaking of Italian immigration politics. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 441-460. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2020.1853907.
- Esposito F., Ornelas J., Scirocchi S., Arcidiacono C. 2019. Voices from the Inside: Lived Experiences of Women Confined in a Detention Center. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 403-431. DOI: 10.1086/699344
- Fondazione ISMU (2022). *Ventisettesimo rapporto sull’immigrazione in Italia 2021*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Ibba M. 2021. La programmazione regionale delle politiche per gli immigrati: quale istituzionalizzazione? I casi di Toscana e Veneto. *Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche*, no. 1, pp. 127-158. DOI: 10.1483/100376
- Istituto di studi politici S. Pio V, Centro studi e ricerche IDOS 2020. *L’integrazione dimenticata. Riflessioni per un modello italiano di convivenza partecipata tra immigrati e autoctoni*. Roma: Istituto di studi politici S. Pio V – Centro studi e ricerche IDOS.
- La Bella M. 2020. Accogliere senza integrare: le distorsioni delle politiche sull’immigrazione nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia. *Società Mutamento Politica*, vol. 11, no.21, pp. 29-37. DOI: 10.13128/smp-11941
- Lo Presti I. M. 2016. Partecipazione politica e diritto di voto degli stranieri in Italia: una disciplina work uin progress. *Revista Europea de Derechos Fundamentales*, no. 1, pp. 381-401. ISSN 1699-1524. <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5866428>.
- Lotto M. 2015. La partecipazione politica dei migranti. Dall’esclusione alle diverse forme di partecipazione. *Società Mutamento Politica*, vol. 6, no. 11, pp. 255-272. DOI: 10.13128/SMP-16410
- Lucchesi D., Romania V. 2022. I politici e l’immigrazione su Facebook: come si (de)legittima il discorso migratorio durante l’emergenza sanitaria. *Società Mutamento Politica* vol. 13, no. 25, pp. 195-211. DOI: 10.36253/smp-13711
- Lunaria 2020. *Cronache di ordinario razzismo. Quinto libro bianco sul razzismo in Italia*. Roma: Lunaria. http://www.cronachediordinariorazzismo.org/wp-content/uploads/quinto_libro_bianco_razzismo_def.pdf
- Moro G. 2013. La partecipazione civica dei migranti: lo scenario italiano. *Studi emigrazione*, vol. 50, no. 189, pp. 103-123. ISSN 0039-2936.
- Musarò P., Parmiggiani P. 2022. *Ospitalità mediatica. Le migrazioni nel discorso pubblico*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Nese A. 2022. Migrations In Italy and perceptions of ethnic threat. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*. Published online on 16th September, 2022. DOI: 10.1007/s12134-022-00985-8
- Nicolosi G. 2019. La migrazione come risorsa simbolica dello storytelling politico. Immaginario emergenziale, discorsi d’odio e media in Italia. *Im@go*, vol. 8, no. 14, pp. 101-123. DOI: 10.7413/22818138150

- Openpolis (2022). *Hate speech against migrants and foreigners during the pandemic*. Roma: Associazione Openpolis. <https://www.openpolis.it/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Hate-speech-covid-migrants.pdf>
- Ortensi L., Ambrosetti E. 2021. Even worse than the undocumented? Assessing the refugees' integration in the labour market of Lombardy (Italy) in 2001–2014. *International Migration*, 3(60), 20-37. DOI: 10.1111/imig.12884
- Ortensi L., Riniolo V. 2020. Do Migrants Get Involved In Politics? Levels, Forms and Drivers Of Migrant Political Participation In Italy. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, no. 21, pp. 133-153. DOI: 10.1007/s12134-019-00703-x
- Osservatorio per la Sicurezza Contro gli Atti Discriminatori (2022). *Segnalazioni 2010-2021*. Roma: Ministero degli interni. https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2023-01/segnalazioni_2010_-_2021.pdf
- Palidda S. 2021. *Polizie, sicurezza e insicurezze*. Milano: Meltemi.
- Pellegrino D. 2021. Teorie cospirazioniste demografiche. Narrazioni del complotto basate sul tema della sostituzione etnica. In Pannofino N., Pellegrino D. (a cura di), *Trame nascoste. Teorie cospirazioniste e miti sul lato in ombra della società*. Milano: Mimesis, pp. 9-27.
- Perrotta D. C. 2019. *Rosarno, la rivolta e dopo. Cosa è successo nelle campagne del Sud*. Roma: Edizioni dell'Asino.
- Petrovich Njegosh T. 2023. La teoria della sostituzione etnica in Italia: una narrazione razzista e sessista. *From the European South*, no. 12, pp. 105-122. ISSN 2531-4130. https://www.fesjournal.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FES_12_9_Petrovich-Njegosh.pdf
- Pilati K. 2018. La costruzione sociale dell'immigrazione come problema: il caso italiano. *Società Mutamento Politica*, vol. 9, no. 18, pp. 189-204. DOI: 10.13128/SMP-24346
- Quassoli F. 2021. *Clandestino: il governo delle migrazioni nell'Italia contemporanea*. Milano: Meltemi.
- Storato G., Sanò G., Della Puppa F. 2021. Finding New Ways for Refugees and Asylum Seekers' Inclusion: A Reflexive Analysis of Practices Developed by the Third Sector and Civil Society in Trentino. In Della Puppa F., Sanò G. (eds.), *Stuck and Exploited Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Italy Between Exclusion, Discrimination and Struggles*. Venezia: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, pp. 189-213.
- Tagliamonte R. 2019. Il difficile rapporto tra media e migrazioni sotto la lente delle scienze sociali. *Politica.eu*, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 78-91. ISSN 2421-4302. <http://www.rivistapolitica.eu/wp-content/uploads/MIGRAZIONI.pdf>
- Villa M., a cura di 2018. *Migrazioni e comunicazione politica. Le elezioni regionali 2018 tra vecchi e nuovi media*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Zamponi L. 2017. Practices of Solidarity: Direct Social Action, Politicisation and Refugee Solidarity Activism in Italy. *Mondi migranti*, no. 3, pp. 97-117. DOI: 10.3280/MM2017-003005
- Zanfrini L. 2021. Il lavoro. In Fondazione ISMU, *Ventisettesimo rapporto sull'immigrazione in Italia 2021*. Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 113-124.

6.5. Immigration to Poland: public perceptions and policy response⁹

In recent years, especially since 2015, the entire European Union has faced a large wave of immigration. In Poland, too, the immigration of foreigners is becoming a widely noticed and palpable phenomenon, especially in view of the influx of refugees from Ukraine caused by the Russian-Ukrainian war. Determining the number of foreigners currently residing in Poland is a difficult task due to the variety of circumstances of their arrival in our country and the fact that some immigrate to Poland for permanent residence, some on a short-term basis for work or education, while others come seasonally for work purposes. Therefore, the figure is constantly fluctuating, and at the same time does not take into account foreigners residing in Poland illegally, hence it is also certainly inaccurate.

In 2015, Poland's population oscillated around 38,455,000 people. The recorded number of migrants who came to Poland in 2015 depends on the data source. According to data obtained from the Office for Foreigners it was 121,000 people (Number of foreigner applications for various residence permits), while data obtained from the Central Statistical Institute shows that it was 218,000 people (Central Statistical Institute data on immigration to Poland). Thus, migrants accounted for 1% of Poland's population. The three largest ethnic groups singled out in the 2015 waves of migration to Poland included: Ukrainians, Germans, and Belarusians. Among them were 63.8% men and 36.2% women. Incoming migrants were issued 139,119 work permits in 2016. These individuals found work as: skilled laborers (40.54%), laborers (24.45%), and 3.46% as managers, consultants, and experts. The sectors in which migrants primarily worked in 2016 included construction (19.17%), transportation and warehousing (14%) and professional, scientific, and technical activities (9.5%) [6]. This largely reflected the demand of the Polish labor market. Most of it was economic migration. Ukrainian migrants had a positive impact on the Polish economy. 1.4 million economic migrants from Ukraine alleviated Poland's labor shortage problem, thereby helping to generate 13% of Poland's GDP growth (2013-2018), which was a significant contribution to the Polish economy [7, 8].

In 2022, Poland's population was approximately 37,766,000 people [2]. In 2021, 540,000 foreigners arrived in Poland according to data obtained from the Office for Foreigners (Number of foreigner applications for various residence permits), while according to the Central Statistical Institute the number was 241,000 (Central Statistical Institute data on immigration to Poland). Thus, migrants make up about 5% of Poland's population. The three largest ethnic groups singled out in the 2021 immigration waves to Poland included: Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Georgians. Among them were 45.3% men and 54.7% women. In turn, according to data from the Social Insurance Institution, at the end of 2021 there were 875,090 foreigners registered for pension and disability insurance: a significant increase from 184,188 in 2015 [9]. This statistic does not include all groups. It does not include children or those not in the labor force, for example. Arriving migrants in 2022 were issued 365,490 work permits. The sectors in which migrants primarily worked in 2022 included Manufacturing (26.7%), Administrative and support service activities (21%) and Construction (19.4%). According to data from REPORT MRiPS-01, the number of registered unemployed foreigners in Poland was 19,241 as of the end of April 2023, while the total number of registered unemployed in Poland at that time was 821,916 and so the share of foreigners among the unemployed is 2.3% [10]. The data presented shows that the structure of employment has changed compared to 2016, which has to do with the fact that due to the Russian-Ukrainian

⁹ This country report was prepared by Kornelia Batko, University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland.

war, mainly women came to Poland, finding work in manufacturing and administration, and men, who had previously primarily worked in construction and transport and warehouse management.

A large number of children also arrived in Poland by 2021. For the 2022/2023 school year, figures as of Sept. 30, 2022, indicate that about 4.6 million students started school in kindergartens, primary and secondary schools. The number of students who come from countries other than Poland totals 352,923, accounting for 7.7% of all students [11]. As many as 180,000, or about 3% of students, are from Ukraine, which is related to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Surveys show that the word "immigrant" or "foreigner" arouses a lot of emotions among Poles, often extreme ones. Not only do they constitute an important element of public discourse, but also a problem of a political nature [12]. The influx of immigrants to Poland sometimes arouses fear among the Polish population who worry about threats to national security, or about losing jobs to the immigrant population. As of 31.01.2022, there were 1767 foreigners incarcerated in penitentiary units, including 929 temporarily detained, 824 sentenced and 14 punished [13].

In Poland, the migrant situation is different from that in other European Union countries. The geographic location and the migration routes to Europe mean that migration originates from countries lying to the east of Poland, and not from Africa or the Middle East, as is the case in many countries of the European Union. These conditions have been further reinforced by the outbreak of war in Ukraine. As of February 24, 2022, more than 3.8 million people have crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border [8]. Currently, there may be between 1.2 and 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees in Poland, however, this figure is imprecise due to the lack of a single database collecting complete information. Due to Refugees Operational Data Portal by UNHCR there were 12 110 155 border crossing from Ukraine to Poland and 9 855 130 border crossing from Poland to Ukraine since 22 February 2022 [14]. 992 670 refugees from Ukraine were recorded in country as of date. Moreover 1 615 825 refugees applied for Asylum, TP or similar national protection schemes in Poland since 22 February 2022.

It is worth noting at this point that until a decade ago Poland was not a country of immigration. On the contrary, after Poland joined the European Union (2004), the balance of migration was negative, as Poles emigrated to Western European countries instead. The situation changed after 2014, due to the first problems in the eastern part of Ukraine, when Poland began to accept seasonal labor from abroad, especially from Ukraine [15]. As a result, there was already a large group of economically active Ukrainians living in Poland before the war (2022), which can be estimated at about 1.35 million (based on CSO data). Despite the increasingly widespread presence of Ukrainians in the Polish labor market, the scale of economic and socio-cultural tensions remained relatively low.

Thus far, the influx of immigrants to Poland has been taking place in practice without a coherent and clearly articulated migration policy. Individual governments have tried to create a document with strategic status. A study, which can be considered such a document, is one entitled "Migration policy of Poland - current state and postulated actions" adopted in 2012, but canceled in 2015 after a change of government, and which had not been replaced by a new one (until today). Admittedly, in December 2020, a diagnostic document was prepared to form the basis for the findings of Poland's new migration policy entitled "Poland's migration policy - diagnosis of the initial state", which emphasized the importance of the development of the state's policy on, among other things, legal immigration, prevention of illegal immigration, development of a return policy, international protection of foreigners, integration of foreigners (including education, public services for foreigners, integration programs for particular groups of foreigners, granting Polish citizenship,

information activities for Polish society) [16]. In the middle of 2021, on the basis of this diagnosis, a proper document of an executive nature had been prepared on the directions of migration policy for 2021-2022 (Migration Policy of Poland - directions of action 2021-2022), but its submission for approval to the Council of Ministers ended in its withdrawal and the dissolution of the department under which it was prepared [16].

It should be borne in mind that the current influx of war refugees from Ukraine will have long-term consequences for Poland, and requires urgent action, in particular to ensure the availability of social services within the framework of the public policy implemented. All the more so because, in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, immigration of foreigners has become widespread, noticeable and perceptible in Poland. Those crossing the Ukrainian border with EU member states and Moldova are immediately subject to the provisions of the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants them numerous rights [17]. In essence, it makes the status of war refugees from Ukraine similar to that of EU citizens in terms of rights under the free movement of persons. Also, in accordance with the Law on Assistance to Ukrainian Citizens in Connection with Armed Conflict on the Territory of Ukraine, Ukrainians register to obtain a Polish identification number (PESEL), providing them with access to certain public goods and services.

It is difficult to predict the future of Ukrainian war refugees coming to Poland, their number, as well as the number of Ukrainians returning to their home country. This depends mainly on the developments of the war and the future reconstruction of the country. The recent refugee wave has put a strain on many systems in the Polish economy that had been already severely strained, including the education, health, and housing systems. Most of the relief efforts are ad hoc and bottom-up in nature, and thus risk exhaustion. Long-term stays of Ukrainian war refugees will generate numerous challenges in the field of social services, the provision of which will affect a much larger number of people. Preventing conflicts that may arise between Ukrainians and Poles in the medium and long term is also a very important challenge. Therefore, the role of the government in conducting social campaigns and planning assistance in such a way as to reduce controversy and suspicion among Poles about preferential treatment of Ukrainians is very important here. Thus, there is a need to develop a comprehensive plan that also considers the possibility of another wave of refugees and systemic assistance in the long term.

There is a need to develop certain norms of coexistence between migrants and local communities. CBOS data from January 2023 shows that the vast majority of Poles (78%) still support our country's acceptance of Ukrainian refugees [7]. However, as one might have guessed, the initial enthusiasm for helping Ukraine and its citizens is slowly beginning to wane, a phenomenon observed not only in Poland. In contrast, the opinion that the international community is doing enough to help Ukraine now prevails more clearly among Poles than at the beginning of the war. The dominant opinion is still that the assistance offered by our country to refugees from Ukraine is sufficient, while the percentage of respondents who consider it too much has declined quite significantly. The majority of respondents also state that Poles generally have positive attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees, although the share of such responses is significantly lower than at the beginning of the war (62% vs. 82% in April 2021). At the same time, according to Deloitte, 64% of Poles surveyed believe that Ukrainian refugees should return to their country as soon as possible, while 21% of respondents see Ukrainian refugees as a threat to Poland, most commonly citing their negative impact on the labor market / Poland's budget / inflation, a potential increase in crime or Ukrainian nationalism as the reason [8]. The scale of support offered to refugees arriving in Poland is becoming an increasingly controversial issue for Polish society. While the access of Ukrainian

children to Polish schools is met with general acceptance, other issues are no longer so obvious to Poles. Financial aid to Ukrainians in particular raises a lot of emotions.

Issue that is also relevant when it comes to migration issues in Poland is the migrant crisis on the Belarus-EU border represents a series of events that are part of the migrant crisis in Europe caused by the organized trafficking of migrants and refugees (mostly young men) to the European Union from Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries in the Middle East and Africa, among others, via the Belarusian-Lithuanian and Belarusian-Polish and Belarusian-Latvian borders. The situation on Poland's eastern border escalated in August 2021 and still is developing.

Public perceptions and past research on immigrants

Racism and xenophobia in Poland are social problems that, as in most other societies, are the subject of social debates and academic research. Racism in Poland mainly manifests itself in hate speech, but physical attacks also occur. According to a 2020 poll, Poles are least fond of Arabs and Roma (65% and 57%, respectively, said they dislike these groups), followed by Russians (43%), Ukrainians (41%), Romanians (40%) and Jews (33%) [18].

In June and July 2023, a discussion heated up in Poland about the forced relocation of immigrants, Warsaw's opposition to the European Union's migration policy and the admission of labor migrants to Poland. The discussion about a possible referendum heated up after the European Union returned to the idea of so-called forced relocation as part of the migration pact, i.e. imposing on member states to let illegal migrants from Africa and the Middle East into their territory. The aftermath of the discussion was a United Surveys poll for RMF FM and Dziennik Gazeta Prawna, conducted July 7-9 on a sample of 1,000 people. Although Poles believe that the European Commission is right in this dispute with Brussels, at the same time as many as 45.5 percent of respondents do not want citizens of non-EU countries to be brought to Poland to work. 25.5 percent of respondents "Strongly disagree" with the statement that "Poland should attract citizens of non-EU countries to work in our country," and 20 percent. "Rather disagree." Nearly 40 percent of respondents take the opposite view, with 25.1 percent indicating that they "Rather agree" with the statement, and 14.5 percent indicating that they "Strongly agree." As many as 14.9 percent of respondents chose the answer "Don't know/difficult to say"[19].

Policy response to the immigration

Thus far, the influx of immigrants to Poland has been taking place in practice without a coherent and clearly articulated migration policy. Individual governments have tried to create a document with strategic status. A study, which can be considered such a document, is one entitled "Migration policy of Poland - current state and postulated actions" adopted in 2012, but canceled in 2015 after a change of government, and which had not been replaced by a new one (until today). Admittedly, in December 2020, a diagnostic document was prepared to form the basis for the findings of Poland's new migration policy entitled "Poland's migration policy - diagnosis of the initial state", which emphasized the importance of the development of the state's policy on, among other things, legal immigration, prevention of illegal immigration, development of a return policy, international protection of foreigners, integration of foreigners (including education, public services for foreigners, integration programs for particular groups of foreigners, granting Polish citizenship, information activities for Polish society) . In the middle of 2021, on the basis of this diagnosis, a proper document of an executive nature had been prepared on the directions of migration policy for 2021-2022 (Migration Policy of Poland - directions of action 2021-2022), but its submission

for approval to the Council of Ministers ended in its withdrawal and the dissolution of the department under which it was prepared.

References

- [1] Rocznik Demograficzny 2016 (Demographic Yearbook 2016); <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/roczniki-statystyczne/rocznik-demograficzny-2016,3,10.html>
- [2] Population. Population status and structure and natural movement by territory. Status on December 31, 2022; <https://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/ludnosc/ludnosc-stan-i-struktura-ludnosci-oraz-ruch-naturalny-w-przekroju-terytorialnym-stan-w-dniu-31-grudnia,6,34.html>
- [3] Data obtained in response to a query sent to the Migration Analysis and Statistics Department of the Office for Foreigners
- [4] Cieślak-Wróblewska A. Bezrobocie wciąż rekordowo niskie. Napływa więcej cudzoziemców (Unemployment still at record low. More foreigners are coming in); <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art36923851-bezrobocie-wciaz-rekordowo-niskie-naplywa-wiecej-cudzoziemcow> (Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [5] Foreigners working in Poland - statistics- Data from the Ministry of Family and Social Policy; <https://archiwum.mrips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-w-polsce-statystyki/> , (Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [6] Work permits for foreigners, Labor Market Department MRPiPS <https://psz.praca.gov.pl/web/urzed-pracy/-/8180075-zezwolenia-na-prace-cudzoziemcow> , Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [7] Komunikat z badań CBOS: Polacy wobec wojny na Ukrainie i ukraińskich uchodźców (CBOS survey report: Poles towards the war in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees) Nr 12/2023 (January 2023); https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_012_23.PDF (Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [8] Deloitte monitor, Refugees from Ukraine in Poland Challenges and potential for integration October2022; <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/pl/Documents/Reports/pl-Uchodzcy-z-Ukrainy-w-Polsce-Report.pdf> Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [9] Foreigners in the Polish social security system – XII 2021; <https://www.zus.pl/documents/10182/2322024/Cudzoziemcy+w+polskim+systemie+ubezpiecze%C5%84+spo%C5%82ecznych+-+XII.2021.pdf/cd231552-e7eb-264f-ece6-a63a834cf458?t=1655983980351> , Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [10] Report "Registered Unemployment" of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy ; https://psz.praca.gov.pl/rynek-pracy/statystyki-i-analizy/bezrobocie-rejestrowane/?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_NdWEmSW4euAS&p_p_lifecycle=0&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_pos=2&p_p_col_count=3&p_r_p_564233524_resetCur=true&_101_INSTANCE_NdWEmSW4euAS_navCategoryId=16713188 (Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [11] School students by age in the 2022/2023 school year by school type and province: https://dane.gov.pl/pl/dataset/930,dane-statystyczne-uczniow-wedug-wieku/resource/45740/table?page=1&per_page=20&q=&sort= (Accessed: 10.06.2023)
- [12] Włodarczyk- Madejska J., Kopeć M., Goździk G. (2021): O przestępczości cudzoziemców i przestępczości wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce na podstawie statystyki policyjnej [Immigrant crimes and victimization in Poland based on police statistic]; ARCHIWUM KRYMINOLOGII [Archives of Criminology]; DOI 10.7420/AK2021.17; https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356666190_O_przestepczosci_cudzoziemcow_i_przestepczosci_wobec_cudzoziemcow_w_Polsce_na_podstawie_statystyki_policyjnej (Accessed: 15.06.2023)
- [13] Annual statistics of the Prison Service: <https://www.sw.gov.pl/strona/Statystyka> (Accessed: 15.06.2023)
- [14] Deloitte Report: Refugees from Ukraine in Poland, Challenges and potential for integration, October 2022 <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/pl/Documents/Reports/pl-Uchodzcy-z-Ukrainy-w-Polsce-Report.pdf> , (Accessed: 15.06.2023)
- [15] Operational Data Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine> (Accessed: 18.06.2023)
- [16] Łodziński S., Szonert M. (2023): Polityka migracyjna “bez polityki”. Antynomie tworzenia polityki migracyjnej w Polsce w okresie 2016-2022. <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/CMR-WP-130-188.pdf> , (Accessed: 18.06.2023)
- [17] Duszczyk M., Kaczmarczyk P.: Wojna i migracja: napływ uchodźców wojennych z Ukrainy i możliwe scenariusze na przyszłość, <https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Spotlight-APRIL-2022-PL.pdf> , (Accessed: 18.06.2023)
- [18] Omuła-Rudzka M. (2020). Komunikat z badań CBOS. Stosunek do innych narodów (CBOS survey report. Attitudes towards other nations). Warszawa: Fundacja Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej.
- [19] Wyniki sondażu: Niemal połowa Polaków nie chce sprowadzania do Polski imigrantów spoza UE: (Poll results: Nearly half of Poles do not want to bring non-EU immigrants to Poland: <https://www.rp.pl/spoleczenstwo/art38721961-sondaz-niemal-polowa-polakow-nie-chce-sprowadzania-do-polski-imigrantow-spoza-ue> (Accessed: 20.07.2023)

6.6. Ukrainian refugees in Poland: public perceptions and media reporting¹⁰

Polish media's attitude towards Ukrainian refugees and migrants

The escalation of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 caused a huge migration of refugees. The largest number of refugees crossed the border into Poland and were met with massive, spontaneous, and all-around support and assistance from Poles. After the outbreak of war, as expected, the largest number of refugees crossed the border into Poland. Border Guard data shows that 4.408 million people were cleared at border crossings on the direction from Ukraine to Poland between 24/02/2022 and 29/06/2022, including 2.2 million during the first month of the war alone [1]. The response to the massive influx of refugees from Ukraine by both the majority of the public and state authorities was fundamentally different from that of those trying to cross the Polish-Belarusian border in 2021, or the migrant crisis caused by the influx of people from Middle Eastern and African countries in Europe in 2015 [2].

This study shows attitudes toward refugees from Ukraine in the Polish press and television. It was assumed that newspaper titles and television events at six-month intervals since the outbreak of the war (February-March 2022, August 2022, February 2023, August 2023) will be analyzed. In Poland, the newspapers with the largest coverage are "Fakt" and "Super Express" [3]. But because these are tabloids for the purposes of this study, it was decided to analyze the newspapers that ranked 3rd and 4th, namely "Gazeta Wyborcza" and "Rzeczpospolita". E-editions of these newspapers were analyzed. The analysis showed that since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Gazeta Wyborcza has published 1,744 articles on refugees from Ukraine, and Rzeczpospolita 3746 (Table 1).

Table 1. Number of articles on refugees from Ukraine from 22.02.2022-28.08.2023

Gazeta wyborcza	1744
Rzeczpospolita	3746

Source: own study.

The position of the leader of the TV market in Poland is held by TVP1, the second place is held by TVP2, which is its complement, and the third place is held by TVN [4]. TVP1 and TVN were selected for analysis.

February-March 2022

In the first days of the war, the press focused on descriptions of the war effort, information about how many refugees had crossed the borders. Later, articles began to appear talking about how Poles should not help Ukrainians [5], [6] or saying that the Polish labor market is ready to hire Ukrainians [7]–[10]. There were also predictions that the refugee crisis will last a long time and we need to be patient and plan daily, economic and educational support accordingly [11]. There were many articles in newspapers showing various refugee aid actions and articles that refugees are getting better in Poland and have assimilated well with Poles [12]. Television stations at the beginning of the war also focused on reporting on the war and showing about the situation at Ukraine's border crossings with Poland. In mid-March, television broadcasts focused on showing how refugees were

¹⁰ This country report was prepared by Kornelia Batko, University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland.

coping in Poland, that they were trying to start a new life here. Many reports were shown of how Poles were helping refugees.

August 2022

Six months since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the press has focused on analyzing how refugees found the labor market [13], [14] and how it has changed as a result of the war [15]. The results of the survey, which "Rzeczpospolita" describes, confirm positive attitudes toward Poland's rapidly growing group of workers from Ukraine. We were able to learn from the press that Poles were helping refugees, as much as 67 percent of the residents of the 12 largest Polish cities had been involved in helping refugees since the start of the war [16] and the size of that help [17]. Gazeta Wyborcza published several articles showing the negative effects of accepting Ukrainians, among other things, seen in the real estate market [18], [19]. Television continued to focus on coverage of the war, but also tried to show in breakfast programs the previous life of Ukrainians, before the war, acquainted with their culture or traditions. Both TVN and TVP1 tried to show Poles how the lives of Ukrainians had changed with the results of Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Many aid actions were also publicized, with broadcasts of concerts to raise aid funds for Ukraine.

February-March 2023

On the anniversary of the beginning of the war in Ukraine, most media in Poland focused on summaries and statistics. Noteworthy are articles about how Ukrainians have changed Poland [20], [21] or how they have acclimatized in Poland [22]. There have been articles attempting economic analysis, such as whether wages in Poland would have grown faster without Ukrainians, which showed that 41 percent of Poles are concerned that by the influx of Ukrainians they are losing the chance for solid raises [23], an analysis of consumption growth in Poland, which showed that consumer spending in Poland would have increased by about 2 percent in 2022, instead of by 3 percent, and thus Poland's GDP growth would also be lower [24] or about changes in the real estate [25]–[27] and labor market [28], [29]. Much space in the Polish press was devoted to students from Ukraine. It was written that there is a place for them in Polish schools, that they stay at home for homeschooling [30]. Many articles in Gazeta Wyborcza were devoted to showing how in major Polish cities (including Warsaw, Krakow, Lodz, Gdansk, Poznan, Bialystok) Poles together with refugees celebrate the anniversary of the outbreak of war by organizing marches.

Also present were articles describing attitudes toward Ukrainians, such as those describing anti-Ukrainian online hegemony (Anti-Ukrainian hegemony on the Internet is carried widely. It is spread by, among others, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, n.d.), in which the thesis is that hate speech on the Internet may have an impact on the fact that, according to polls, acceptance of the presence of war refugees from Ukraine is declining among Poles, or an analysis that constitutes its own time: How have Poles' attitudes toward refugees changed? [31], which concluded that Poles' attitudes toward refugees from Ukraine went through three stages. The first was a "successful rush," where Poles were focused on helping refugees and giving them the best possible reception. The second phase came around May, when Poles became emotionally and economically breathless. After our huge economic investment, Poles began to wonder if they themselves would need help with their growing financial problems. Two currents of thinking about refugees emerged. In this phase, Poles believed that Ukrainians had too many privileges in Poland (52% of Poles agreed with this thesis in November 2022). This can be read as a result of fears of economic difficulties that Poles will face in the winter. By the end of February, the thesis of over-privileging Ukrainians was supported by only about thirty-something percent of Poles. The third phase was a sense of relief that the bleakest scenario about an attack on Poland or another wave of refugees linked to Russia's attack

on Ukraine's critical infrastructure had not come true. There have also been articles showing that the attitude of Poles toward Ukrainians has changed from the beginning of the war to a more negative [32]. The authors of the report suggest that this may be influenced by the demanding attitude of Ukrainians, a different culture or butthurt and arrogance, which in Ukraine is in this society a relic of the "Russian mira" and at the same time a symbol of good status, position, as well as a penchant for snobbery, expensive cars, disrespect for prohibitions such as speed limits, parking in prohibited places. Gazeta Wyborcza also published articles analyzing the attitude of Poles toward Ukrainians [33], [34], in which it stressed that the attitude is still positive, but with a downward trend. This is noted by Ukrainians themselves, in an article presenting the results of a study on the overall picture of the quality of life of Ukrainian refugees who have settled in the EU ¹¹ [35] it is shown that a third of refugees feel that they are already part of the host country community, but on the other hand, just as many refugees would like to return to Ukraine. A statement from one refugee woman living in Poland was posted: "In Poland, there are many good people there ready to help. But I also met many who hate us, don't respect Ukrainians and think we are to blame for rising prices," said the Ukrainian woman quoted in the report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. The TVN station showed a series of reports on how Ukrainians are coping in Poland, but also on what help for Ukrainians looks like now and in what direction it should evolve. They pointed out that more help was provided by ordinary people, not by the State authorities, and that there is still a lack of systemic solutions on how to help refugees. The TVP1 station praised the attitude of Poles helping refugees and showed how ruling party politicians support Ukrainians. There were materials about the benefits granted to refugees and how to deal with official matters.

August 2023

In August 2023, the main axis of the narrative on refugees from Ukraine centered around the analysis of Polish-Ukrainian relations. There were articles on propaganda targeting Ukrainians [36] and on the need to take care of relations between Poland and Ukraine [37]. Gazeta Wyborcza also highlighted the increased tension in Polish-Ukrainian relations [38]. The camp of Jaroslaw Kaczynski (chairman of the Law and Justice party) and his attempts to stay in power with the help of accentuating hard settlements with Kiev regarding the "Volyn massacre" on the 80th anniversary of these events is considered to be to blame for this situation.¹² At the end of July, Polish Television 1 (TVP1) showed many programs about the Volyn massacre, statements by Poland's most important Politicians. TVN television did the same. Nevertheless, the overriding theme was Ukraine's grain imports, which became a bone of contention negatively affecting Polish-Ukrainian relations [39]. Over the past few months, there has been a lot of talk in the Polish media about the so-called "grain crisis," caused by the increased flow of Ukrainian grain and other agricultural products to Poland, Romania, or Bulgaria. It is the aftermath of the European Union's lifting of most tariffs on trade with Ukraine a few months after the war broke out. This was intended to support Ukraine's economy and to address the food crisis elsewhere in the world. As a result of these regulations, much of the Ukrainian grain that went to Poland and other countries in the region was already staying there, causing huge price drops in local markets. This hit local farmers. The escalation of the conflict resulted, the EC at the beginning of May 2023 introduced an EU temporary ban on imports of wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower from Ukraine to Poland and other neighboring

¹¹ The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has published the results of a major survey of more than 14,000 Ukrainian refugees who fled to the European Union after Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24 last year.

¹² The ethnic purges of 1943-45, carried out by Ukrainian nationalists in the eastern lands of the Second Polish Republic

countries, to replace the unilateral (and under EU law illegal) blockades introduced earlier. Several press articles have covered this issue.

TVP1, as well as TVN and TVN24, also engaged in an analysis of Polish-Ukrainian relations, especially in the context of the Polish ban on Ukrainian grain imports. TVP1's "News" and TVN's "Facts" news programs, in addition to discussing information from the front, devoted a great deal of time to the "grain crisis." In the program "Political Quadrant" on TVP1, broadcast on July 31, 2023, the head of the Presidential Office for International Policy stressed that: "The most important thing is to defend the interests of the Polish farmer." In doing so, he repeated the words of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who explained in this way the announcement of the extension - after September 15 - of the embargo on Ukrainian grain. He added that "Ukraine has really received a lot of support from Poland. I think it would be worthwhile for it to start appreciating what role Poland has played for it over the past months and years." Andriy Sybiha, deputy head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, referred to these words on his Facebook page, which was also noted by the Polish press [39]. He stressed that Ukraine repays both Poland and other allies every day with the heroism of its soldiers at the front. That is why, as Sibiha points out, it is difficult to accept Poland's insistence that Kiev accept the closing of its borders to Ukrainian agricultural production as part of its gratitude: "There is nothing worse than when your savior demands that you pay for your rescue, even when you are dripping with blood." He also pointed out that the words, which came from the Polish side, were ridiculous in the context of Polish-Ukrainian relations, and that the two countries "are destined for a strong alliance and brotherhood." The TVN station tried to highlight farmers' concerns about the lifting of the EU embargo and to show the effects of the grain crisis, blaming the government of Mateusz Morawiecki, or rather the Minister of Agriculture Robert Telus in a way [40], [41]. TVN also tried to show what it looks like now in Poland to help Ukrainians by broadcasting Anna Czerwinska's report on August 19, 2023, in "Facts"¹³, "*When the war broke out, Poles rushed to help refugees from Ukraine. What does it look like now?*".

Attitudes toward refugees and migrants from Ukraine-results of surveys

The CBOS survey shows that between February 28 and March 10, 2022, 88% of respondents were closely following events regarding the war and as many as 85% of Poles believed that the war in Ukraine threatens Polish security [45]. At the beginning of the war (in February/March 2022), approval for accepting refugees from Ukraine was 94% [2]. As many as 68% declared that they help Ukrainians in some way, such as in kind or financially [45]. An April 2022 survey shows that Poles' attitudes toward refugees were favorable [46]. Roughly eight in ten respondents perceived them as positive (82% among Poles in general and 81% among those in the area, respectively). Thus, in 2022, immediately after the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Poles' attitudes toward Ukrainians and helping them were very positive.

Six months after the outbreak of the war, 75% believed that the war in Ukraine threatened Poland's security, and 40% believed that the war in Ukraine would not spread to other countries [47]. Most respondents (84%) supported Poland's acceptance of Ukrainian refugees, and 53% said they either help Ukrainian refugees personally or someone in their household does so. Along with the prolonged presence of Ukrainian refugees in Poland comes the theme of the long-term economic consequences of this in the Polish public debate. The results of surveys from this period show that according to Poles, Poland's acceptance of refugees from Ukraine will not be economically beneficial to it in the long term (46%), but 38% of respondents hold the opposite view [47]. It is

¹³ TVN station's daily news program

worth noting that most of the responses are undecided: answers "rather no" (31%), "rather yes" (29%) and "hard to say" (16%). In August 2022, Poles believed refugees should return to Ukraine after the war (78%), only 6% were of the opposite opinion.

According to the report "The war in Ukraine in the opinion of Poles" of research conducted by the Media Studies Research Laboratory of the University of Warsaw in May and June 2022, Poles were concerned about their future because of the war in Ukraine [42]. For 70% of those surveyed, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict caused feelings of anxiety and shattered the foundations of their sense of security. According to the report, "the assistance provided to Ukrainian refugees was an unprecedented mass phenomenon in Poland, never recorded in modern history." According to almost all respondents (99%), refugees from Ukraine were well received in Polish local communities. It is worth noting, however, that Poles were divided in their opinions on the level of exposure of the war topic in the media. 31% of respondents felt that the Polish media give too much attention to the war, however, 54% did not share this opinion.

A year after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (March 2023), 73% of Poles believed that the war in Ukraine threatens Poland's security [48]. Most Poles (81%, up 3 points from January) support taking in Ukrainian refugees. This percentage has remained relatively stable at around 80% since June 2022. In April, there was a sharp, as much as 10-point drop in the percentage of Poles who support accepting refugees from Ukraine (73% vs. 83% in March) [43]. This is the lowest result since the outbreak of the war. Nearly one in five Poles (19%, up 8 points from March) are now opposed to accepting Ukrainian refugees, which in turn is the highest result since the outbreak of the war. It is likely that these changes can be linked to the precarious economic situation, especially the uncontrolled influx of cheap Ukrainian grain into Poland, which has recently sparked a wave of protests in the country. 39% of Poles said they help refugees from Ukraine.

The June 2023 survey shows that the percentage of Poles who support accepting refugees from Ukraine remained at a very similar level as in April, at 72% [49]. The percentage of declarations of helping Ukrainian refugees is 43%. An important issue covered in the media is the so-called grain crisis. Survey results show that most respondents (72%) support the European Commission's ban on the supply of wheat, corn, rapeseed and sunflower from Ukraine to Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries, with 27% supporting it only as a temporary remedy. Only one in seven respondents (15%) opposes the EU import ban, and a similar percentage (13%) has no opinion on the issue [49].

The results of the 2023 survey show that Poles still want to help Ukrainians, but on a much smaller scale than immediately after the outbreak of the war [44]. Poles are changing their approach to helping Ukrainians, and even to themselves. Only 21% of respondents are in favor of allowing refugees from Ukraine to settle in Poland (in January 2023, the opinion was expressed by as much as 37%) [44]. Poles have a decidedly bad opinion of social assistance for refugees from Ukraine [50]. As many as 60 percent of respondents say "no" to equalizing access to benefits that Poles have (in January 2023 it was 47 percent), "in favor" is now 18 percent. The declaration of willingness to accept Ukrainians into their homes has also declined (57 percent of Poles no longer want it, only 17 percent agree). The survey shows that we still want to help refugees from Ukraine - as many as 76% of Poles agree that Ukrainians should live in our country, which is in line with the CBOS survey presented. However, one in three respondents admitted that their attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees have recently changed, with the largest number - as many as 85 percent. - declared that this attitude had worsened. Why? 39.4 percent declared that the reason was the

"entitlement attitude" of refugees. What do Poles mean by "entitlement attitude"? - Respondents most often cite such phrases as: "everything is due to them" or "everything is due for free" [51].

Attitudes of leading parties towards war migrants from Ukraine

In general, the attitudes of the leading parties are consistent, both in conveying a positive image of migrants from Ukraine and in the joint actions taken. In this regard, it is important to note the following significant events that have influenced the formation of a positive perception of war migrants from Ukraine in Polish society:

- Already on the day of the outbreak, February 24, 2022, when all member states in a statement issued unanimously condemned the Russian invasion, a press conference was held under the chairmanship of Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration Mariusz Kaminski. Eight reception points were set up at the Polish-Ukrainian border to provide basic information to newcomers and help distribute necessities. "We will support the Ukrainian people and any of our Ukrainian neighbors if they need such assistance," Kaminski said at a meeting with journalists.
- On March 10, 2022, the Parliament passed a law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens in connection with the armed conflict on the territory of Ukraine (the President signed it on March 12, 2022). The law was passed by an overwhelming majority, with 439 deputies voting in favor, 12 against, and three abstentions. Almost all Konfederacja, one deputy from the Lewica, one from Polska2050 and one from Kukiz'15 voted against the bill. All party groups supported the Act, only one deputy from Konfederacja opposed it. Robert Winnicki stated that this is a law that will cost the Polish state tens of billions of zlotys. In addition, according to the MP, there should be a national debate on the issue of migrants from Ukraine, as this is a law that opens "a kind of settlement action in Poland." Konfederacja and Kukiz'15 are groups that foment xenophobic resentment against a broadly defined group of labor migrants (including migrants arriving from Ukraine).
- On March 12, 2022, the government passed a law that authorized the opening of border crossings on the Polish-Ukrainian border. A website under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office was also established to facilitate coordination between volunteers and Ukrainian people in need of assistance.
- On April 28, 2022, at a press conference, Pawel Szefernaker, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, announced the establishment of a local-government team to help improve the adaptation of people from Ukraine. "We need to work out such solutions so that the majority of people can adapt by the vacations, so that as many people as possible can take up jobs, so that children who have arrived with women from Ukraine can be taken care of."

References

- [1] K. Mokrzycka, „Do Polski w miesiąc trafiło więcej uchodźców niż do całej UE w czasie kryzysu migracyjnego w 2015 r.”, 300Gospodarka.pl, 24 March 2022. <https://300gospodarka.pl/explainer/do-polski-w-miesiac-trafilo-wiecej-uchodzcow-niz-do-calej-ue-w-czasie-kryzysu-uchodzczego-w-2015> (Accessed:31 August 2023).
- [2] K. Maciejewska-Mieszkowska, „Stosunek Polaków do uchodźców w kontekście wojny w Ukrainie”, Środ. Stud. Polit., nr 4, Art. nr 4, grudz. 2022, doi: 10.14746/ssp.2022.4.7.
- [3] „Sprzedaż «Faktu» spadła do 124 tys. egz. «Gazeta Wyborcza» straciła najwięcej”, 4 August 2023. <https://www.wirtualnemedial.pl/arttykul/sprzedaz-gazet-w-polsce-fakt-spadla-do-124-tys-egz-gazeta-wyborcza-stracila-najwiecej-ponizej-40-tys-egz> (Accessed:28 August 2023).



- [4] „TVPI liderem, traci Polsat, zyskała Czwórka. Stacje newsowe z dużymi spadkami”, 4 April 2023. <https://www.wirtualnemedi.pl/artykul/ogladalnosc-telewizja-March-2023-tvp1-lider-traci-polsat-zyskuje-czworka-hity> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [5] „Jak mądrze pomagać uchodźcom”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/dodatki/art35973101-jak-madrze-pomagac-uchodzcom> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [6] „Przyjęli do swojego domu uchodźców: Oni mogą nam pomóc bardziej niż my im”, olsztyn.wyborcza.pl, 26 March 2022. <https://olsztyn.wyborcza.pl/olsztyn/7,48726,28260332,oni-moga-nam-pomoc-bardziej-niz-my-im.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [7] „Polscy pracodawcy już czekają na Ukraińców”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art35956011-polscy-pracodawcy-juz-czekaja-na-ukraincow> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [8] „Polskie firmy otwarte na specjalistów i menedżerów z Ukrainy - rp.pl”. <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art35956001-polskie-firmy-otwarte-na-specjalistow-i-menedzerow-z-ukrainy> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [9] „Praca dla uchodźców z Ukrainy. Poradnik”, gazetapl, 24 March 2022. <https://wyborcza.biz/biznes/7,182270,28253559,praca-dla-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy-poradnik.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [10] „Wojna w Ukrainie. Gdzie są wolne etaty dla uchodźców? Duże zmiany na rynku pracy”, warszawa.wyborcza.pl, 29 March 2022. <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,28252807,wojna-w-ukrainie-na-polskim-ryнку-pracy-ubylo-kierowcow-i-budowlancow.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [11] „Kryzys uchodźczy potrwa długo”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://regiony.rp.pl/spolecznosci-lokalne/art35954631-kryzys-uchodzcy-potrwa-dlugo> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [12] „Pomoc uchodźcom z Ukrainy. Sąsiedzi, których każdy by sobie życzył”, bialystok.wyborcza.pl, 18 March 2022. <https://bialystok.wyborcza.pl/bialystok/7,35241,28234745,pomoc-uchodzcom-z-ukrainy-sasiedzi-ktorych-kazdy-by-sobie.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [13] „Jak Polakom pracuje się z Ukraińcami. Wyniki nowego badania”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art36890321-jak-polakom-pracuje-sie-z-ukraincami-wyniki-nowego-badania> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [14] „Uchodźcy z Ukrainy mają kwalifikacje, chcą na siebie zarabiać”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://edukacja.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art36791091-uchodzcy-z-ukrainy-maja-kwalifikacje-chca-na-siebie-zarabiac> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [15] „Nielatwo firmom wypełnić lukę po ukraińskich mężczyznach”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art36921661-nielatwo-firmom-wypelnic-luke-po-ukrainskich-mezczyznach> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [16] „Badanie: Dwie trzecie mieszkańców 12 największych polskich miast zaangażowało się w pomoc uchodźcom”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/spoleczenstwo/art36811101-badanie-dwie-trzecie-mieszkancow-12-najwiekszych-polskich-miast-zaangazowalo-sie-w-pomoc-uchodzcom> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [17] „Michał Płociński: Naród wspaniały. I ludzie ofiarni”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/komentarze/art36766401-michal-plocinski-narod-wspanialy-i-ludzie-ofiarni> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [18] „1 tys. zł za 6 m kw., czyli źniwa właścicieli mieszkań na wynajem w Warszawie. Ceny zmieniają się z minuty na minutę”, warszawa.wyborcza.pl, 7 August 2022. <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,28762186,szukanie-pokoju-to-program-tysiac-plus-studenci-miesiacami.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [19] „Jak z Ukrainy, to dziękuję”: Warszawiacy nie chcą wynajmować mieszkań uchodźcom”, warszawa.wyborcza.pl, 27 August 2022. <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,28823394,polacy-coraz-czesciej-nie-chca-wynajmowac-mieszkan-ukraincom.html> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [20] „Ukraińcy zmienili Polskę. Ale tylko trochę”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/plus-minus/art38010481-ukraincy-zmienili-polske-ale-tylko-troche> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [21] „Z Rzeczpospolitą tak, z Rosją nie. Jak wojna zmieniła stosunek Ukraińców do Polaków”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/spoleczenstwo/art38015581-z-rzeczpospolita-tak-z-rosja-nie-jak-wojna-zmieniła-stosunek-ukraincow-do-polakow> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [22] „Ukraińskie rodziny po roku. Nie jesteśmy już w Polsce jak ślepe kocięta”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/plus-minus/art38010491-ukrainskie-rodziny-po-roku-nie-jestesmy-juz-w-polsce-jak-ślepe-kocieta> (Accessed:10 July 2023).



- [23] „Płace w Polsce rosłyby szybciej bez pracowników z zagranicy?”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/wynagrodzenia/art38154501-place-w-polsce-roslyby-szybciej-bez-pracownikow-z-zagranicy> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [24] „Uchodźcy mocno rozpedzili wzrost konsumpcji”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/dane-gospodarcze/art38026001-uchodzcy-mocno-rozpedzili-wzrost-konsumpcji> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [25] „Nawet co dziesiąte mieszkanie sprzedane w Warszawie w 2022 r. kupili klienci z Ukrainy. Wielka rewolucja na rynku po wybuchu wojny”, warszawa.wyborcza.pl, 24 February 2023. <https://warszawa.wyborcza.pl/warszawa/7,54420,29494353,nawet-co-dziesiate-mieszkanie-sprzedane-w-warszawie-w-2022-r.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [26] „Wojna w Ukrainie zmieniła rynek nieruchomości. Zwłaszcza najmu mieszkań”, wroclaw.wyborcza.pl, 24 February 2023. <https://wroclaw.wyborcza.pl/wroclaw/7,35771,29498733,wojna-w-ukrainie-zmienila-rynek-nieruchomosci-zwlaszcza-wynajmu.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [27] „Wojna zmieniła rynek nieruchomości”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/nieruchomosci/art38018451-wojna-zmienila-rynek-nieruchomosci> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [28] „Dla wielu to niespodzianka: Ukraińcy w Polsce są nie tylko pracownikami, ale też pracodawcami i przedsiębiorcami”, wyborcza.pl, 17 March 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/magazyn/7,124059,29473382,dla-wielu-to-niespodzianka-ukraincy-w-polsce-sa-nie-tylko-pracownikami.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [29] „Ukraińscy uchodźcy odnaleźli się na polskim rynku pracy”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/rynek-pracy/art37993771-ukraincy-uchodzcy-odnalezli-sie-na-polskim-rynku-pracy> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [30] „Zagubieni ukraińscy uczniowie, jak im pomóc wrócić do szkół?”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/cudzoziemcy/art38076731-sprawdzmy-dlaczego-ukrainskie-dzieci-nie-chodza-do-szkoly> (Accessed:10 July 2023).
- [31] „Jak zmieniła się postawa Polaków wobec uchodźców? Marcin Duma: Mobilizacja, obawy, a potem ulga”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/wywiad/art38015721-jak-zmieniala-sie-postawa-polakow-wobec-uchodzcow-marcin-duma-mobilizacja-obawy-a-potem-ulga> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [32] „Badanie: zmienia się nastawienie Polaków do uchodźców z Ukrainy”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/spoleczenstwo/art37927281-badanie-zmienia-sie-nastawienie-polakow-do-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy> (Accessed:29 August 2023).
- [33] „Nasze nastroje po roku wojny w Ukrainie? Rośnie strach, ale też tolerancja”, opole.wyborcza.pl, 16 February 2023. <https://opole.wyborcza.pl/opole/7,35086,29470971,nasze-nastroje-po-roku-wojny-w-ukrainie-rosnie-strach-ale.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [34] „Prof. Duszczyk: Wielki zryw Polaków? W jednej kwestii się pomyliliśmy”, wyborcza.pl, 23 February 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,82983,29483449,prof-duszczyk-wielki-zryw-polakow-w-jednej-sprawie-sie-pomylilismy.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [35] „Wielki raport o uchodźcach z Ukrainy w krajach UE. Czym Polska różni się od sąsiadów?”, wyborcza.pl, 3 March 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,29520653,wielki-raport-o-uchodzcach-z-ukrainy-w-krajach-ue-czym-polska.html> (Accessed:30 August 2023).
- [36] „Propaganda wymierzona w Ukraińców w rozkwicie. Szerzy teorie spiskowe, bazuje na strachu, szczerze Polaków na uchodźców”, wyborcza.pl, 4 August 2023. <https://biqdata.wyborcza.pl/biqdata/7,159116,30043448,propaganda-wymierzona-w-ukraincow-w-rozkwicie-szerzy-teorie.html> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [37] „Dobre stosunki z Ukrainą są polską racją stanu, ale trzeba nad nimi pracować”, wyborcza.pl, 6 August 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75968,30047134,dobre-stosunki-z-ukraina-sa-polska-racja-stanu-ale-trzeba-nad.html> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [38] „Antyukraiński zwrot wyborczy. PiS szuka politycznego złota”, wyborcza.pl, 2 August 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,30035007,antyukraincy-zwrot-wyborczy-pis-szuka-politycznego-zlota.html> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [39] „Spięcie na linii Kijów - Warszawa. W tle zakaz importu ukraińskiego zboża”, wyborcza.pl, 1 August 2023. <https://wyborcza.pl/7,75399,30032152,spiecie-na-linii-kijow-warszawa-w-tle-zakaz-importu-ukrainskiego.html> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [40] „Pierwsze zarzuty w sprawie technicznego zboża z Ukrainy, obawy o zniesienie unijnego embarga”, TVN24, 25 August 2023. <https://tvn24.pl/programy/pierwsze-zarzuty-w-sprawie-technicznego-zboza-z-ukrainy-obawy-o-zniesienie-unijnego-embarga-7306740> (Accessed:28 August 2023).



- [41] „Rolnicy załamują ręce. «To jest paranoja, w jaką popadł rząd Morawieckiego»”, TVN24, 10 August 2023. <https://tvn24.pl/polska/rolnictwo-embargo-na-ukrainskie-zboze-co-potem-minister-robert-telus-bez-wsparcia-od-rzadu-i-prezydenta-twierdzi-ekspert-7286057> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [42] „Wojna w Ukrainie w opinii Polaków – raport”, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 18 August 2022. <https://www.uw.edu.pl/wojna-w-ukrainie-w-opinii-polakow-raport/> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [43] „CBOSNews 2023/14”. https://cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/news/newsletter_ver3.php?news_r=2023&news_nr=14 (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [44] „Polacy wciąż chcą pomagać Ukraińcom, ale na dużo mniejszą skalę niż zaraz po wybuchu wojny”, Rzeczpospolita. <https://www.rp.pl/spoleczenstwo/art38594711-polacy-wciaz-chca-pomagac-ukraincom-ale-na-duzo-mniejsza-skale-niz-zaraz-po-wybuchu-wojny> (Accessed:28 August 2023).
- [45] KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOŁECZNEJ (CBOS), (SURVEY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH) Nr 38/2022: Polacy wobec rosyjskiej inwazji na Ukrainę (March 2022), https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_038_22.PDF
- [46] KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOŁECZNEJ (CBOS), (SURVEY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH) Nr 62/2022: Polacy wobec uchodźców z Ukrainy (April 2022) https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_062_22.PDF
- [47] KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOŁECZNEJ (CBOS), (SURVEY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH) Nr 101/2022: Polacy wobec wojny na Ukrainie i ukraińskich uchodźców (August 2022), https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2022/K_101_22.PDF
- [48] KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOŁECZNEJ (CBOS), (SURVEY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH) Nr 28/2023: Polacy o wojnie na Ukrainie w rok po jej wybuchu (March 2023) https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_028_23.PDF
- [49] KOMUNIKAT Z BADAŃ CENTRUM BADANIA OPINII SPOŁECZNEJ (CBOS), (SURVEY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH) Nr 69/2023: Polacy wobec wojny na Ukrainie i kryzysu zbożowego (czerwiec 2023), https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2023/K_069_23.PDF
- [50] Raport Laboratorium Badań Medioznawczych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Wojna w Ukrainie w opinii Polaków. (Report of the Media Studies Laboratory of the University of Warsaw, War in Ukraine in the Opinion of Poles. LBM UW, Warszawa, August 2022, <https://www.uw.edu.pl/wojna-w-ukrainie-w-opinii-polakow-raport/>
- [51] Raport LAB Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Studiów Międzynarodowych Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego i Wydziału Nauk Społecznych Akademii Ekonomiczno-Humanistycznej w Warszawie "Społeczna percepcja uchodźców z Ukrainy, migrantów oraz działań podejmowanych przez polskie państwo" (LAB report of the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies of the University of Warsaw and the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Academy of Economics and Humanities in Warsaw "Public perception of refugees from Ukraine, migrants and actions taken by the Polish state") (maj-czerwiec 2023), <https://www.portalsamorzadowy.pl/polityka-i-spoleczenstwo/badanie-uw-68-proc-polakow-jest-za-przyjmowaniem-uchodzcow-z-ukrainy-55-proc-przeciw-dodatkowej-pomocy,468070.html>

6.7. Immigration to Slovakia: public perceptions and policy response¹⁴

Public perceptions of the immigrants in Slovakia

In general, the attitudes of Slovaks towards immigrants are rather negative. In December 2015, according to survey of the Slovak Academy of Science, 70% of Slovak population feared the arrival of refugees in Slovakia. According to 49% of the respondents, those refugees who had already arrived in Europe should only be helped in absolutely necessary cases, and according to 19.4%, they should not be helped at all. The most important reasons for fearing refugees were the expectation that refugees will increase crime and the danger of attacks by Islamist extremists. Approximately four out of ten respondents stated one or the other reason. Concerns about their lack of adaptability and the costs associated with their adoption were mentioned somewhat less often (three out of ten)¹⁵.

With the last refugee crisis (due to war in Ukraine), Slovakia became to accept much more immigrants. In the begging, majority of Slovaks was supportive towards those seeking refuge from the war in Ukraine¹⁶. However, public opinion has shifted over time. In a regional comparison (Visegrad four), Slovakia became to be a country with the most negative attitude towards Ukrainian refugees (52% of population has negative attitude¹⁷). *One of the key drivers of negative perceptions are the concerns of the Slovak population fearing negative impacts of refugee aid on its own economic situation.*

Looking at xenophobic tendencies, the attitude of Slovaks towards foreigners has been worsening, and this trend has not improved even after the migration crisis of 2015-16 subsided.

While in 2009, a third of Slovaks would mind having a Muslim family as a neighbor, in 2017 it was already 73%.¹⁸ The negative perception remains. According to latest survey (2020), more than 50 percent of people have a very bad feeling when they hear the term economic migrant and more than 60 percent of people have a bad feeling when they hear the term Muslim family¹⁹.

Social distancing towards foreigners has also increased. While in 2008²⁰ approximately 18% of Slovaks would mind for foreigners to live in their city, in 2020 it would be almost 36%.²¹

Policy responses to the immigration in Slovakia

Slovakia lacks main central authority that would be responsible for the management of migration or migrant integration. The Migration Office, whose name suggests that it should fulfill this role in Slovakia, has very limited powers, specifically in the area of assessment requests for asylum or another form of international protection. Border and Immigration Police Office is in charge of border control, registration of foreigners and granting permits to stay or exalting foreigners who are in Slovakia illegally.

¹⁴ This country report has been prepared by Aneta Vilagi, Univerzita Komenskeho v Bratislave, Slovakia

¹⁵ Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2015).

¹⁶ Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2022a; 2022b).

¹⁷ Globsec (2022).

¹⁸ Institute for Public Affairs (2017).

¹⁹ Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021: 80).

²⁰ Vašečka, M. (2009), Postoje verejnosti k zahraničnej migrácii, Bratislava, IOM – Medzinárodná organizácia pre migráciu, dostupné na <https://bit.ly/3D9du2S>

²¹ file:///C:/Users/antusova1/Downloads/FINAL_kniha_SLOVENSKO_A_MIGRACIA.pdf

Since 2014 when Slovakia adopted the document “Integration policy of SR”, the gestor institution for this strategy became Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. However, the integration is broader than just labour and social affairs. Some scholars argue that integration policy in Slovakia “is not applied at all in practice and is not reflected in the creation of systematic and effective integration policies for foreigners”.

The actual governmental document dealing with migration is framework document Migration Policy of the Slovak Republic with a view to 2025. The document is quite brief and vague. It does not establish more detailed principles according to which migration should be managed in the future. It does not work with development trends, it does not analyze demographics or economic development of the country and does not model possibilities, needs and challenges in the area of migration in the future.

The part dedicated to the integration of foreigners focuses on legal migrants. Slovakia “leans towards the integration model, which is based on the respect of cultural realities, language and traditions of the Slovak Republic by foreigners” (p.8). The emphasis is mainly on enabling the acquisition of language competences to foreigners and building social inclusion and cohesion. However, the reflection of the need to work (also) with the majority population is completely absent.

One of the reasons why integration policy is neglected might be a low inflow of the immigrants to Slovakia. The number of refugees and asylum seekers and number of granted asylums are very small (see Table 6.7.1 below). Major inflow of immigrants is connected to labour migration.

Table 6.7.1: Asylum seekers & Refugees in Slovakia

Year	Number of asylum applications	Asylum granted	Additional protection provided	Rejection of the application	Stopped proceedings
2015	330	8	41	72	128
2022	547	23	48	76	387

Source: Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (2015; 2022)

Policy responses to labour migration

The strategic documents focus on managed (regular/legal) labour mobility, not on asylum seekers or refugees. While in the previous version of the document (up to 2020) the target groups of activities were mainly qualified and highly qualified migrants, with an emphasis on culturally close countries of origin, the current version (up to 2025) speaks about the employment of foreigners in sectors with an identified labour shortage. There is no mention of the need for cultural proximity of foreigners. Despite the negative demographic tendencies and actual need for even less qualified workforces even in the past, Slovak politicians have been very cautious to promote labour migration.

The main argument against labour migration is mainly still high-rate unemployment in some regions of Slovakia. Also, in public and political discourse, labour migration has long been presented as a threat to Slovak employees, their wages or social standards. Therefore, policies that smooth the integration of migrants to Slovak labour market are usually presented by politicians as temporary measures to address the current shortage in workforces. Even the Strategy on labour mobility of foreigners in Slovakia, puts a lot of attention to reassurance that the government’s

priority is employing Slovak citizens and that they support regulated labour mobility of foreigners - only to compensate for the lack of available labour on the Slovak labour market.

Literature review of domestic sources on immigration in Slovakia

To search for publications and sources related to the migration & trust we used Google Scholar²². We limited the search to period 2015-2023. In case of edited collections, individual contributions pertaining to the subject were included in this overview, as edited collections might often contain chapters on other subjects as well. In addition to that, we reviewed also databases of publications of most important NGOs as their publications were not included in the list of results provided by research engine of Google. While they are not affiliated with any ‘academic’ institution, their influence in society (including media) is significant. In the list below, we created a separate category for NGOs’ publications (A1 – D1).

The first group of research publications (A) analyze immigrants in Slovakia. Some publications adopt a perspective of intercultural interactions with a focus on issues like intergroup anxiety, intercultural contact (e.g. Jeleňová 2017, others describe migration policies in Slovakia (Antalová 2016). This group of research was rather descriptive. Findings pointed on lasting favoritism of in-group by majority of Slovaks and still limited of cases in which there is interaction between migrants and the domestic population which can explain caution and mistrust towards the foreigners in Slovakia.

The second group of research (B) focuses on the analysis of reactions to migration in Slovakia be it reactions of public (Jeleňová 2017), media (Žúborová and Borárosová 2016) or politicians (Baboš, Világi, Oravcová 2016). Publications point on rather negative attitude towards immigrants in Slovakia. The results indicate that individuals who emphasis values as safety and conformity expressed more negative attitudes towards immigrants. A more positive perception of immigrants is associated with preference of universalistic values. However, connections between value orientations and attitudes towards immigrants turned out to be lackluster (Jeleňová 2017). Political-economic influences play a more important role in explaining the attitudes of Slovaks. The importance of the influence of political discourse on public attitudes towards immigrants was fully demonstrated during the migration crisis of 2015-16. Despite almost non existent inflow of migrants in Slovakia, political parties used the migration as threat during the pre-election campaign in 2016 (Baboš, Világi, Oravcová 2016)) and it contributed to the overall increase of xenophobic attitudes in Slovakia.

The third group of research (C) focuses on migration and Slovakia from the perspective of international relations. The migration became to be an issue with regard to Slovak membership in the EU. The rejection of European solutions to the migration crisis was the very first manifestation of Slovakia's rebellious position in the EU (Világi 2016). At the same time, Slovakia's stances on the issue and the coordination with other Visegrad countries, contributed to increase the perception of regional (Visegrad) cooperation significance of in the country (Strážay 2016).

The largest category of domestic academic production with regard to migration (D) focuses on emigration from Slovakia, including topics as brain drain, remittances or return of emigrants. This group of literature explores motivations of Slovaks for first migration and for return too and the difficulties and feelings connect with return back to Slovakia.

The NGOs’ publications present a specific category of literature on phenomena of migration. These publications represent an advocacy voice on the Slovak scene aiming to counterbalance harsh and

²² “migrácia” OR “migracia” AND “dôvera” (6.7.2023) (also checked was “utečenci”).

rejecting attitudes of politicians. They give a voice to immigrants living in Slovakia (e.g. Gallo Kriglerová et al. 2020), offer a critical analysis of Slovak migration and integration policies (e.g. Gallo Kriglerová et al. 2021b; Hlinčíková and Mesežnikov 2016) and analyze best practices to follow (e.g. Gallo Kriglerová et al. 2023; Chudžíková 2018).

List of references

A: Migration - immigrants in Slovakia

Antalová, M. (2016).. Migrantí a ich asimilácia na Slovensku [Migrants and their assimilation in Slovakia]. *Politické, ekonomické a sociálne súvislosti súčasnej migračnej krízy v Európe*, Bratislava: EUBA, pp. 7-18.

Jeleňová, I. (2017) *Interkultúrne interakcie a migrácia. Vybrané aspekty problematiky [Intercultural interactions and migration. Selected aspects of the issue]*. Košice: UPJŠ.

Žúborová, V., Borárosová, I. (2016). Migrácia v médiách: utečenci verzus migranti. Chápanie migrantov a utečencov v mediálnom priestore v kontexte pozitívnej a negatívnej mediatizácie [Migration in media: refugees versus migrants. The understanding of migrants and

refugees in media in the context of positive and negative mediatization] *Central European Journal of Politics* Volume 2 (2016), Issue 1, pp. 1–15.

B: Migration: attitudes towards it

Baboš, P., Világi, A., Oravcová, V. (2016). Utečenecká kríza: kampaň vládnej strany a vnímanie hrozby voličmi [The refugee crisis: the governing party's campaign and the perception of threat by voters]. In: Baboš, P., Világi, A., Oravcová, V. *Spoločenské problémy a politické (ne)riešenia: Voľby 2016*. Bratislava: UK, pp. 91 – 109.

Babos, P., Vilagi, A., Solarikova, P. (2019). Role of Anxiety in Radicalizing Political Attitudes: Experimental Evidence from Slovakia. *Studia psychologica* 61(1):42-55.

Kentoš, M. (2020) Postoje k migrantom a vnímanie bezpečia v kontexte ethnicity [Attitudes towards migrants and perceptions of safety in the context of ethnicity] In: Regináčová, N., Šutaj, Š., Ďurkovská, M. (eds.) *Etnické vzťahy na Slovensku na začiatku 21. Storočia*. Košice: UPJŠ., pp. 95 – 109.

C: Migration as an „issue“ in international relations

Strážay, T. (2016). # V4 2015: neľahké hľadanie odpovedí na európske výzvy [# V4 2015: difficult search for answers to European challenges]. In: Brezáni, P. (ed.) *Ročenka zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky 17/2015*, Bratislava: RC SFPA, n.o., pp. 59-67.

Világi, A. (2016) Slovensko v krízami poznačenej Európskej únii [Slovakia in the European Union affected by crises]. In: Brezáni, P. (ed.) *Ročenka zahraničnej politiky Slovenskej republiky 17/2015*, Bratislava: RC SFPA, n.o., pp. 19-35.

D: Migration as emigration of Slovaks

Chrančoková, M., Fífeková, E., Nemcová, E. (2017). Migration of Slovaks. In: Nálepová, V., Šťastná, J. (eds.). *Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference ECONOMIC POLICY IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT*. Havířov: Vysoká škola sociálně správní, 2017, pp. 119 – 130.

Janovská, A. (2016). Podiel faktorov súvisiacich so zámerom odísť natrvalo žiť do zahraničia – regionálne rozdiely [The share of factors related to the intent to leave to live permanently abroad - regional differences] In: Birknerová, Z., Frankovský, M. (Eds.). *Identifikácia a rozvoj sociálneho a psychického potenciálu*. Prešov: FM PU.

Kabát, L. (2020). Migrantí a remitendy v priestore EÚ a na Slovensku – problémy, alebo zdroje ekonomického rastu [The migrants and remittances in EU and Slovakia – the problems, or source of economic growth]. *Verejná správa a regionálny rozvoj*, XVI(1), 36 - 55.

Košťalová, K., & Hofreiter, R. (2019). Fenomén návratu domov. Mladí ľudia a ich návrat zo zahraničia na Slovensko [The homecoming phenomenon. Young people and their return from abroad to Slovakia]. *Journal of Urban Ethnology*, 17, 171-185.

Krajňáková, E. (2019). Migrácia občanov Slovenska za prácou do zahraničia v kontexte európskych migračných tokov pracovnej sily [Migration of Slovak citizens for work abroad in the context of European labor migration flows]. *Social & Economic Review* 17(4).

Vrzgulová, M. (2022). E/migrácia–stále aktuálny výskumný problém [E/migration – still an actual research problem]. *Slovenský národopis*, 70(1), 149-152.

NGOs publications (A1)

Gallo Kriglerová, E. (2018). Banská Bystrica – mesto pre všetkých? Cudzinci a úloha samosprávy v ich integrácii. [Banská Bystrica - a city for everyone? Foreigners and the role of self-government in their integration]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Holka Chudžíková, Kadlečíková, J., A., Pišová, M. (2020) Cudzinci ako obyvatelia miest – zistenia z výskumu [Foreigners as urban dwellers - research findings]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021a) Cudzinci na Slovensku. Hľadanie nového domova. Skúsenosti cudzincov s integráciou na Slovensku – výskumné zistenia [Cudzinci na Slovensku. Hľadanie nového domova. Skúsenosti cudzincov s integráciou na Slovensku – výskumné zistenia]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021b) *Slovensko a migrácia hľadanie ciest k spolužitiu* [Slovakia and migration, the search for ways to live together]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021c) Cudzíe nechceme, svoje si nedáme - zhrnutie. [We don't want someone else's, we won't let to take our own - summary]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2023) *Sprievodca integráciou ľudí na úteku a cudzincov v mestách* [A Guide to the Integration of Refugees and Foreigners in Cities]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Hlinčíková, M., Mesežnikov, G. (eds.) (2016) *Otvorená krajina alebo nedobytná pevnosť? Slovensko, migranti a utečenci* [Open country or impregnable fortress? Slovakia, migrants and refugees]. Praha: HBS, IVO.

Hlinčíková M., Sekulová M., (eds.) (2015) *Integrácia ľudí s medzinárodnou ochranou na Slovensku: Hľadanie východísk* [Integrácia ľudí s medzinárodnou ochranou na Slovensku: Hľadanie východísk]. Bratislava: IVO.

Chudžíková, A. (2018). *PriesTTor pre všetkých. Cudzinci a možnosti ich integrácie v meste Trnava* [PriesTTor pre všetkých. Cudzinci a možnosti ich integrácie v meste Trnava]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Chudžíková, A. H., Bargerová, Z. (2018) *Obete pracovného vykorisťovania alebo „nelegálni migranti“? Ochrana pracovných práv ukrajinských pracovníkov na Slovensku* [Victims of labor exploitation or "illegal migrants"? Protection of labor rights of Ukrainian workers in Slovakia]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Kadlečíková, J. (2018). *Cudzinci v Bratislave*. [Foreigners in Bratislava]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Luptáková, Z. Medľová, K. (2018). *Integrácia cudzincov v Košickom samosprávnom kraji* [Integration of foreigners in the Košice self-governing region]. Bratislava: CVEK.

NGOs publications (B1)

Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021d) *Cudzíe nechceme, svoje si nedáme. Postoje majoritnej populácie k migrácii a cudzincom na Slovensku* [We don't want someone else's, we won't let to take our own. Attitudes of the majority population towards migration and foreigners in Slovakia]. Bratislava: CVEK.

Globsec (2019). *Europe's Migration Myths*. Bratislava: Globsec.

Kucharczyk J., Mesežnikov G. (eds.) (2018) *Phantom Menace. The Politics and Policies of Migration in Central Europe*. Bratislava: HBS, IVO.

References

- Gallo Kriglerová, E., Kadlečíková, J., Holka Chudžíková, A., Pišová, M. (2021) *Slovensko a migrácia hľadanie ciest k spoločenstvu* /Slovakia and migration, the search for ways to live together]. Bratislava: CVEK.
- Globsec. (2022) *New report shows that the V4 population supports Ukrainian refugees with some reservations* [Online]. Available at: <https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/press-releases/new-report-shows-v4-population-supports-ukrainian-refugees-some> (Accessed: 30 July 2023)
- Institute for Public Affairs (2017). *Zaostrené na extrémizmus* [Focused on extremism] [Online]. Available at: https://www.ivo.sk/buxus/docs/rozne/Prezentacia_IVO_15_12_2017.pdf (Accessed: 30 July 2023)
- Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2015). *Slovenská verejnosť a utečenci v decembri 2015* [Slovak public and refugees in December 2015] [Online]. Available at: <https://sociologia.sav.sk/podujatia.php?id=2297&r=1> (Accessed: 30 July 2023)
- Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2022a). *Aká je verejná mienka o prijatí utečencov z Ukrajiny?* [What is public opinion about accepting refugees from Ukraine?] [Online]. Available at: https://www.sav.sk/?lang=sk&doc=services-news&source_no=20&news_no=10320&fbclid=IwAR3_fDmi0rs7ms9RsswhdLZnmkoNXdVlGr6JZh7rwYUMY3hNeyUXBmb3o (Accessed: 30 July 2023)
- Institute for Sociology of the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2022b). *Ochota pomôcť Ukrajine neklesá* [Willingness to help Ukraine is not decreasing] [Online]. Available at: https://sociologia.sav.sk/cms/uploaded/3259_attach_ASMS_Ochota_pomocet_Ukrajine_APR2022.pdf (Accessed: 30 July 2023)
- Migračná politika Slovenskej republiky s výhľadom do roku 2020* (uznesenie vlády SR č. 574/2011). (2011). [Migration policy of the Slovak Republic with a view to 2020 (Resolution of the Slovak Government No. 574/2011)] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.minv.sk/?zamer-migracnej-politiky-slovenskej-republiky> (Accessed: 20 July 2023)
- Migračná politika Slovenskej republiky s výhľadom do roku 2025* (uznesenie vlády SR č. 496/2021). (2021). [Migration policy of the Slovak Republic with a view to 2025 (Resolution of the Slovak Government No. 496/2021)] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.minv.sk/?zamer-migracnej-politiky-slovenskej-republiky> (Accessed: 20 July 2023)
- Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic. (2016) *Štatistická ročenka 2016/17* [Statistical Yearbook 2016/17] [Online]. Available at: https://www.cvtisr.sk/cvti-sr-vedecka-kniznica/informacie-oskolstve/statistiky/statisticka-rocenka-publikacia/statisticka-rocenka-zakladne-skoly.html?page_id=9601 (Accessed: 25 July 2023)
- Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport of the Slovak Republic. (2022) *Štatistická ročenka 2022/23* [Statistical Yearbook 2022/23] [Online]. Available at: https://www.cvtisr.sk/cvti-sr-vedecka-kniznica/informacie-oskolstve/statistiky/statisticka-rocenka-publikacia/statisticka-rocenka-zakladne-skoly.html?page_id=9601 (Accessed: 25 July 2023)
- Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. (2015) *Štatistická správa – rok 2015* [Statistical overview - year 2015] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20> (Accessed: 25 July 2023)
- Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (2016). *Štatistika kriminality v Slovenskej republike za rok 2016* [Crime statistics in the Slovak Republic for 2016] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.minv.sk/?statistika-kriminality-v-slovenskej-republike-za-rok-2016> (Accessed: 27 July 2023)
- Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic. (2021) *Štatistická správa – rok 2021* [Statistical overview - year 2021] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20> (Accessed: 25 July 2023)
- Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (2022). *Štatistika kriminality v Slovenskej republike za rok 2022* [Crime statistics in the Slovak Republic for 2022] [Online]. Available at: https://www.minv.sk/?statistika_kriminality_v_SR_za_rok_2022_csv (Accessed: 27 July 2023)
- Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic. (2014) *Integračná politika Slovenskej republiky* [Integration policy of the Slovak Republic] [Online]. Available at: <https://www.employment.gov.sk/files/slovensky/uvod/informacie-cudzinci/integracna-politika.pdf> (Accessed: 27 July 2023)
- Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of the Slovak Republic. (2018) *Stratégia pracovnej mobility cudzincov v Slovenskej republike* [Strategy on labour mobility of foreigners in Slovakia]. [Online]. Available at: <https://www.employment.gov.sk/files/slovensky/uvod/informacie-cudzinci/strategia.pdf> (Accessed: 27 July 2023)
- ÚHCP P PZ. (2015) *Štatistický prehľad legálnej a nelegálnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike za rok 2015* [Statistical overview of legal and illegal migration in the Slovak Republic for 2015] [Online]. Available at: https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/hranicna_a_cudzinecka_policia/rocnky/rok_2015/2015-rocenka-UHCP-SK.pdf (Accessed: 15 July 2023)
- ÚHCP P PZ. (2022) *Štatistický prehľad legálnej a nelegálnej migrácie v Slovenskej republike za rok 2022* [Statistical overview of legal and illegal migration in the Slovak Republic for 2022] [Online]. Available at: https://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/hranicna_a_cudzinecka_policia/rocnky/rok_2022/2022-rocenka-UHCP-SK.pdf (Accessed: 15 July 2023)
- ÚPSVR. (2016) *Štatistické údaje o zamestnávaní cudzincov na území SR, december 2016* [Statistical data on the employment of foreigners at territory of the Slovak Republic, December 2016] [Online]. Available at: https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/statistiky/zamestnavanie-cudzincov-statistiky/kopia-zamestnavanie-cudzincov-na-uzemi-slovenskej-republiky-za-rok-2015.html?page_id=585750 (Accessed: 29 July 2023)
- ÚPSVR. (2022) *Štatistické údaje o zamestnávaní cudzincov na území SR, december 2022* [Statistical data on the employment of foreigners at territory of the Slovak Republic, December 2022] [Online]. Available at: https://www.upsvr.gov.sk/statistiky/zamestnavanie-cudzincov-statistiky/zamestnavanie-cudzincov-na-uzemi-slovenskej-republiky-za-rok-2022.html?page_id=1156941 (Accessed: 29 July 2023)

6.8. Immigration to Slovenia: public perceptions and policy response²³

Policy responses to the immigration in Slovenia

In the field of labor migration and protection of workers, cooperation and deepening of relations with key stakeholders are essential, as emphasized by all participants of the international conference organized by the Employment Service of Slovenia in April 2023. Data shows that economic growth cannot be achieved without a more proactive migration policy. The Labor Market Productivity Reports 2022 show that economic growth in the future can only be achieved with a more proactive migration policy. The goal is to attract top professionals to address labor shortages in construction and manufacturing, and to recruit the necessary healthcare workforce, especially nurses, which is critical. With the recently adopted amendment to the Act on Employment and Self-Employment of Foreigners, the government has responded to the needs of employers. Accordingly, professions in health and social services within the public network no longer require the previously required consents and permits for employment. Regarding migrant workers, an integration strategy is also being prepared. This strategy aims to enable the state to address all the highlighted problems, which will help obtain the necessary workforce and facilitate proper integration into society. In addition to amending two laws, the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities has recently taken an active approach to updating the already valid employment agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.

The Government Office for the Support and Integration of Migrants "provides asylum seekers accommodation, support and psychosocial assistance, and offers integration support to persons granted international protection. Asylum seekers are received by the Reception and Support Division, which provides accommodation at the Asylum Centre or one of its units. Through different programmes carried out at the Asylum Centre, asylum seekers may exercise their rights in accordance with the applicable legislation. Following the successful completion of the procedure, persons granted international protection are provided assistance through the Integration Division to better integrate into Slovenian society. Each person granted protected status is provided accommodation at one of the integration houses and assigned an integration counsellor, who helps devise a personal integration plan. To ensure faster integration, persons under international protection may participate in various programmes, among which the most important is a Slovenian language course."

Integration into Slovenian society

Slovenia provides integration and integration assistance programmes for beneficiaries of international protection and third-country nationals. A person granted international protection who has concluded a contract on integration activities has the right to: (1) accommodation in an integration house or other accommodation facilities provided by the Office; (2) cash allowance for private accommodation; (3) a course on Slovenian society; (4) a Slovenian language course; (5) a one-off Slovenian language test; (6) coverage of other costs related to the education; (7) coverage of translation costs related to the recognition and evaluation of the education on the basis of appropriate evidence; (8) coverage of the costs related to the recognition and evaluation of the education where formal education cannot be proven by documents.

Foreigners who are not EU citizens are entitled to the following programmes ensuring faster integration into the cultural, economic and social life of the Republic of Slovenia: (1) Slovenian

²³ This country report was produced by Anja Kolak, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia.

language courses and courses on Slovenian history, culture and constitutional order; (2) programmes promoting social exchanges and communication with Slovenian citizens; (3) provision of information related to their integration into Slovenian society.

Public opinion perceptions of immigration in Slovenia

In April-June 2016 in Slovenian public opinion survey 75.5% of surveyed expressed that they would not have drug addict for neighbor, 69% drunk people, 44% Roma people, 30.2% people with Aids, 28.4% homosexuals, 18.6% Muslim people, 15.9% migrants, foreign workers; 15% people of other races, 14.6% Jewish people, 11.8% people of other religion, 5.4% people that speak other languages and 2.1% unmarried people that live together. In 2022 in Slovenian public opinion survey 42.3% would not have Roma people for neighbors, 20.3% of surveyed would not have homosexuals for neighbors, 21.7% refugees, 19.1% Muslim people, 13.8% Jewish people, 12.9% migrants, workers from abroad, 12.6% people of other races, 10% people of other religion, 8.3% people that speak other language.

References

- Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij (2022). Slovensko javno mnenje 2022/1. Ljubljana, Fakulteta za družbene vede. https://www.cjm.si/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/SUM_SJM_2022_1_L.pdf.
- Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij (2016). *Slovensko javno mnenje 2016*. Ljubljana, Fakulteta za družbene vede. https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/podatki/sjm/sjm161_rm1_sl_v1_r1.pdf
- Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij (2015). *Slovensko javno mnenje 2015*. Ljubljana, Fakulteta za družbene vede. https://www.adp.fdv.uni-lj.si/podatki/sjm/sjm15_rm1_sl_v1_r1.pdf.
- Črešnar, M. (2023). *Delovne migracije: Mednarodna konferenca: Delovne migracije in zaščita delavcev*. Obrtno-podjetniška zbornica Slovenije. <https://www.ozs.si/novice/mednarodna-konferenca-delovne-migracije-in-zascita-delavcev-643feb50216d4776050689ea>.
- Eurostat (2023). *Early leavers from education and training by sex and citizenship*. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EDAT_LFSE_01_custom_7037739/default/table?lang=en
- Eurostat (2023). *Population by educational attainment level, sex, age and citizenship (%)*. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/EDAT_LFS_9911_custom_7037679/default/table?lang=en.
- Eurostat (2023). *Population by sex, age, citizenship and labour status (1 000)* https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Migrant_integration_statistics
- Eurostat (2023). *Prisoners by citizenship*. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/CRIM_PRIS_CTZ/default/table?lang=en.
- Eurostat (2023). *Suspects and offenders by citizenship* https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/CRIM_JUST_CTZ/default/table?lang=en.
- Medvešek, M., Bešter, R. and Pirc, J. (2022). *Kazalniki integracije priseljencev in potomcev priseljencev v Sloveniji*. Ljubljana, Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja. <http://www.inv.si/DocDir/projekti/Izzivi%20integracije/Kazalniki%20integracije%20priseljencev%20in%20potomcev%20priseljencev%20v%20Sloveniji.pdf>.
- MMC RTV (2023). *Selitveni prirast pozitiven, največ prispevali Ukrajinci: Podatki državnega statističnega urada*. <https://www.rtv.slo.si/slovenija/selitveni-prirast-pozitiven-najvec-prispevali-ukrajinci/675205>.
- Republic of Slovenia.GOV.SI (2023). *Government Office for the Support and Integration of Migrants: About the Office*. <https://www.gov.si/en/state-authorities/government-offices/government-office-for-the-support-and-integration-of-migrants/about-the-office/>.
- Republic of Slovenia.GOV.SI (2023). *State and society: Immigration to Slovenia*. <https://www.gov.si/en/policies/state-and-society/immigration-to-slovenia/>.
- Republic of Slovenia.GOV.SI (2023). *Vladne službe: Urad vlade za oskrbo in integracijo migrantov*. <https://www.gov.si/drzavni-organi/vladne-sluzbe/urad-vlade-za-oskrbo-in-integracijo-migrantov/zakonodaja/>.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia – SiStat (2015). 1. januarja 2015 Slovenija s 2.062.874 prebivalci, 5 % tujih državljanov. <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/News/Index/5148>.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia – SiStat (2020). Glavni razlog za izdajo prvega dovoljenja za prebivanje je bila zaposlitev. <https://www.stat.si/statweb/News/Index/9272>.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia – SiStat (2022). *V letu 2021 število prebivalcev upadlo*. <https://www.stat.si/StatWeb/news/Index/10268>.

6.9. Refugees from Ukraine: return home or successful adaptation in new places²⁴

The migration situation in Ukraine since 2014 has been defined by the war with Russia. From 2014 until February 24, 2022, the main migration trend was internal displacement, affecting around 1.5 million people. After the full-scale invasion by Russia on February 24, 2022, the issue of internal migration persisted, but it was accompanied by the displacement of Ukrainians abroad. Among the main types of population migration in Ukraine, caused by the war, the following can be highlighted:

- **Migration abroad.** According to the United Nations data as of July 2023, 6217800 individuals are registered as refugees from Ukraine [1]. Migration figures vary depending on the situation in the country. The number of migrants was significantly higher during times of escalated hostilities with Russia. As of July 2023, the largest number of refugees from Ukraine is registered in Germany (1079815 people), Poland (968390 people), Czech Republic (356625 people), United Kingdom (209300 people), Spain (186045 people), Italy (16,570 people), Bulgaria (162935 people), Republic of Moldova (115305 people), Slovakia (105245 people), and Austria (100575 people) [1].
- **Internal displacement within the country:** According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, internal population displacement affected 4884292 people, including 1050068 children under the age of 18 (July 2023) [2].
- **Migration of Ukrainian citizens to Russia and the Republic of Belarus.** According to the United Nations data, as of December 2022, 1275315 people have been displaced to Russia, and as of January 2023, 27675 individuals have been displaced to Belarus [1]. A significant portion of migration to these countries has been involuntary. Additionally, some migrants have used Russia and Belarus as transit countries to reach other destinations.

The research "Ukrainian Refugees in Europe," conducted by 4SERVICE HOLDING in 2002-2023 (3 waves), allows to study the challenges faced by Ukrainians in Europe. In the third wave of the study, 2977 respondents from 39 European countries aged 18 and older were polled using an online questionnaire. The fieldwork for the research took place from March 23 to April 17, 2023 [3].

The problems that challenged the refugees abroad, according to research, can be categorically divided into two groups: 1) social-psychological and 2) organizational and material issues. Social-psychological problems primarily include the lack of close relatives and friends nearby (65%) and a longing for their homeland (60%) [3]. It should be noted that one of the challenges faced by refugees is family separation. Family reunification can be one motivation for returning to Ukraine. However, among those who have already had the opportunity to leave Ukraine, the proportion of those who wish to return due to family separation may significantly decrease if husbands or wives can join their families in the countries where they are residing. These factors indicate the refugees' connection to their country of origin. This can impact the process of social adaptation, as emotional well-being and psychological comfort can be crucial factors in interacting with a new social and cultural environment.

Regarding organizational and material problems, research indicates that as of June 2023, the main issues are the lack of necessary medicines or access to medical services (35%) and insufficient funds (34%) (Table 6.9.1).

²⁴ This case-study was prepared by Iryna Kuzina, V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine.

Table 6.9.1. Ukrainians in Europe: Difficulties Abroad

	June 2022	April 2023
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS		
Lack of family and friends nearby	72%	65%
Feeling homesick	70%	60%
Psychological problems, stress, depression	45%	44%
Uncertainty, hopelessness, lack of plans	48%	43%
Lack of communication in the current place of residence	25%	24%
Lack of communication with family	36%	22%
Misunderstanding of social or cultural peculiarities of another country	19%	18%
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS		
Lack of funds	41%	34%
Lack of necessary medications / access to medical services	28%	35%
Bureaucratic barriers	26%	29%
Difficulties in finding separate housing	29%	27%
Lack of employment	28%	25%
Lack of information on integration and legal issues	20%	17%
Lack of support and/or programs for refugees	11%	11%
Lack of volunteer assistance, shortage of humanitarian aid	12%	9%

Source: <https://4service.group/social-project/index.html>

The results from the Razumkov Centre's study titled "Attitudes and Assessments of Ukrainian Refugees (July-August 2022)" involving 511 refugees residing in 30 countries indicated that the primary sources of livelihood for the refugees were as follows: material assistance from various sources (28%), previous savings (19%), regular or temporary employment (24%), remote work (9%), and other means. Overall, respondents assessed their financial situation as follows: about 60% of individuals had enough money only for food and inexpensive necessities, one-fifth stated that they had enough to cover living expenses, and 12% mentioned they were barely making ends meet [4].

According to the results of the same Razumkov Center research, language, and lack of knowledge of the language are cited by 65% of refugees as their main problem. Additionally, 35% of refugees face difficulties in communicating with the local population due to a lack of knowledge of the language. Only 20% of refugees claim to have a high level of proficiency in the English language (scoring from 8 to 10 on an 11-point scale, where 0 - No knowledge at all, 10 - Fluent) [4]. This research indicates that the language barrier and lack of knowledge of the language are significant challenges for refugees during the process of social adaptation. Furthermore, even fewer refugees know the language of the country they are staying in, which further complicates their adaptation. According to the Razumkov Center research, only 10% of respondents claim to have a high level of proficiency in the language of the country they are residing in (scoring from 8 to 10 on an 11-point scale) [4].

According to the research, Ukrainian refugees mainly experience a positive attitude from the local population. In April 2023, 82% of respondents noted a friendly attitude towards them, 12% felt

indifference, only 4% reported a negative attitude, and 2% chose not to answer this question. This indicates that Ukrainian refugees do not face significant problems of social discrimination or negative perceptions about them [3].

Thus, the Russian-Ukrainian War has caused a significant migration crisis, leading to approximately 6217800 people leaving the country and 4884292 people being internally displaced (as of July 2023). Ukrainian refugees abroad face a range of social-psychological, organizational, and material challenges during the process of social adaptation, including family and friends separation, financial difficulties, and language barriers that hinder their successful adaptation abroad.

At the same time, the results of the three waves of research on Ukrainian refugees in Europe, conducted by 4SERVICE HOLDING from 2002 to 2023, show that with each month of the war, fewer people are willing to return to Ukraine. In April 2022, 75% of respondents had definite plans to return. After 12 months, only 52% expressed the same intention. Thus, within a year of the war, 23% of Ukrainian refugees have changed their plans, indicating that they are less likely to return to Ukraine and therefore will not participate in the country's economic, political, and demographic life. Additionally, the percentage of respondents who said they would not return increased from 4% in April 2022 to 12% after a year (Table 2) [3].

Table 6.9.2. How many Ukrainian refugees will return to their homeland?

	April 2022	June 2022	April 2023
Plan to return for sure	75%	66%	52%
More likely to return	14%	18%	20%
More likely not to return	4%	6%	12%
Do not plan to return	3%	2%	4%
Difficult to answer	4%	8%	11%

Source: <https://4service.group/social-project/index.html>

The Ukrainians who are more satisfied with various aspects of their life are more inclined to stay abroad. For example, those who are more satisfied with such *personal life spheres* as safety (91%), freedom of choice (77%), education (73%), and living standards (71%) are more likely to stay abroad. Similarly, in terms of *social life spheres*, those who are more satisfied with environmental protection (90%), leisure opportunities (80%), and the legal system (77%) are also more inclined to stay abroad (Table 6.9.3) [3].

Thus, there is a trend: with the prolongation of the war, the percentage of Ukrainians willing to return home decreases. Furthermore, certain European countries are interested in replenishing their own human resources and are likely to make efforts to retain qualified professionals and youth within their territories [5]. They may achieve this by integrating them into the local environment, including language learning, employment, and providing education to their children. However, a certain portion of Ukrainian refugees may face challenges in finding job within their profession due to language barriers or other reasons, leading them to work in low-skilled jobs.

Additionally, the uncertainty of the socio-political situation in Ukraine does not favor the return of refugees. Indeed, this leads to a decrease in the number of people willing to return home, and the

migration crisis in Ukraine is likely to deepen. Additionally, there might be a possibility of increasing social tension in the host countries.

Table 6.9.3. Satisfaction with Life Spheres among Ukrainians Abroad, April 2023

	Life spheres	Will return	Will stay
Personal Life	Education	57%	73%
	Health	44%	56%
	Standard of Living	55%	71%
	Employment	40%	54%
	Safety	85%	91%
	Freedom of Choice	61%	77%
Social Life	Local Job Market	34%	54%
	Leisure Opportunities	64%	80%
	Local Government	70%	76%
	Central Government	70%	75%
	Environmental Protection	83%	90%
	Legal System	68%	77%

Source: <https://4service.group/social-project/index.html>

References

1. Data from the United Nations: Ukraine Refugee Situation (July 2023). – Available at: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>
2. Data from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine (July 2023). – Available at: <https://www.ioc.gov.ua/dashboardVpo/>
3. Ukrainian Refugees in Europe. From the Beginning of the Full-scale Invasion to the Present (Three Waves of Research: April 2022, June 2022, April 2023). 4SERVICE HOLDING. – Available at: <https://4service.group/social-project/index.html>
4. Attitudes and Assessments of Ukrainian Refugees (July-August 2022). Razumkov Centre. – Available at: <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/nastroi-ta-otsinky-ukrainskykh-bizhentsiv-lypen-serpen-2022p>
5. Maliyovska, O. (2023). Forced emigration of Ukrainians abroad: how to estimate the scale correctly? National Institute for Strategic Studies. – Available at: <https://niss.gov.ua/news/komentari-ekspertiv/vymushennyi-vyyizd-ukrayintsiv-za-kordon-yak-korektno-otsinyty-masshtaby>

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Population and migration

Global trends

International migration is a long-standing issue globally and on the increase. Thus, in year 2000 international migrants of all categories numbered 173 million, whilst in year 2022, international migrants reached 281 million. The means that the total number of immigrants in the course of the last 22 years has increased, in absolute numbers, by over 100 million people. In relative numbers, international migrants from encompassing 2% of the world population nowadays comprises 3,6% of world population (see Table A.1).

During the same period, the numbers of refugees nearly doubled, while the estimated number international migrants that are women and of those who are children slightly reduced. During the same period international remittances in USD increased manifold, i.e., by 5,5 times over. The evolution of some additional key figures regarding immigration trends in the world during the 22 years from year 2000 to the year 2022, in portrayed in Table A.1.

Examining the global migration flows over a longer a period of 50 years (1970-2020) it is noteworthy that while for about 20 years international immigration went hand in hand with the growth of the world population, it significant increase in the early 1990s. The next significant increase is observed from 2010 until today and with a stronger growth rate. At a macroscopic level, we could assume that the changes in the growth rate of migration flows coincide with the far-reaching events of the end of the Cold War in 1989-1991, the global financial crisis of 2008 and the increasing conflicts of the last decade (see Table A.2).

Table A.1 - Key facts and figures from World Migration Reports 2000 and 2022

	2000	2022
Estimated number of international migrants	173 million	281 million
Estimated proportion of world population who are migrants	2.8%	3.6%
Estimated proportion of female international migrants	49.4%	48.0%
Estimated proportion of international migrants who are children	16.0%	14.6%
Region with the highest proportion of international migrants	Oceania	Oceania
Country with the highest proportion of international migrants	United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates
Number of migrant workers		169 million
Global international remittances (USD)	128 billion	702 billion
Number of refugees	14 million	26,4 million
Number of internally displaced persons	21 million	55 million

Source: McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (2021: 11).



According to IMO (2022) when international migrant populations are examined by United Nations region, Europe is currently the largest destination for international migrants, with 87 million migrants (30.9% of the international migrant population), followed closely by the 86 million international migrants living in Asia (30.5%). Northern America is the destination for 59 million international migrants (20.9%), followed by Africa with 25 million migrants (9%). Over the past 15 years, the number of international migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean has more than doubled from around 7 million to 15 million, making it the region with the highest growth rate of international migrants and the destination for 5,3 per cent of all international migrants. Around 9 million international migrants live in Oceania, or about 3,3 per cent of all migrants.

Table A.2 - International migrants, 1970–2020

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of international immigrants</i>	<i>Migrants as a % of the world's population</i>
1970	84.460.125	2,3
1975	90.368.010	2,2
1980	101.983.149	2,3
1985	113.206.691	2,3
1990	152.986.157	2,9
1995	161.289.976	2,8
2000	173.230.585	2,8
2005	191.446.828	2,9
2010	220.983.187	3,2
2015	247.958.644	3,4
2020	280.598 105	3,6

Source: McAuliffe & Triandafyllidou (2021: 23).

(B) European trends


Turning now the focus on EU countries as a whole, it is notable that successive enlargement and the increase of population has meant a steady population increase of about 100 million in the course of sixty-two years (from 1960 to 2022) (see Graph A.1). However, during the same period the relationship between live births and deaths in the EU has shifted significantly. Live births, although in long decline, exceeded deaths for the first 35 years of this period. Subsequently, they nearly balanced for a period of about 8 years, even though live births still exceeded deaths. However, during the last 10 years (2013-2022), deaths surpassed live births (see Graph 2).

The earlier noted overall population increase for the period 1960-2022 is due to the natural population increase (more live births than deaths) during the first 53 years of the period, and on the migratory and refugee arrivals. Such net migration, after a first peak in the early 1960s, particularly since 1985 has been providing important human input and has affected the total EU population. As a matter of fact, the contours of net migration since 1985 (see Graph A.1) appear to follow quite closely those of total population change in EU-27. In effect, it appears that net migration, particularly after 2012, is instrumental in counterbalancing the negative natural population growth of EU-27.



Graph A.1 - Population in Europe

Population, EU, 1960-2023
(at 1 January, million persons)




Note: Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997. Breaks in series: 1991, 1998, 2000-01, 2008, 2010-12, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021-2023.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

eurostat

Graph A.2 – Birth and Deaths in the EU, 1961-2022

Births and deaths, EU, 1961-2022
(million)



Note: 1960: not available. Excluding French overseas departments up to and including 1997.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_gind)

eurostat



Appendix 2: Countries of citizenship of the foreign/foreign born population - additional European countries

Country: France , Year 2020 Population: 67,75 million	Foreign-born population in 2020, by country of birth, five largest ethnic groups as a percent of locally-born population
<i>Indigenous</i> : 61,10 m – 90,19% <i>Foreign-born</i> : 6,64 m – 9,80,0%	Algeria: 853.466 8,6% Morocco: 802.806 7,0% Portugal: 601.762 6,3% Tunisia: 302,379 4,7% Italy: 286,395 4,0% Other: 3.796.890 57,1% Total: 6.643.698 100,0%

Source: Insee, Population census 2020 (data published on 27/06/2023). Insee, RP2020 exploitation principale, géographie au 01/01/2023.

Country: Greece , Year 2021 Population: 10,48 million	Population with foreign citizenship in 2021, by country of birth, five largest ethnic groups
<i>Indigenous</i> : 9,71 m – 80,0% <i>Foreign-born</i> : 2,09 m – 20,0%	Albania: 374.926 49,0 % Bulgaria: 35.444 4,6 % Pakistan: 33.083 6,3% Romania: 28.250 3,7% Georgia: 26.083 3,4% Other: 265.586 34,6% Total: 765.598 100,0%

Sources: <https://elstat->

outsourcers.statistics.gr/Booklet_%CE%91%CF%80%CE%BF%CF%84%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B1%CE%A0%CE%BB%CE%B7%CE%B8%CF%85%CF%83%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%852023_II%20EN_FINAL2_WEB.pdf

Country: Sweden , Year 2022 Population: 10,45 million	Foreign-born population in 2022, by country of birth, five largest ethnic groups as a percent of locally-born population
<i>Indigenous</i> : 8,36 m – 80,0% <i>Foreign-born</i> : 2,09 m – 20,0%	Syria: 197.799 8,6% Iraq: 146.831 7,0% Finland: 133.083 6,3% Poland: 98.287 4,7% Iran: 85.488 4,0% Other: 1.428.512 68,3% Total: 2.090.000 100,0%

Sources: Statista. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1041828/sweden-foreign-born-population-origin/> & <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1143161/sweden-population-by-birthplace/>



Country: Switzerland , Year 2021 Population: 8,81 million	Foreign-resident population in 2021, by country of birth, five largest ethnic groups as a percent of locally-born population
<i>Indigenous</i> : 6,62 m – 75,17% <i>Foreign-born</i> : 2,18 m – 24,83%	Italy: 331.379 15,1% Germany: 313.702 14,3% Portugal: 258,439 11,8% France: 151.551 6,9% Kosovo: 115.575 5,2% Other: 1.019.143 57,1% Total: 2.187.789 100,0%

Sources: Federal Statistical Office (FSO), Section Demography and Migration, info.dem@bfs.admin.ch
<https://migration.swiss/en/migration-report-2021/immigration-and-integration/a-few-figures>

Country: United Kingdom Year 2021 Population: 67,02 million (estimate)	Foreign-born population in 2021, by country of birth, five largest ethnic groups as a percent of locally-born population; estimates
<i>Indigenous</i> : 57,41 m – 85,6% <i>Foreign-born</i> : 9,61 m – 14,3%	India: 896.000 9,3% Poland: 682.000 7,0% Pakistan: 456.000 4,7% Ireland: 412.000 4,2% Germany: 347.000 3,6% Other: 6.831.000 70,9% Total: 9.614.000 100,0%

Source:
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/uk-populationbycountryofbirthandnationality/yearendingjune2021> ;
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/timeseries/ukpop/pop>

Appendix 3: Key framework programs and provisions at the EU level

Some of the most important legal texts adopted in the area of immigration include:

- Article 20 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union law on EU citizens;
- Article 21 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on EU citizens;
- Article 79 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on border checks, asylum and immigration for third country nationals;
- Directive 2003/09/EC on reception conditions for asylum seekers;
- Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification;
- Directive 2003/109/EC on a long-term resident status for non-member nationals;
- Directive 2003/110/EC on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air;
- Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States;
- Directive 2004/81/EC on victims of trafficking;
- Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data;
- Directive 2004/83/EC on qualification;
- Directive 2004/114/EC on the admission of students;
- Directive 2005/71/EC for the facilitation of the admission of researchers into the EU;
- Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 on migration and international protection;
- Directive 2008/115/EC for returning illegally staying third-country nationals;
- Directive 2009/50/EC concerning the admission of highly skilled migrants;
- Directive 2009/52/EC concerning employer sanctions;
- Directive 2011/95/EC on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status of refugees eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content for the protection granted;
- Directive 2011/98/EU on single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State;
- Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection;
- Directive 2013/33/EU on standards for the reception of applicants for international protection;
- Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 EURODAC Regulation on law enforcement access to the EU fingerprint database of asylum seekers under strictly limited circumstances, in order to prevent, detect or investigate the most serious crimes, such as murder and terrorism;
- Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the EU Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national (national of a non-member country) or stateless person (Dublin Regulation);
- Directive 2014/36/EU on seasonal workers;
- Directive 2014/54/EU on freedom of movement of workers;
- Directive 2014/66/EU on intra-corporate transferees;
- Directive 2014/67/EU on posted workers;
- Directive 2016/801/EU on students and researchers;
- Regulation (EU) 2020/851 amending Regulation (EC) No 862/2007;
- Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/382 of 4 March 2022 establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Directive 2001/55/EC, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection.

Source: Eurostat (2023b).

The overall “Action plan on Integration and Inclusion 2021-2027”, which outlines EU aims with respect to integration for immigrants, inclusive of citizens with migrant background, is available in European Commission (2020).

Appendix 4: Immigration and Political Trust: Country Results

In Figures A4.1-A4.25, the results of whether immigration is bad or good for country's economy, the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigration and immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live and political trust in the country's parliament are presented at country level for Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, respectively. All the results presented were significant at $p < .001$ for all countries. What follows is an analysis of the three opinions towards immigration and political trust at country level by investigating the end points of the scales although very few cases were counted in the scales' right endpoints (10) and therefore caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions.

In Austria (Figure A4.1), 20.3% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 31.9% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 30.3% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 29.8% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 35.8% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 21.3% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In Belgium (Figure A4.2), 24.7% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 23.1% believing that immigration is rather good (8) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 22.4% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is rather undermined (5) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 30.8% believing that the country's cultural life is rather enriched (8) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 21.3% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 30.8% believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat better (6) place to live have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament.

In Bulgaria (Figure A4.3), 19.8% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament, 24.2% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy and 24.2% is good (10) for the country's economy; 24.1% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 22.9% believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants; 29.7% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 20.6% believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live.

In Croatia (Figure A4.4), 23.9% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 24.1% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy; 23.0% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 32.3% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 30.0% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 26.7% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In Cyprus (Figure A4.5), 23.3% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 50.0% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy and 25.0% that is rather good (8); 34.4% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 44.4% believe that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants and 22.2% that it is somewhat enriched (6); 32.2% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 37.5% believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live, 25.0% a somewhat worse (5) and 25.0% a better place to live (10).

In Czechia (Figure A4.6), 46.0% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 22.9% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy and 22.9% that is somewhat bad (5); 49.8% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 25.7% believe that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants and 22.9% that it is somewhat undermined (5); 49.5% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 27.8% believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live.

In Estonia (Figure A4.7), 26.9% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 31.1% believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy; 24.3% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 31.8% believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants; 27.2% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 31.1% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In Finland (Figure A4.8), of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 18.8% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy, 18.8% that it is somewhat bad (4)

and 18.8% that it is somewhat good (6) whereas 23.4% believing that immigration is very good (9) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; of the respondents having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 29.4% believe that the country's cultural life is rather enriched (7) by immigrants whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 31.9% believe the country's cultural life is fairly enriched (8) by immigrants and 31.9% that it is enriched (10); 23.5% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 21.7% believe that immigrants make the country a fairly better (8) place to live.

In France (Figure A4.9), of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 28.5% believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 41.7% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 22.2% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 33.3% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 39.0% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live, whereas 23.8% believing that immigrants make the country a better (10) place to live have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament.

In Germany (Figure A4.10), 25.0% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 36.5% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 32.2% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 34.6% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 38.2% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 26.6% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live and 24.8% a better (10) one.

In Greece (Figure A4.11), 34.5% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 16.7% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy; 36.1% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 16.7% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy and 16.7% that it is quite bad (2); 29.1% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 16.7% believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live.

In Hungary (Figure A4.12), 28.7% of the respondents believing that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 17.3% believe that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy and 17.3% that it is somewhat bad (5); 29.0% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's

parliament 30.9% believe that the country's cultural life is rather undermined (5) by immigrants; 20.3% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 37.1% believe that is somewhat a worse place to live (5), whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 28.3% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In Ireland (Figure A4.13), 22.8% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 27.8% believe that immigration is fairly good (8) for the country's economy; of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 22.1% believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 25.0% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 18.1% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 32.4% believe that immigrants make the country a fairly better (7) place.

In Italy (Figure A4.14), 23.3% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 26.7% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy; 19.8% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 26.7% believe that the country's cultural life is fairly enriched (7) by immigrants; 19.8% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live and 27.5% believe that is a somewhat worse place to live (5), have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 20.0% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live, 20.0% a fairly good (8) place and 20.0% a good (10) place.

In Latvia (Figure A4.15), 26.2% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 38.5% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy; 25.4% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 38.5% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants; 30.9% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 33.3% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) and 33.3% a better (10) place to live.

In Lithuania (Figure A4.16), 24.7% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 22.9% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 27.5% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 17.6% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants; 27.9% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas of those having

complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 27.3% believe that immigrants make the country a better (10) place to live.

In the Netherlands (Figure A4.17), 37.1% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 20.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that that immigration is rather good (6) for the country's economy; 25.7% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 25.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants; 22.9% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 25.0% believe that it is a quite worse (1) and 25.0% a rather better (7) place to live.

In Poland (Figure A4.18), 21.9% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 31.4% believe that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy and 25.7% that it is bad (0); 28.2% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 40.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants; 23.5% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 41.2% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a better (10) place to live.

In Portugal (Figure A4.19), 26.8% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 32.0% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 35.0% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 31.8% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 33.3% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 26.1% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In Slovakia (Figure A4.20), 43.3% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 18.4% believe that immigration is rather good (7) for the country's economy, 18.4% that it is fairly good (8) and 18.4% good (10); 41.0% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 18.4% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 39.2% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 22.9% believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live and 22.9% a better (10) one.

In Slovenia (Figure A4.21), 24.8% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament 16.7% believe that that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy, 16.7% believe that is somewhat bad (5) and 16.7% that it is good (10); 27.4% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's

cultural life is somewhat undermined (5) by immigrants whereas 23.1% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants; 34.6% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas 23.1% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live.

In Spain (Figure A4.22), 29.4% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 52.3% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy; 25.6% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 63.5% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants; 33.0% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas 51.8% believing that immigrants make the country a better (10) place to live have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament.

In Sweden (Figure A4.23), 61.9% of the respondents believing that immigration is bad (0) for the country's economy have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 23.3% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy; 34.4% of the respondents believing that the country's cultural life is undermined (0) by immigrants have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 31.6% believing that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 45.8% of the respondents believing that immigrants make the country a worse (0) place to live have no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament whereas 24.3% believing that immigrants make the country a somewhat better (5) place to live have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament.

In Switzerland (Figure A4.24), 36.4% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 22.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is fairly good (8) for the country's economy; of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament 18.2% that the country's cultural life is somewhat undermined (4) by immigrants, 18.2% that it is fairly enriched (7) and 18.2% that it is enriched (10); 27.3% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament and 26.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live.

In the UK (Figure A4.25), 23.7% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigration is somewhat bad (5) for the country's economy whereas 33.3% believing that immigration is good (10) for the country's economy have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament; 17.6% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is enriched (10) by immigrants and 50.0% of those having complete trust (10) in the country's parliament believe that the country's cultural life is very enriched (9) by immigrants; 18.2% of those having no trust at all (0) in the country's parliament believe that immigrants make the country a somewhat worse (5) place to live whereas 50.0% believing that immigrants make the country a better (10) place to live have complete trust (10) in the country's parliament.

Fig. A4.1 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Austria: European Social Survey, 2020.






Fig. A4.2 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Belgium: European Social Survey, 2020.






Fig. A4.3 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Bulgaria: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.4 Political trust in country’s parliament and opinions towards immigration, Croatia: European Social Survey, 2020.






Fig. A4.5 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Cyprus: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.6 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Czechia: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.7 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Estonia: European Social Survey, 2020.




Fig. A4.8 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Finland: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.9 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, France: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.10 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Germany: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.11 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Greece: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.12 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Hungary: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.13 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Ireland: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.14 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Italy: European Social Survey, 2020.






Fig. A4.15 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Latvia: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.16 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Lithuania: European Social Survey, 2020.






Fig. A4.17 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, the Netherlands: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.18 Political trust in country's parliament and opinion towards immigration, Poland: European Social Survey, 2020.



Fig. A4.19 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Portugal: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.20 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Slovakia: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.21 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Slovenia: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.22 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Spain: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.23 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Sweden: European Social Survey, 2020.








Fig. A4.24 Political trust in country's parliament and opinions towards immigration, Switzerland: European Social Survey, 2020.

